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Epistemological Crisis in Ethical Governance and Constructing a New Islamic Episteme 
as an Ethical Theory: A Case of Institution of Hisbah 
by 
Fawad Khaleel 
Abstract: 
The research presented in this thesis explores the governance within Islamic thought 
in the case of the institution of hisbah as well as exploring the episteme that is the 
cause of the recognised and unrecognised incoherencies and inconsistencies in the 
theories, regulations, and laws associated to the institution of hisbah. The analysis is 
based on conducting an epistemological examination in moral philosophical dialect in 
relation to the historical regulative institution of hisbah. Institution of hisbah 
constitutes the focus of this research, because this institution was politically 
structured, theologically positioned and theoretically entrusted to maintain public law 
and order, with the objective of supervising the behaviour in society and market from 
an Islamic perspective by using Islamic legal theories within its own theoretical 
framework with the aim of subscribing good and forbidding evil.  
 
The analysis presented found that the institution of hisbah was subject to continuous 
institutional failures throughout its history. In advancing the analysis, the research 
deconstructs the theoretical framework upon which the institution of hisbah located 
its operations for the moral governance of the market and the society. The 
deconstruction of theoretical frameworks point to the use of Islamic legal theory and 
juristic subjectivity for judging the moral conduct of activities as the root cause of the 
problem. The study further deconstructed the Islamic legal theory along side 
exploring for the alternative episteme within the broader view of Islamic thought, 
given the diversity of philosophical standpoints on good and evil within Islamic 
discourse. However, the result of this exploration suggests that epistemological crisis 
embodies the whole of Islamic tradition, which pave the way to a rise in crisis in 
morality and crisis in legitimacy within the tradition, which resulted in institutional 
failures, such as the ones witnessed in the operations of institution of hisbah. 
 
The study further discovers that consequent to the crisis in the Islamic tradition, the 
key questions on good and evil, within the realm of governance can no longer be 
settled by using the historically established tradition’s epistemological sources, 
because within the current settings of tradition, there is insufficient or no method of 
enquiry, form of argumentation and episteme that can address the crises, or through 
which a solution for the crises can be derived.  
By using MacIntyre’s work as a conceptual structure, this research attempts to 
construct a new epistemological source that may address the crises by specifying a 
model justified through model-dependent realism with the objective of creating a new 
point of orientation through which reality and dichotomy of good and evil can be 
objectively understood, whilst safeguarding the life form of the fabric of belief that is 
central to the traditional Islamic thought. Such episteme can then be used as an ethical 
theory by the institution of hisbah for judging the moral conduct of activities in the 
market and society. 
 
The new episteme is constructed, while preserving the tradition’s consequential 
essence. The consequential essence is inferred down to morality based on 
objectiveness and universality, and away from public choice, along with the notion of 
survival as episteme for philosophical perspective and theological stance. The 
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consequential essence of tradition is maintained by using objectivist ethics and 
environmental sustainability within the outlines of classic theories on sovereignty of 
internal and external realm, as a foundational framework to construct the proposed 
model of ‘objective subjectivism’ as a theory of normative ethics. This proposed 
episteme as an Islamic ethical theory asserts that standard of value is life and measure 
of value and purpose of life is sustainability, and through this notion good and evil 
can be objectively distinguished for each realm, and therefore institutionally 
subscribed or prohibited for that realm, thus providing a workable framework for the 
operations of hisbah.  
 
As a research methodology and model construction process, the research presented in 
this research utilises discursive reasoning to conduct an epistemological enquiry based 
on critical discourse analysis, which is ontologically justified by model-dependent 
realism and epistemologically framed under consequentialism.    
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
Most of the Muslim World, house some sort of institutions or government sponsored 
regulatory bodies that are attempting to apply the religious and customary principles 
to regulate the contemporary practices in the market and the society. Much of the 
research on financial crisis of 2008, such as Colander, et al. (2009), Fassin and 
Gosselin (2011), and many others have shifted the focus back to the role of ethics in 
the governance. This shift has made the study and examination of ethical governance 
of market and society in the Muslim world, relevant to the contemporary enquiry.  
The Muslim world provides a unique opportunity to study the effects, hurdles, success 
and failures of regulating the market and society, purely from the ethical standpoint. 
Currently these institutions or government sponsored regulatory bodies that are 
operating in diverse political climate and sometimes with limited capacity. For 
instance: the return of democratic rule in 1999 within Nigeria brought back the 
volunteer based hisbah authorities, while the Saudi Arabia has the state backed hisbah 
police (Bello, 2013). However the continuity of these attempts to institutionalise the 
system of morality for governance can be traced back to the early Islamic societies. 
The examination of this persistent endeavour which spans over more than ten 
centuries can allows us to understand the hurdles, problems and issues of 
institutionalising morality for the purpose governance of society and market. 
Islamic tradition, which includes Islam as a religious belief, Islamic culture, Islamic 
spirituality, Islamic law (Shari’ah) and Islamic worldview as point of orientation with 
divergent sects, has from the start of Islamic history played a part, sometimes as a 
rhetoric and sometime as a rationale, for structuring, reforming and then governance 
of society, polity and market. Whilst, the understanding on the ‘purpose’ of 
structuring, reforming and governing the society, polity, and market in historically 
observable manner differs, depending on the field of study from which one 
approaches this issue (such as anthropology, sociology, politics, theology or history), 
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however, the major role Islamic tradition played and plays as a rhetoric or as an 
antecedent, in such forms of enquiries is widely acknowledged and recognised. From 
late nineteenth century onwards the most efforts, that accessed Islamic tradition to use 
it as rhetoric or as antecedents, which aimed to organise, rearrange or govern the 
society, polity or market, produced unrecognisable incoherence either in practice or 
within constructed regulations.   
Much discourse from East and West of the world, such as Rudolph and Piscatori 
(1997), Donohue and Esposito (1982), Banuazizi and Weiner (1988), Khalid (2003), 
Iqbal (2003), Umar (2006) and Lapidus (1967, 1988, 1996), has highlighted the early 
crisis and search of identity within the Muslim world especially after the World War 
I, and the interaction of Islamic tradition with the modern States and new social 
challenges, which resulted in Muslim thinkers producing discourse that either aims to 
construct such an Islamic perspective, by building practical consideration in theory, 
which rationalises, justifies and explains the new realities, as examined in the work of 
Mallat (2004) and Tibi (1990); or attempts at providing new interpretations for social 
realities, by theoretical innovations, that maybe more coherent and consistent with the 
Islamic thoughts, as examined by Euben (1999) and highlighted by Sayyid (2003); 
and then there are secularist who outright deny any ontological existence to Islamic 
tradition; and fundamentalists who deny the ontological authority of epistemology 
developed or used by modernism.  
Overall the entire range of schemas, that are the result of the subtle questions posed 
by the dynamism of modernism to the Islamic thoughts, maybe categorically summed 
in four approaches: the traditionalists approach of conserving the society in a frozen 
state, so that what exists and resembles, in form or in substance, to the notion of ideal 
Islamic society can be preserved, such as the one used in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
monarchies; the Modernist approach which attempts to drastically reform the historic 
positions of Islamic law, so the Islamic law can catch up with the social realities, such 
as Family Law of Tunisia and Morocco; the secularist approach that attempts to imply 
the secularisation thesis with close proximity to French model, symbolised by Turkish 
approach (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003); and the reaction to the failure of these three 
approaches, is the fundamentalist approach, which attempts to drastically reverse the 
evolution of social, economic and political development to the point that it may 
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resembles to the radical understanding of ideal society, such as the one used by 
Afghani Taliban and Pakistani Taliban (Ahmad,1991).  
When these schemas, individually failed to create any viable and acceptable solution 
for political and economic reformation, and after over half century of efforts to bring 
Islamic thoughts up to speed with the current challenges and issues of governance, 
then these schemas innovated a joint approach, where for instances traditionalists and 
modernist came together to form a theory of governance, such as in case of Malaysia, 
Iran, Bangladesh and pre-millennium Pakistan, there are also example of 
fundamentalist and traditionalists coming together for constructing a method of 
governance such as in Yemen (Euben, 1999; Mawňsililĺi, 1999). 
So far these schemas, individually and collectively, have been unsuccessful in 
producing a system of value that may harmoniously work with the value judgements 
of modernity. This failure is not just in the arena of political reformation and 
governance, where many factors may influence the outcomes. The failure can also be 
noticed in the legal system of Muslim countries, such asL Egypt, Morocco, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, and Nigeria. 
Otto (2010:628) surveyed legal system of twelve Muslim countries, to measure the 
extent in which the constitution of a country establishes Islamic law as a norm, and 
their findings show that constitution of five countries give provisions for 
establishment of a full Islamic State, while the six countries have constitutional 
articles that declare Islamic law to be a source of law through which the new laws and 
legislations need to be tested; moreover, six out of twelve countries had hadd 
punishment in the law, however only one carried amputation, with no countries with 
any recent use of stoning as a punishment. The rationale for such behaviour, 
according to Otto’s (2010:651) study, is that the independent legal system of these 
countries harmonise the fundamental conflicts between Islamic law, and 
constitutionalism, along with accommodating for value judgements of modernism and 
hence creating a limitation on implementation of religious law. 
However, in spite of efforts of independent legal institutions, and introduction of 
different schemas of reformations from different social, political and religion groups, 
there still exists a fundamental problem in harmonising the Islamic values and value 
judgement of modernism; the prominent frontiers where such conflict can be observed 
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is the notion of human rights, freedom of speech and so on. This research attempts to 
uncover the root cause of this incoherence, and how it may be resolved, so that the 
two systems may simultaneously coexist in harmony.  
Roder (2009:257) examined the Islamic legal system and observed that in its current 
state it is “‘a patchwork’ of various norms” that are grounded in secular provisions in: 
the constitution, codified or un-codified religious law, and customary traditions of the 
society, while Otto (2010:646) suggests that the ratio of these norms within the 
‘patchwork’ shift continuously to accommodate the conflicting demands of 
“conservative ulama, the puritans, the modernists, the religious minorities, the 
feminists, and so on”. 
The effects of incoherence between Islamic values and value judgement of 
modernism are not limited to the legal system, as Kuran (1996, 2003, 2004, 2012) 
identifies that Islamic “society’s commercial capabilities depend on its legal 
infrastructure” (Kuran, 2003:415), therefore the weakness created by incoherence of 
two value systems in the legal infrastructure is linked to the weakness in commercial 
capability. 
In 2012 the analysis of two decades of economic data on Arab region concluded that 
the governance and law are the root cause of the economic condition, and that the 
public institutions in are in dire need for reformation and redesigning, therefore the 
Arab States need to rethink the laws through which they approach the issue of 
governance (International Labour Organisation, 2012:102). Most, if not all, of these 
Arab nations use Islamic tradition or its sources in some capacity, either ideologically 
or as a source of law, and Islamic legal theories plays an important apart in the 
manner they approach governance. 
At the turn of century it was the dynamism of modernity through global institutions 
that gave prominence to the absence of any progressive plan for reformation within 
the governance by Islam tradition within the Islamic world, however, the Arab Spring 
was one of the most recent indicators that showed that the earlier warnings, and 
previous political economic reformation, especially the nineteen ninety’s reformation 
in Arab countries, failed to focus on the main issues of governance of society and 
market through ‘a patchwork of fundamentally conflicting norms and values’. Amin 
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et al. (2012:2) analyses, reaches similar conclusions, on the contributing factors for 
the Arab Spring, and suggests that while socioeconomic deficits and governance 
deficits are important matters in this context, but “In sum, Arab Spring was sparked 
by homegrown movements over dignity, fairness, and exclusion”. The issue of 
dignity, fairness, and exclusion takes the debate outside the realm of economic 
performance and into the realms of ideological standpoints used as core principles for 
nation building, which in this case are grounded in the incoherent value system, as it 
is the value system that provides a point of orientation for understanding the concept 
of dignity, morality, justice, and fairness.  
The social reality of Muslim world is such that the Islamic tradition, will remain a 
major reference point for legal, political, economic, and social guidance (Naʻīm, 
2008; Vikør, 2005) and there also will remain a strong desire to reconcile the Islamic 
tradition and its values with modernity and its value judgements (Hallaq 2009: 500-
542). Under such circumstances, any policies that are grounded in values that have no 
ontology authority or epistemological source within the tradition are more likely to be 
unsuccessful; as observed by United Nation’s Development Program, whilst 
investigating the reasons behind the failure of “liberal economic policies adopted by 
many Arab states since the 1990s”, in creating sustainable political institutions (Al-
Nashif and Bahous, 2012:10). Amin et al. (2012:15) also expand on this issue, by 
focusing on failure of 46 countries out of 103 countries that went through political 
transformation and economic transition since 1960s, and they conclude that to be 
successful, a schema of transformation should be inclusive of all social realities, and 
address the society’s expectations of growth, fairness, and justice, with a clear 
“guiding vision as to the end point”. Tripp (2006:110) suggests that these conditions 
of successful transformation, such as inclusiveness, in context of Islamic tradition 
mean that: “a change in the focus of clerical and lay Muslims alike, as well as 
innovative thinking that drew on possibly neglected aspects of the broader Islamic 
tradition”.            
This research attempts to investigate the root-cause or causes, in the Islamic tradition, 
that are the foundation of fundamental conflict in the value judgements, in the realm 
of governance of society and market, between the Islamic tradition and modernity, 
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and whether there are any broader aspects of Islamic tradition that may be used to 
solve such a conflict.  
Figure 1: Major Factors or Agents Influencing the Islamic Tradition 
 
This research conducts this investigation by focusing on the agents or factors that 
influence the positions and stances taken by the traditions, these factors or agents, as 
shown in the Figure 1, are: ‘epistemological sources of the tradition’, ‘the method of 
enquiry used to approach these sources’, ‘the theologians that apply the method’, and 
‘the social reality that necessitates a response and hence put the prior three in motion’, 
or influences the outcomes or the requirement for it. 
In order to understand the dynamics and mechanism of their interaction with each 
other as they influence the position of the tradition, this research attempts to examine 
the regulations and laws within Islamic thoughts, in the context of the epistemological 
sources that influenced the construction of these laws and regulations, the method of 
enquiry used, and the motivation for theologian, and jurist to reach that particular 
position. For the purpose of this examination, this study focuses on theories and 
operations of institution of hisbah, namely institution and concept of market 
regulation. As the episteme of Islamic thoughts, at least theoretically, remains 
unchanged, therefore by focusing on the theories, operations and regulatory manuals 
of this institution would allow this research to investigate the interaction between all 
the episteme and identify the cause of recognised and unrecognised incoherencies and 
inconsistences.  
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The institution of hisbah captures the essence of values within governance in Islamic 
thoughts, because of it theologically assigned duty of actively ‘subscribing good’ and 
‘forbidding evil’ in the market and the society, for which it uses Islamic legal theories 
to distinguish between the good and evil, and then attempts on subscribing or 
forbidding it within variety of political settings. Much of Islamic scholarship such as 
Ibn-Taymiya (1992), Al-Ghazzali (1982a; 1982b; 1990; 2004), Al-Mawardi (1996), 
Ibn-Khaldun (1950; 1967a; 1967b) and many more, have also either voiced their 
opinion on this institution or constructed a framework for its operations, while 
contemporary historians such as Grunebaum (1967), Buckley (1999), Glick (1972), 
Holland (1992), Khan (1992), Imamuddin (1963) and others have assessed and 
critiqued different aspects of the institution. There is also evidence of borrowing of 
notion of hisbah, in its form and substance, by other cultures, and, therefore, the 
evolution of some of the modern institutions maybe traced back to institution of 
hisbah. Overall, the institution of hisbah provides a rare opportunity for observing the 
theory and practice coming together to govern the society and market by subscribing 
good and forbidding evil, whereas, otherwise the development of theory, and 
governance of society and market, historically evolved in independent realms and 
within separate social classes, such as theological circles and political class. 
 
 
1.2.  AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this research is to critically examine the operations of institution of hisbah, 
and its institutionalised system of morality, as well as investigating the episteme that 
is causing the recognised and unrecognised incoherencies and inconsistencies in the 
theories, regulations, and laws associated with the institution of hisbah. Upon such a 
deconstruction-oriented investigation, this research also aims discursively to construct 
and develop a response. 
This investigation is limited to the values that is theoretically or practically deployed, 
implemented, utilised or suggested for the governance of society and market within 
Islamic thoughts, and that are largely recognised as inconsistent with the modern 
global values.  
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The ‘modern global values’, which are sometimes referred as ‘value judgements of 
modernity’, are defined as the degree of importance ascribed to something based on 
the globally agreed concepts of dignity, morality, justice, and fairness. These concepts 
sometimes are reflected in the globally accepted legal statues, political, economic, and 
social guidance of current epoch; such as: the European Union’s declaration of human 
rights. This research is not using these globally accepted legal statues, political, 
economic, and social guidance of current epoch as axioms; instead they are used as a 
point of orientation for conducting an analysis. The Islamic values are understood as 
the collection of values constructed by Islamic scholarship or deduced from 
theological sources of Islam (See Appendix III for details).  
As the statement of the ‘aim’ suggests the focus of this investigation is on 
epistemology rather than ontology, as any discourse, purposing or constructing any 
kind of value, no matter how incoherent or contradictory with the rest of the body of 
Islamic thoughts, can be referred to or used as guidance within the method of enquiry 
used in the Islamic thoughts, and therefore availability of such discourse assigns it a 
legitimate ontological existence within the Islamic thoughts. Consequently, this study 
focuses on the episteme of things, and assumes the ontology from their availability.  
The objectives designed to achieve the stated aim of the research are:  
(i) to examine the theory and practice of historical institution of hisbah, for 
identifying the episteme and form of argument that is the cause of the 
incoherence and the inconsistences; conduct a survey of available epistemic 
sources (see Chapter 3) and method of enquiries,  
(ii) accordingly, to suggest a model, in which the chosen episteme may be 
approached by using the selected method of enquiry, that sufficiently addresses 
the inadequacies, incoherence and inconsistences created by current sources and 
by present form of enquiry of the tradition.   
The research questions this research intent to answer are:  
(i)_What are the causes, within the method of enquiry and episteme of Islamic 
tradition that produces values, which were historically used for governance by the 
institution of hisbah, that are contradictory to the value judgement of modernity?;  
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(ii) What is the nature of schema that is required for the reformation within the 
Islamic tradition? 
The premises for the hypothesis proposed for this research is that the Islamic tradition 
has reached a state of crisis, where the current methods of enquiry and  forms of 
rational arguments, which are unique to the Islamic tradition. And by means of which 
the Islamic tradition has progressed so far, are now creating inconsistencies in the 
tradition. These inconsistencies cannot be resolved using the recognised 
epistemological sources of the tradition, which is resulting in an epistemological 
crisis.  
While there can be many possible outcomes of this research, however the ones 
deemed more plausible at this stage are:  
(i) the causes, of the contradictory values of the tradition, are unrecognisable and 
therefore no resolution may be constructed or suggested; and 
(ii) the causes are recognisable, but there is no solution that can provide the 
continuity in the evolution of the tradition; and 
(iii) the causes are recognisable and solution, in form of a schema, that provides the 
continuity in the evolution of the tradition is constructible. 
1.3.  RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION 
This research is, hence, an attempt to conduct an enquiry, focused on epistemology, 
that is neither biased towards the Islamic traditions’ current framework, nor is 
prejudiced by the value judgement established by modernism. Therefore, this research 
is not aimed to fit in with a current framework of either traditionalist, fundamentalist, 
nor modernist or secularist, rather this research is motivated by the issues and 
problems of governance within Islamic thoughts, and attempts to address these 
problems, by studying the episteme of these problem whereby it represents an 
emergent research. 
The observation on continuous clash of values of Islamic tradition and modernity in 
political, social, and legal arena, whilst the reasonable harmony between them in the 
financial world, became a rationale for conducting an enquiry on identifying the core 
problem of this conflict, and exploring the solutions for creating harmony between the 
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value system of the two social realities, without discounting an ontological existence 
of any of them. 
I initially made these observations, while studying Islamic law. Thereafter, when I 
examined the application of legal theory in Islamic finance during my Masters 
qualification, I witnessed incoherence in the application of Islamic legal theory. 
Moreover, I lived in countries, such as Pakistan, that grant legal authority to the 
Islamic scriptures, which produces continuous clash of values with modernity, 
therefore I was always intrigued to explore the source of these problem, as I was 
personally subjected and impacted by this clash of values within my civil and social 
life.     
1.4.  SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
The significant research contribution of this research can be spanned into five sets, as 
follows:  
The first set of contribution is the development of an understanding on workings of 
hisbah, through critical survey of literature directly or indirectly addressing dynamics 
of institution of hisbah.  
The second set reflects the Al-Ghazzali, Ibn-Taymiya and Al-Mawardi’s individually 
proposed framework for institution of hisbah, which is modelled by extracting their 
suggestions and ideas that were initially scattered within different discourse authored 
by them.  
The third set represents the theoretical contribution on structuring a model for 
evaluation of legal guidelines, regulations and laws by tracing the source of goodness 
in them, followed by categorising it into intrinsic, final, unconditional good, to 
measure the legitimacy and authenticity of the legal guidelines, regulations and laws 
based on the level of goodness they aim to establish; this structured model is then 
used to empirically test an eleventh century hisbah manual.  
The fourth set of contribution, covered in the third research, demonstrates the 
tendencies of most, if not all, of the epistemological sources of Islamic tradition, as 
they contribute or create the epistemological crisis in the tradition and how the current 
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method of enquiry of the tradition escalates and spreads the epistemological crisis into 
crisis in morality and crisis in legitimacy.  
The fifth set contains an interdisciplinary approach, that utilises theories from the 
discipline of normative ethics, environmental studies, law, ecology, politics, futuristic 
studies, and evolutionary biology, to create a theory of normative ethics, under the 
name of ‘objective subjectivism’, which not only is aimed at addressing the crises 
within the tradition, but it may also be used for justifying or rationalising the 
environmental policies outside the framework of public choice and utilitarianism (see 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). 
1.5.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This research is based on a discursive study conducted by applying the analytical 
tools from critical discourse analysis. The research method used for this study is, 
hence, textual discourse analysis, as this study analyses the knowledge created in the 
field to extract contents for discussion.  
The textual discourse analysis is used under the paradigmatic assumption that 
discourse is “an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other 
elements” (Fairclough, 2003:2) of political, economic, and social life. Assumption 
paradigm is approached from Kuhn’s (1970) perspective on paradigms, which is less 
restrictive as compared to one suggested by Burrell and Morgan (Mingers, 2001:243). 
While Burrell and Morgan’s work proposes that paradigms coexist, which would 
classify this research as a subjective view of the researchers, however Kuhn’s (1970) 
assumption paradigm presupposes that one paradigm proceeds another, due to 
paradigm shift; this understanding of paradigm shift justifies the attempt made by this 
research to observe and examine same information but in a way that is entirely 
different to the one in which this information or discourse was viewed and understood 
previously. Therefore, Kuhn’s (1970) paradigm provide a broader ontological and 
epistemological grounds for verifying the validity of the knowledge and its existence 
along with wider ethical angle for understanding what is to be considered right and 
valuable.  
The strategy of reducing the political, economic and social life to discourse, does not 
suggest that everything is a discourse; this research strategy is merely an effective and 
   12 
productive way of focusing on the ideas that are “substantive content of discourse”, as 
discussed by Schmidt (2008:303), and they exist at three levels that is: regulations, 
theories and philosophises. These ‘ideas’, from a perspective of social constructivism, 
are social constructs and therefore for analysing them, this research uses information 
outside the discourse to analyse the discourse in question; this approach is widely 
used in social sciences (Antaki et al., 2003).  
This research uses ‘critical discourse analysis’ and applies the postmodern and post-
structural Foucauldian thinking, based on the work of Fairclough (1992; 2005), 
Hodge and Kress (1993), Foucault (1972), Kogan and Gale (1997), and Wetherell 
(1998), This approach allows this study to use the information outside of the 
discourse, such as the socio-political-historical contexts of regulations, theories and 
philosophises, to analyse the discourse and its complexities for negotiating its 
meanings by treating the discourse as a consequence of many elements interacting 
with each other. This rationale for using postmodern and post-structural Foucauldian 
thinking is further elaborated in Gale’s work (2010:177). 
The inclusive nature of this enquiry that examines the discourse, whilst also observing 
the relation of a discourse with other elements allows it to develop a comprehensive 
understanding on the complexity of meaning and continuation or alteration of the 
meaning of one discourse within another discourse. By using the above stated 
research methods, and by conducting an enquiry similar to Habermas (1984), which 
looks for “real, purposeful, pragmatic interaction between social subjects” (Mingers, 
2001:243) in the discourse, instead of only analysing syntax or semantics, as is the 
norm in Islamic studies; we can observe many layers of complexity in the meaning, as 
Edwards (1991:523) asserts that discourse is “not just a way of seeing, but a way of 
constructing seeing”. In our methods, we approach the problem form a discursive 
perspective and by using critical discourse analysis, as it allows us to look at each 
discourse as an idea that has “a straightforward linguistic expression” (Winch, 
2008:128).  
Potter’s (1996:206) work demonstrates that the usefulness of discursive approach is 
that it “consider construction and deconstruction as a central and researchable 
feature”. In support of this, Gale (2010:185) elaborates that discursive approach gives 
us a method for examining the interaction of multilayer relations in construction or 
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deconstruction, which allows us to see the “value in attending to how these constructs 
are relationally achieved, maintained or changed”. Furthermore, Fairclough’s (1992) 
work explores the reasons why textual analysis is not sufficient for discourse analysis, 
and Jorgensen and Phillips (2002:66) elaborate on these reasons by asserting that 
textual analysis: 
… does not shed light on the links between texts and societal and cultural 
processes and structures. An interdisciplinary perspective is needed in which 
one combines textual and social analysis. The benefit derived from drawing on 
the macro- sociological tradition is that it takes into account that social 
practices are shaped by social structures and power relations and that people are 
often not aware of these processes. The contribution of the interpretative 
tradition is to provide an understanding of how people actively create a rule-
bound world in everyday practices. 
This assertion is especially relevant in the context of this research, as this research 
runs an enquiry on a particular discourse within Islamic thought which focuses on 
dichotomies of good and evil, and which attempts to create a divinely ascribed rule-
bound world. Therefore, the method suggested above is a productive research method, 
as this method is neither restrictive to textual information, nor observes a narrow 
focus on the sociological traditions. Without the restrictiveness in enquiry and 
narrowness in approach, this study can rigorously address the challenges of examining 
the institution of hisbah, its regulations, theories, and philosophies.  
In a similar line, Schmidt (2008:313) investigates the challenges of such form of 
enquiry and suggests that: “The challenge is both ontological (about what institutions 
are and how they are created, maintained, and changed) and epistemological (about 
what we can know about institutions and what makes them continue or change with 
regard to interests and norms)”. The epistemological challenge is addressed by 
observing the evolution of institution of hisbah, whilst also examining the politico 
socio conditions that shaped the institution of hisbah over the centuries, and the 
ontological challenge is addressed by focusing on the function of subscribing good 
and forbidding evil, which is the defining factor of institution of hisbah.  
1.5.1. Research Frame: Philosophical Assumptions  
The above-mentioned research methods are applied under few philosophical 
assumptions that are discussed below. 
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For this research, instead of categorising epistemology and ontology in a manner of 
upper and lower, we categorically approach epistemology and ontology, and view 
them in layers, hence discussing them separately for deconstruction and construction. 
The justification for slightly separate, although philosophically coherent, 
epistemology and ontology is epistemically cited in the work of MacIntyre (1977; 
1988), as his work suggests a switch in ontology and creation of new episteme can 
only address an existing epistemological crisis.  
During deconstruction, the ‘ontological’ is understood from the premise that the 
human knowledge is not objective, while through our knowledge, we perceive reality 
in categories. However, our knowledge or our perception cannot be considered as the 
absolutely correct reflection of the reality, and instead it should be taken as a by-
product of the discourse (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:6). Gale (2010:185) explores 
this philosophical orientation of considering discourse as an ontological source of 
reality and asserts that this premise “does not deny the ontological existence of a 
reality independent of language but questions if we can ever ‘know’ that reality”. 
The assertion by Gale makes it possible for this enquiry to carry forward the belief 
system of the tradition without subjecting it to the processes of construction and 
deconstruction, whilst including the theological philosophies and proclamations that 
may influence the social entities within the analysis. The epistemology used within 
the process of deconstruction is based on Burr’s (1995:3) ‘historical and cultural 
specificity’, and it is essentially anti-foundationalist and anti-essentialist, as it takes 
the position that the structure of the social world is not pre-given. Therefore, the 
social structure is constructed discursively and socially, and that there is no solid 
meta-theoretical base on which the human knowledge may be solely and exclusively 
grounded. Moreover, our worldview is “historically and culturally specific and 
contingent” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:5), and our knowledge is dependent on and 
relative to our individual culture and history (Gergen 1985: 267). Jorgensen and 
Phillips (2002:4-15) demonstrate that these premises are connected and coherent with 
Fairclough’s (1992) approach to ‘critical discourse analysis’, as Fairclough’s 
approach is less poststructuralist as compared to the theory of discourse discussed by 
Laclau and Mouffe (1987; 2001), as it suggests that along with discourse, other social 
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practices also play a part in construction of social world (Jorgensen and Phillips, 
2002:4-15).  
The methods applied by this research are not only relevant for the nature of enquiry, 
but they are also suitable to the nature of discourse under investigations. Islamic 
scholarship uses historical and cultural specificity to construct a worldview relevant to 
their philosophical stance within the tradition, and the Islamic legal theories, legal 
system and body of laws, appeal to social elements and discourse of texts that are 
outside of primary sources of Islamic law. In relation to this, Fairclough’s approach to 
‘critical discourse analysis’ especially focuses on investigating this interactions and or 
any changes that occurs in it over time through Fairclough’s (1992) “concept of 
intertextuality”, as shown by Jorgensen and Phillips (2002:7).  
Fairclough (1993:130-138) views discourse as constitutive and constituted, and as he 
maintains the dialectic relationship among different dimensions of social practice, 
while differentiates between the discursive and non-discursive dimensions; he refers 
discourse to the language as a social practice, to the language particular to the field of 
study in question, and “to a way of speaking which gives meaning to experiences 
from a particular perspective” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:66-67). These three 
different manners of discourse, then, contribute to the construction of identity, social 
relations, and ideational functions (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:67-69).  
These philosophical premises, methods and theories of analysis provide methods of 
enquiry for conducting this research. As, this study, similar to Fairclough’s (1995) 
approach of order of discourse (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:67-69), first examines 
different types of discourse within the institution of hisbah, such as its philosophies, 
theories and regulations in socio-political-historical context, and then observes, via 
deconstruction, the dynamics of how these three contributed to the formation of 
distinctive identity of good and evil, its relations with the regulations and laws, and 
ideational functions it performs.  
The results of deconstruction conducted in this research are in line with the 
perspective of MacIntyre’s (1977; 1988) theories on epistemological crisis. Therefore, 
the process of construction is conducted upon deconstruction using discursive 
   16 
reasoning, while the epistemology and ontology of construction is grounded in the 
model-dependent realism and concepts of instrumentalism. 
The discursive reasoning is used, because the sources used for construction are 
multidisciplinary, as required by MacIntyre’s (1977; 1988) guidelines for solution. 
The sources used for construction broadly pertain to ecology, evolutionary biology, 
moral philosophy and normative ethics, and the application of discursive allowed the 
thesis to construct and formalise ‘the solution’, “by means of the sum of opinions 
supplied” (Akama et al., 2010:200) by all the sources. This rationale for the use of 
discursive and its application is consistent with the studies on discursive reasoning, as 
shown by Akama et al. (2010), and used by Edwards and Potter (1992) in psychology, 
by Bucar (2008) in ethics and theology, and by Weinberger (1999) in law. 
The construction is designed using the Hawking and Mlodinow’s (2010:30-60) 
‘model dependent realism’, which is a method of scientific enquiry that suggests that 
the ‘actual reality’ cannot be known or understood in totality and we can only know 
‘actual reality’ approximation through a model that acts as an intermediately. The 
criterion for construction or selection of ‘the model’, in ‘model dependent realism’, is 
that it “accounts for the largest body of observations and does so with the maximum 
possible simplicity” (Koonin, 2011:427). The rationale for using ‘model dependent 
realism’ is that it is coherent with all the other philosophical premises used within this 
study, and it also provides a criteria and framework through which we can 
productively apply discursive logic to construct an epistemic source that satisfies 
MacIntyre’s requirements, whilst also leaving a metaethical room for existence for 
humanly unknown theologically motivated realities.  
In overall, hence, the process of deconstruction and construction are tasks within the 
analytical process, which is consistent with other discursive studies within qualitative 
research, as Taylor and Littleton (2006:28-29) assert that: “These are not ‘stages’ 
because, as in any qualitative analysis, the process is not straightforwardly sequential 
but inevitably iterative, although it is systematic in that it involves rigorous”. 
The process applied in this research is systematic, while it uses the historically 
available and accessible resources. However, the number of resources used for this 
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enquiry are not extensive, but this does not affect the rigour, as King et al. (1994:4) 
elaborate: 
Such work has tended to focus on one or a small number of cases, to use 
intensive… analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method, and to 
be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit. 
Even though they have a small number of cases, qualitative researchers 
generally un-earth enormous amounts of information from their studies. 
Sometimes this kind of work in the social sciences is linked with area or case 
studies where the focus is on a particular event, decision, institution, location, 
issue, or piece of legislation. As is also the case with quantitative research, the 
instance is often important in its own right: a major change in a nation, an 
election, a major decision, or a world crisis. 
As King et al. (1994) indicate and Taylor and Littleton (2006) suggest, this research 
attempts to systematically construct a comprehensive account and the rigour of the 
research is in its approach and in the comprehensiveness of its account, as it attempts 
to explore the issue at hand, as detailed in the following chapters. 
1.6. THE SCOPE AND OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
This research explores and develops an understanding of the underlying issues of 
governance within the Islamic thoughts; and therefore, the central claim made in this 
research is the presence of epistemological crisis within the Islamic thoughts, when it 
comes to regulation and governance. It focuses on historical institution of hisbah, by 
critically analysing and mapping the existing narratives in the theoretical discourse on 
hisbah by the political philosophers, regulatory manuals of theologians for hisbah and 
the operational practice of muhtasib, to identify the episteme of good and evil, or lack 
of it, in them.  
The institution of hisbah is the point of focus, within this research, because this 
institution was politically structured, theologically positioned; morally substantiated, 
and theoretically entrusted to maintain public law and order with the objective of 
supervising the behaviour in society and market, from an Islamic perspective, by 
using Islamic legal theories within its own theoretical framework.  
The examination, in a philosophical dialect, of institution of hisbah is due to its moral 
orientation, political status, theological authority, legal scope on society, which 
allowed this research to investigate the issues of governance within the Islamic 
thoughts from politico-social, philosophical and theological stand points.  
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In responding to the aim and objectives identified above, the examination in the form 
of explorations in Chapter 2 and 3 aims to uncover the historical narrative on the 
institution, and then explore the theories on hisbah together with the analysis of its 
regulatory manuals and grading of its operations. In doing so, this study first 
constructs the individual framework proposed in the work of Ibn-Taymiya, Al-
Ghazzali and Al-Mawardi, and then identifies whether the ontological existence of 
practical problems faced by hisbah, as highlighted by historians such as Grunebaum, 
Buckley, Glick and others, are also present within the theoretical framework or 
ontological construct proposed for hisbah.  Based on the result of such explorations 
investigation, this research infers that the theories on hisbah that define its scope, 
authority and function are by product of constructivist epistemology rather than 
theological demands. The second part of examination in Chapter 3 uses Korsgaard’s 
(1997) and Tannenbaum’s (2010) categorisation of good to deconstruct the episteme 
of different category of goodness within the regulations of a eleventh century AD  
hisbah manual, which was authored by al Shayzari (1310), using Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh). Based on the deficiency of epistemologically traceable good or 
evil that is ontologically established by regulations in manual and lack of a method of 
enquiry or form of argumentation, within the theories of hisbah, that can be used to 
characterise good and evil for the purpose of subscribing or forbidding it, this research 
infers that there exists an epistemological crisis with the discourse, which develops 
into a crisis in morality and crisis in legitimacy. 
In Chapter 4, this research critically surveys other possible epistemological sources 
within Islamic thoughts, given the diversity of philosophical standpoints on good and 
evil, and suggests that the key questions on good and evil, within the realm of 
governance, can no longer be settled by using the historically established Islamic 
epistemology, therefore the Islamic tradition is in a state of epistemological crisis. 
After establishing this, and in line with MacIntyre’s (1977; 1988) work on methods of 
addressing and solving epistemological crisis, this research attempts on constructing 
new episteme that is and was alien to Islamic tradition throughout the life of the crisis, 
whilst safeguarding the life of the tradition.  
The essential aspects of Islamic tradition that may be classified as its life form are 
identified at the end of Chapter 5, and are inferred down to consequential essence of 
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life-form in Chapter 5, along side the justification on presence of this consequential 
essence in the newly constructed episteme. The consequential essence is inferred 
down to morality based on objectiveness and universality, and away from public 
choice, along with notion of survival as episteme for philosophical perspective and 
theological stance. In addition, the presence of this is justified by constructing the new 
episteme using objectivist ethics, classic theories on sovereignty that do not use public 
choice, and concept of sustainability in ecology.  
The body of Chapter 5, thus, consists of an attempt on construction of the new 
episteme using these foundational concepts so that the epistemological crisis maybe 
addressed. In doing so, ontology of authority and legitimacy of newly constructed 
episteme as a solution for the epistemological crisis is justified using MacIntyre’s 
(1977; 1988) work. The newly constructed episteme uses life as ‘standard of value’, 
which is inferred from objectivist ethics, and sustainability as a measure of value, that 
also provides a point of orientation for interpreting reality and for distinguishing 
between good and evil. All this is constructed within the framework that separates the 
individuals (internal realms) and the perpetuity of temporary existence (external 
realm) by using the classic theories on sovereignty. From Islamic traditions’ 
perspective, this research suggests that this episteme should be used for constructing 
laws and regulations for governance of market and society, and by doing so the 
tradition will not only be able to address the current crises, but also work towards 
creating a future that can sustain life, whilst safeguarding the life form of the 
traditions and simultaneously preserving all the goodness life offers.  
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Chapter 2 
THE HISTORICAL INSTITUTION OF HISBAH AS A 
REGULATORY BODY  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim in this chapter is to examine the implementation and working of market 
regulations within the Muslim world with the objective of investigating the political 
economy of institution of hisbah, and examining the process of construction of 
regulations, and developing an understanding on the process of implementation of 
these regulations.   
This chapter, hence, fulfils the first part of the research aim, as it examines and 
explores the operational side of governance within Islamic thoughts in the form of the 
institution of hisbah. The investigation within this chapter focuses on the socio-
politico-economics behind the operations of hisbah and the episteme, the method of 
enquiry, the theologians that applied it as well as the social reality that necessitated an 
intervention from the institution. This helps to explore and articulate the creativity in 
the application of method of enquiry and inclusion of juristic subjectivity to regulate 
the continually changing social realities of the market, whilst justifying the epistemic 
connection with unalterable sources of law.   
Islamic tradition has sufficient discourse within the tradition that supports a laissez 
faire system as a market exchange system, as substantiated by Ibn Taymiyah’s (1992) 
and then re-emphasised by the Siddiqi (1996) and Khan (1995) and other modern 
Muslim economic theorists. Therefore, if we take this as an assumption, then the state 
intervention through institution of hisbah becomes a second best solution. Therefore, 
it is vital to understand the historical operations of this institution to examine whether 
there was a good case for the institutional interventionism.  
The institution of hisbah is also of particular importance to the enquiry of this study, 
because this institution carries the theological responsibility for ‘subscribing good and 
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forbidding wrong’, within the society and the market. It uses the Islamic legal theories 
(usul) to distinguish between good and bad, and hence captures the essence of values 
within the governance in Islamic thought. The investigation of institution of hisbah 
will allow us to observe the implementation and working of market regulations within 
the Muslim world, which is the foundational objective of this research, as it is the 
necessary step in understanding the episteme of recognised and unrecognised 
incoherencies and inconsistencies in the Islamic law’s governance of market and 
society.  
As for the etymology, the term hisbah is not mentioned in the Qur’an, which is 
derived from the root an Arabic word h.s.b, which means an arithmetic problem 
(Holland, 1992:135). The verb hisbah is ihtasab and it is generally translated as “to 
take into consideration” (Holand, 1992:135). There is no historical reference that 
provides unequivocal reasons for use of this term or the connection of root words, 
with the function of hisbah (Cahen et al., December 18th, 2010). Generally, hisbah 
connotes three degrees of meanings, that is (Vikør, 2005:197):  
(i) hisbah within the court of law, refers to the right of a party, who is not directly 
effected, to initiate a case on behalf of the absent or affected parties;  
(ii) in general terms it signifies the religious duty of every Muslim to subscribe good 
and forbid evil; or specifically; 
(iii) it refers to an institution and a public office, responsible for monitoring the 
religious perceptions within the market and endorsing of public morality by 
performing the duty of commanding good and forbidding evil. 
This study is focused on the last mentioned meaning, while it takes into account the 
meaning mentioned second as well, as it examines the construction and 
implementations of market regulations, along with their efficiency and 
appropriateness.    
It should be noted that the legal source of economic and financial matter in Islamic 
tradition is Shari’ah (Islamic law), however it is also the formulated framework of 
Islamic principles, which denote a just rule in Islam (Vikør, 2005:201). In this 
framework the theologians, juriconsults and jurists argue that there are independent 
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processes for deriving laws, distinct methodologies of interpreting and exclusive 
techniques of implementing them, which works under the umbrella of a legal, moral 
and spiritual systems to develop a society, that could be considered just and fair, from 
the perspective of Islam. Similar to any other institutions, hisbah is one of the cogs 
within this machinery.    
2.2 HISTORICAL ACCOUNT ON INSTITUTION OF HISBAH 
The early Muslim societies and the pre Islamic Arab society not only were loosely 
aware of foreign Weltanschauung, but there were also traces of foreign influences 
such as the Pagan, Christian and Jewish traditions (Donaldson, 1953:3). However, 
there is no clear evidence of cultural borrowing on the concept of ‘hisbah’, therefore 
the notion of hisbah, should be considered as an idea that is original to the Islamic 
world. The pre-Islamic Arab society based its morality loosely on the notions of 
generosity (al-karam), tranquillity (al-hilm), vendetta (th’ar) and clique mentality 
(asabiyyah) (Heck, 2002). Where the generosity formed the primary virtue that 
emphasised the moral superiority in exhibiting hospitality. This, along with cultural 
norms provided the general guidance on the moral obligations within the social 
contracts. While, the ‘vendetta’ was considered as a virtue, which underpinned the 
notion of social justice (Heck, 2002). The notion of institutionalised morality for the 
purpose of regulating and governing the market and society only appears after the 
creation of the Islamic societies.  
Historical roots for institution of hisbah can be traced back to the time of Prophet 
Muhammad. The formation of an Islamic establishment in Medina after the hijra in 
623 CE marks the revelation of Qur’anic versus with legislative orientation. While, 
Islam started its message with axiomatic approach of “no God, but the God”, which 
signifies the implicit and inherent nature of its methodology of superseding the 
existing belief system, with a system that is divinely inspired and transcendental 
(Cook, 2000). However, when it comes to socio-economic practices and in some 
extent moral practices, a totally different approach was applied. The legislative 
orientation of Islam required a complete replacement of the pre-Islamic pagan 
narratives that provided ontological authority to the ethical practices, with the 
transcendental metaphysical narrative of Islam. While, for the ethical practices at the 
front end of pre-Islamic pagan narratives were not entirely superseded, instead a 
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divinely prescribed filter mechanism of al-amr-bi'l maroof, wa nahi al-an munkar 
(commanding good and forbidding evil), was used to filter and stop the socio 
economic practices, which were in unsupportive of Islamic narrative. The pre-Islamic 
tradition that was in conformance with the Islamic narrative was given a new 
ontological authority based on new episteme within the Islamic tradition and the 
front-end practice was allowed to continue.  
2.2.1 Legitimacy of Hisbah  
Theoretically hisbah is the institution that methodically applies this mechanism of 
filtering the good and bad practices in the market and the society. Prophetic 
methodology for reformation heavily relied on this mechanism, for which few Muslim 
historians have classified him as the first muhtasib (official of institution of hisbah). 
However, there is an isolated report from the work1 of Ibn-Hazm, an eleventh century 
Andalusian scholar, which gives reference to an official, with role similar to 
muhtasib, in pre Islamic Arabian Peninsula (Buckley, 1999:3). The first official 
appointment of a market inspector was by the Prophet Muhammad, who not only 
appointed men and women for this post, but also had separate inspectors for Medina 
and Mecca (Buckley, 1999:3). However, as the Muslim empire grew, the institution of 
hisbah expanded with it. Abbasid Caliph Jafar al-Mansur in 774 C.E developed the 
initial operational structure of this institution and interjected position of two qualified 
staff with title of Arifs and Amins, under a full time muhtasib (Khan, 1992:136). The 
expansion of Islamic empire gave further prominence to the institution of hisbah, as it 
became a key institution for implementation of Islamic ethical framework on the new 
markets. It also played an active role under the rule of Fatimid’s, Ayyubid's and 
Ottomans and for much of Islamic history, as it remained an important part of state 
infrastructure (Khan, 1992:136); due to which, as the government weakened around 
the time of Mamluks, the institution of hisbah was also distorted through the 
appointment of corrupt officials (Ibn-Tulun, 1998: 216; Al-Jaziri, n.d.:1000-1144). 
The earliest reference to the designation of official of hisbah, appear in Ibn-Sallam’s 
work ‘Kitab al-Amwal’, which dates to the period of Caliph Umar bin Khattab, where 
‘Sa’ib B. Yazid’ is referred with a title of amil ‘ala Suq (market inspector) (Buckley, 
                                                      
1 Jamharat Ansab al-Arab  
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1999:4). There are further reports of appointment of market inspectors by Caliph 
Uthman b. Al-Affan, however, the discourse lacks any details such as job description 
and duties (Buckley, 1999:4). Reference to an official with designation of amil ‘ala 
Suq, with occasional mention of the name of the official along with the area of their 
jurisdiction, continues through out the literature on the Umayyad period (661-750), 
but there is no detailed account on scope of duties (Buckley, 1999:4). The lack of 
details could be due to the fact that the official of hisbah at this point was not seen 
with its full potential and the philosophical depth of ‘subscribing good and forbidding 
evil’ was not realised. The realisation of the philosophical extend of hisbah’s work, 
which provides the legal and theological legitimacy to official for distinguishing 
between good and evil, came as the institution evolved.   
 
2.2.2 The Evolution of Muhtasib  
After the Prophet, the function of hisbah was also carried out by the four Caliphs and 
sometimes by governors along with the individuals who were appointed as Amil ‘ala 
Suq (Khan, 1992:136). It could be assumed that the duty of ‘commanding good and 
forbidding evil’ within the market was specifically assigned to hisbah, while the first 
four Caliphs simultaneously performed this duty on a more generalised social and 
economic scale. Buckley (1999:6) takes the position that, because the post of amil ‘ala 
Suq existed before the start of Byzantine conquest; this signifies that it was created as 
a result of internal requirements and not the foreign influence. Furthermore, Buckley 
(1999:6) adduce that the post of Amil ‘ala Suq was profane and had no religious 
connotation, as the historical account suggests that the duty of hisbah was regularly 
performed by the rulers especially the first four Caliphs, whereas the replacement of 
amil ‘ala Suq by muhtasib signifies the Islamisation of the post, in its function and 
also in its spirit, resulting in the establishment of institution of Hisbah. This view, in 
theory signifies the delegation of power from the ruler to the officials institution of 
hisbah, specifically the power and responsibility of subscribing good and prohibiting 
wrongs. In other words, the official of hisbah performs the duty on behalf of Khalif. 
The theological argument on, how hisbah draws its powers along with jurist’s work 
on theory and scope of hisbah somewhat support this position. However, practically 
the history accounts a very different power structure in different times within the 
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Muslim empires, which could be due to the lack of consensus on a well-defined 
political system.  
For Amil ‘ala Suq, the extent of the information from beginning of Islam to the 
succession of Abbasids (750–1258), is very limited, however, the social and economic 
activities  of hisbah becomes much clearer and detailed in the historical accounts 
dated after the Abbasids assumed power in 749 CE (Buckley, 1999:4). It was also in 
the early years of Abbasids regime that the designation of Amil ‘ala Suq was replaced 
with muhtasib, a name that previously referred to vigilantes who practised the spirit of 
hisbah, that is: commanding good and forbidding evil. Buckley (1999:7) argues that 
this was in the time of Caliph Abu Jafar al-Mansur (754-775) that official designation 
was replaced and the first person to be appointed with this new designation was Asim 
al-Ahwal, who previously served as a faqih (jurisprudent) of Baghdad and as a judge 
in Al-Madain. Some attribute this transformation to Abbasids Caliph Al-Mamun 
(813-833) and connects it with the Islamisation of institutions in the time of 
Mutazilites (Cahen et al., December 18th, 2010). The scale of such a transformation 
specifically in scope and role of hisbah cannot be measured as historical sources lack 
such details.  
After the Abbasids assumed power in 749 CE, the Umayyad’s established a dynasty 
in Al-Andalus region, where they interpolated the position similar to that of Amil ‘ala 
Suq (market inspector) with a new title of Sahib al-Suq (market officer) (Buckley, 
1999:5). Buckley’s analysis concludes that the post of sahib al-suq had no religious 
association and its duties mainly concentrated on regulating and administrating the 
market, with no attention to public morality (Buckley, 1999:5). Glick (1972:65) 
however takes the position that although Sahib Al-Suq by it’s very nature was an 
administrative and regulative post, with sole focus on the market, but it also 
performed some ‘astynomic’ functions like enforcement of regulations on ditches in 
residential area.  
In Andalusia, the transformation of sahib Al-suq into muhtasib was delayed during 
the Umayyad’s period and the term muhtasib become common in the eleventh 
century, while some of hisbah’s officials in treatise from Andalusia are also referred 
to as wali al-hisba bil suq (guardian of hisbah in market) (Glick, 1972:65-67). 
Although even after eleventh century the historical evidence suggest the coexistence 
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of Umayyad’s and Abbasids title for official of hisbah (Glick, 1972:66), it can be 
speculated that the definition of this title, that is ‘guardian of commanding food and 
forbidding wrongs’, represents the meaning of job description of hisbah officials at 
the time.  
2.2.3 Complications and Difficulties in Defining the Remits and Functions of 
Institution of Hisbah  
An eleventh century hisbah official is also mentioned by Ibn-Abbar with a title of 
wali khuttat al-suq, namely governor of administration of market, and in twelve 
century Ibn-Bashkuwal, while discussing the tenth century, refers to function of 
hisbah as wilayat al-suq or custodian of market; Glick’s (1972:66) further 
investigation into the diversity of titles, adjudges that: “To Andalusi Muslims, at least 
through the twelfth century, hisba and wilayat or kuttat al-suq were synonymous, 
indicating that hisba was understood in its practical, administrative connotation, rather 
than a philosophical one”.  
Although scholars like Ibn-Khaldun have scribed a broader function of hisbah, many 
historical documents like Al-Khatib’s letter to a muhtasib, portray an institution 
confined within the boundaries of the market, not just by its powers but also by its 
function (Glick, 1972:68). Emile Tyan further elaborates on this issue and explicates 
that the philosophical foundations and theoretical definition of hisbah which extends 
to all human activities never practically translated into institution of hisbah, and 
institution of hisbah was mainly limited as an “institution of administration and 
police” (Glick, 1972:65).   
The institution of hisbah played a central and vital role in market and even sometimes 
in governance; however despite the centrality, institution of hisbah to no extent 
utilised in its full potential, which is entrusted to it under the philosophy of ‘ascribing 
good and forbidding evil’, despite many attempts made by different muhtasib over the 
history to extend its jurisdictions. Still muhtasib, along with other hisbah officials 
(assistants) did perform diverse range of functions within the market and society, such 
as: upholding of justice and fairness, executing the mal-practitioners by inspection 
and implementation of correct measures within the market. Many Andalusian 
historians have documented the functions performed by muhtasib in Andalusia. The 
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most widely accepted description was cited by Al-Maqqari, from the work of a 
thirteenth century historian Ibn-Said, in which, the author accounts that the muhtasib 
continuously checked the weights and balances, and implemented different 
procedures for public safety along with counterchecking the prices (Glick, 1972:68).  
The historical sources evidence that muhtasib also monitored the market, using a 
technique similar to mystery guest, as he checked for fairness by sending slaves and 
young girls to buy from the market and after the transactions, he checked the price 
offered to them and the balance used (Glick, 1972:69). Different monitoring 
techniques were adopted for overseeing and counselling the diverse range of activities 
within the market. The hisbah manuals are the documents that specialise in guidance, 
for monitoring different trades and businesses. These manuals listed the possible 
malpractice used within each trade along with the ways of identifying and in some 
cases correcting them. Ibn-Said elaborates on the matters where malpractice or mal-
practitioners were identified, that (taken from Glick, 1972:69) “if he [muhtasib] finds 
an error, he gauges in this his comportment with people ... in such a case, for if he 
[offender] does it often and does not repent after being flogged and receiving public 
reprobation in the markets, he [offender] is expelled from the city”... 
It should be noted that outside the scope of market, muhtasib supervised the 
cleanliness of street, the construction of new buildings and compliance to building 
codes, along with other municipal duties. The requirement of the time and nature of 
duties performed by hisbah, required personal involvement of muhtasib in every 
process. This along with lack of structural distribution of power meant that post of 
muhtasib required a person to be well versed not only in Islamic law or fiqh but also 
in market mechanisms, a trait that is similar to the requirement for Shari’ah scholars 
in Islamic finance industry in contemporary times. 
The references of historians and the hisbah manuals are the main sources, from which 
the duties and role of muhtasib may be contextualised; however reconciling the two 
sources to build an exact picture of muhtasib is difficult. The hisbah manuals provides 
the list of aversions from Islamic values in the market, while the historian’s 
description present muhtasib as a distinct personality within the society and 
concentrates more on its social status, rather then the policies (Glick, 1972:67). 
Buckley (1999:8) provides the rationale for this by suggesting that the transformation 
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from amil ‘ala Suq to muhtasib meant that the official of hisbah had become a 
prominent official figure from an average state employee. This aggrandisement 
resulted in greater attention in historical accounts.  
By the time of Fatimids (909-1160) in Egypt, muhtasib became one of the top posts in 
the establishment, which further amplified the ostentatious nature of muhtasib’s 
ceremony of investiture, his dress code and possessions (Buckley, 1999:9). The 
continuous ennoblement of muhtasib resulted in further political limelight, as the post 
was ranked just below the Head of Public Treasury and at top fifth position in the 
judicial system, under the rule of Mamluks (1250-1517) (Buckley, 1999:10). The 
aggrandisement of muhtasib could also be a necessity rather than luxury. Rosenthal 
(2009:55) elaborates on this issue by arguing that: “The integrity of the official is 
essential for the preservation of public order and morale, and since the [muhtasib]... is 
obliged to “command the good and forbid the evil” the political organization of the 
Muslim community is superior to that of any other state”. 
This further suggests that the efficiency and effectiveness of institution of hisbah 
depends mostly on the understanding and morality of muhtasib. From sixteenth 
century Ibn-Tulun, (1998: 216), al-Jaziri (n.d.:1000-1144), Ibn-Iyas (1960:378) and 
others have documented cases, where the post of muhtasib may have been obtained 
through bribery, followed by malfeasance through corruption and exploitation. Cahen 
et al. (December 18th, 2010) suggest that this decline in effectiveness and reverences 
of muhtasib was at the end of late Middle Ages, and it was due to the socio economic 
crises of the time.  
The socio economic unrest at the end of middle ages may have been the general cause 
of many institutional failures including institution of hisbah at the time; however, 
Dabbi (as cited by Imamuddin, 1963:27) cites a muhtasib long before the time of 
Mamluks, who was appointed by Muhammad I (852- 886)2, and he became famous 
for his injustice and brutality, while there are also references in historical sources of 
different muhtasib, some from same and others from different epoch, who by contrast 
were considered successful, just and able. The operational mechanism of institution of 
hisbah was constructed in such a manner that it heavily relied upon the level of acute 
                                                      
2 Umayyad emir of Cordoba. 
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knowledge, standard of adherence to morals and scale of fidelity to religious values 
by the muhtasib. The reliance on muhtasib’s perspicacious judgment also reflects in 
every hisbah manual. The first instruction to muhtasib in al-Shayzari’s (1310:29) 
manual is that: “the first thing muhtasib must do is to act according to what he knows”  
The strong reliance on muhtasib’s perspicacious judgment resulted in the appointment 
of muftis (scholars or religious authority), with expertise in Islamic market law, in the 
Andalusian institution of hisbah. The historical account suggests that these muftis 
were considered an authority in market regulations, which they exercised by issuing 
instant legal opinions (fatwas) to formulate new regulations or to resolve conflicts in 
interpretation of market laws, along with training the staff working for institution of 
hisbah, on affairs of the market (Imamuddin, 1963:29).  
The whole operation was conducted under the framework of Islamic fiqh 
(jurisprudence). An attempt to regulate the ever-changing markets meant consistent 
use of qiyas or analogical reasoning, independent interpretation or ijtihad, discretion 
or istihsan and other lower layers of principles of Islamic jurisprudence, namely usul 
al-fiqh, along with an abstract sense of ethics.  
Usul al-fiqh is a tool, which inherently depends on the competency of person applying 
them. Although there are detailed principles of applying different layers of usul al-
fiqh, which act as regulations and there is additional legal safeguard as the muhtasib’s 
decision can be challenged in the court of law. However, due to lack of any internal 
model, which was independent of legal framework, there was a deficiency in the 
mechanism of operating institution of hisbah. This deficiency meant that there was no 
process for internally analysing and evaluating the relevance and effectiveness of 
formed regulations. Specially, considering the fact that one of the main functions of 
hisbah is to intervene, as to, prevent the damage or evil before it actually takes place. 
However, it should be noted that historically there were no internal precautionary 
measures structured within the institution to prevent it from regulating the socio 
economic activities in a way that is harmful for the market and the society. In absence 
of these checks with lack of any internal structure or procedures to critically judge the 
regulations in context of their relevance to the problem and without any system which 
can forecast the long term and short term effects of constructed regulation on the 
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market and on the society; the hisbah itself had potential of harming the market by 
unintentionally preventing good and allowing evil.  
Another hindrance in the effective implementation of hisbah was the geographical 
area covered by muhtasib. The extreme cases can be cited in the Egypt, at the time of 
Fatimid’s that also correspond to the condition in the period of Mamluks, where three 
major cities with large markets were supervised by one muhtasib (Buckley, 1999:10). 
Buckley (1999:10) argues on the issue of multiple appointments and suggests that 
“this would positively prohibit him from having any but the most minor role in the 
responsibilities theoretically attached to the office.” 
There are also several reports, which identify one individual being incumbent to many 
offices simultaneously. In the cases, where there were multiple appointments, the 
same individual took charge of one or more offices like the judicial office, tax office, 
office dealing with inheritance, police, prison office, office of royal correspondent, 
administration of ports, alongside institution of hisbah. In hindsight, this kind of 
appointment raises the question of moral hazard, accountability and effective 
regulation of market by institution of hisbah, during such times. The multiple 
appointments were made due to many reasons; some of them were political while 
other practical. The practical reason was the overlap of institutional powers and 
responsibilities, and the specific skill set, knowledge base and expertise required to 
chair these offices. The overlap of responsibilities between different institutions and 
offices were more to do with the intrinsic nature of hisbah and partially due to the 
absence of formally constituted legal boundaries for the practice of institutional 
powers.  
The intrinsic nature of ‘forbidding wrong and subscribing to good’ allows hisbah the 
potential to interfere in all walks of life. A clear example of this overlap can be cited 
in historical records on muhtasib from South Asia. The institution of hisbah was 
reinitiated in South Asia at the time of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. However, from 
the start, this office gained a substantial position, which could be due to Aurangzeb’s 
attempt to Islamise the empire (Siddiqi, 1963:113). Prior to muhtasib’s introduction, 
the duties were evenly distributed between kotwal (chief police officer) and qazi 
(judge); However, the introduction of institution of hisbah caused “confusion and 
bureaucratic conflict” (Siddiqi, 1963:119). The jurisdictions of muhtasib over lapped 
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in powers as well as in function, with kotwal (chief police officer) and qazi (judge) 
(Siddiqi, 1963:119). Originally, muhtasib was entrusted with supervision of market, 
policing of public morals and in theory was to act as a subordinate to judiciary (Qazi) 
and local ruler (faujdar), with very limited judicial powers; however there are cases 
cited in historical sources which show that muhtasib not only crossed the judicial 
limits but also ignored the guidance of judiciary (qazi) and local ruler (faujdar) and in 
some cases incongruous with chief police officer (or kotwal) (Siddiqi, 1963:119). 
Although there are many reasons for such behaviour, from moral hazards to adverse 
selection of scholars interested in the post and from lack of clear guidelines to 
administrative structure of empire, however one of the key issues was the lack of 
transparent internal system for check and balance.  
The position of muhtasib was originally created to act as an early warning system for 
the deviations in market practises from the expectations and articulations of Islamic 
morals and values. There were also clear guidelines for muhtasib to use persuasive 
methods and to report the matter to judiciary qazi in case of persistence in violations 
(Siddiqi, 1963:119). Siddiqi (1963) categorises the duties of muhtasib into ‘religious 
duty’ and ‘secular duty’, where the religious duty includes the superintendence of 
mosques and dispensation of morals, while the secular duties include the supervision 
of market, administration of transactions, and advocating of fairness, justice and 
honesty. Among the other multifarious functions, muhtasib was also assigned the 
municipal powers. Overall it is difficult to examine the impact of muhtasib on the 
socio economic functions. The historical sources on one side cite the details of 
corruption by muhtasib, while on the other side sources like Maasir-i-Alamgiri give a 
laudatory account of muhtasib (Siddiqi, 1963:119). The effectiveness of hisbah might 
also be different in different regions of the empire. The intrinsic nature of operational 
mechanisms of institution of hisbah, brings the ‘effectiveness’ of hisbah in direct 
relation to the ‘virtuousness’ of muhtasib, which could be the reason for diverse and 
contradictory account on its performance.  
A significant thirteenth century hisbah manual Nihayat Al-Rutba fi Talab Al-Hisbah 
(the Utmost Degree in the Pursuit of Hisbah), authored by Al-Shayzari, gives a 
detailed and extensive guidelines for regulating the market, however even the 
muhtasibs, which were following this manual, operated a very different institution in 
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practice compared to guidelines of this manual, which was also due to the above listed 
problems (Buckley, 1999:11). This difference in normative expectations and positive 
practices is indicated in Gotein’s (taken from Buckley, 1999:11) conclusion on hisbah 
in the Fatimid period, that: “The Muhtasib, the official who, according to the text 
books, should be expected more than anyone else to represent the government to the 
populace, is all but absent from the Geniza papers”.  
The moral, juridical and religious connotations of hisbah did not completely translate 
into the practical guidelines given by the hisbah manuals and the guidelines of hisbah 
manual does not entirely correlate to the operations of hisbah in practice. These gaps, 
where due to lack of any independent model which could counter check, assess, 
identify and measure the good within the commands of ‘prescribing good; and the 
wrong’ within the forbidding of wrongs. The gap between the normative and positive 
was not consistent throughout the history, as the institution of hisbah changed it shape 
and form in every era. Therefore the practice of hisbah is different across different 
time and space, as every governing entity moulded and reshaped institution of hisbah, 
in different ways and forms to fulfil their political motives or to fit the requirements 
of socio economic fabric of society. For instance, the term hisbah and muhtasib are 
absent from the historical documents of Ottoman Empire and instead term ihtisab and 
ihtisab aghas (market police) are used, while the function of the institution remains 
tantamount (Cahen et al., December 18th, 2010). 
It could also be further suggested that theologians and jurists, as compared to political 
philosophers, state officials and political class, perceived hisbah institution from a 
different reference point. The theologians saw hisbah as an instrument for 
commanding right and forbidding wrong, and institution of hisbah as a systemic use 
of this instrument, so that the religious duty of commanding right and forbidding 
wrong is fulfilled at all times. As for political philosophers, State officials and 
political class, they perceived hisbah as a mean to intervene in every section of 
private life and institution of hisbah as a part of State infrastructure, confined to the 
political position of rulers.   
The evolution of amil al-suq to muhtasib, hence, signifies the transmogrification in 
operations and scope of institution of hisbah and these event does not signify any 
alteration or shift in the theologian’s position on duty of hisbah and general 
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theological comprehension of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’ (Cahen et al., 
December 18th, 2010). The differences were mainly is the definition of jurisdiction 
and distribution of power and responsibilities of amil ‘ala Suq or muhtasib within the 
state infrastructure. Most of the times, the function of hisbah was jointly conducted by 
the Caliph, local ruler, muhtasib or amil ‘ala Suq. This could be due to the extensive 
nature of powers, which could be drawn from the notion of ‘commanding of good and 
forbidding of evil’.  
2.2.4 Historicity of Institution of Hisbah 
The internal operational failures are not the only factor to effect the concernment of 
institution of hisbah. The continuously growing market, emergence of new cities and 
expansion into new territories as being the ever changing conditions, they presented a 
constant challenge for governments. Moreover, development of the region was very 
much dependent on the success of its markets, which was directly linked with the 
degree to which law and order prevailed within the market place.  
The institution of hisbah presented a practically viable solution, which was also 
theoretically justified in the Islamic law. It also offered a mechanism of reparation, 
and a chance of rectification of immoral and sometimes illegal activities, without the 
evolvement of court of law in addition to providing a legal guidance to market players 
along with acting as a source of vital information on immoral trends in the market 
through continuous investigation and supervision. For religiously motivated 
governing entities, it also ensured in depth implementation of Islamic law and 
adherence to the Islamic morals. Because of which the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258) 
revitalised it and Umayyad’s transmigrated it to Andalusia, while the Mughal Empire 
simulated it in South Asia.  
There is also historical evidence of cultural borrowing of institution of hisbah, in its 
concepts and in its function, by the medieval Christian states specially the ones which 
bordered Dar al-Islam (land of Islam) (Glick, 1972:70). The viability and versatility 
of hisbah attracted the governing entities interested in regulating the socio economic 
sphere of life. A study conducted by Glick, reveals no major difference in the 
functions or procedures within Christian and Islamic muhtasib and suggests this 
cultural borrowing at Latin kingdoms of Jerusalem, Frankish Cyprus and post 
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Moorish Iberian Peninsula (Glick, 1972:71). The tenth century witnessed a rapid 
growth in the economies of provinces like Leon in the Christian Spain, which 
probably triggered a need for moral guidance in socio economic matters, effective 
supervision, and comprehensive regulation of market (Glick, 1972:71). Therefore, in 
the eleventh century, “emerged a new and distinctive official- zabazoque or 
zavazaure- derived from an Islamic model” along with manual of regulations and 
legislations in the form of Fuero de Leon (Charter of Leon) (Glick, 1972:71). Glick 
(1972:71) suggests the diffusion of the titles and further claims that: “Zabazoque is 
derived from Arabic, sahib al-suq... In the twelfth century, the zabazoque was 
supplanted by the almotacen, derived from the Muhtasib”.  
The almolacen was an official from Castilian and Leon, and as its diffusion was from 
less developed eleventh century sahib al-suq (market official); therefore, it had 
limited powers and there is scare details of its role in historical text, as compared to 
the mustasaf from Valencia whose powers and role were more sophisticatedly 
structured and it’s authority widely accepted, as it was a cloned off a much advanced 
version of institution of hisbah in the thirteenth century (Glick, 1972:72). The hisbah 
manual was diffused into ‘book of mustasaf’ that contains ordinance dated from 1293 
(Glick, 1972:73). Mustasaf accordant with the role of muhtasib, was in charge of the 
market, administrator of municipal matters and custodian of Christian religious and 
moral functions; it also imposed punishments and fines on matters such as religious 
deviation and had power to initiate a judicial process. Moreover, the framework of 
proceedings was also identical to muhtasib, and hearings were conducted in an oral 
argument, as according to the requirement of the time (Glick, 1972:76). Furthermore, 
to epitomise the spirit of hisbah; the execution of legal penalties were designed to 
discourage the malpractice. First the inadequate object or product is confiscated and 
destroyed, and if the violation is repeated three times, then along with the confiscation 
of commodity, the merchant or trader incurs a fine or is placed on a pillory in the 
night dress, encase he or she is unable to pay the fine (Glick, 1972:76). Glick 
(1972:77) cites similar intricacies in the operations of mustasaf, as were faced by the 
muhtasib, especially the jurisdictional disputes with other authorities, and elaborates 
that in Christian experience, similar to the Muslim experience, the:  
nature of the office and its involvement in casesratione materiae meant that the 
mustasaf would in fact come into frequent jurisdictional disputes with other judicial 
and executive authorities. No matter how specific the regulations, the inevitable et  
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aliorum consimilium of the privileges allowed him to broaden his jurisdiction by 
analogy.  
The unclear jurisdiction or boarding of jurisdiction is an important issue within 
operations of institution of hisbah, because the philosophical rationale for this 
institution, can allow it to extend its boundaries endlessly. The use of legal framework 
for ethical purposes also supports the expansion of jurisdiction. In modern times, it is 
the notion of human rights and understanding of economic freedom that keeps the 
modern regulatory institution in check by providing balance of powers.  
 
From the very beginning, the concept of hisbah and then Institution of hisbah, were 
perceived, by authorities of the time, as a pragmatic and prudent. It was seen as fit for 
purpose, because of their ability to Islamise the newly conquered markets and to 
maintain a good level of ethical-practices in the existing markets. The development of 
institution of hisbah, over time, was largely due to the institution’s perceived ability 
to control the malpractice in the market and to establish and improve on the ethical 
principles within the society. The institution of hisbah was developed and structured 
with this purpose. However, in the process of development of the institution, certain 
structural and operational factor created inefficiency. It could be suggested that these 
factors and such inefficiencies are indigenous to any institutionalisation of a 
theological construct that is as broad as ‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’. It 
is also important to examine these factors thoroughly, for understanding whether 
they’re indigenous to religiously aspired regulation or regulatory bodies or an 
operational bottleneck in governing mechanisms from bygone age.   
 
This study also endeavours to view these factors in context of government 
intervention and human rights, as these factors are mainly associated with the realm of 
power and responsibility of an individual and the realm of power and responsibility of 
the State. The discourse on human rights is relevant to this study as it guarantees the 
realm of power and responsibility for the individual, and keeps its existence beyond 
the scope of State.   
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2.3 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INEFFICIENCY OF THE 
INSTITUTION  
The lack of a clear jurisdictions and limits in exercise of power, is a fundamental 
issue, which is not only apparent in the historical accounts on muhtasib but also in 
operations of mustasaf, who directly descended from the model of hisbah. This issue 
roots from the institutional approach ‘to command good and forbid evil’, as it can be 
applied to any part of state, market or civil society, so therefore it can be used at will 
to extend the jurisdictions. In a society the institutional power to command good and 
forbid evil are counter balanced by the rights of individual. Although, Shari’ah has a 
moral code embedded within it and primary sources of Islam does implicitly mention 
certain human rights; however, historically the operations of hisbah were somewhat 
driven by legalistic thinking, ideological bias or political manoeuvring, and the moral 
boundaries of power and the rights of individuals were often ignored. The term ‘rights 
of individuals’ only signifies the rights acknowledged in the primary sources of Islam, 
which were later developed during the late nineteen eighties to form the ‘Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam’ (CDHR). There are many questions raised on 
the legitimacy and authenticity of CDHR; for orthodox Muslims that follow 
traditional Islamic jurisprudence object to the epistemological origin of CDHR, as it 
attempts to conceptually imitate and endeavour to international law; for liberal circles 
in Islam, the CDHR is not relevant because the principles of Shari’ah are compatible 
with Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as long as Shari’ah is 
“differentiated from… body of law developed by the schools of interpretation during 
the classical period.” (Center for Inquiry, 2008:15). Mayer (2007:102), in her 
analysis, highlights that CDHR only signifies equality in dignity and obligation and 
that the document is worded in a way that it does not discuss, draw on or establish any 
equality in rights. The sensitivity in Islamic law over equity of rights arises from the 
classical position of Islamic law and its traces can be observed on the later developed 
notions on the rights of non-Muslims and women.  
The preposterous effects of the underdevelopment of these rights can be witnessed 
throughout the Islamic history, however the prominent incident occurred at the time 
of first Caliph Abu Bakr, when he ordered a freebooter named Fujaa to be burned 
alive; after the execution, Caliph Abu Bakr questioned his own decision in respect to 
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the manner of execution and publicly regretted it (Muir, 1883:29). Muir’s (1883:29) 
analysis suggest that there were legitimate grounds for the application of death 
sentence in accordance with the law of the time; however, the manner of execution is 
questionable, as burning alive is discouraged within the primary sources Islam. This 
incident is important to our inquiry, in two aspects. Firstly, Abu Bakr is considered by 
historians to be the most mild and generous in his judgements (Muir, 1883:29), and he 
is also considered as one of the most pious companions of Prophet Muhammad; a 
status which was acknowledged theologically and in oral traditions, as he was placed 
foremost in the list of Ashrah al-Mubashirina bil Jannah (ten companions who were 
guaranteed paradise in their life time). Secondly, Abu Bakr within his lifetime 
recognised the flaw in the decree he issued and throughout his remaining life 
repeatedly regretted it. The question is not on the use of death penalty but rather in the 
manner fujaa was executed that is by burning alive. On the grounds of these two 
points, it could be argued that if Abu Bakr, who belonged to the best of generations 
according to Islamic theology and who is considered to be one of the most proficient 
in the matters of Islamic law, can overstep with authority, then the probability of 
similar violation is not only quite high, but such violations are the major problem in 
the use of Islamic law as a methodology for governance. In hindsight it could be 
suggested that the only framework, which could have prevented Abu Bakr from 
issuing such a decree, would be a thorough framework of theologically accepted, and 
legally binding acknowledgement of human rights to prevent transgression of the 
right of the individuals by the authority. Such a framework could also be the only 
means of regulating and balancing the authority, which ‘commands good and forbids 
wrong’, and it could be further argued that there must be substantial grounds for 
theologically justified concept of human rights in primary sources of Islam, for Abu 
Bakr to conclude that the decree issued is morally incorrect. The ontology of notion of 
human rights is relevant, as it guarantees the realm of power and responsibility for the 
individual, and keeps its existence beyond the scope of state.   
The examples of this conflict between the rights of individual and the power vested in 
‘commanding good and forbidding evil’, becomes further prominent in the narrative 
of Umar Ibn-al-Khattab, the second Rightly Guided Caliph, in which Umar while 
performing the duty of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’, suspects 
consumption of wine in a house and to catch the culprit in the act, Umar enters the 
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house by climbing the garden wall; however, the residing man retorts, that although 
he has committed one sin but Umar has committed three, that is: he spied, entered the 
house without permission and failed to enter through the door, contrary to 
unequivocal instruction of doing so, in the Qur’an (49:123; 02:1894; 24:275) (Al-
Hindi, Vol 2-hadith No. 3696:167). Umar Ibn-al-Khattab accepted this argument and 
assured the party concerned that these principles shall not be violated under his rule. 
However, neither this incident, nor the previously discussed lead to further 
development in the concept of privacy and rights.  
These are also not isolated incidents, as there are many examples of similar nature 
spread across the Islamic history. The issue of privacy and rights is of particular 
importance for efficient operations of hisbah and exercise of powers associated with 
‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’; as it defines and narrows the scope of the 
institution and provides it with the framework for the institution to work under. It also 
could potentially provide foundational basis for defining the extent to which 
institution of hisbah ought to intervene in the market and society.  
Cook (2009:81) extends this discussion and cites three examples of similar kind from 
different eras and he concludes that the primary sources of Islam and early Muslim 
scholars’ approach this issue from the position that the “potential enemy of privacy is 
not society but the state”, or the institution which exercises ‘commanding of right and 
forbidding of wrong’. The primary sources of Islam address this problem by 
contriving three foundational principles, which Cook (2000:80) calls ‘respect for 
privacy’. The first principles is mentioned in Qur’an6 (49:12) and prophetic traditions7 
which prohibits spying and prying; the second is the moral obligation of concealing 
                                                      
3 O you who have believed, avoid much [negative] assumption. Indeed, some assumption is sin. And 
do not spy or backbite each other. Would one of you like to eat the flesh of his brother when dead? 
4 And it is not righteousness to enter houses from the back, but righteousness is [in] one who fears 
Allah. And enter houses from their doors. And fear Allah that you may succeed. 
5 O you who have believed, do not enter houses other than your own houses until you ascertain 
welcome and greet their inhabitants. That is best for you; perhaps you will be reminded. 
6 “O you who have believed, avoid much [negative] assumption. Indeed, some assumption is sin. And 
do not spy or backbite each other. Would one of you like to eat the flesh of his brother when dead? You 
would detest it. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is Accepting of repentance and Merciful”. 
7 Narrated Abu Huraira: The Prophet said, “Beware of suspicion, for suspicion is the worst of false 
tales; and do not look for the others' faults and do not spy, and do not be jealous of one another, and do 
not desert (cut your relation with) one another, and do not hate one another; and O Allah's worshipers! 
Be brothers (as Allah has ordered you!)”.  (Sahih Bukari, 73:90-92) 
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that which could dishonour a Muslim, as stated in the Prophetic traditions8; and the 
third is the sanctity of home based on the Quranic versus (02:128; 24:27)9 (Cook, 
2000:80). Moreover, in Shari’ah any act cannot be legally examined unless it is 
apparent. There is even an authentic oral tradition of prophet, which state that reading 
someone’s written material without their permission, will lead to hell fire (Abu-
Dawud, hadith No.1142).    
These simple but conjoint principles, where literally interpreted by most of Muslim 
jurists and theologian, consequently they did not develop into any legal conventions 
on privacy or rights, which could extend to socio economic sphere and diametrically 
oppose the judiciary powers by creating an equilibrium between the rights of 
individual and jurisdiction of the state or institution exercising the commanding of 
right and forbidding of wrong on market or on society. The lack of theological 
development on these issues such as private autonomy and private morality, induced 
the European Court of Human Rights to declare that: “the constant evolution of public 
freedoms have no place in ... Sharia ,.. [and] Sharia ... clearly diverges from 
Convention values, ... [in] the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public 
life in accordance with religious precept” (European Court of Human Rights, 
December 27th, 2011). 
It could be argued that the manner of intervention referred by European Court of 
Human Rights is not a particular approach innate to Islam. For example: the 
intervention into private and public life stems from the legal theory and it may be 
suggested that different traditionalist and rationalist doctrines, which existed before 
the development of al-Shafi’s rudimentary principles of usul al-fiqh may have 
differently approached the issue of state or institutional intervention in public and 
private sphere. Furthermore, Hallaq’s (1997:22-32) analysis into the historical 
discourse on different Islamic legal theories suggests that prior to the acceptance of 
al-Shafi’s Risala:  
                                                      
8  Narrated 'Abdullah bin Umar: Allah's Apostle said, “A Muslim is a brother of another Muslim, so he 
should not oppress him, nor should he hand him over to an oppressor. Whoever fulfilled the needs of 
his brother, Allah will fulfill his needs; whoever brought his (Muslim) brother out of a discomfort, 
Allah will bring him out of the discomforts of the Day of Resurrection, and whoever screened a 
Muslim, Allah will screen him on the Day of Resurrection”. (Sahih Bukari, 43: 622). 
9 “And it is not righteousness to enter houses from the back, but righteousness is [in] one who fears 
Allah. And enter houses from their doors. And fear Allah that you may succeed” (Qur’an, 2:189); “O 
you who have believed, do not enter houses other than your own houses until you ascertain welcome 
and greet their inhabitants. That is best for you; perhaps you will be reminded” (Qur’an, 24:27). 
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The Quran as a source of law hardly needed any justification, though the same cannot 
be said of the Sunna of Prophet [.] ... Shafii’s predecessors resort to ra’y with little 
attention to Sunna. Shafii regulates ra’y in the form of qiyas... Ibn-Hanbal avoids qiyas, 
but not completely. Dawud completely rejects it in favor of a literal reading.  
Moreover, as the extend of state or institutional intervention in private and public 
sphere is not explicitly defined in Qur’an, therefore it would be argued that with the 
diversity in nature of legal thinking, different methodologies of extracting law, and 
among the variety of groups: ranging from the rationalist who took Qur’an and 
rationalism to be sufficient for interpretation and regulation, to traditionalist like al-
Shaybani who advocated the invalidity of legal rulings, if they are not “based upon a 
binding text” (Hallaq, 1997:19); it may not be possible to unify the position of Islam 
as a whole on the matter of intervention, but by using combination of these 
approaches, it might have been possible to balance the intervention of state or 
institution with the rights of individuals in market and in society, in a way that good is 
still allowed and evil is still prohibited. However, historically such a course of action 
was not taken, and Bonte (1981:54) suggests, that there are two primary causes, that 
is: “the transformation of linage ‘endogamy’... into strata endogamy; the 
nonequivalence of the different categories of filiation”.  
The development towards a State infrastructure and departure from the tribal 
dynamics of Prophet’s time, prompted a need for regulating the political powers. 
However, the causes listed by Bonte (1981:54) drove the development away from an 
egalitarian structure. Consequently, the solution was developed in the form of 
furstenspiegel (mirror for princes) literature, which consists of “inherited tradition of 
wisdom, preserved in books in the form of anecdote, aphorism and story” (Heck, 
2000:226), while the large part of it deal with ethics, which are either in the form of 
maxims or developed into treatises, by using Greek philosophy, and the traditions of 
wisdom are inherited from “Arabo-Islamic... Indo-Persian and Greco-Hellenistic 
traditions”(Heck, 2000:228). Furstenspiegel literature was recognised in Islamic 
world as a necessary knowledge in the art of governance and Qudama suggests that 
this literature was primarily designed to act as a theory of state (Heck, 2000:227).  
The use of furstenspiegel literature to regulate the political powers, introduced the 
ethics into governance, without allowing: the development of any legally binding 
understanding of universal equality, without any augmentation in the idea of private 
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space, which is outside the reach of political powers, and without any official 
recognition on inherent nature of fundamental rights of human. This meant that there 
was not a clearly defined structure in which the State or hisbah can ‘command good 
and forbid wrong’, without crossing the boundaries of justice. Even with the 
underdeveloped notion of rights, and obscure understanding of social justice, certain 
act of State, Caliph or hisbah official were understood as unjust, in the commentary 
written by the Muslim thinkers on the events of their epoch. Therefore, it was not just 
an issue of underdevelopment of right but the problem of imbalanced and unregulated 
nature of political powers. 
The operational and structural deficiency of institution of hisbah goes more further 
from the rudimentary privacy laws and underdeveloped human rights. Glick 
(1972:80-81) considers the “office of Muhtasib was less than a full success”, he 
further elaborates that: “there was no distinction made in Islamic law between 
municipal jurisdictions, it becomes clear how Islamic cities were unable to develop 
municipal institutions that had enough internal consistency to survive the tenure of a 
weak or corrupt incumbent”. 
Glick’s (1972) conclusion is based on the comparison of fifteenth century ‘mathessep 
of Cyprus’, which was another European version of muhtasib; with an eleventh 
century muhtasib, when the institution was mostly corrupt and State largely weak. 
Although the conclusion may still be valid but the qualification of the sample used in 
the Glick’s argument does not seem adequate, as the institution of hisbah did evolve 
in its functions and responsibilities, and continued as an integral part of State 
infrastructure under the Ottoman empire (1299-1929). In Glick’s defence, the term 
hisbah or muhtasib does not appear in the registers of Ottoman administration, and 
due to a lack of direct reference to hisbah or muhtasib, this may appear as an 
extremity in the existence of institution of hisbah (Cahen et al., 2010). However, in 
our analysis, the institution of hisbah survived in the Ottoman period and it was 
officially addressed as the institution of ‘ihtisab’, this position is supported by 
majority of studies conducted on Ottoman Empire. 
The only change of reference between the institution of hisbah and the institution of 
ihtisab is that Ottomans referred the evolved and developed form of hisbah as 
institution of ihtisab; and the philosophy of hisbah formed a part of the dominant 
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causal origin of the institute of ihtisab and the descriptive information associated with 
it. Cahen et al. (December 18th, 2010).in their research observed that “regulations 
concerning the duties of the muḥtasib were codified in the iḥtisāb ḳānūnnāmeleri ... 
[and] iḥtisāb finally came to denote the whole aggregate of functions that had 
devolved upon the muḥtasib or iḥtisāb āg̲h̲āsi̊”. El-haj (2005:98) also suggests that 
during sixteenth century; market inspector (muhtasib), judge and ahl al-suk (people of 
market) collectively determined the affairs concerning ihtisab.  
Under the early Ottomans the regulatory framework was of two layers that is internal 
and external. Akhies (brothers) used to operate in structure similar to guilds and they 
regulated the market internally, by setting quality standards, regulating prices, 
controlling policies and practices, and by managing legal and ethical issues, while 
market supervisor regulated the market as whole, while also externally managing 
akhi-guilds (Erdem, 2010:25-26). The akhi movement started as a result of social 
change and a need to compete with foreign traders, and existed between twelve and 
sixteenth century (Unluhisarcikli, 2007:115). Akhies had socio-religious, economic 
and political influence; as they aimed to concentrate on social equality and economic 
alliance by consolidating on social solidarity rather than competition (Unluhisarcikli, 
2007:116). They also discouraged unfair advantages and prevented monopolies 
(Erdem, 2010:26).  
At the time of the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II (1481-1512), akhies in an attempt to 
standardise the legal and ethical regulations, complied ihtisab kanunnameleri (laws of 
municipality); which was a collection of “municipality laws, laws of customer rights, 
environmental and food regulations” (Erdem, 2010:26). Furthermore, Cahen et al. 
(December 18th, 2010) argue that ihtisab official (ihtisab aghasi) used the books of 
ihtisab kanunnameleri as a guideline for levying taxes, and for supervision, inspection 
and punishment. The evolution of ihtisab aghasi from hisbah meant that the market 
official was entrusted with duties to collect taxes, such as import duty, sales tax and 
others. The office was farmed out annually (iltizam), so that the uncertain stream of 
revenue from taxes can be transformed into fixed periodic payments; this was 
achieved through a process of regional nominations and government approvals, where 
upon the selected individual paid a fixed sum in exchange for the right to farm taxes. 
The new setup, exposed the ihtisab aghasi, to a whole new set of problems; due to 
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which the system was abolished in Istanbul in 1826, and the responsibilities and 
powers were reassigned to bureaucracy, which operated under the title of ihtisab 
naziri (Cahen et al., 18th, 2010).  
The system of iltizam also has attracted various criticisms by different historians and 
scholars. For Mustafa Ali the problem is in the appointments, which are made on 
monetary qualifications, rather than merit; while El-haj (2005:96-97) suggests that the 
office was used as a stepping-stone for higher offices and therefore the nominations 
and appointments were subject to adverse selection. Moreover, the subjection of the 
appointment process to market forces also caused moral hazard, as it was in the 
interest of appointed individual to introduce new taxes. Cahen et al. (December 18th, 
2010) report that there were some occasions when sultan had to interfere and cancel 
the taxes imposed by muhtasib as they were considered unjust and “prejudicial to the 
population”.  
The alternative to this system within the literature is the ‘Islamic meritocracy’, where 
ulema (shari’a scholars) are appointed for such positions, and admission into a degree 
of alim (scholar), mufti (cleric) mufassir (interpreter) and others, act as a merit. 
Majority of medieval, and most of contemporary Islamic theologians and Muslim 
scholars have shown supports for such a system, which we refer to as Islamic 
meritocracy. In ‘Mustafa Ali’s Council for Sultans of 1581’, Ali acknowledges the 
abundance of examples in history, when corrupt and unjust officials were appointed 
because of an Islamic meritocratic system. However, in Ali’s (1979:75) viewpoint, the 
problem is not intrinsic to the system and it can be overcome, by reducing the 
influence of politicians and government officials on ulema (Shari’ah as well as 
Islamic theologians) and by regulating the interaction of ulema (with other 
government and state officials.  
Ali similar to other Muslim historians and scholars, basis his recommendations on the 
high frequency of historical evidence, in which politicians, government officials or 
Caliph influenced ulema and power they exercised or attempted to exercise on ulema. 
In contrast to the lack of any clear historical reference on attempts made by the 
governing class or Islamic State to intervene or arbitrate in the training or education of 
Jurists, jurisconsults or ulema. Therefore, there is a general assumption among 
Muslim historians and scholars, including Mustafa Ali, Al-Ghazzali, Al-Mawardi and 
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Ibn-Taymiyyah that without any external political or social influence, the majority of 
ulema will be competent for the post of muhtasib. This assumption is based upon the 
presuppositions that the system educating Shari’ah is proficient to produce 
sufficiently skilled scholars, who are competent enough to chair institutions like 
Institution of hisbah; Islamic legal theory have adequate framework and sufficient 
procedural steps to produce rulings and guidelines for removal of difficulties: by 
facilitating individual and societal needs, through reduction and humanisation of 
religious obligations, and realisation of the public welfare and the universal justice;   
and lastly that the institution of ifta can satisfactorily develop the legal doctrines in 
response to any pressing needs. The confidence in the system of education rises from 
the politically remote development of the system. For Muslim thinkers, the lack of 
any political influence on the education system, theological literature and the legal 
theories, means that the literature captures the true essence of Islam; however, the 
distance from political circles raises the questions of practicality and sustainability of 
political and legal theories, and effectiveness of education system. 
2.3.1 The Jurisprudence of Jurisconsults 
The mainstream system of educating Islam has evolved and developed since the time 
of Prophet, into a system, which by its very design concentrates on producing 
jurisconsults. Such a system subsequently enrooted “an absolutist and legalistic 
Islam” (Sajoo, 2002:116), where lawyers (in broader sense) make up the majority of 
intellectual class, a legalistic society which “does not necessarily uphold moral 
virtures” (Sardar, 2011:372), and a “state that adhered to a totalitarian mode of 
government” (Sajoo, 2002:97). Sardar (2011:372) suggests the reason for this is that: 
“The Qur’an seeks to build a moral society, not a legalistic one... [but] Muslim 
tradition sees the Qur’an as a book of law, rather than the source of principles for the 
making of laws”. 
The scholars expounding Islamic law according to Hegazy (2005:133) are, therefore, 
“neither equipped nor required to take into account public policy concerns” and in 
contrast to a public legislator they are unable to accommodate the “needs of different 
societal groups”. Moreover, the theologians and scholars are only trained on the 
religious theory but not, for example, on the constraints of practical application of 
religious theory in current era, methodologies for improvement in operational 
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performance, and implementation strategies for different cultures and for societies 
with different socio economic conditions.  
It should be noted that the nature of inquiry, Islamic scholars produced by this 
education system are trained to lead is on the legal and illegal attribute of things. 
Therefore, as these scholars were appointed as officials for institution of hisbah, the 
inquiry lead by institution of hisbah also became legalistic in nature. Consequently, 
the construction of regulation, methods of implementation them and delivery of 
punishments, were governed by the Islamic legal theory. This could either be the 
reason that independently designed framework for the institution of hisbah remained 
undeveloped; or this could be the consequence of lack in religious consensus, absence 
of political incentive and fear of repercussions for developing a framework for hisbah, 
which could operate parallel to Islamic legal theory.  
The legalistic approach of hisbah officials and the governance of hisbah through 
Islamic legal theory meant that institution of hisbah, crossed into the jurisdiction of 
police and court of law, which caused jurisdictional disputes and this also made 
hisbah a part of State legal structure. Being a part of legal structure, hisbah not only 
was unable to attain its institutional independence but it also made hisbah subject to 
political manoeuvring.  
The jurisdictional disputes of hisbah are prominent throughout the history of hisbah. 
Al-Mawardi in Al-Ahkamal Sultaniyya has specially tried to distinguish between the 
operational boundaries and subject-matter jurisdiction of institution of hisbah, police, 
court of law and tort laws. However, subject-matter jurisdiction is not the highest 
operational risk. The general cause of inadequate echelons or failed internal processes 
and systems was the lack of liberty in deciding on cases that came before hisbah. The 
duty of ‘commanding of right and forbidding wrong’ is not instructed in 
institutionalised format within the primary sources of Islam. The institutionalisation 
of this duty was for the assurance that such an institution will be able to protect the 
Shari’ah in socio-economic sphere and implement the values imbedded in the primary 
sources. Without institutional independence hisbah as an institution is weak and prone 
to external pressure; therefore, there are many historical incidents where it failed to 
justly and fairly adjudicate disputes, preserve the rule of law and the fundamental 
justice. Grunebaum (1971:166) also argues this and suggests that:  
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Hisba, so admirably devised in the flexibility of its tasks to suit the contingencies of of 
an irresponsible government...[the absence of institutional independence meant that] 
the near-impossibility of preser-ving [preserving] a clean conscience when pressured 
by the caliph on the grounds of raison d’etate.  
The absence of institutional independence is unique to hisbah and is not present in 
mustasaf, namely the European counterpart. Mustasaf continued to evolve within the 
medieval European cities and these cities including the ones in eastern Spain 
developed a system of municipal government, which over time had allowed the 
participation of popular view into the making of public policy (Glick, 1972:81; 
Mundy and Riesenberg, 1958:87). Thus, the popular view or electoral power balanced 
the national interest with public interest. The European cities achieved it through the 
“amplification of the idea of the universitas” (Mundy and Riesenberg, 1958:87), 
which advocates the equality of all male citizens (Mundy and Riesenberg, 1958:58). 
With increase in popularity and demand universitas eventually provided the 
constitutional basis for the patrician governments of Europe and transformed the 
medieval towns into republic (Mundy and Riesenberg, 1958:58).  
Qur’an implies the idea of equality, which is then expressly stated in the oral 
traditions of the Prophet. However, the verse10 that implies the concept of equality 
continues on further, to state that the ‘righteousness (taqwa) is the standard for 
nobility in the sight of God”. The emphasis on equality within the primary sources 
provided the necessary foundations for the development of a theory of legal 
egalitarianism; however, the standard of nobility was introduced in the State and 
government affairs. Taqwa, on the other hand, has been understood as a variable that 
transformed the flat structure of equal human beings into a hierarchal structure of 
unequal humans, where the individual’s  level of piety (taqwa.) is the qualifying 
instrument for the inequality. This distinction is similar to the argument presented by 
William Letwin (as cited in Sen, 1992:14-15) that: “people are unequal, it is rational 
to presume that they are to be treated unequally”-The only difference in Islamic 
position and Letwin’s argument is that the measure of human’s worth according to 
Islam is taqwa. This doctrine although exists in the primary source, but it was 
introduced into political economic sphere by the second Caliph Umar Ibn-al-Khattab. 
For example: Abu Bakr, the first Caliph who succeeded the prophet in the political 
                                                      
10 “O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes 
that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most 
righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted”. (Quran, 49:13) 
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framework; he equally divided the spoils of war and took no distinction between 
“young or old, slaves or free, male or female” (Levy, 1962:57). However, Umar Ibn-
al-Khattab, although repeatedly emphasised the equality at birth, but while 
distributing spoils of war, introduced the idea of distinguishing between the people 
and scaling the distribution of the spoils accordingly to the time of conversion and 
longest standing in Islam (Levy, 1962:57). Umar Ibn-al-Khattab used participation of 
individuals in key historical events of early Islam as a standard of nobility. The order 
of distinction started with earliest companions of the Prophet and then the group 
which migrated with the Prophet, followed by the Ansar, the group of people which 
received the Prophet in Medina, continued by who fought battle of Badr and who did 
not, and then the habitants of Mecca (Levy, 1962:57). Umar had used such a 
categorisation, as there is special emphasis on these groups in the primary sources of 
Islam. The inequality based on taqwa was also introduced to invalidate the social and 
genealogical inequalities that were common practice in pre-Islamic Arabia.    
After few generations and under Umayyad Caliphate when this distinction was no 
longer possible, tribalism followed by Arab nationalism became qualification of 
nobility. This was contrary to the unequivocal declaration of Prophet, delivered in his 
last sermon that all men are equal and an Arab has no superiority over a foreigner. 
Interestingly this passage, stating the equality of all Muslims, is absent from the 
account of last sermon given by ibn-Hisham (died 833) and by al-Waqidi (748-822), 
and it only appears half a century later in the work of Tarikh al-Yaqubi (Levy, 
1962:57).  
Over the years, the Islamic empire expanded and the number of non-Arab Muslims 
also increased with it. This created a non-Arab political voice, and strengthened the 
Persian influence. In the middle of eighth century and after the regime change, non-
Arab political influence gathered political grounds for the implementation of equality 
in society and politics. This era is especially renowned for the fabrication of Prophet’s 
traditions, which were then used to supplement the case for equality. With half 
Persian and Abbasid Caliphate in power, the equality on the grounds of race, 
nationality and origin was acknowledged and established, however this did not 
stopped the evolution in the public sentiments on the classification of nobility, and the 
standard of nobility switched from race and nationality to social standing and 
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monetary worth. Al-Fadl b. Yahya, who was an Abbasid courtier is quoted by Ibn-al-
Faqih (903 CE), to have said that human beings fall in four classification, in this 
order: the ruling class, people with knowledge and wisdom, people with wealth and 
people who have cultural importance; while all remaining are considered as the worst 
human beings incapable of any intellectual or social benefit (as cited in Levy, 
1962:67).   
2.3.2 The Evolution of Legal Theory 
During all this, the evolution of fiqh was also simultaneously underway and many 
scholars working on different theological subjects were starting to emerge from 
different parts of Muslim empire. The Islamic scholarship always had religious 
devotees and a degree of public support, but after receiving more prominence under 
Abbasid Caliphate, their social status further increased. The Islamic scholarship 
extracted scriptural justification to support their right to precede the public, similarly 
the rulers also extracted scriptural justification for almost absolute obedience. 
Consequently, Islamic scholarship followed the ruling class in the ranking of social 
order. For commoners, it was not possible to join ruling class without a conquest; 
therefore only available opportunity to jump the class ladder was by joining the 
Islamic scholarship through education. Therefore, in Islamic societies knowledge 
became one of the many instruments to measure a human’s ‘worth’ and scholarship 
became one of the important qualification for nobility.  
The evolution in the qualification of nobility along with continuous social and 
political emphasis in inequality supported by authentic or fabricated religious 
justification; which also had influence on the development of fiqh and other religious 
sciences, as jurists attempted to reconcile the customs, traditions and civil practice 
with Islamic law. The influence is more prominent in the concept of kufu in Islamic 
family and marriage law, which promotes financial, occupational, religious and 
ancestral inequalities within the Muslims, to the extent that it distinguishes between 
Quraysh (tribe of Prophet) and non-Quraysh Arabs, Arabs and non-Arabs, and 
discourages the marriage between them. Hanafites followed by Shafiites are more 
inclined towards the unequal status of Arabs and non-Arabs in this matter, as 
compared to Malikites, as most of Malikites had African roots (Levy, 1962:67). In the 
matter of kufu, the jurists attempted to reconcile the original position of Shari’ah with 
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the customs of the time, and during the reconciliation the scale tilted towards the 
customs of the society. Therefore, it could be further suggested that development of 
other branches of Islamic law may also be effected in similar way by the customs of 
the time and most importantly by the theoretical and practical promotion of inequality 
within the society. 
The doctrine of ijma (consensus of Muslim community) is the third most fundamental 
source of law in current legal theory of Shari’ah, was developed by interpreting the 
Prophetic traditions, in a manner that consensus of Islamic scholars was considered as 
the consensus of Muslim community. Al-Shafi used ijma in his legal theory as the 
opinion of community of scholars, while the pre-Shafi ijma was considerably a 
diverse concept, which mainly meant that, “that matters that are agreed upon in 
Medina (al-amr al-mjtama’ ‘alayhi bi’l-madina)” (Lowry, 2007:321). In pre-Shafi 
period, it also served variety of purposes from being a methodology for confirming 
the prophetic traditions, to a method for substantiating the universal nature of a 
doctrine, in addition of being an independent source of law, and it had various 
formations that is consensus among all, consensus among two locales, consensus of 
all locale and consensus of Muslim scholars (Lowry, 2007:321). Although it is argued 
that pre-Shafi understanding of ijma produced unclear distinctions between Sunnah 
(prophetic traditions), ijma (what people think) and amal (what they do); and al-
Shafi’s restriction of ijma to the opinion of scholars corresponds with al-Shafi’s 
epistemology and his views on the universal systemisation of divine law (Lowry, 
2007:320-322).  
However, if we view the development in the understanding of ijma with the evolution 
in the standard of nobility, we see that both are consistent with each other. The pre-
Shafi understanding of ijma, which mainly restricts the consensus to the opinion of 
few people through a geographical distinction, corresponds with the nationalistic, 
tribal and genealogical discrimination in the Arab society under the Umayyads (661-
750 CE); and that the society was accustomed to drawing such distinctions in social, 
political and religious matters. Al-Shafi (767-820 CE) was born and educated under 
the rule of Abbasids (750-1517 CE), when the community of scholars had achieved a 
distinct social status, during the fall of Umayyads and the key role played by the 
scholars in bringing the political and social change was still in living memory. It 
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could be argued that these factors might have compelled al-Shafi to consider opinion 
of scholars as more prudent then opinion of public.  
It could also be argued that restricting ijma to religious scholars was a requirement of 
the epoch or a necessity for circumscribing the Islamic law within Qur’an and 
Sunnah, or an essential agent for a stable legal theory, nonetheless the restricting ijma 
to religious scholars must have had some social effects and may have strengthened the 
notion of inequality in the society. The notion of inequality in the consensus (ijma), 
which acts as tools for extracting the law, may not be directly harmful to the society 
or to the operations of hisbah. It was when such ideas were exported from the legal 
theory, to the public sphere and used in the governance of institutions and public 
bodies, that they produced adverse effects. Moreover, it was not the legal theory that 
pioneered this idea, as it was Arab customs and culture, which had the notion of 
inequality imbedded in them.  
Thereafter, with change in political and social events, the criteria of inequality further 
evolved from ancestral nobility to acquired knowledge. Interestingly, Islamic societies 
showed no resistance in accepting it and it was perceived as just and fair standard to 
measure inequality, and many philosophers, theologians and jurists supported this 
position and viewed knowledge to be directly proportional to piety.  
The manner of conceptualising inequality and the overall acceptance of this idea, 
influenced the way in which the structure and formation of communities, and settings 
of society was understood. This understanding then had influence on the development 
of Islamic political theories, which theorised the tacit assumption of inequality and 
theoretically magnified the gap between social classes. The injudicious, imprudent 
and misinformed impression of public, established by restricting ijma to religious 
scholars, further developed within decades of al-Shafi into a political stance that 
general public has iconoclastic nature and nonconformist religiosity. In early tenth 
century, Qudama b. Ja'far authored a work on theory of state and formation of 
communities; the argument presented in this, followed the line of reasoning that the 
public has ghayy or misguided behaviour, faragh or rebellious nature and a tendency 
to deviate into religious and economic idleness, and this leads to chaos and disorder, 
which can only be prevented or stopped by hayba or dread of political community 
(Heck, 2002:222).  
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Hayba (root of Arabic word h.y.b) is an attribute of the powerful, both divine and 
worldly, which rests on fear (makhafa) and inspires awe in the hearts of the subjects, 
for obedience (Marmon, 1995:64). This idea received prominence in Hellenized’s 
version of Aristotle, where it played a dual role that is ‘use of charisma and fear, by 
the rulers, towards the subjects, for the purpose of better administration’; this theory 
was then adopted by Qudama and hayba was introduced in the political philosophy of 
Arabo-Perso-Islamic synthesis, as an Islamised version of realpolitik (political 
realism) (Heck, 2002:219-224), although Heck’s (2002:218) analysis suggest that 
Qudama, who was also a senior state official under Abbasids rule, presented a theory 
of state and not a religious theory. Thereafter hayba became an effective agent in 
Islamic political theories, and later on al-Mawardi suggested it as an “effective agent 
in the formation of polity, even as an order in its own right and the very basis of 
political power” (Heck, 2002: 225). The above mentioned argument and the line of 
reasoning it follows, when used in ilm al-siyasa (knowledge of governance), means 
that the knowledge essential to the political community, for the formation of a stable 
state (nizam al-mulk) and welfare of polity, is not the understanding required to do 
ijtihad (interpret law), or to have a philosophically formulated faculty of reasoning, or 
a thorough understanding on needs of their subjects and requirements of polity; but it 
is the ability of political community to exercise hayba, by using charisma to inspire 
subjects out of idleness and by using dread to obliterate their rebellious nature and 
ameliorate their religious deviations (Heck, 2002: 222). The notion of hayba was also 
endorsed by many political scientists like al-Mawardi (Vogel, 2000:299), many jurists 
and theologians like al-Ghazzali (Cook, 2000:431) and many historians like ibn-Sa’id, 
also used it to explain the political success and failure of different Caliphates (Safran, 
2000:71). The line of reasoning, idea of hayba and perception of untrustworthiness of 
public are not just part of literary discourse, but they were used in the policymaking.  
Although institution of hisbah was an administrative organ of the state, it was not 
autonomous in its operations and methodologies, therefore it had to work within the 
framework conceptualised by such political theories, which restricted it from 
developing its own theories of administration based on the practical experiences of 
regulating the market or by directly interpreting the transcendental sources. The 
hisbah manuals and historical account on hisbah’s operation, along with the way in 
which hisbah intervened in public and private life, and the kind of punishments given, 
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coincides with the underlying assumptions used in the construction of political 
theories.  
The time of early Abbasids, was also full of political turmoil, in which the legitimacy 
of Abbasid’s rule was challenged, an alternative political theory of Imamate was 
proposed, along with armed uprising of different groups (Kennedy, 1981), which 
could be the historical rationale behind the political stance on untrustworthiness, 
iconoclastic nature and nonconformist religiosity of public. Moreover, the immediate 
challenge for Abbasid’s was “the integration of peoples of diverse cultural and 
religious origins into a single Islamically defined framework” (Heck, 2002:15), and to 
develop and maintain an inter-mutual religious identity under a religiously justifiable 
administrative structure (Heck, 2002:15).  
Qudama presented the solution in his political theory, which, according to Heck 
(2002:15), had the literary status of an encyclopaedia at the time. Qudama considers a 
charismatic ruler as a formative agent, able to create the political community and 
assimilate the subjects, along with Islamic law as a foundation for polity, which can 
“win the Islamic respectability” (Heck, 2002:179) and provide legitimacy for the rules 
of political powers, while also establishing the inter-mutual religious identity for 
integrating people with diverse back grounds and conflicting theological affiliations, 
to establish a communal identity which can unites all (Heck, 2002:15-220). Heck 
(2002:16-179) argues that the political theories suggesting foundational characteristic 
of Islamic law in polity, does not coincides or synchronise with the Islamic 
theological debates, theories and positions on the legitimacy of religious, legal and 
political rights to rule the Muslim community and that, these political theories express 
“Islamic law more universally, not... in terms of its content, but its form”. Heck 
(2002:221) suggests that this is because the political literature did not spread out from 
jurisprudence or theology, and it did not originate from religious circles, and neither 
with a motive of development in the Islamic perspective of politics, instead it was 
largely authored by administrative circles, with principal interest in the “exercise of 
power” and “primary inspiration... [in] the construction of a theory to justify a state 
which happened to be Islamic”  
In other words, the political theories of the time were administrative solutions, 
constructed in response to the political turmoil and social challenges. Moreover, the 
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relation between the law and ruler, went through its own evolution, starting from an 
ambiguous nature in the first century of Islam, to Umayyads contention on legitimacy 
of authority based on status of divinely chosen leadership (khalifat Allah), which is 
divinely entrusted for implementation of transcendental design (Heck, 2004:94-95). 
Abu Yusuf through Kitab al-Kharaj further developed this position, as he suggests 
that: “it is the judgement (ra’y) of the ruler that establishes the common good” (Heck, 
2004:95). Ibn-al-Muqaffa in al-Risala fi’l-Sahaba further signified the role of ruler’s 
judgement, by considering it as a source of law, and setting it along side the other two 
sources, that is Qur’an and Prophetic traditions (Heck, 2004:95-96). This special 
status is, however, not passed onto the officials appointed by the ruler, as Ibn-al-
Muqaffa argues that this would make the officials equal in status to the ruler and ruler 
will have no unique characteristics (Heck, 2004:96). Qudama also takes similar 
position, as he suggests that singularity of authority is necessary for the unity (Heck, 
2002:221), and that (Heck, 2002:221): “the ruler is the embodiment of the 
state...There is thus no room for arbitrary rule”. The political literature generally 
supports this position and this stirred Islamic political theories on an opposite 
directions to the one which leads towards the distribution of power and institutional 
autonomy.  
Heck (2002) also suggests that the political theories were not shaped by any 
theological directive, instead the political theories were structured to strictly address 
the political issues of the time, as the Abbasid’s attempted to “reformulate...from a 
revolutionary and quasi-messianic movement...to an established state” (Heck, 
2004:95). The establishment of notion on inequality and the evolution of inequality 
from the categorisation of filiation, to establishment of clear boundaries between 
social classes, and emergence of political class and scholarly class as two important 
classes, coincide with the line of reasoning in the development of political theories. 
Distribution of power, institutional autonomy and systematic induction of public 
opinion in the running of state, would have been in direct conflict with the 
classification of nobility, accepted social class structure, and self-interest of political 
elite.  
The classification of nobility still stands within the Sunni Islam, while the Shia Islam 
still have an element of genealogy in their classification of nobility. The acceptance of 
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inequality was also the primary difference between the evolution of Islamic hisbah 
and its European version. Unlike the concept of universitas which helped in the 
evolution of autonomous municipal councils; the Islamic concept of everyone is equal 
at birth did not evolve to provide autonomy to public bodies, nor at any stage public 
opinion was legitimatised to even partially play a systematic role in the governance of 
public bodies like hisbah. This was despite the scriptural support for Muslim 
communities’ opinion and the divine trust in the affairs of Muslim community as a 
whole, which is mentioned in Qur’an and in the traditions of the Prophet. The Islamic 
scholars, who were most of the time very sceptical of political powers, all together 
neglected the role of the government working under the extension of legal rulings, 
such as ijma. Kamali (2002:7) also analysis this and observes that: “The schools of 
jurisprudence continued to grow, and succeeded in generating a body of doctrine, 
which, however valuable, was by itself not enough to harness the widening gap 
between the theory and practice of law in government”. This was due to reluctance in 
including the different sectors of society in the process of law derivation. In theory the 
Islamic scholars with appropriate level of knowledge, would be just and pious, and 
the legal doctrine they are trained in would allow them to efficiently, effectively and 
Islamic-ally forbid evil and subscribe good in society and in market; however, this can 
never be guaranteed in practice.  
2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Islamic thought, argue for institution of hisbah to be the establishment with an 
institutionalised framework for creating an ethical practice within the society and the 
market. The uniqueness of the institution of hisbah lead to its wide spread existence, 
and the concept of hisbah was also borrowed by other cultures. The importance of this 
institution is vital to Islamic finance industry of current time, as its uses theological 
techniques similar to the ones that produced the hisbah manuals.  
Islamic finance industry also uses theological interventionism based on philosophical 
logic similar to the institution of hisbah, while our discussion in this chapter suggests 
that in operations, there is a gap between the theory and practice of hisbah. This 
conclusion is similar to the concerns raised by modern academics, on the governance 
of Islamic finance industry, such as Asutay (2012:94), Badawi (1997: 20), Khan 
(2007:2860 and Siddiqi (2004).  
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The examination of historical operations of hisbah demonstrates that the gap in theory 
and practice, severely limited the effectiveness of hisbah to uphold public interest and 
Islamic interest. It is also essential at this point, to incorporate the modern view of 
Islamic economist, such as Siddiqi (1996) and Khan (1995), who in line with Ibn 
Taymiyah’s (1992) position, theologically support a laissez-faire system. This is 
theologically justified by Ibn Taymiyah (1992:18) who argued that the price 
established in the market is the price of God, and the markets do not require state 
intervention. However, the state intervention in the form of hisbah, is applied with an 
underlying assumption that the state has an ability to foresee, distinguish and prevent 
evil, whilst subscribing good. Therefore, legitimacy for institutional intervention is 
directly dependent on the effectiveness of foreseeing, distinguishing and preventing 
evil within the market. Consequently, the ontological justification of institution of 
hisbah is directly dependent, and is ought to be tested against, its ability to subscribe 
good and forbid evil.  
The investigation on operations of hisbah, suggests that there were number of factors 
that resulted in institutional failures, one of which is the inability of the institution to 
operate according to the theoretical framework that was set for it. The gap between 
theory and practice was as a result of undefined boundaries for hisbah to exercise its 
powers. As, the undefined boundaries, infinitely increased the scope of hisbah, and 
forced the limited regulatory religious discourse to be artificially stretched for 
regulating almost every aspect of society and market.  
Another factor linked with this debate is the underdevelopment of individual’s realm 
of power and responsibility, whilst the state’s realm of power and responsibility was 
overstretched and overdeveloped. The inclusion of human rights to this debate is 
important because the notion of human rights provides the underlining foundation for 
the development of individual’s realm of power and responsibility. The extent of state 
intervention in society and market is still a very relevant and important issue within 
Islamic thought. As within the contemporary Islamic thought, there is scholarship that 
justifies the total intervention and then there are others who suggest the theological 
justification for a free-market within Islamic economic thought. There are also some, 
who take the moderate approach and suggest that state ought to intervene is special 
circumstances, without clearly defining the meaning of the special circumstances. 
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Davis and Robinson (2006: 167), whilst reviewing eight countries from Muslim 
World suggest that within Islamic perspective, state’s responsibility to care gives the 
state legitimacy to intervene in most social contract, while other Presley and Sessions 
(1994:584) have examined the Islamic thought that lean towards Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand of market. 
There was also other element that ought to be considered, which may have influenced  
the jurists’ interest in the office of hisbah, such as adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Historically, the renowned jurists did not participate in the political process and were 
unwilling to take any public office; while most of the muhtasib were retired judges or 
ones who used this office as a stepping-stone to higher offices, such as office of 
governor. Even in cases where muhtasib’s intention cannot be challenged, it could be 
argued that the legal doctrine they used to regulate the socio economic life was not 
practical enough.  
There were no clear rules on the jurisdiction and the intrinsic capability of institution 
of hisbah to broaden its scope and expand its jurisdiction, caused complications and 
confusion with other public offices. Although the frequency of the reports on 
complications and confusion about jurisdictions in comparatively low considering the 
wide spread practice of hisbah, these reports are cited over time in almost all the 
territories (India, Arabia, North Africa and Andalusia) where hisbah operated. This 
shows that issue of jurisdiction was not cultural, social or political, but rather 
depended on the intuition of the person appointed for the post.  
The issue of impracticality was not only in the implementation of regulations but also 
in the manner regulations were constituted for social and economic life. The 
construction of regulations was more focused on the legality of matter, and 
compliance to the legal theory, then on establishing socio economic justice. The 
ulema were not trained in the operations of public office and the legal theory used in 
the operations of hisbah, evolved away from public sphere and without any practical 
testing. The institution of ifta operated without any meritocratic system of evaluation 
such as a Bar Association, which can regulate the entry into the profession, check 
intelligence, administer credentials and qualifications of jurisconsults, which 
developed into a “problem of an institutionalized system coping with inadequately 
qualified persons” (Hallaq, 1997:208). With most of hisbah officials coming from 
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scholarly circles, and in some instances from ruling class or business families and 
claiming literal understanding of Shari’ah; this allowed the above mentioned 
problems to infiltrate institution of hisbah and weaken it.     
This intrinsic weakness of institution of hisbah meant that it became incapable of 
upholding the public interest and ‘Islam’s interest’ while simultaneously withstanding 
the pressure on the grounds of national interest. Therefore, it could be suggested that 
obstructions in development of hisbah into a sufficiently autonomous quasi-judicial 
body were the scepticism towards the public morality and distrust in the prudence of 
public opinions, along with the postulation that ulema are better equipped to 
comprehend the right and wrong in the market and society, in addition to the general 
confidence in perspicacity of ulema to stir the society and market towards a better 
socio economic order, and attempts by political elites to establish and maintain a 
unipolar political power station.   
The institutional failures, along with incoherent and inconsistent practices throughout 
history suggest that the institution of hisbah in practice was unable to judge the moral 
conduct of activities. Hence, based on the debate from this chapter, next chapter 
continues its focus on the first part of the research aim, as it examines the theories of 
hisbah to develop an understanding about the underlying factors of failures in 
governance through institutionalisation of subscribing good and forbidding evil.  
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Chapter 3 
TAXONOMICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISCOURSE 
ON HISBAH 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The institution of hisbah provides a rare opportunity for observing the development of 
different kind of discourse aimed at governing the society and market by subscribing 
good and forbidding evil. As explained in the previous chapter, theoretically this 
discourse ought to be able to distinguish between good and evil in order to justify the 
institutional intervention within the market and the society.  
In the previous chapter, we established that the ontological authority of hisbah is 
dependent on its ability to foresee, distinguish and the subscribe good and forbid evil 
practices within the society and the market. Upon examination of the operations of 
institution of hisbah, Chapter 1 established that in practice institution of hisbah was 
unable to judge moral conduct of activities and therefore unable to subscribe good and 
forbid evil in the market and the society.  
The aim of this chapter, hence, is to develop an understanding about the nature of the 
theories of hisbah and the part they played in the institutional failures in the Islamic 
governance system, as discussed in previous chapter. The theories are tested on the 
same criterion of subscribing good and forbidding evil so that their inability in 
efficiently operating hisbah can be demonstrated. This chapter also focuses on the 
first part of the research aim, as we continue to explore underlying issues of the 
governance within Islamic thoughts by focusing on the theory on the institution of 
hisbah. 
The discourse on hisbah consist of juriconsults, philosophers and theologians’ work 
that details the guidelines for muhtasib in the form of hisbah manuals, whilst there are 
also some theorised models for morally operating hisbah. Others expressed their 
views on the institutions while documenting history or within discussions on other 
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politico-socio-economic topics. These diverse discourses on hisbah can be separated 
into two types when categorised taxonomically. The first rank is referred as Class A, 
which consists of discourse on theory of hisbah and literature examining the 
institutional powers, jurisdictional boundaries and scope of hisbah duties. The 
discourse discussed under the category of Class B literature, on the other hand, 
concentrates on the practical administrative and regulative guidelines, and mainly 
consists of hisbah manuals.  
Class B literature also includes most recent discourse on institution of hisbah was 
mostly penned in last forty years, such as academic surveys on theory and practice of 
institution of hisbah, along with modern Islamic scholar’s reflection on institution of 
hisbah as part of a solution for modern socio economic problems. Buckley’s work 
titled as the Book of Islamic Market Inspector (1999) is central to Class B literature, 
as it includes a critical view of institution of hisbah along with translation of a twelfth 
century hisbah manual. Glick’s work is important for developing an understanding on 
the impact of institution of hisbah on socio economic life, as Glick (1972:59-82) 
traces the cultural borrowing of hisbah from Muslim world to Christendom, followed 
by the success and development in the concept of institution of hisbah by the two 
sides. In expanding the literature, Islahi (2008:7-20) has also compiled a list of hisbah 
manuals significant to understanding the operations of hisbah. Moreover, 
Shatzmiller’s (1994) work also holds significance, as she uses hisbah manuals to 
focus on the labour and crafts in the market at medieval time. There are also many 
other studies dedicated to examining and summarisation of original work of Class A 
authors. 
A part of Class B literature follows the academic endeavour focused on history, while 
the other part belong to the literature produced by Islamic economists, political 
scientists and scholars in the wake of re-emergence of Islam in the later part of 
twentieth century. The difference becomes noticeably preeminent when we compare 
the specification and depiction of institution of hisbah in Brill’s Encyclopaedia of 
Islam and in Encyclopaedia of Islamic Economics. The article on institution of hisbah 
in Brill’s Encyclopaedia of Islam is more focused on the examination of the events of 
the past, and investigation of historical patterns in the study is an end in itself; 
Encyclopaedia of Islamic Economics, on the other hand, is slightly more focused on 
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the analysing the usefulness of hisbah and, therefore, its narrative is more attentive to 
the relevance of the institution to the present time. Similarly, Khan’s (1992:135-152) 
approach on hisbah also concentrates on the relevance of hisbah styled institution to 
modern times.  
Kuran (1996:439) suggests that the driving force behind this type of discourses tend 
to be cultural identity and it lacks much relevance to economic issues of present time. 
The construction of this type of discourse stands on logic, persuasion and rhetoric, 
without much attention to the historicity. For instance: Lewis (2006:6) suggests that 
the “shura, hisba and shari’a [as] building blocks of a system of Islamic corporate 
governance”, and then asserts that the framework of hisbah can “obligate correct 
ethical behaviour in the wider social context”. In shifting and expanding the debate, 
Lewis (2006) refers to the aspect of vigilantism in hisbah, which is also argued by Al-
Ghazzali (1982a; 1982b), although discourse does not focus much on the historical 
evidence on the pros and cons of this practice. However, Lewis (2006:7) highlights 
the vigilantism as a problematic aspect of hisbah, which puts it in conflict with the 
operational philosophy of modern state institutions. Later Abu-Tapanjeh (2009:564) 
then uses Lewis as a reference to suggest that hisbah (only vigilantism aspect) forms 
an essential part of good corporate governance for Islamic financial institutions, while 
Abu-Tapanjeh’s discourse completely ignores Lewis’s (2009:566) concerns and does 
not focus at all on patterns of cause and effects of hisbah’s operations in the past. 
Subsequently Bhatti and Bhatti (2009: 67-91) suggest a model for Islamic corporate 
governance based on hisbah, without any mention of hisbah’s historiography. The 
critical examination of class A and class B literature should help in developing a 
historiographical understanding on institution of hisbah. 
3.2 DISCOURSE ORIENTED LITERATURE ON HISBAH: CLASS A 
LITERATURE  
The Class A literature deals with the theological argument on rationale, authoritative 
power, scope of hisbah and its ethical dynamics, which are then used to create 
guidelines on performing religious and regulative duties of ‘forbidding wrong and 
commanding right’ in the society and in the market. It should be noted that Class A 
literature appears in the eleventh century, centuries after the establishment of the 
institution of hisbah (Cahen et al., December 18th, 2010).  
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It was about two centuries after the development of hisbah manuals that they were put 
into practice; one of the reasons for this gap in publications could be that the muhtasib 
may be utilising their knowledge of Islamic law, and abstracts sense of ethics and 
morals present in the primary sources of Islam, as majority of them had previous 
experience as a fiqeehi (judge). 
It is also interesting that this literature starts to appear at the consolidation stage of 
fiqh. Philips (1990:111) suggests that during the consolidation stage, namely between 
950-1259 (CE), fiqh had been methodically organised and systematically approached, 
which helped the surviving madh’habs (Muslim Schools of Law) reach their 
individual legal ruling. Therefore, the class A literature could be the result of 
systematic approach to scriptures or it may be that the systematic approach to fiqh, 
accentuated the need for some sort of ethical theory, which could be placed between 
the fiqh and hisbah manuals, so that the utopian aspect of ‘commanding good and 
forbidding wrong’ can be harmonised with the socio economic realities, to produce 
positive consequences from hisbah regulations, which developed into the form of 
hisbah manuals two hundred years earlier. The discourse in Class A literature is 
therefore in same genre as furstenspiegel (Mirror for Princes), and as Muslim thinkers 
developed furstenspiegel literature for limiting and regulating political powers (Heck, 
2000:226). Similarly, it could be suggested that Muslim thinkers used Class A 
literature, as a mean for regulating and limiting the hisbah’s power of ‘subscribing to 
good and forbidding wrong’. This conclusion is more likely, because of its close 
resemblance to furstenspiegel, and the fact that it appeared after two centuries of 
practical experience began with the hisbah manuals, which mostly focuses on various 
ways for hisbah officials to exercise powers and different socio-economic dimensions 
where it can be exercised.   
The principal works in this class are Al-Ahkamal Sultaniyya’s chapter twenty by Al-
Mawardi, while a few chapters in Book II of Ghazzali’s Ihya Ulum al-din and Risala 
fi 'l-hisba by Ibn-Taymiyya. Al-Mawardi’s work is of judicial nature, while Al-
Ghazzali concentrates on the morals and Ibn-Taymiyya attempts to uncover the social 
dimensions of hisbah through the judicial and moral roots of Islam (Cahen et al., 
December 18th, 2010). The Andulisan jurist Ibn-Hazm in Fasl fi 'l-milal has also 
contributed to the literature in this class along with al-Nuwayri (Nihaya, vi), Ibn-
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Djamaa, al-Subki (Muid al-niam), al-Kalkashandi, al-Makrizi and others (Cahen et 
al.,, December 18th, 2010). Work titled Niṣāb fi 'l-iḥtisāb of al-Sinami, from a 
seventh century muhtasib from Central Asia and Ibn-Khuldun’s Muḳaddima (1967a) 
(1967b), are also important contributions to this class.  
3.2.1 Institutionalisation of ‘Commanding Good And Forbidding Wrong’ 
Ibn-Khaldun (1967a: 462-463) consider institution of hisbah as purely a religious 
duty and suggests that the responsibility of ‘commanding right and forbidding wrongs 
lies’ with the rulers or state, which they then transfer it onto the officials of institution 
of hisbah. Al-Ghazzali (1982b: 230-245), however, speaks of ‘commanding right and 
forbidding wrong’ as a responsibility of every Muslim, which is performed by 
vigilantes in the society; he then goes further and states the requirements and 
prerequisites, which one needs to be fulfilled before pursuing any vigilantism. This 
stance by Al-Ghazzali comes from the understanding of ‘commanding good and 
forbidding wrong’ as a primary subject of religion, which when ignored can result in 
divine wrath, and when accomplished, can make a nation the best of all nations. Al-
Ghazzali documents this understanding by citing the primary sources and claims that 
without commanding good and forbidding wrong, the “prophethood would have been 
meaning less, religion lost, ... ignorance spread... and mankind destroyed” (Al-
Ghazzali, 1982b:231). Al-Ghazzali (1982b:238) then lists: being a wise and mature 
believer, having a sense of justice, along with carrying the ability to prevent 
transgression and strength to enforce right as the necessary qualifications for the one 
who takes on himself to fulfil this duty. However, it should be stated that these 
qualifications are very subjective in nature and would cause chaos in the civil society, 
therefore al-Ghazzali (1982b:243) further suggested that the first steps of 
commanding right and forbidding wrong should be possessing and not acquiring the 
knowledge of transgressor’s condition, and having a theological understanding on the 
nature of transgression.  
Al-Ghazzali’s focus concerning commanding right and forbidding wrongs is on the 
etiquette and regulations at private individual level; however when ihya Ulum-id-Din 
(Revival of Religious Sciences) is observed in its totality, from a political economic 
perspective, it could be suggested, that al-Ghazzali (1982a: 30) envisioned a society, 
where everyone would acquire knowledge of what concerns them, according to their 
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needs and within their circumstances, in the same manner as the assumed perfect 
market conditions of classical economists. The individuals, who are proficient in 
specific fields or professions, would then be able to command good and forbid wrong 
within their specific fields. On the other hand, the ordinary people who may not 
pertain to any profession are considered except from this duty (al-Ghazzali, 
1982b:238). It is obvious that this would theoretically create a society which self 
rectifies and continuously adjusts its course towards righteousness in a dynamic 
feedback or circular system. Therefore, there may not be any specific need for state 
intervention and without the institutionalising of hisbah, the commanding of good and 
forbidding of wrong can remain a religious duty performed as a virtuous deed. This 
very much resembles Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, as Smith considered that market 
will reach optimality between private interest and social good through the adjustment 
mechanism provided by an invisible hand, in which the invisible hand refers to 
morality in the individual and society level. 
As for the role of state, al-Ghazzali (1982a: 30) explains that it is only a guard and 
administrator of civil society, and claims that the “government does not belong 
primarily to the religious science”. Therefore, as long as a community agrees on what 
is right and what is wrong, they can command and forbid it, without any permission 
or intervention from the state, but when the community is split on any matter, then the 
state should intervene and individuals should stop acting independently (Cook, 
2000:437). Hence, in the case of not achieving the first best solution, Ghazzalian 
world would suggest a regulative and corrective role in providing second-best 
solution as the neo-classical economics had done in the beginning of the 20th century. 
Ibn-Taymiya also holds similar position and suggests that the obligation of 
commanding right and forbidding wrong is communal by nature; therefore, if the 
institution of hisbah fails in performing this duty, then “the sin lies with every able 
person in accordance with his capacity” (Ibn-Taymiya, 1992:77). Moreover, Ibn-
Taymiya (1992:77) harmonises the obligations of the duty with the realities and 
explains that the duty of commanding of right and forbidding of wrong is not 
incumbent on every individual, and even for the individuals who merit the 
requirements, similar to the ones given by al-Ghazzali, as they should assess the 
situation patiently and in case, if, attaining compliance to the command of good 
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would not be possible, then they should refrain from executing this duty; because, the 
commanding of good and forbidding of wrong should not violate the basic principles 
of “adherence to the community and renunciation of armed struggle against the 
leaders, as well as renunciation of civil war” (Ibn-Taymiya, 1992:79). 
Al-Ghazzali suggests that in principle there is no difference in commanding good and 
forbidding wrong as a responsibility to be conducted by the state, rulers or anyone in 
authority like from son to the parents. However, he recommends that the duty should 
be restricted to the first two steps, that is: to establish that the information is from 
unsolicited testimony of reliable witnesses; followed by informing the transgressor of 
his transgression (Cook, 2000:431). Al-Ghazzali, further, warns that any further steps 
like stopping the ‘wrong or undoing the wrong’, can result in harmful consequences 
for the individual ‘commanding the good’, therefore the one who is ‘commanding 
good’, should weigh the kind of wrong being committed and extend of it, with the 
possibility of harmful retaliation (Cook, 2000:431). The restriction of duty against the 
one in authority does not come from principles of hisbah but it roots from the 
obligation of safeguarding oneself, and acts as a precaution for ensuring personal 
safety. Interestingly, al-Ghazzali leaves it to the discretion of the one who is 
commanding good, to decide if they want to follow on from first two steps. However, 
when it comes to rulers al-Ghazzali forbids any further steps to be take, and strictly 
restrict the commanding of good to first two steps, as he argues that further steps 
would damage the ruler’s hayba or majesty (Cook, 2000:431). On the other hand, he 
shows less restriction towards commanding of good from pupil to scholar, as he 
argues that: “scholar who does not practice his learning is owed no respect” (Cook, 
2000:431).  
It could be argued that the reason al-Ghazzali and to some extend Ibn-Taymiya take 
such positions is because in their views the obligation towards the ruler originates 
from their legitimacy to rule, while for scholars it emanates from their knowledge and 
the pious deeds, that is the piety of scholars creates the public acceptance of their 
views, which supersede the privilege of obedience and respect towards them, and 
render void the immunity from the remaining steps of commanding good. 
Accordingly, historically, the legitimacy of the scholars emerged from their 
embeddedness in society due to their knowledge and piety. 
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Interestingly, there were no official attempts made, for institutionalisation of this 
function of hisbah, where public was entrusted with commanding of right and 
forbidding of wrong to religious scholars and rulers. The institutionalisation of this 
function would have followed line of reasoning similar to a democratic system of 
governance. In contemporary times, the hybrid system of governance introduced by 
the post 1979 constitution of Iran has a similar system of governance, where public 
participates in commanding of good and forbidding of wrong through a 
democratically elected parliament, while an unelected Supreme leader chairs the 
highest political office, through the philosophical legitimacy of guardianship of jurist, 
namely wilayat al-faqih or the infallibility of imams in Shia Islam; however, this is 
outside the context of hisbah and in the realm of the theory of State and therefore will 
not be discussed in detail in this study. 
Among other scholars, whose work has implications for hisbah, Al-Mawardi takes a 
different position and suggests that there are nine categorical differences in 
commanding of right and forbidding of wrong by an institution as compared to a 
private individual. Contrary to al-Ghazzali’s (1982b: 238-263) position, al-Mawardi 
(1996:260) argues that it is not compulsory on a volunteer to perform this duty when 
they witness a transgression, and the obligation to do so rests solely rests with the 
official of hisbah, whereby he limits the individual’s power to intervene with the 
objective of providing a structured or institutional position on the matter. Moreover, a 
plaintiff can and should only appeal to hisbah official and in its response hisbah 
official can launch an investigation, use assistance from State departments, penalise 
the wrongdoer, while exercising an independent judgement (Al-Mawardi, 1996:260). 
As can be seen, in comparison to al-Ghazzali, Al-Mawardi’s (1996) trend of thoughts 
demonstrate a slightly liberal approach, with a positive attitude towards mutual 
decision making, and more focus towards egalitarianism, while al-Ghazzali attempts 
to give a moderate outlook to his conservative philosophy that combines Islamic law 
and Sufism. Al-Mawardi envisions the institutionalisation of commanding good and 
forbidding wrong to overcome chaos and vigilantism, while al-Ghazzali converges on 
this issue from purely a theological point of view and approaches it as a religious 
duty, while methodologically corresponding it with his hierarchy of maqasid al-
Shari’ah (objective of Islamic law). This difference in approach becomes more 
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apparent in al-Ghazzali’s and al-Mawardi’s positions on the scope of hisbah, which is 
discussed in detail. 
3.2.2 Jurisdiction and Scope of Hisbah 
The theologians, philosophers and juriconsults who have addressed the operations of 
institution of hisbah, have taken slightly different positions on the jurisdictions and 
scope of hisbah. Overall discourse apprehends the institution of hisbah as an 
institution, which monitors the society, and introduces measures for the practice of 
commonly known good, while where necessary it also stops commonly known evil. 
The Class A or discourse oriented theological and conceptual studies on the subject 
matter in the literature does not go into the details of what is ‘good’, and instead takes 
a position similar to Qur’an, by treating the good, as something which is already 
known and understood as right, and similarly the ‘wrongs’ are also considered clearly 
distinguishable. The jurisdiction and scope of hisbah deals with the boundaries or 
limits to which this institution should go in subscribing the right and forbidding the 
wrong.  
3.2.2.1 Al-Mawardi’s conceptualisation of hisbah institution 
Al-Mawardi approaches the jurisdiction and scope of hisbah by concentrating on the 
blind spots in jurisdictions of other institutions. He argues that the focal point of this 
institution should be the grey areas, which does not fall under other government 
bodies, magistrates, court of law, tort law and other public offices (Al-Mawardi, 
1996:260-263), as the jurisdiction of this institution is not only in the economic sphere 
but it also focuses in social morality and spirituality.   
Al-Mawardi annotates on the scope of hisbah and differentiates between the tort law, 
court of law and function of hisbah. He argues that there are two aspects each, where 
scope of hisbah is: concurrent to court of law, exceeds the court of law and is below 
the court of law (Al-Mawardi, 1996:261). Hisbah has similarities with court of law, as 
it has an authority to serve the complains of plaintiff; however, this authority is 
limited to issues within the market, that is the deception through application of 
incorrect measures and weights; fraudulence relating transactions, contracts and 
prices; and deliberate delay in payments of due debt (Al-Mawardi, 1996:261). In Al-
Mawardi, hisbah is also similar to court of law, as it can enforce the repayment to the 
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defended concerning issues, within the above-mentioned boundaries (Al-Mawardi, 
1996:261). The restrains and limitations of hisbah compared to the court decisions is 
that it is restricted to entertain only those lawsuits, which fall within the range of its 
activities (Al-Mawardi, 1996:262). This range is determined on the historical account 
of actions performed by the institution of hisbah. This restriction also keeps the 
relevance of court of law within the market. Hisbah is confined within its framework 
of acknowledged claims and should “neither hear evidence in proof of rights, nor 
exact an oath in denial of claims beset with exchanged repudiation and denial... [as 
court of law is] more entitled to hear such evidence and make the... parties take oath” 
(Al-Mawardi, 1996:262). 
There are also two methods, where hisbah surmounts the court of law. Hisbah inherits 
the religious duty of ‘recommending good and forbidding evil’, from Muslim 
community, which allows it legitimate grounds in Islamic law, to investigate, examine 
and act without a plaintiff (Al-Mawardi, 1996:262). In addition, Al-Mawardi’s 
(1996:262) definition of hisbah also holds the coercive powers within the religious 
matters, specifically for excess in or violation of, religious duties. The scope of 
hisbah, hence, is parallel to function of tort law in respect that both deal with matters, 
in the interest of public welfare and attempt to purge injustice and aggression caused 
due to sovereign audacity or sternness of power (Al-Mawardi, 1996:262). While, the 
tort law deals with issues beyond the scope of court of law, the institution of hisbah, 
as Al-Mawardi (1996:262) identifies, deals with matter beneath the functional 
limitation of court of law..   
According to the above positioning the institution of hisbah will be classified as 
quango (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation), within the modern state 
infrastructure. Al-Mawardi has also restricted and confined the institution, in its 
ability to extract unlimited and unrestricted powers from subscribing of right and 
forbidding of wrong, by ranking it lower in authority then court of law and tort laws, 
within the hierarchy of state infrastructure (Al-Mawardi, 1996:262). This is especially 
important, as without a statutory obligation to preserve ‘fundamental human rights’, 
and without any developed understanding of public and private domains, there are no 
competing forces, which can create a stable balance of powers. Al-Mawardi, attempts 
to create these competing forces by placing institution of hisbah tightly within the 
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state infrastructure and by focusing its powers on the market to stop injustice and on 
society to promote Islamic religiosity.  
3.2.2.2 Al-Ghazzali’s conceptualisation of hisbah  
Al-Ghazzali (1982b: 238-263) does not speak of hisbah as an institution, and 
concentrates on the duty of subscribing good and forbidding wrong; and hence, he 
refers to the instrumentality of hisbah. In addition, Al-Ghazaali (1982b: 243) also 
includes the legally responsible and people with diminished or no legal capacity, 
within the scope of this duty. The legally responsible can be ‘enjoined good or forbid 
evil’, because they come under the roam of Shari’ah, while people with diminished or 
no legal capacity are included, in circumstances when others (others as in society, 
public or Islamic creed) are or can be affected by their actions. The only exception al-
Ghazzali (1982b: 238-263) shows is with the rulers and that is based on the possibility 
of retaliation for the one who performs this duty, and this exception only comes as 
advise, rather then recommendation. The institutionalised form of al-Ghazzali’s 
hisbah would therefore be able to interfere in all walks of life. Al-Ghazzali addresses 
this issue by including furstenspiegel style of discourse, constituting aphorism and 
stories of prophets or saints.  
Al-Ghazzalian discourse focuses on ‘merits of enjoining good’ and ‘necessary 
qualifications for one who forbids evil’. In ‘merits’, al-Ghazzali (1982b: 230-232) 
starts by establishing the compulsive nature of this duty, by sighting Qur’anic versus 
and Prophetic traditions, and thereafter he explains the repercussions a society may 
face in the form of divine wrath, if they neglect this duty. Al-Ghazzali (1982b:232) 
then sites an oral tradition of the Prophet, which speaks of a time, when the practice of 
prescribing good will create disagreements, as the person prescribing good will face 
retaliation from the one, on whom the good is been prescribed.  
Al-Ghazzali’s theory of hisbah also uses the prospect of retaliation as boundaries of 
jurisdiction for this duty, which implies that the good should be enjoined and wrong 
should be forbiden until it may result in harm from retaliation of wrongdoer. In 
circumstance when there is a possibility of harm caused due to retaliation, al-Ghazzali 
(1982b: 245) downgrades the duty from obligatory and compulsory act to a voluntary 
act. He further attempts to define the boundaries by using ethical measures, and calls 
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them the ‘qualification of one preventing wrong’. He list’s three ethical requirements, 
that’s is “having certain knowledge that an act is wrong, having taqwa (God’s fear) 
and possessing good conduct” (al-Ghazzali, 1982b:245). He then establishes these 
ethical notions as boundaries of jurisdiction for hisbah, by claiming that any action of 
prohibiting wrong, without these qualities, would “exceed many a time the limits of 
shariat” (al-Ghazzali, 1982b:246). In spite of establishing the ethical principles in this 
manner, they however remain very subjective, which can be interpreted in different 
ways. Interestingly, al-Ghazzali does not talk about the qualifications of enjoining 
good, as his focus remains on the necessity of theologically establishing the essential 
nature of enjoining good and qualification of forbidding wrong. It should be argued 
that al-Ghazzali’s views right and wrong as the only two options and does not 
consider that certain actions or deeds might be a combination of both. He further 
advises the one, who wants to fulfil this duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil, to 
remain separated, autonomous and independent of society and people (al-Ghazzali, 
1982b:246), which could lead to anti social behaviour in the society. However, in the 
hindsight on the problems faced by institution of hisbah, al-Ghazzali’s guideline on 
autonomy and financial independence could have proved very useful, but contrary to 
al-Mawardi’s approach, al-Ghazzali focused his theory purely on vigilantism.  
3.2.2.3 Ibn-Khaldun on hisbah as an institution 
Ibn-Khaldun (1967a: 462-463) discusses hisbah in its institutionalised form and 
categorises it as a religious office, which he conceptualises as non-autonomous, as it 
draws its powers from the Caliph. This is contrary to al-Mawardi’s (1996) position, 
who argues that hisbah performs the duty of commanding good and forbidding wrong 
on behalf of Muslim community and therefore draws its powers from Muslim 
community.  
Ibn-Khaldun’s position of considering Caliph considering as the source of legitimacy 
coincides with the line of reasoning followed in his political theory of power state. 
Moreover, Ibn-Khaldun (1967a:463) allows hisbah to interfere in all socioeconomic 
matters except the legal issues, and sites the examples of Egypt under Fatimids and 
Umayyad’s Andalusia, where institution of hisbah was under the subordination of 
judiciary, who would also appoint the officials. Ibn-Khaldun (1967a:463) also points 
out the shift in the position of hisbah within the state infrastructure, as rulers 
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converted it into a royal office from an institution under the supervision of judiciary. 
The infrastructural change in institutional hierarchy reduced any aspect of autonomy 
hisbah may have had, whilst working under judiciary. This also signifies the move 
away from hisbah as a quango (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation)   
3.2.2.4 Ibn-Taymiya’s account on hisbah 
Ibn-Taymiya (1992:38) considered the duty of prescribing good and forbidding evil as 
as an axiom for governance, which ought to be jointly exercised by all state 
departments, while muhtasib (official of hisbah) only specialises in performing this 
duty by taming the market forces and by administrating the adherence to religious 
commandments on general public (Ibn-Taymiya, 1992:26). Ibn-Taymiya similar to 
other theologians, for example, places the mosque management, along with 
supervision of imams (leader of religious congregation in mosques) and other staff 
members working at mosques or at similar religious institutions under the scope of 
hisbah (Ibn-Taymiya, 1992:26).  
Ibn-Taymiya argues for the use of Islamic legal theory as a methodology to perform 
all these duties he associates with hisbah institution, while also suggesting that the 
inflicting of transcendentally subscribed punishments, with an exception to capital 
punishment, should also be administered by hisbah (Ibn-Taymiya, 1992:26). Ibn-
Taymiya draws the duty of subscribing the transcendentally subscribed punishments 
from the ‘rights of divine’ and institutional obligations towards these right, as he 
attempts to define the regulatory measures for supervision of society. He views the 
‘transcendentally subscribed punishments’ as only those religious obligations and 
punishments, which are clearly stated and explicitly defined in the primary sources.  
Furthermore, Ibn-Taymiya did not discuss the human rights as general or socio 
politico human rights, although he does focus on the economic rights within the 
market regulations, by discussing the conflict between public welfare and the rights of 
buyers and sellers in the market. He discusses this issue by using categorical moral 
reasoning, as he attempts to locate the morality in duties and rights, while his 
approach is socialist and his method remains legalistic, as he uses Islamic legal theory 
as a mean to provide solutions to economic problem. He concentrates on the 
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theological framework of divine rights and individual11 rights to balance the 
conflicting nature of ‘public economic rights’ and ‘private economic rights’ in the 
market, which he then uses to illustrate the possible equilibriums between the conflict 
of public interest and private interest, and then finally capitalises all this to define the 
scope to which a market should and can be regulated.  
The terminologies such as ‘private economic rights’ and ‘public economic rights’ are 
not used by Ibn-Taymiya, as he does not differentiate between personhood rights 
within society and rights to economic activities. In this study, the ‘private economic 
rights’ are taken as the rights Islamic law assigns to individual economic agent, and 
the ‘public economic rights’ are the rights, which Ibn-Taymiya (1992:54-56) argues 
for the whole body of economic agents, for example: obligation of selling a 
commodity, when another economic agent (general public or otherwise) is in dire 
need of it. The concept of need is used by Ibn-Taymiya to draw the idea of ‘public 
economic rights’ from the notion of public welfare, thereafter he categorises the 
priority of ‘public economic rights’ by using the framework of divine rights versus 
individual rights (Ibn-Taymiya, 1992:54-56). For the institution of hisbah that 
operates under Ibn-Taymiya’s guidelines, this concept would mean that the institution 
of hisbah will be required to map the ‘public need’ and enforce the economic activity 
accordingly. This practice can be witnessed within the operations of local councils in 
the modern times.     
A need, which creates a duty to act, is reoccurring theme within Islamic thoughts, 
which is philosophically different to the notion of ‘rights’. To elaborate on this 
distinction, it is important at this point to consider the philosophical differences 
between universal declaration of human rights, and concept of rights developed, as 
Donnelly’s (2003:73) research suggests that notion of rights in primary sources of 
Islam was interpreted and “treated… entirely in terms of duties” by theologians, 
political scientists and jurists, as they only developed it within the framework of 
“rights held because one has a certain legal or spiritual status”, therefore they do not 
correlate to the ‘rights’, as treated in universal declaration of human rights. Moreover, 
the development of rights within the frame of duties, linked with the legal or spiritual 
                                                      
11 The word ‘individual rights’ is used to differentiate (the concept of rights in Islam developed by 
Jurist, Theologians and Philosophers, by extracting it from the Quran and Sunna), from the concept of 
modern human rights.   
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status made the violation of this convention of rights morally and legally acceptable, 
as they were not developed on the lines that they are inalienable rights which every 
person is inherently entitled to as a human being. This does not imply that the notions 
of right, equality or democracy are not in harmony with the primary sources of Islam 
(Moussalli, 2003:2), as the enquiry here on the Islamic concept of rights focuses on 
“Not [on] how Muslim… holy texts might or ought to be read, today or in the past, 
but rather how those texts were in fact read and acted on by ‘traditional; Muslim 
societies.” (Donnelly, 2003:74). Within this frame of reference, Islam divides the 
rights into two major categories; the public rights and private rights. The public rights 
are understood as rights of Muslim community as a whole, while the private rights are 
the rights of individuals (Khadduri, 1946:77). The public rights are seen as divine 
rights or rights of Allah and are always considered superior in importance to private 
rights (Khadduri, 1946:77).  
The individual rights subdivided into five categories: the right to personal safety, 
which is for very one living within the Islamic Empire, as the Muslims classify for 
this right through their faith and non-Muslims classify, because they pay for the 
protection, consideration of hurma (respect for personal reputation), equality in the 
context of tribalism, right to participate in Muslim community, and to be a part of 
Muslim brotherhood; and right to be justice (Justice in context of Islamic theology) 
(Khadduri, 1946:78). 
The divine rights, on the other hand, are generally considered to be three, that is: right 
to religious devotion (ibadats), right to ask the state for transcendentally ascribed 
punishment for sins, and the right to receive divinely ascribed share in spoils of wars, 
or alms giving and any other theologically justifiable categories, which entitle one to 
financial compensation (Khadduri, 1946:78). The theologians, jurists and juriconsults 
argued for an extended understanding of ibadah, in which every action that leads to 
anything, which is allowed, subscribed, recommended in Islamic law, or is part of 
sunnah of the Prophet in any sense, is to be considered as a form of ibadah. Ibn-
Taymiya (1992:80) also shows his support for such an understanding by claiming, 
“every act of obedience is a correct action and every correct action is an act of 
obedience”. This extension of ibadah, in addition of individual rights especially the 
right to participate in Muslim community, and to be a part of Muslim brotherhood, 
   73 
was interpreted within the political domain, as a consecrated responsibility of state to 
focus on maintaining and preserving the Muslim community by administering to 
communal needs. The manner of this interpretation was based on the understanding, 
that any universal public need would restrict the Muslim community in performing 
ibadah; therefore based on the concept of Muslim brotherhood, all Muslims should be 
expected to willingly or unwillingly surrender any of their individual rights, in favour 
of prevailing the public need, and, hence, preserving the public right or divine right. 
Ibn-Taymiya (1992:54) also concluded this, that “when there is a universal public 
need for something, the right in it belongs to God”, which further elevated the status 
of this reasoning. 
This line of reasoning allows Ibn-Taymiya (1992:29-45) to define and contextualise 
‘the righteous path’ by prioritising the importance of divine right and universal needs 
of Muslim community along with providing a framework for legitimising the fixing of 
prices, setting of price ceilings, forcing of owners to sell a product and so on. The 
scope of hisbah in this case is, therefore, not restricted by any means, as it can violate 
most, if not all of individual rights, for the sake of greater public good or fulfilment of 
divine rights. Once Ibn-Taymiya (1992) establishes the unrestricted scope of hisbah, 
he then goes further to discuss the means and ways in which this unlimited potential 
in commanding good and forbidding evil, will or can operate. The framework 
provided by Ibn-Taymiya does not addresses the problem of undefined jurisdiction, 
which was highlighted earlier. In contrast, Ibn-Taymiya reaffirms the unlimited scope 
of hisbah to regulate the market and society. This could be because of the 
understanding of the governance prevailing at the time. 
In regards to operations of hisbah, Ibn-Taymiya (1992:86) starts by claiming that the 
knowledge of Islamic law is a very essential requirement for an understanding of what 
is correct and what is not, and he further suggests that with this knowledge the right 
intentions are shaped, which then translate into proper actions. Ibn-Taymiya 
(1992:86) uses this line of reasoning in furstenspiegel style, to define the scope of 
hisbah, as he argues that the actions of commanding good and forbidding evil, should 
also originate from similar procedure, otherwise they will be improper actions. Ibn-
Taymiya (1992:87), then, further develops this by introducing a filter, as he argues 
that actions based on intentions, which are shaped by comprehensive understanding of 
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Islamic law, can produce proper actions, but these proper actions needs to be filtered 
by the “conditions of what is commanded and what is forbidden”, and the most 
significant condition is that the subscribing of good or forbidding of evil, should lead 
the subject of these commands towards the righteous path (sirat-e-mustaqeem). This is 
demonstrated in Figure 3.1, which explains Ibn-Taymiya’s ideas on step-by-step 
implementation of ‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’. The righteous path is 
the path, in which the divine rights are fulfilled, especially the ones that accomplish 
any universal public need.  
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Figure 3.1: Ibn-Taymiya’s ‘Commanding Good and Forbidding Wrong’ 
Ibn-Taymiya (1992:76-78) uses this mechanism to restrict and regulate the scope of 
hisbah in society and market, especially as he allows the vigilantism, along with 
institutionalisation of functions of hisbah. He further cites Prophetic traditions which 
discourage any rebellious act against the rulers and uses it to create immunity for 
rulers from being subjected to commanding of good and forbidding of evil (Ibn-
Taymiya, 1992:79-80). Similar to al-Mawardi, Ibn-Taymiya (1992) also recognises 
the communal nature of this duty; however he focuses on utilising the existing powers 
and authorities within the society for fulfilment of this duty by arguing that the 
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collective responsibility of fulfilment of this duty lies with the able individuals, who 
are considered as the individual which possesses power and authority to perform such 
duty (Ibn-Taymiya, 1992:23). In following this line of reasoning, Ibn-Taymiya 
approves the legitimacy of all pre-existing authoritative and powerful individuals 
within the society, while also overlooking the possibility of creating a new legitimate 
civil power, which may educe the public opinion in the operations or administration 
of hisbah or other state institutions, especially, because, Ibn-Taymiya in his theory of 
hisbah puts great emphasis on the line of reasoning by which institution of hisbah 
extracts its legitimacy and exercises its powers from the divinely subscribed 
responsibility of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’ to Muslim community.  
Moreover, Ibn-Taymiya further expands his mechanism of regulating the scope of 
hisbah, to enforce the importance of analysing the ‘commanding of good or 
forbidding of evil’ with the consequences and outcomes of doing so, and if the results 
will increase or decrease the aggregate goodness or aggregate evil. In case, there is a 
decrease in overall goodness and/or increase in overall evil, then Ibn-Taymiya 
(1992:80) advises against the commanding of such good and/or forbidding of such 
evil, as he suggests that: “if the right is preponderant it should be commanded, even if 
it entails a lesser wrong. But a wrong should not be forbidden if to do so entails the 
loss of a greater right. Indeed, such prohibition comes into the category of obstructing 
the way of God.” 
In Ibn-Taymiya’s theory, Islamic law is not the instrument for measuring and 
comparing the preponderance between ‘commanding and forbidding’, and ‘not 
commanding and not forbidding’, and it is instead a criterion of what is good and 
what is not. Considering the focus of Islamic law on ‘public good’, it may be argued 
that there is a utilitarian dimension within Ibn-Taymiya’s theory. Ibn-Taymiya 
(1992:80) while placing Islamic law as a criterion puts strong emphasis on the 
importance of conducting an assessment by direct use of primary sources, instead of 
analogical deduction or personal judgements.  
3.2.3 Good and Modes of Subscribing Good 
When it comes to modes of subscribing good, Ibn-Taymiya follows the consequential 
moral reasoning, as he suggests that value of good in ‘subscribing of good’ and/or 
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‘prohibiting of wrong’, is based on the consequence of such subscriptions or 
prohibitions, and under certain circumstances subscribing of good and/or prohibiting 
of wrong can have negative value of goodness and therefore it ought not to classify as 
good and instead it should be considered as an evil or wrong act. 
Al-Ghazzali provides an alternative to Ibn-Taymiya’s consequential moral reasoning, 
as Al-Ghazzali uses his hierarchy of maqasid al-Shari’ah for this purpose; however, 
Ibn-Taymiya counteracts this by suggesting the need for an evaluation of the 
consequences of commanding good and/or forbidding wrong, while also 
acknowledging that there would be situations where right and wrong will be mutually 
inextricable (Ibn-Taymiya, 1992:80). In this, Ibn-Taymiya’s (1992:83) line of 
reasoning inclines towards the moral doctrine of utilitarianism, as he suggests that the 
basic principle of his doctrine is “man’s love of what is proper and hatred of what is 
improper … correspond to God’s love, hatred … as expressed in the Scared Law”. 
It could be argued that the major difference in moral doctrine of utilitarianism and in 
Ibn-Taymiya’s theory is that the good or the happiness is viewed from the perspective 
of Islamic law, while pain and pleasure are only considered as instruments for 
measuring and comparing the preponderance between ‘commanding and forbidding’, 
and ‘not commanding and not forbidding’. In other words, Islamic law decides what 
is right and what is wrong, while the concept of pain and pleasure decides that if that 
good should be commanded or not, and if that wrong should be forbade. This 
implicitly states that pain and pleasure can out rule the good decreed by Islamic law. 
Ibn-Taymiya also argues for the consensus of the Muslim community as a criterion 
for deciding what is ultimately good despite the fact he located the legitimacy of 
hisbah in Islamic theology.  
This is contrary to orthodox theological position of taking ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in the 
context of pain and pleasure, and the defining pain and pleasure in conjunction with 
pain and pleasure in this world summed with pain and pleasure of hereafter. The 
abstraction of divine concept of justice and the criteria based on duties for salvation in 
hereafter as specified in primary sources of Islam, is used to evaluate the value of pain 
and pleasure of hereafter. Importantly, the sum of pain and pleasure of this world and 
of hereafter can produce different results, as compared to only focusing on the pain 
and pleasure of this world. 
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Similar to Mill’s greatest happiness principle and Bentham’s pleasure principle, Ibn-
Taymiya (1988:102) phrases it as the universal public need, as he makes it a criterion 
for good or right. Moreover as Bentham (1988:99-102) suggests pleasure to be the 
only good and pain to be the only evil, then concludes that: “there is no such thing as 
any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one”. On the other hand, Ibn-Taymiya 
(1988:38) carries forward the understanding of earlier scholars that the happiness of 
humankind is in the adherence to Islamic creed, and public welfare is the very key 
ingredient in this adherence, which is the very responsibility of the state. It should be 
noted that in this argument that the Islamic discourse on happiness mostly stems from 
al-Farabi, who argued that: “The truth about divine things and about the highest 
principles of the world, be conducive to virtuous actions, and form part of the 
equipment necessary for the attainment of ultimate happiness.” (Mahdi, 1987:207). 
However, the jurists understood Islamic law as a criterion, which could distinguish 
and define the virtuous actions, providing the necessary equipment for attaining 
happiness.  
Ibn-Taymiya understands public welfare in context of fulfilling of universal public 
need and includes it in the list of divine rights. In substantiating, he argues that any 
action performed with a motive of ‘commanding good or forbidding evil’, may not 
necessarily increase good and/or decrease evil, and with this argument Ibn-Taymiya 
establishes the neutral nature of motive in ‘commanding of good and forbidding of 
evil’. The important distinction here is as follow: the theological position supported 
by majority of Muslim jurists, is that the motive is in itself good and bad, and if the 
good motive causes ‘good’ the goodness is increased, while if a good motive causes 
‘wrong’, the value of good in ‘motive’ does not become nil or negative; Ibn-
Taymiya’s theory, on the other hand, propagates that within the context of 
‘commanding good and forbidding evil’, the motives might not have the inherited 
goodness in them and if the consequences are not good, the motive and/or action 
might not carry any good. Similarly, Bentham (1988:102) argues on the neutral nature 
of motives, as they can cause any sort of actions and consequences, by explaining 
that: “If they [motives] are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects: good on 
account of their tendency to produce pleasure, or avert pain: bad, on account of their 
tendency to produce pain, or avert pleasure.”  
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 It could also be argued that underline reasoning of Ibn-Taymiya’s position is based 
on al-Farabi’s argument, that: “Happiness cannot be achieved without… the 
achievement of perfection … The distinction between noble and base activities is thus 
guided by the distinction between what is useful for, and what obstructs, perfection 
and happiness.” (Mahdi, 1987:209).  The noble activities are the good activities, 
while base activities are the wrong or evil ones. The good activities thus are useful for 
acquitting perfection, which results in ultimate happiness. Bentham’s line of 
reasoning is similar, but more detailed and comprehensive: the perfection leading to 
happiness is the ultimate pleasure and whatever constraints from achieving the 
ultimate pleasure constitute as pain. This line of reasoning does not leave much 
allowance for development of independent moral principles of equality or rights, 
which is similar to the case of Bentham’s theory, as Conklin’s (1979:68) analysis 
suggest that: “the greatest happiness of the greatest number left little room for either 
liberty or equality as independent moral considerations”. It could be further suggested 
that this may be the reason for Ibn-Taymiya does not discuss, develop or strengthen 
the principle of equality, universal human rights or universal rights for Muslims, and 
even socio-politico rights, despite the scriptural support on the foundations of these 
principles. 
For Bentham the moral justification for legislating any conduct a crime is the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number (Conklin, 1979:67). However, for Ibn-Taymiya 
(1992:54) the moral justification for commanding any action or forbidding any is the 
universal public need. The practical problem with classifying good in this manner is 
that unlike the Bentham’s theory, where majority decides as what will constitute as 
the ‘greatest happiness’, in Ibn-Taymiya’s theory, Islamic law is the criteria which 
decides on what would constitute as public need, which in practical terms would mean 
the jurists, juriconsults or theologians would decide on the public need and 
distinguishing between pain and pleasure, consequently giving a judgement on if a 
good is to be subscribed and a wrong should be prohibited, while simultaneously 
defining right and wrong through Islamic law. This dimension provides immense 
powers to the state departments, such as institution of hisbah.  
Qudama’s theory of state (taken from Heck, 2000:227), theorises the transformation 
of this power to political class or rulers, in which the political class, unelected rulers, 
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muhtasib, jurists, juriconsults or theologians are agents of their self interest, and in the 
absence of any moral consideration to liberties and rights in Islamic law or in Islamic 
philosophy, there is a deficiency of any counteractive power to neutralise the 
possibility and to act as a protective measure. The absence of any moral consideration 
to liberties and rights also means that challenging any decision of rulers, muhtasib, 
jurists, juriconsults or theologians in a court of law would be a labyrinth task. Even 
without the decree on liberties and rights or the issue of self-interest, the 
establishment of public needs through the Islamic law may not be very practical, as 
the focus of Islamic law is towards the scriptures rather then towards the condition of 
society (taken from Heck, 2000:227).  
Moreover, Ibn-Taymiya places the public need in the set of divine rights, and where 
ibada is the only well developed element. From perspective of Islamic state or 
institution of hisbah, the greatest public need would, therefore, manifest as ibadah, 
and in an attempt to establish or maintain compliance and correspondence of public 
life in society and in market, the Islamic law uses sanctions on approved and 
disapproved social and economic activities. This allows the state or institution of 
hisbah to infiltrate the social or economic life through regulations and laws. The 
ideological approach of this dimension signifies a move from authoritarianism 
towards totalitarianism, and annihilation of freewill. The use of consequential moral 
reasoning in Ibn-Taymiya’s theory, also can be used as a justification by rulers to 
violate any or all individual rights, in the name of public good or public need. Ibn-
Taymiya (1992:29-45) himself uses it in his discourse to justify the pricing of goods 
and services, along with justifying the unconsented forceful selling of goods and 
monetarily compensated removal of private property from ownership of private 
individual on the grounds of greater public need. It could be suggested that Ibn-
Taymiya introduced the assessment of consequences as a countermeasure to prevent a 
totalitarian approach, but as to the method of predicting a consequence of an action 
produces further problems.  
The prediction is specially an issue from theological as well as practical point of view. 
While, there is a philosophical foundations in Qur’an12 for building a case for 
                                                      
12  “Those who respond to their Lord and keep up prayer, and their rule is to take counsel among 
themselves” (Qur’an. 42:38). 
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democratic form of government, however, there is no Qur’anic account (similar to 
Qur’anic warnings on polytheism and divine response to it) on any approach to 
governance and the divine response to it. Without such kind of scriptural support, it is 
not possible to construct a theologically acceptable model, which could then be used 
to predict the transcendental consequences of State laws or hisbah’s actions or 
regulations. Furthermore, the absence of discourse, which addresses questions like: 
‘what is good?’, ‘how to measure its benefits?’ and ‘how to access regulations and 
policies in relation to the kind of consequences they may result in?’ does not help the 
case for Ibn-Taymiya’s theory.  
Al-Ghazzali, on the other hand, on these issues is somewhat close to Kant, as Johnson 
(2012) argues that Kant claims:  “what makes a good person good is his possession of 
a will that is in a certain way ‘determined’ by, or makes its decisions on the basis of, 
the moral law”. Hence, Al-Ghazzali’s (1982b: 237) discourse on hisbah is built 
around similar assumption, that is: Kant’s good will or as al-Ghazzali calls it the 
‘heart of a believer’, acts as a criterion to distinguish between what is good and right, 
and what is evil and wrong. Al-Ghazzali similar to Kant, discusses the process of 
working of this criterion and the attributes required for it, which in al-Ghazzali’s case 
are the God consciousness and wisdom of Islam. Al-Ghazzali (1982b:109-111) 
extracts the attributes, which could lead to good conduct from the description on 
people of heaven in the primary sources of Islam. He uses the theological 
methodology of reward and punishment in hereafter to stress on the importance of 
having these attributes, which would lead to good conduct (Al-Ghazzali, 1982b: 110). 
The discourse overall follows a micro perspective and addresses the individuals in the 
society rather then institution or state. Al-Ghazzali (1982b: 231), for example, uses 
the notion of inequality in arguing that humans are unequal in the eyes of divine, so 
the ones who are better should enjoining good and forbidding evil, to the ones who 
are worst. He, then, focuses on the reactionary wrath of God, when this duty is not 
fulfilled, for which he cites many examples from the scriptures to support the priority 
of this duty (Al-Ghazzali, 1982b: 231).  Interestingly, al-Ghazzali only mentions the 
divine wrath with forbidding of evil and does not mention the enjoining of good in 
those sentences. Al-Ghazzali (1982b: 231) makes one important distinction, as he 
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hints on a very strong linkage between the concept of justice in Islam and the duty of 
subscribing good and forbidding wrong.  
The majority of al-Ghazzali’s work on this topic concentrates on defining, 
recognising, forbidding and handling of evil, which is consistent with the overall 
approach of discourse in the genre. In context of ‘good’, al-Ghazzali resorts to 
defining what can add to the value of goodness rather then defining what may 
constitute as ‘good’. 
Al-Ghazzali links the value of goodness with development, which in his views is 
restriction on consumption of goods and services. The more this asceticism is 
expanded; the more one develops, with which the value of ‘good’ also increases. Al-
Ghazzali suggests that every prohibited thing is bad, while all the things allowed in 
Shari’ah has some value of goodness in them. It should be noted the value of 
goodness varies among the things allowed in Islamic law, which according to al-
Ghazzali (1982b: 81) categorically fall in four classes as defined in Figure 3.2. He 
further argues that each class acts as a stage of development and by confining oneself 
from consumption of things in one class, one can progress onto the next class (al-
Ghazzali, 1982b:81-82). This asceticism originates from goodwill (or heart of 
person), while simultaneously increasing the aggregate goodness in and for that 
person.   
Figure 3.2, refers to the fours classes as stages as defined by al-Ghazalli. In al-
Ghazzali’s (1982b:81) views development starts from the first stage, which comes 
with the lowest form of piety and value of goodness. In this stage the individual 
restricts himself or herself from the consumption of goods and services that are 
unlawful in Shari’ah. The second stage is to restrict oneself from doubtful thing, 
which are classified by fiqh as lawful, while in the third stage, one has to restrict 
himself/herself from consumption of goods and services, which are free from doubt 
but their consumption can result in something, which is unlawful or doubtful. The 
fourth stage is the final stage of development and has mystical significance (Al-
Ghazzali, 1982b:81). In this stage, an individual abstains from lawful things, as an act 
complete devotion to God and in a hope to attain the pleasure of God by going beyond 
the legal form into piety. Al-Ghazzali (1982b:81) refers to one, which attain this stage 
as siddiq (Person of great truth). Al-Ghazzali views the categorically abstaining from 
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consumption of good and services as mean to develop and with this development a 
person can increase the value of goodness. The value of goodness in the person allows 
him or her to distinguish between the right and wrong.  
Figure 3.2: Al-Ghazzali’s Four Classes 
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Al-Ghazzali suggests that ultimate happiness (sa'ada) is through complete devotion to 
God and to develop towards that devotion, one must reduce the consumption and with 
this asceticism, the value of goodness would increase as well. It could be suggested 
that al-Ghazzali views goodness and ultimate happiness (sa'ada) as a consequence of 
same action. Al-Ghazzali’s line of reasoning could further suggest that the ‘good’, 
‘lawful’ and ‘undoubtedly lawful’ are categorically different. Moreover, if the value 
of goodness increases by giving up something ‘lawful’ or something even 
‘undoubtedly lawful’, that would suggest that ‘lawful’ and ‘undoubtedly lawful’ may 
have some intrinsic value of ‘wrong’ in them and by giving up their consumption, one 
is actually reducing the aggregate ‘wrong’ within themselves, which may add some 
form of ‘good’, and ultimately resulting in an overall increase in value of goodness. 
This would imply that the criteria for good is not determined by fiqh compliance, 
instead the criteria for good is the act of devotion towards God, and as the devotion 
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towards God is ‘ultimate happiness’, therefore conclusively ultimate happiness is the 
criterion to decide what is ‘good’, and what is not. In other words, in the Ghazzalian 
world, there is no such thing as intrinsic good, and every form of ‘good’ draws its 
value from the final and ultimate good of devotion towards Allah. Al-Ghazzali 
(2004:43), therefore, argues that the attainment of this ultimate good is the human 
perfection, and further suggests that “Human perfection resides in this: that the love of 
God should conquer a man's heart and possess it wholly, and even if it does not possess it 
wholly it should predominate in the heart over the love of all other things”. Therefore, it 
could be suggested that in al-Ghazzalian world, the value of goodness increases as we 
progress towards the human perfection, and manner of this progress is to move from 
fiqhi restrictions on unlawful to the restriction based on doubt through the use of 
goodwill defined by asceticism for attaining falah or salvation.   
Al-Mawardi (1996:263-266) attempts to approach the issue of ‘what is good’, from 
the viewpoint of rights, duties and obligations. He categorises the rights, as shown in 
Figure 3.3, into following three categories: ‘good originating from rights of divine’, 
‘good emanating from the rights human beings’, and ‘good related to common rights 
of divine and rights of fellow human beings’. He, then, suggests that good should be 
understood within the frame of commanding what accomplishes these rights (Al-
Mawardi, 1996:263).  
Al-Mawardi (1996) understood ‘rights’ similar to other Muslim thinkers, where it is 
considered as a duty towards others, rather then something inherent to human beings 
or divine. Al-Mawardi (1996) uses the rights to structure and regulate the execution of 
commanding of good, while also restricting it. 
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Figure 3.3: Al-Mawardi’s Regulatory Process  
 
   86 
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, Al-Mawardi (1996:263) argues that the first and foremost 
duty or right is to divine. He further classifies it into the ‘duty of individual towards 
God’ and ‘duty of society towards God’. Al-Mawardi (1996:263) adheres to the 
philosophies of conservatism, as he describes the ‘right of society towards God’ as 
context of maintenance of acceptability and correctness of traditional sociological 
perspective and orthodox practice of Islam, as societal standpoints. In regards to 
implementation of this as a policy, al-Mawardi inclines towards a lenient approach. 
He uses individual reasoning as a counter balance to restrict a micro management of 
society in religious affairs through commanding of good.  
Al-Mawardi (1996) also perceives institution of hisbah, as an institution, which 
preferably works with the community, by helping it reach a consensus, and attempts 
to fulfil all the rights and duties by means of consensual agreement. Similar to rights 
of God, in the ‘rights towards human beings’, al-Mawardi (1996:266) suggests that 
hisbah officials should attempt to persuade the public to exercise their right to self 
help, and maintain, rejuvenate or improve the public welfare provisions in their 
locality, especially when the treasury is unable to fund such projects. The combined 
rights towards God and human beings are on similar line to Article 22 and Article 24 
of Universal Declaration of Human Rights as they focus on the economic, social and 
cultural right along with right to standard of living (Eide, 1998:122). However, unlike 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they are discussed on community basis rather 
then individual, that is, if something acts as a hindrance to economic, social or 
religious activity of general public, then it can be classified under the duty towards 
God and human being. This introduces an element of utilitarianism in the concept of 
rights. Furthermore, the rights as duties discussed by al-Mawardi do not propagate 
any freedom from ‘want’ of basic human necessities. This is because the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and rights as duties in Islam, do not share similar 
philosophical foundations, and although in Al-Mawardi’s framework of hisbah, there 
is encouragement to the extend of strong emphasis on the duties for public welfare, 
but treatment of rights as duties prevents them from attaining a status of statutes and 
becoming legal obligations, hence they can not lead to prosecution in the Court of 
Law. Although in theory they are used to restrict or regulate the operations of hisbah 
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but in practice they will not act as barriers or restrictions for commanding good and 
forbidding evil.  
Al Mawardi (1996) suggests very narrow framework with limited restrictions on 
commanding of good to the individuals, under the title of ‘duties of individuals 
toward God’. This is because the textual analysis of Muslim thinkers, jurists and 
theologians have resulted in the interpretation of the primary text in a manner that 
individuals are considered as impediment in the accomplishment of duties towards 
God, and duties towards God and society, while the Muslim community as a whole is 
considered to be the bearer, sustainer and endorser of ‘good’ required to accomplish 
all the duties and rights. In this, Al-Mawardi (1996:64) assigns three kinds of 
protection that is: every individual should be allowed to pray in the mosque, state 
should not declare holy war against any individual, and every individual should have 
their right in the spoils of war. He then places a condition, which would classify 
individuals to receive the privilege of these protections from the forces of 
commanding good and forbidding evil, and that condition is “as long as you stick with 
us” (Al-Mawardi, 1996:64), by keeping the religious believes within boundaries of 
the consensus and to avert from philosophical or theological innovations (Al-
Mawardi, 1996:64). Since Al-Mawardi is a political scientist, his theories mostly have 
two intrinsic features: creating incentive for people to remain or join the mainstream 
views of the society, and to emphasis and justify the ruling class’s right to govern. 
Thus, by stating “as long as you stick with us”, Al-Mawardi attempts to incorporate 
both features (Al-Mawardi, 1996:64). 
The distrust and scepticism towards the individuals, endorsement of ‘good’ on the 
Muslim community, and the condition introduced for entitlement of protection from 
forces of commanding good and forbidding evil can all be explained in context of the 
consequence of social events rather then as a consequence of theorising of original 
position in primary sources of Islam. Al-Mawardi served as kadi (judge) for major 
cities and was entrusted with diplomatic duties many times due to his exceptionally 
renowned negotiation skills (Al-Mawardi, 1996), He was then entrusted by Abbasid 
Caliph al-Ḳadir (991-1031) to undertake the task of “restoring Sunnism” (Al-
Mawardi, 1996). The condition ‘stick with us’ on protections from the forces of 
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commanding good and forbidding evil would be a rational argument to propagate in 
the context of the intention of caliph and task of Al-Mawardi.  
The Abbasids had the scholarly consensus and authority of declaring their version of 
Islam as orthodox, along with the connotation that it a religious obligation to follow 
the orthodoxy. Al-Mawardi also upheaved the status of Sunni Muslims, giving them 
entitlement to a form of religious protection, along with establishing moral grounds 
for political class to act against the followers of other Islamic doctrines. Any 
theological development on doctrine of inheriting human rights, any extension of 
duties towards individual, or even acknowledgment on equableness of ‘duties towards 
individual’ for every individual, without any discrimination on which version of Islam 
they follow, would have been an irrational choice for Al-Mawardi in the face of 
political and theological turmoil of the time and immediate objectives of Abbasid 
empire. Therefore, the unorthodoxy was not only indirectly discouraged through the 
condition of ‘stick with us’, but Al-Mawardi also separately argued for preventing any 
new unorthodox groups from emerging by advocating the use of force by the state to 
prevent unorthodox people to organise themselves in the form of a group and to have 
any geographical location employed as symbolism of their views (Al-Mawardi, 
1996:64). The details on ‘what to prevent?’ and ‘when to prevent?’ may be a 
consequence of internal influence like the historical experience with Mutazilism, 
Shiaism, Rafidism and others unorthodox groups and sects.  
The underline assumption in discriminately nature of ‘duties towards individuals’ and 
hostility towards unorthodoxy could be that Abbasids thought any unorthodoxy in 
religious views will immediately challenge the status quo of their sovereignty and 
legitimacy of their rule due to non-secular nature of political structure. It is also 
possible that political position on prevention of unorthodoxy may have originated as a 
result of external influence from Greek civilisations. The “assumption that the private 
religious rites … were inextricably connected to aristocratic power” (Kearns, 189) is 
largely associated with the Greek philosopher Cleisthenes who reformed the Athenian 
constitution. Aristotle while discussing the methods of establishing the ‘extreme’ 
form of democracy suggest that “private religious rites should be reduced to a few 
public ones; and every means should be used to mix everyone up with each other to 
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the greatest possible degree and to loosen the bonds of previous associations” 
(Kearns, 1985:189). 
There is a possibility that Al-Mawardi could be applying Aristotle’s methodology, 
especially considering that Abbasids viewed their main priority to be “the integration 
of peoples of diverse cultural and religious origins into a single Islamically defined 
framework” (Heck, 2002:15). Aristotle argues for establishment of democracy 
through this methodology, while Abbasids may be using it as a strategy to develop 
and maintain an inter-mutual religious identity under a religiously justifiable 
administrative structure. This position can further be supported with historical account 
of Al-Mawardi and Caliph Al-Qadir’s use of four schools of thought in literature and 
in politics to restore Sunnism as one identity followed by prevention of Shiites from 
celebrating their religious rites in 1015 (Tholib, 2002: 257) and Caliph Al-Qadir’s 
recommendation of public disavowal of Mutazilia as an official policy for restoration 
of Sunnism (Tholib, 2002:259). These steps coincide with Aristotle’s suggestion of 
reducing and filtering the religious rites and establishing few publically accepted rites, 
which are also officially accepted by the legislature, in addition to abating the 
previous associations and replacing them with one communal identity, to which 
everyone can feel a sense of belonging. Therefore, it could be argued that if the forces 
of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’ are to be balanced or restricted using the 
notion of rights then the rights of individuals can be further developed to form a 
concrete protection, as within this framework the rights play a vital role on deciding 
‘what is Good?’ and ‘what is not?’ The underdevelopment of rights, therefore, can 
adversely influence the process of identifying ‘what is Good?’ to the extent that 
wrong can be classified as right or good. 
The concept of ‘rights’ receives much attention in the subscribing good, because of 
the manner it is used by Islamic thinkers, that is the concept of rights gives a workable 
framework to differentiate between, ‘what is legally allowed to be subscribed?’, and 
‘what is consequentially correct?’ to be subscribed. It could be suggested that the 
Muslim scholars may have implicitly acknowledged the constraints and dangers of 
using the legal theory as a directive for commanding of good and forbidding of 
wrong, as they attempted to construct a framework for regulating the one (institution 
or an individual) who performs the duty of commanding good and forbidding wrong. 
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However, the discourse on this topic is not rigorous enough to be used for developing 
a legally binding framework to regulate the forces of commanding good and 
forbidding evil, and this failure or weakness comes down to the use of inadequately 
developed human rights. From the standpoint of the notion that the “morality cannot 
be legislated but behaviour can be regulated” (King cited by King and Washington, 
1986:124), the discourse not only fails to build a strong foundations for development 
of legislative boundaries, which could restrict the behaviour of the one who is 
‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’, but it also falls short of a comprehensive 
argument and a workable solution on distinction between scenarios where it is legally 
allowed to ‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’ and scenarios where it might be 
legally allowed to ‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’, but is ethically 
incorrect to do so. In case of Ibn Taymiya’s theory, which concentrates on utilitarian 
line of reasoning, as a mean for prudent use of ‘commanding good and forbidding 
wrong’, the discourse does not address the issue of unelected political class entrusted 
with utilitarian reasoning and decision making.  
In the defence of the discourse, it does manage to indirectly highlight the absence of 
such concepts and importance of such concepts. Moreover, it could also be argued 
that it was neither in the interest of jurists, theologians and political scientists, nor a 
rational choice for them to fully develop such concepts on the face of social constructs 
faced by them in their era. These meant that institution of hisbah throughout its 
history was lacking a clear philosophical and conceptual framework that could create 
a balance of power, and provide the required framework for the institution to exercise 
its powers.  
3.2.4 Wrongs And Modes of Preventing Wrong 
While, Islamic discourse on governance lacks the conceptual framework on applied 
ethics, which would have been extremely beneficial for institution of hisbah. A 
framework grounded in applied ethics, would have allowed the institution of hisbah to 
run a philosophical enquiry to identify the morally correct course of action (Brandt, 
1959), instead of relying on legal methods for this purpose. This is because the 
general approach of legal theories is to classify the wrongs vigorously, and postulate 
whatever is left unlegislated, unrestricted and unclassified as correct and right. The 
Class-A literature focusing on theological discussion relating to hisbah is not an 
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exemption, and, therefore, provides detailed discourse on wrongs and modes of 
preventing wrongs.  
Al Ghazzali (1982b: 245) suggests that there should be three qualifications for the one 
who aims to prevent the wrong: ‘knowledge of wrong act’, ‘god consciousness’ and 
‘good conduct’. The ‘god consciousness’ and ‘good conduct’ has a furstenspiegel 
tone, while knowledge is used by al-Ghazzali (1982b: 245) to practically confine and 
restrict the forces of denouncing wrong, within the boundaries of Shari’ah, in regards 
to the matters of “place, limit and order for prevention of wrongful act”. Al-Ghazzali 
(1982b) demonstrates a clear concern on the communal disuse social misuse or 
religious overuse of this duty and therefore attempts to regulate it by the Islamic law, 
especially considering his allowance for the vigilantism in social and religious 
matters. In modern times, Al-Ghazzali’s argument can be considered reasonable as it 
follows closely with the legal justification on the legitimacy of citizen’s arrest. 
However, Al-Ghazzali’s attempt to regulate the forces for prevention of wrong 
through Shari’ah, can be problematic, given the unclear consensus on the legitimate 
level of infiltration in matters of religious significance and underdeveloped Islamic 
doctrines on privacy laws and human rights acts. 
Al Ghazzali (1982b: 245-248) takes a very linear view of right and wrong, its 
understanding and the method of distinguishing it, as he argues that Shari’ah is the 
only method of knowing what is wrong, and wrongs are what Shari’ah classifies as 
haram (unlawful) and makruh (detestable) and the knowledge of wrongs cannot be 
understood without shari’a.  
In al-Ghazzali’s theory of right and wrong, the purpose of fiqh and to some extend the 
whole of Shari’ah is to articulate ‘what is wrong?’, while ‘what is right or good?’ has 
to be understood in the context of human happiness which is in the progression 
towards the human perfection. In this, the perfection of humans is to attain the 
complete devotion to God, and the method of attaining such perfection in through 
asceticism. In the progress towards this goal, one increases the value of goodness 
within ‘self’, which causes the goodwill to flourish. This implies that the higher a 
person is in the stages of development, the more advance version of goodwill they 
possess. Hence, the development of goodwill enhances the capacity of the person to 
distinguish between ‘what is right’ and ‘what is not’ in varied circumstances. With 
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this line of reasoning al-Ghazzali suggests that it is the religious duty of the person 
with the advance form of goodwill ;to command what is right and forbid what is 
wrong;.  
Ibn-Khaldun (1967a: 463) does not indulge into this discussion, as he suggests that 
the notion of ‘wrongs’ in context of institution of hisbah should be understood as to 
what may adversely affect general public welfare. The institution of hisbah in this 
framework would observe the market and the society, in order to identify and correct, 
whatever is having adverse affects on general public welfare. Ibn-Khaldun’s (1967b: 
103-107) general public welfare can be understood in the context of injustice, which 
Ibn-Khaldun (1967b: 107) argues causes destruction to civilisation. Ibn-Khaldun 
while citing the five maqasid (objective) of Shari’ah argues that the divine aim is to 
use the religious law to forbid the injustice that causes “destruction and ruin of 
civilization … [and may result in] eradication of the (human) species”. Therefore 
wrongs, which institution of hisbah should be concerned about, would be the practices 
in the market and society that may, can or are causing destruction of society, 
community or civilisation. This line of reasoning could be further developed to 
suggest that the extend of hisbah’s intervention in the market or society should only 
be limited to the cases, which may, can or are causing destruction of society, 
community or civilisation. 
Al-Mawardi (1996:268) approaches the concept of wrongs for the point of 
reprehensibility and blameworthiness, which he associates and explores within the 
framework of duties of individual; similar to the manner he approaches ‘good’. Al-
Mawardi considers three main categories under forbidding of reprehensible actions, as 
shown in the Figure 3.4. He suggests that there are three further branches in the first 
category of ‘duties toward God’, that is: “what is proper to rites of worship; what 
relates to prohibition; and… business transactions” (Al- Mawardi, 1996:268). Under 
rites of worship, al-Mawardi (1996:268-274) calls for the establishment of 
conventionalism in worship, and he regards the act of establishing this 
conventionalism as a form of ‘forbidding of wrong’, while in the second branch he 
argues for prohibiting “people from dubious situations or blameworthy actions”, 
where al-Mawardi attempts to regulate the use of suspicion by institution of hisbah; 
and under ‘business dealings’ al-Mawardi argues for forbidding the social or 
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economic transactions which remain illegal under Islamic law, in spite of consensus 
of contracting parties.  
Figure 3.4: Al-Mawardi’s Three Categories under Forbidding of Reprehensible 
Actions 
 
In the first category of ‘duties toward God’, al-Mawardi (1996:276) argues for a 
proactive approach by institution of hisbah, as compared to the second category of 
‘duties toward humans’, where al-Mawardi suggests a reactive approach. The second 
category of ‘duties toward humans’, and the third category of ‘duties toward humans 
and God’, are very similar in al-Mawardi’s work, as they mainly argue forbidding of 
ethically incorrect practices and unjust actions.  
Al-Mawardi does not develop any extensive framework for protection from the forces 
of forbidding wrong and the only limit he purposes is the ones which are explicitly 
stated in the primary sources, that is the limitation on forbidding of wrong without 
any substantial grounds for suspicion and limitation on spying with in intention of 
forbidding wrong actions. The last two categories are also very similar to the hisbah 
manuals, as al-Mawardi discusses different kinds of wrongs, which are unique to 
different professions along with the discussion on the manner in which different 
professionals are to be regulated through ‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’. 
In these discussions, al-Mawardi (1996: 277) highlights the three major kind of 
wrongs in the market, that is through ‘negligence of market players’, ‘dishonesty of 
market player’, and ‘through poor quality of good produced by market player’; he 
then categories market players in context with the kind of wrong they are capable of 
committing.  
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On the contrary to al-Mawardi (1996), Ibn-Taymiya (1992) uses an approach similar 
to utilitarian logic, as he attempts to draw a framework for forbidding of wrong. 
Similar to other theologians, he views wrong with the sense of what Islamic law 
classifies as wrong. However, Ibn-Taymiya (1992) argues for the evaluation on the 
forbidding of wrong in context of pain and pleasure (in Islamic context) that may be 
caused by forbidding of wrong. Therefore, Ibn-Taymiya’s theory argue for Islamic 
law as a measure of identifying right and wrong, while pain and pleasure as an 
instrument for measuring and comparing the preponderance between ‘commanding 
and forbidding’, and ‘not commanding and not forbidding’. His work also implicitly 
extends this model to suggest that if Islamic law classifies something as wrong, while 
evaluation through pain and pleasure, suggests against forbidding of that wrong, then 
Islamic law may have to reconsider its position.  
As the discussion so far indicates, Al-Mawardi, Ibn-Taymiya, Ibn-Khaldun and al-
Ghazzali similar to most theologians, juriconsults and jurists establish Islamic law as 
a criterion for distinguishing between right and wrong. However, their method of 
using these criteria for ‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’ and framework 
designed for its application largely differs.  
Al-Mawardi’s work can also be taken as an attempt to tackle the key philosophical 
issues, which create operational and practical problems for institution of hisbah, as al-
Mawardi may have acknowledged the shaky foundations of building an institution on 
virtuous nature of hisbah official. However, intricacy arises in al-Mawardi’s work due 
to the understanding of rights as duties that individuals are obliged to fulfil, and not as 
fundamental rights, to which human processes inherent entitlement. Therefore, the 
only advantageous expedient in al-Mawadi’s work is the attempt to formulise the 
function of institution of hisbah within the framework of rights. Because of this the 
framework purposed by al-Mawardi remains largely unpractical and fails to create 
any substantial boundaries or lay down a practical agenda for efficient use of 
‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’ by institution of hishab.  
It should be noted that Al-Mawardi’s hisbah also seems more focused on establishing 
conventionalism of Islamic rituals and it would take a very reactive role in the market. 
Moreover, the major emphasis still boils down to the virtuous nature of hisbah 
official, when it comes to systematical use of suspicion in institutional settings. 
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Overall, al-Mawardi’s work can even be classified as mere guidelines to a ‘virtuous 
hisbah official’, than a comprehensive model for institution of hisbah. Al-Ghazzali, 
one the other hand, does not attempt to reconcile the practical constraints of building 
an institution of hisbah on ‘virtue’, but attempts to embrace it, as he suggests that 
virtuous individuals develop within a society through asceticism, and because of this 
development they possess sophisticated goodwill, which allows them to differentiate 
between right and wrong, therefore it is the duty of these individuals to guide the 
society through the practice of ‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’.  
Al-Ghazzali and Ibn-Taymiya focused on institution of hisbah from entirely different 
angles.  While, Al-Ghazzali’s work on hisbah does not draw on practical issues and 
envisions a collective utopia, where asceticism will lead to justice and wellbeing by 
‘commanding of good and forbidding of wrong’, however, Ibn-Taymiya concentrated 
on differentiation between the process of evaluating what is right and what is wrong, 
and the process of whether this good should be commanded or this wrong should be 
prohibited. He bases his discussion on dichotomy of pain and pleasure; however, his 
theory lacks an efficient mechanism on decision making of pain and pleasure, as 
within Ibn-Taymiya’s theory the power of interpreting Islamic law and decision-
making on pain and pleasure remains with jurists. This is important because Ibn-
Taymiya attempts on creating a mechanism based on pain and pleasure which could 
act as a counter measure on interpretation of Islamic law, so what is subscribed is not 
consequentially wrong and what is forbidden is not consequentially good, and with all 
the power concentrated within the jurist circles and with no attention to public 
opinions, it is hard to foresee a efficient or effective implementation of ‘commanding 
good and forbidding wrong’.   
All together the discursively theological positioned Class-A literature attempts to 
develop a framework for optimal use of ‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’, 
by suggesting different outlines of regulations and restrictions to refrain ‘commanding 
good and forbidding wrong’ from causing any harm or injustice, while simultaneously 
the discourse attempts to divert these forces for achievement of various ends, based on 
each author’s perception on as to ‘what should be the ultimate purpose of 
‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’. 
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The entire framework suggested in this class heavily reply on the collective utopia 
‘virtuous hisbah official’. This reliance became necessary for the authors of this class, 
because Islamic thoughts purely reply on the accountability in hereafter and lack any 
discourse on the systematic induction of public accountability in governance. Roy 
(1994: 145) while discussing the issue of virtue concludes that: 
The idea of building …[an institution] that would function only through the virtue 
of the economic actors is an illusion, a sweet one to be sure in terms of collectivist  
utopias, but for this reason totally non-functional, as various attempts have shown, 
and, in economics as in politics, when virtue doesn’t function, its opposite 
emerges: the abuse of power, speculation, and corruption, the banes of “Islamized” 
economic systems.  
In concluding, Class A literature of discursive theological debate, as so far discussed, 
is mainly based on theories on hisbah, which are normative in nature. While,  al-
Mawardi’s work on hisbah can still be classified in between Class-A, and Class-B 
literature. Mawardi’s work provides practical administrative and regulative guidelines 
on hisbah, as he starts with a theory on hisbah, by establishing parameters for 
‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’ and a framework, in which this force can 
be exercised. He then follows it by practical guidelines for ‘commanding good and 
forbidding wrong’, based on possible activities of market-players. The practical 
guidelines on official of hisbah mainly constitute in hisbah manuals, which according 
to categorization of this research fall under Class-B literature.  
3.3 PRACTICAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATIVE GUIDELINES ON 
HISBAH: CLASS B LITERATURE  
The work classified here as Class B literature has appeared in various forms, which 
consists of a mixture of manuals and treatise in hisbah. They cover range of issues, 
from guidelines for muhtasib to technical methodology for supervising different 
market players. Some are of the discourse has judicial characteristics, while other 
concentrates on administration issues. 
The historical sources illustrate that the writing of hisbah manual started in late ninth 
century, which coincides with the time of writing of other professional manuals 
(Shatzmiller, 1994:83). The initial writings on hisbah did not simulate as a manual 
and rather appear as a collection of fatwas (legal opinions). Shatzmiller (1994:83) 
argues that the close link between hisbah manuals and judicial literature obviated the 
initial literary development; however, the development and innovation in trade 
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nourished its amelioration into a literary genre. This amelioration transformed the 
collections of fatwas on hisbah into a manual composed of technical guidelines and 
protocols for supervising a wide range of market players (Shatzmiller, 1994:83). An 
evaluation by Levi-Provencal suggests that much literary work conducted in the field 
of hisbah is due to the cardinal role, which hisbah played in the city; however, a few 
of these manual have survived (as cited in Shatzmiller, 1994:83).  
It should be noted that most of the manuals, which have survived are post twelfth 
century and they are significant in number. They attend to large scale of issues and 
their main point of focus is the consumer and producer relationships and socio-
religious effects of socio-economic actions. The desirability and undesirability of the 
social effects were perceived within the religious context that resulted in the 
allowance or disapproval of actions, which resulted in these social effects.  
Al-Shayzari’s 12th century manual ‘Nihayat al-Rutba fi Talab al-Hisbah’ (The Utmost 
Authority in the Pursuit of Hisbah), due its wide citation by other manuals and its 
official use by various muhtasib, is considered to be one of the major work in this 
class (Buckley, 1999:v). Because of this importance, it is used as a primary source for 
many academic studies, such as: Stilt (2012), Shatzmiller (1994), Ghabin (2009), 
Sabra (2000) and others. 
The oldest available manual is considered to be Yahya b. Umar’s Ahkamal Suk, 
which is dated to the middle of ninth century (Cahen et al.,, December 18th, 2010). 
Although it does not mention the word hisbah, but it is a collection of fatwas on the 
matters of market and trade, written as questions and answers along with some legal 
discussions based on hadith, concerning matters mostly related to city of al-Kayrawan 
(Shatzmiller, 1994:71). 
Chronologically very close to Ahkamal Suk, comes Al-Zaydi’s Manual of Hisbah, 
which not only uses the hisbah but is also considered to be the first manual to describe 
the office of hisbah (Shatzmiller, 1994:71). The author of this manual is identified as 
Al-Nisar al-Hasan al-Utrush (Shatzmiller, 1994:71). The manual was written 
concerning the social and economic matters of Tabaristan, which had under developed 
market and trade, which adversely limited the contents and technical details included 
in the manual, however, the manual does accommodate more trades and market 
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actors, and is in far more detail, which could be due to Zaydi’s approach of 
interpreting precise and unequivocal meanings of law (Cahen et al., December 18th, 
2010). From legal perspective, the Zaydi’s viewpoint within this manual coincides 
with the Sunni position in hisbah manuals from Middle East and Spain (Shatzmiller, 
1994:72). The earliest disquisition on hisbah, which can be classified as treatise are 
recorded to be from the end of eleventh century and are of Spanish origin, while in 
east they appear at the end of twelfth century (Cahen et al.,December 18th, 2010). 
The post eleventh century literature has various geographical orientation: from West 
the literature on hisbah originated from Al-Andalusia, while from the East it comes 
from Middle East, North Africa and Indian subcontinent. The wide spread 
establishment of institution and the manuals used in different geographical location 
had same epistemology.   
3.3.1 Epistemology of Hisbah Manuals as Expressed in Class B Literature 
Class B literature of hisbah manuals is based on the construction of Islamic legal 
theory, and it shares the epistemological foundations with other rulings of Shari’ah. 
While, Islam means total submission, Shari’ah can be understood in the sense that it 
is the way or the manner of submitting.  
In classical sense, Shari’ah consists of two broad and latitudinous divisions: Islamic 
natural law (ibadat) and Islamic positive law (muamalat); where natural law 
concentrates on vertical relationship between God and humans, and is considered to 
be self evident truth that communicates an almost perfect expression of God’s will. 
The positive law, on the other hand, is horizontally structured and focuses on 
relationships between humans, with an acknowledgement on its ever changing nature, 
although any process of adjustment or reconciliation with the socio economic realities 
“must be worked out strictly in accordance with the Qur’an, hadith and local legal 
traditions” (Janin and Kahlmeyer, 2007: 29). The Islamic natural law is considered a 
reflection of God’s will, and is therefore not bound to much change, while the 
disagreement between different schools of law are minor and mostly related to 
performance of rituals, while, on the other hand, the Islamic positive law needs to 
change over time, so it can accommodate the changing socio-economic realities (Janin 
and Kahlmeyer, 2007:29), which can be rationalised through maqasid al-Shari’ah.  
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The question central to Islamic theology and Islamic law from the very first century of 
Islam was as to what degree we can depend or should allow human rationality to 
distinguish between right and wrong, and how much room the human rationality 
should, can and ought to play in the matters of Islamic natural law and Islamic 
positive law (Hallaq, 2009:15)?  
While there was and to some extend still is a difference of opinion among jurists and 
theologians on the answer to this questions, however, the Sunni school of thought 
agrees on a position that if we alter the contents of the ‘substantive assumption’13 on 
which we build an argument, the results will automatically change with it (Hallaq, 
2009:15). In other words, different perception regarding an event, which can arise 
from difference in contents of thinking, will produce different conclusion on the 
classification of an event as good or bad; while the method of reasoning could be 
constant no matter which conclusion is drawn. On this basis, they argued that if 
‘substantive assumption’ is regulated and restricted then whoever follows the agreed 
method of reasoning would draw same conclusion, so there will be uniformity in the 
outcome. Therefore, by regulating the ‘contents’ of rational thinking, consistency can 
be achieved on conclusions, which are drawn. Moreover, when the contents of 
thinking are restricted to what is “predetermined, transcendental and above and 
beyond what we can infer through our mental faculties” (Hallaq, 2009:15), then God’s 
will, which reflects in the predetermined and transcendental sources, should also 
reflect on the conclusion drawn from them. This line of reasoning is based on two 
assumptions; one is the assumption that the God’s will replicates itself in the 
conclusion, when the contents on which the conclusion is based are transcendental. 
Hallaq (2009:15) draws on the second assumption and points out that the underlining 
belief in the above argument is the notion that the human beings are incapable of 
understanding the ‘secrets of world’, and human’s knowledge lacks the capacity to 
comprehend the ‘secrets of the world’, but by using transcendental sources as contents 
of rational thinking humans can compensate themselves for this lack of capacity and 
inadequate capability.  
The development of structure for regulating the ‘contents’ of rational thinking in 
Islamic legal traditions resulted in development of an Islamic theory of law known as 
                                                      
13 ‘Substantive assumption’ loosely means, what a player knows and what they believe to be self 
evidently true. 
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usul ul fiqh. The Islamic theory of law hieratically organises and methodologically 
arranges the elements that can be used as contents for the process of rational thinking, 
in addition to constructing methods for appropriate usage of these elements.  
Islamic legal traditions place Qur’an on top of this hierarchy, and all Sunni school of 
thoughts agree on its importance as unquestionable primary source of law and as a 
criterion for testing the accuracy of other sources. In classical Sunni schools, the only 
exception is in Dhaahiree School of Imaam Daawood (815-883 CE), in which the 
status of Qur’an as an unquestionable primary source of law is restricted to literal 
interpretation of text, and the text is only to be applied to the specific the circumstance 
that are termed within the Qur’anic text (Philips, 1990:95). 
The subject matter of Qur’an is divided into three groups in Islamic thoughts, the 
versus that address human conduct are called legal verses; verses with exhortative 
nature are pronounced ethical verses and considered a subject matter of Islamic ethics 
(ilm al-akhlaq); and verses with theological description relating to Islamic theology 
(ilm al-kalaam of aqeedah) (Philips, 1990:23). Islamic legal traditions focus on legal 
verses, which make up about 8% of total Qur’anic verses. The contents of the legal 
verses are then further divided into two groups, that is: ‘contents dealing with human-
God relationship’ and ‘contents dealing with human-to-human relationship’.  
All major schools of thought consider traditions of Prophet as next primary source of 
law, but all of them have also introduced different forms of qualifications for its 
acceptance. Hanafites require the tradition to be commonly known (mashoor); 
Maalikee leave out the Prophetic traditions that contradicts with the consensus of 
people of Medina (ijmaa of the Madeenites); Shafities concentrate on the validity in 
transmission (saheeh), while for Hambalee, any and every tradition that is ascribed to 
Prophet is acceptable without any question on its validity (Philips, 1990:98).  
The third source of law is consensus or ijma that constitutes less than a percent of 
total law, which is “reached on rules that were based on inferential methods of 
reasoning” (Hallaq, 2009:22). Different schools of thought use ijma in slightly 
different way, as for Maalikee and Hanafites consensus of Prophet’s companion and 
consensus of scholars is a source of law, while Shafities approach it with doubt and 
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for Zaydee consensus of companions is fourth sources after the sayings of Ali Ibn-
Abi-talib (Philips, 1990:80-84).  
The remaining sources are qiyas or deductive reasoning, istislah or public interest and 
istihsan or juristic preference, which, are technically not sources but rather are “set of 
methods through which the jurist arrives at legal norms” (Hallaq, 2009:22). The 
method widely used in qiyas is analogy deduction, where a new case is matched with 
an existing case from the first three sources of law, and the two are linked together in 
identifying a common denominator in them, thereafter the decree issued or agreed for 
the existing case is implemented on the new case. In other words, jurists construe a 
premises for a new case from an existing premises of a case referred in primary 
sources, and the process of inference stands on a common denominator, which is 
normally the reason connecting the decree and the act. 
In some cases, the reason connecting the act and the decree is clearly stated in the 
sources, while in other cases jurist have to reason and speculate over the categories of 
premises and the connection between them. The jurists in favour of qiyas do not view 
it as an instrument for creating new laws, but rather a process of extending the already 
established laws within primary sources. However, the speculative nature of qiyas 
lead some jurists (Mutazilah, the Zahiri, the Shiites and some Hanbalites) to argue 
that the laws, created or extended as a result of practice of qiyas, have caused 
incoherence in the body of Islamic law, as these laws do not correspond with the 
maqasid or objectives of Islamic law ((Kamali, 2002:181). Therefore, to create 
coherence in the law, a process of evaluating the connection and premises was 
introduced, which is called doctrine of suitability (munasaba). The doctrine of 
suitability provides “ “relevant” ways of reasoning that serve the public interest 
(maslaha)” (Hallaq, 2009:25), while public interest is understood in context with the 
purpose of law and the purpose of law corresponds with the will of lawgiver. This 
framework of creating coherence in the law rests upon the assumption that the will of 
the lawgiver is discernible. This is the very assumption that was challenged by 
Zahirites. 
It should be noted that the fundamental aim of Islamic law is to forbid what is wrong 
and harmful, and to subscribe what is good and beneficial for this life and the next; as 
Hallaq (2009: 25) argues that “the systematic exclusion of harm and inclusion of 
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benefit are the fundamental aims of the law”. Most Sunni schools agree on an aim and 
purpose of law and suggest that it is to bring benefit for and to the believers (maaslih 
al-ibad). The doctrine of maqasid al-Shari’ah and declaration that God, due to His 
qualities of goodness and justice is obliged to act for the benefit of His creations, and 
therefore the purpose of His laws must be to bring benefit to His creations, were 
developed in response to Mutazila’s principle that “the God’s decrees are subject to, 
rather than the origin of, the ideas of good and evil (Gleave, 2012).  
Jurist’s attempt to classify the benefits that law aims to nurture, resulted in its 
categorisation into three broadly defined groups, that is: daruriyyat or necessity,, 
hajiyyat or supporting needs, and tahsiniyyat or embellishments. In this 
categorisation, the necessity is then further understood as safeguarding of religion, 
life, intellect, lineage and property; which are the categories of maqasid al-Shari’ah. 
The principles of necessity are considered as elements fundamental to human 
existence and primary purpose of law, revealed text and ‘will’ of lawgiver is 
considered to be promotion and protection of these elements. The goal of principles of 
necessity sometimes contradicts with the conclusions constructed through qiyas and 
therefore requires the relinquishment of qiyas by creating exceptions. These 
exceptions are created by the inference of istihsan, in which the legal reasoning starts 
from the revealed text but produces resolutions different to qiyas that are mostly 
justified “on the basis of… consensus or on the principle of necessity” (Hallaq, 
2009:26).As part of the sources of Islamic law, istihsan is similar to the principles of 
equity in English law, as it justifies departure from positive law. However, unlike 
equity, which is based on the principle of fairness, istihsan stands on the “underlying 
values and principles of the Shari’ah” (Kamali, 2002:217). 
The next type of inference is istislah, which unlike previous two types, neither 
initiates from revealed text, nor requires textual support, but instead it is purely 
constructed on calculation of public benefit. This reasoning rests heavily on the 
principle of necessity as an object of justification and an important part of this legal 
reasoning relies on the perception of jurist on what ‘ends’ can and will promote and 
preserve the principles of necessity (Hallaq, 2009: 25).  
Islamic law takes interest in every human action with an intention of not controlling 
or regulating the socio economic life but to establish an order based on peace and 
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harmony with emphasis on principles of necessity and public interest. This approach 
runs contrary to modern law, as modern law attempts to regulate and shape socio-
economic life, while Islamic law concentrates on creating peace and establishing 
justice within the already established socio-economic dimensions. Islamic law is, 
therefore, an instrument which allows jurists to construct an order by altering the 
socio-economic activities through prioritising the human actions and then 
recommending and making obligatory the ones which fulfil the principles necessity 
and are in public interest, while restricting disapproving and forbidding the ones 
which do not. Islamic law, hence, attempts to achieve this by categorically dividing 
the entire set of actions performed by humans during their entire lifetime into five 
groups. The first group is of forbidden actions and second is the actions that one is 
obliged to perform. It should be noted that any violation from the contents of these 
groups incurs punishment. The remaining three do not entail any punishment and they 
are recommended, neutral and disapprove. The punishment incurred on performing 
forbidden actions and/or abnegating obligatory action, is balanced by the rewards. 
However, rewards are deferred to hereafter, while the punishment is immediate. The 
categorical classification of actions into five groups is based on linguistic analysis, 
and although these five groups distinguish between moral to legal actions, the 
classification is without any “conscious distinctions between the moral and the legal” 
(Hallaq, 2009:19), and all the acts are considered as moral-legal commandments as 
they are pronounced as law (Sharia). Hallaq (2009:19) further argues that “there are 
no words in Arabic, the lingua franca of the law, for the different notions of 
moral/legal”. Lack of a conscious distinction between the moral and legal has its roots 
in the primary sources, which “embodies the whole of the Islamic ethos …, contains 
no ethical theories in the strict sense” (Fakhry,1991:1).  
The concoct nature of law as moral-legal commandments meant that jurists, 
juriconsults, theologians, linguistic analyst and muhtasib conjectured a sense of 
legally and morally responsibility, and this sense of legally and morally responsibility 
reflects in the style of guidelines provided to muhtasib in the hisbah manual. The 
legal and moral responsibility also associates a level of trust, which Muslim 
community has to have in the ability of jurists, juriconsults, theologians, linguistic 
analyst and muhtasib. The possibilities of violation of trust is not entirely regulated 
and the abstract nature of notion of public interest and theoretical structure of 
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principles of necessity, provides a formation loose enough for construction of 
reasonable justification for regulations that somewhat makes the regulations, a result 
of arbitrary decisions of jurists, juriconsults, theologians, linguistic analyst and 
muhtasib. 
The evaluation of public interest is not based on any democratic system and 
classification of what will constitute as public interest, remains in the hands of jurists, 
juriconsults, theologians, linguistic analyst and muhtasib; which makes the whole 
system remote, closed and circular. It could be argued that this increases the 
efficiency of the system and makes it easier to construct exceptions to create laws 
suitable for the purpose.  
In context of hisbah manuals, the flexibility in derivation of law is required because 
of epistemological restrictions. When hisbah manuals are approached with an 
assumption that the will of lawgiver can be understood then philosophically hisbah 
manuals should reflect that ‘will’. In an attempt to incorporate the divine directives 
into market regulations, Islamic ministers face the obstacle of limitation of primary 
text; on the face of ever changing market conditions textual deduction proves to be 
restrictive. The theories on hisbah, hence, were developed very close to the ideas of 
ideal doctrine and although they attempt to provide a framework for tackling practical 
problems, they were developed in isolation from the changing market, so they lack 
practically viable context that is relevant to the market conditions. Consequently, 
hisbah manuals had to be constructed without epistemological clarity and they mainly 
relied on the rules of istislah and istihsan, which is a characteristic somewhat 
consistent with entire corpse of Islamic law, as Sachedina (1999:26) suggests that 
when it comes to legal decisions in Islamic law: “there is one rule governing all the 
above, namely the “selection of the better course” (istislah) or the “application of 
juristic discretion” or “seeing fit” (istihsan)”.  
Major reliance on istislah and istihsan was necessary for the architects of hisbah 
manuals, as they attempted to regulate the factors of production in the market. The 
socio economic and political factors also influenced the notion of what efficiency is in 
the market? How it can be achieved?  
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The theories of hisbah with their moral restrictions did not translate into the 
regulation of hisbah manuals, because of their unpractical dimension. This left 
regulations without any clear moral boundaries or restrictions. The abstract sense of 
morality in primary sources was still available to the architects of hisbah manuals, but 
in efforts to tame the market and continuous development in the complexity of factors 
of production left little room for consolidation of moral values. The epistemic 
characteristic compromised the morality, while making the construction of regulations 
a reactive, instead of proactive matter. Thus, hisbah manuals are a product of 
innovative practical thinking on the face of uninformed theory.   
The epistemic source for justification of regulations was mainly market conditions 
and the best response deemed necessary to tackle them. This justification also acted as 
an authority for existence of regulations. Most hisbah manuals include the 
justification with the regulations, which responds to the practice in response to which 
the regulation was constructed. The regulations in hisbah manuals, therefore, are 
categoised occupation wise, that is: author of the manual gives a heading of the 
occupation and then discuss the regulation that occupation should adhered to, while 
sometimes also including the malpractice for which the regulation is designed, along 
with list of possible derelictions within that line of work. This is historically and 
anthropologically significant as it helps in developing an understanding on the 
economic conditions of the time when hisbah manuals were written. Shatzmiller 
(1994:92) draws attention to uneven number of occupations mentioned across range 
of hisbah manuals and points out that some of the authors only included minimal 
number of occupations in their manuals. This diversity in contents across manual and 
difference in structure of manuals could be due to evolution in literary genre 
(Shatzmiller, 1994:92), or it may be, that authors only included those occupations, 
which they deemed troublesome or more prevalent in their time and space.  
As regards to the epistemological attributes of hisbah manuals, the facts, description, 
information and the skills incorporated in the regulations, and the methods of 
acquiring them, do not address the existence of regulations. The existence can be 
understood from the perspective of constructivist epistemology, which implies that 
the regulations were response to historical events and the architects of hisbah manual 
constructed them, in agreement with their mental constructs of ‘what good needs to 
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established through legislation’. The mental construct of ‘good’ was a response to 
their sensory experience of ‘wrong in the market and society’; instead of regulations 
being discovered from the ideological grounds of Islam. This epistemological 
perspective, however, does not facilitate the examination of regulations or in 
epistemological terms the ‘test of truth’, in respect to the accuracy of regulations as 
being the best response to the market conditions. This is, because it would require an 
observation of how market responded to these regulations, which is something not 
sufficiently available in the discourse. The examination of regulations with ‘criterion 
of truth’ is essential for understanding and establishing the adequate or inadequate 
nature of regulations. The adequateness or inadequateness can act as a measure of 
epistemological relevance of current framework of constructing regulations to 
efficiently and effectively regulating the market. This research will now attempt to 
evaluate the epistemological relevance of current framework, in order to suggest 
modification, adjustment, clarification or refutation to current epistemic model of 
hisbah regulations.  
In epistemological philosophy, the test of truth are the rules, which are used to test the 
accuracy of a statement (Tannenbaum, 2010). Selecting the test of truth for hisbah 
manual is bit of an issue, because of their unique epistemic features and lack of 
reliable data on the consequence of these regulations. The hisbah regulations were 
designed to achieve certain goals and their construction was heavily influenced by the 
‘debt of meaning’, therefore the test of truth for these regulations has to cover these 
areas. Therefore, the most appropriate method for checking their reliability would be 
mean-end analysis, within which we could check whether the regulations focus on 
goals set institution of hisbah by the theorists.  
3.3.1.1 Test of truth 
Truth is generally considered to be what is in agreement with reality, while falsity is 
that which disagrees with it. This definition is generally agreed by scholars and 
academics; however, the understanding on the meaning of ‘reality’ and ‘agreement’ 
varies across different groups. For testing the hisbah regulations, the meaning of 
‘reality’ and ‘agreement’ has to be taken into context of epistemic characteristics of 
manual and regulations.  
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For hisbah regulations to be classified as ‘truth’ they have to be coherent with the 
reality. This reality has many dimensions but loosely it could be narrowed down to 
three major fronts (order does not signify preference or importance). Firstly is the 
reality that Islamic law aims to achieve, which is reflected in doctrines like necessity. 
This part of reality is significant because Islamic law provides epistemic foundations 
for the relevant regulations. Thereafter, comes the part of reality that is formed by the 
cognitive superiority of Qur’an and Sunnah. This part of reality is theologically 
eminent, as majority of discourse on Islamic thoughts assigns cognitive priority to the 
commandments of primary sources. The third part of reality is of moral nature and 
deals with dichotomy of right and wrong, which is predominantly essential as it gives 
the purpose of existence to hisbah manual. Institution of hisbah is charged with the 
responsibility of ‘establishing right and denouncing wrong’, so the hisbah manual’s 
purpose is to act as practical guidelines of ‘how’ to fulfil this in socio economic life. 
Therefore, the ‘reality’ with which hisbah manual has to be in agreement with is the 
‘right’ or ‘good’ as understood by Islam, the commandment directly prescribed in 
primary sources, and the goals of Islamic law.  
The meaning, arrangement and measure of ‘agreement’ also need to be defined in 
such a manner that it gives opportunity space for the process by which the regulations 
can be validated, and the meaning of the ‘agreement’ remain in context. The 
‘agreement’ cannot be understood in context of the consequence, as the consequence 
of regulation in the market and society could be driven by other factors, hence the 
agreement is understood in reference to the subject matter of regulations and issues it 
is addressing, instead of through consequential reasoning.    
In other words, the purposed method for testing the validity of hisbah manual is 
through the verification of subject matter of regulations with the dichotomy of ‘right’ 
or ‘good’, the directly prescribed commandment, and the goals of Islamic law. For 
example: Nihayat al-Rutba fi Talab al-Hisbah (The Utmost Authority in the Pursuit of 
Hisbah), which is the work of a twelfth century Syrian muhtasib, and is written as 
guidelines on operations of hisbah, advices that non-Muslim should wear separate 
coloured footwear14 in each foot (Buckley, 1999:39).  There is no scriptural support 
for such a regulations and al-Shayzari, who authored this hisbah manual may have 
                                                      
14 Women should wear two slippers, one of which is white and the other black. 
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some mental justification for the need to draw distinction between Muslim and non-
Muslim within the market and the society; however, without a direct scriptural 
support and without any link or connection with principle of necessity, the agreement 
of this regulation is doubtful. 
In other words, what hisbah manual tries to establish, should technically be ‘what 
good looks like’ and it attempts to achieve this by classifying the ‘wrong’ or ‘evil’, 
followed by establishing the ‘right’ which should replace the ‘wrong’, along with the 
‘right’ way of establishing the ‘right’. The legitimacy of regulations in hisbah 
manuals depends on the existence of ‘evil’ in their own respective classifications of 
‘wrong’, existence of ‘good’ in their prescribed ways and in the state of matter that 
the regulations aim to achieve. In hisbah manuals the laws and ethics converge to 
form the regulations. Moor in his work suggests the subject matter of ethics to be 
‘goodness’ (as cited in Tannenbaum, 2010:257) and therefore the examination of 
hisbah manual will revolve around the presence of goodness within its regulations, 
the goodness that it aims to establish within the society, through regulations.  
3.4 MODELLING THE TEST OF TRUTH FOR HISBAH MANUALS: CLASS 
B LITERATURE 
The deconstruction of hisbah manual based on the level of ‘good’ could also improve 
the understanding of semantic, epistemological, and psychological presuppositions, 
views and commitments of morals structured within the regulation; elaborate the 
degree of ‘caricaturized subjectivism’15 within the manual; and the legitimacy of 
underlying moral and value system of good within the regulations. This process may 
also allow a better understanding of ontological nature of ethical value concepts and 
might improve the current comprehension on epistemology of knowledge on ethical 
values. 
The hisbah manual selected for this purpose is Nihayat al-Rubta fi Talab al-Hisba 
(The Utmost Authority in the Pursuit of Hisba). Although there is disagreement on the 
exact authorship of this manual, the author is commonly referred as ‘al Shayzari’ 
(Buckley, 1999:12). Al-Shayzari’s manual appears to be the first manual from the 
                                                      
15 A view point in ethics which takes the position, that the moral positions are merely personal 
preferences. 
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Islamic east and is dated to eleventh century AD (Buckley, 1999:12). There are 
number of manuscripts from different time, which indicate the wide acceptance of this 
manual. Moreover, Buckley has translated an Egyptian manuscript from thirteenth 
century AD into English, which he argues is the complete version available for this 
manual (Buckley, 1999: v). The reason for selecting this manual is because it is 
widely cited by other manuals and used as guide lines by various muhtasib and jurists, 
along with the large extent of literary work conducted on this manual. The major 
focus of this manual is on describing the state of affairs in society and market, which 
allows an analysis on the understanding of medieval Islamic jurists on the ‘good’ and 
‘evil’, within the context of institution of hisbah.        
Al Shayzair’s manual, similar to other hisbah treaties and manuals, is a collection of 
regulations. These regulations are formulated to achieve an agglomeration of ‘good’ 
within the socio economic sphere, that is: these collection of regulations are 
constructed as means to an end and as the end is ‘good’, therefore the assessment of 
the means (regulations) is being based on the categorical importance of end (good), 
which they aim to achieve. The agglomeration of good can be taxonomically 
separated based on the nature of ethical value concept of good, which the regulations 
aim to achieve. The Figure 3.5 shows the connection of good and hisbah manual; the 
hisbah manuals collect the regulations that have expressed the idea of good within a 
legal structure. 
Figure 3.5: The Agglomeration of Good 
 
 
The historical investigation in the distinction of ‘good’ has resulted in various unique 
dimensional views, which produced numerous definitions and carved the foundations 
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of ethical theories. The unique dimensional views were constructed by attributing 
permutation of ‘good’. 
In the Islamic theology, there are two distinct views on the ontology of ‘good’. In the 
opinion of Ash’arite, the ontological nature of the ethical value concepts can only 
generate through the divine revelations. This view takes the position of ethical 
subjectivism that perceives the ‘right‘ to be the one, which is prescribed and approved 
by someone. The source of ethical subjectivism could be human, social or theistic; 
however, within the context of Ash’arite’s view it is theistic. The rational argument 
for this view is that there is no intrinsic quality within ‘good’, for which it is classified 
as ‘good’ and the ‘good’ is ‘right’ only because it is approved, subscribed and 
categorised as ‘good or right‘ within the transcendental sources. The contrasting 
opinion, which is also held by majority of Islamic theologians is that, the ‘good’ has 
an objective meaning and its values exist in the acts or things. Ibn-Taymiya explicitly 
renounced the Ash’aritian opinion and argued on the theological relevance of ‘reason’ 
as a principal rule in distinguishing good and bad, because the good has intrinsic 
values, which makes it different from bad. Furthermore, Ibn-Taymiya also insisted on 
the logical conformity of this position within the primary text of Islam (Al-Attar, 
2010:13). The two opinions follow similar pattern of reasoning to Euthyphro16 
dilemma, which has been debated by many philosophers and theologians. The model 
designed for analysing good therefore has two-fold structure: the first part is referred 
as first layer and second as second layer, as demonstrated in the Figure 3.6. The first 
layer follows the logical argument of Ash’arites and compares the hisbah regulations 
to what is being prescribed, while the second layer focuses on the importance of ends 
within the regulation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
16 Is the pious loved by the god because they are pious, or are they pious because they are loved by the 
god? 
   111 
 
Figure 3.6: Layers of Goodness 
 
3.4.1 First Layer Assessment 
Moore (2005:9-22) begins Principia Ethica by proposing the hypothesis that ‘good’ 
in its self is undefinable and he further suggested that:  
it may be granted that “good” is an adjective. Well, “the good,” “that which is 
good,” must therefore be the substantive to which the adjective “good” will apply: 
it must be the whole of that to which the adjective will apply, and the adjective 
must always truly apply to it. But if it is that to which the adjective will apply, it 
must be something different from that adjective itself; and the whole of that 
something different, whatever it is, will be our definition of the good...[Moreover,] 
Whenever we judge that a thing is “good as a means,” we are making a judgment 
with regard to its causal relations: we judge both that it will have a particular kind 
of effect, and that that effect will be good in itself. But to find causal judgments 
that are universally true is notoriously a matter of extreme difficulty. 
Moore (2005:9-23) argues that its not defining the word ‘good’ by expressing its 
meaning in another word, that matters, as good is a non-natural property, therefore 
what really matters is analysing ‘good’ based on its source of value. The 
categorisation of good based on the source of goodness results in two categories: 
‘intrinsic good’ and ‘extrinsic good’. The quality of intrinsic good suggested by 
Korsgaard is that, the intrinsically good things posses the value of goodness internally 
and do not need to derive the value of goodness from an external source, while the 
extrinsically good things have an external source for value of goodness (as cited in 
Tannenbaum, 2010:269). This method of categorising good when entailed with the 
Ash’arite’s approach on what is ‘good’, results in the following definition: the 
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intrinsic good is what is mentioned or subscribed directly as good within the 
transcendental sources, namely Qur’an and hadith. Due to the direct transcendental 
prescription, the subscription becomes the ‘good’ for its own sake and therefore is 
‘intrinsic good’. 
Aristotle while exploring ‘good’, states that “every action ... aim at some good; and 
for this reason the good ...[is] that at which all things aim” (Aristotle, 2007:5). The 
characterisation of good based on the work of Aristotle and Plato gives three types of 
good: ‘the good classified as good for its own sake’; ‘the good classified as good for 
its own sake and for the sake of some other good’; and ‘the good classified as good 
only for the sake of some other good’ (Tannenbaum, 2010:258). In contrast to Greek 
philosophy, the Islamic thoughts distinguishing good with the ‘doctrine of 
divisibility’. The standard form of this doctrine argues that the good can be bisected 
into two parts, that is: “the obligatory and the supererogatory, with the corollary that it 
is obligatory to command obligatory right17, and supererogatory to command 
supererogatory right” (Cook, 2000:272). 
The good directly mentioned within the transcendental sources is of both types, that is 
obligatory and the supererogatory, therefore the intrinsic good would be the 
obligatory or the supererogatory good subscribed directly within the transcendental 
sources. In terms of Aristotle’s distinction, the ‘intrinsic good’ is classified as the 
good, which is ‘good’ for its own sake only; and the good that is ‘good’ for its own 
sake and for the sake of some other good. The first layer of assessment utilises this 
distinction as a benchmark for classifying the intrinsic good and extrinsic good. The 
bench mark definition is: ‘the intrinsic good is that ‘good’ which is classified as 
‘good’ for its own sake; and the ‘good’ classified as ‘good’ for its own sake and for 
the sake of some other good. It should be noted that the ‘for the sake’ test is based on 
the direct mention of ‘good’ within the transcendental source, even though it is 
obligatory or/and the supererogatory good’. In other words the good commanded or 
subscribed directly within the transcendental sources in taken as intrinsic good, and 
the good not directly mentioned in transcendental sources is classified as extrinsic 
good. The word ‘direct’ mentioned above indicates the restriction on the law derived 
using tools such as analogical deduction, from being intrinsic good, as such kind of 
                                                      
17 The word ‘right’ is used by cook as a translation of Arabic word Ma'ruf .  
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law derives its value of goodness from the external source and is extrinsic good. 
Moreover, the first layer assessment only separates the intrinsic good from extrinsic 
good and do not attempt to further deconstruct the intrinsic good into its categories.    
In theological terms the above benchmark for first layer assessment could be 
explained with the example of sawm (fasting). Observing sawm during the month of 
Ramadan18 is an obligatory19 act, as it satisfies one of the minimum standards 
required to be a Muslim, while sawm recommended outside Ramadan within hadiths 
is tool for development. Due to explicit mention of these types of sawm in 
transcendental sources, both will be considered as intrinsic20 good. However, when 
sawm is observed outside the obligatory requirements and supererogatory 
recommendations, it loses its inherit value and becomes extrinsic good as it is no 
longer the exact practice of something directly mentioned in transcendental sources. 
In which case, in order to remain good it has to draw it’s goodness from other sources 
of good, which could be piousness or achieving the ridwan Allah (pleasure of Allah). 
In conditions, where the connection with source is intermittently incoherent, the 
extrinsic good loses its goodness and therefore can no longer remain in this category.  
For instance, the extensive observance of voluntary sawm is such a case and is 
therefore forbidden in Islam through hadith (Al-Sijistani, 1984:666). The rationale for 
forbidding extensive observance of voluntary sawm could be due to its possible 
adverse effects on health; however, it is not the rationale, which relevant to the 
categorisation of good, but its the mechanism in which the voluntary sawm loses its 
goodness. In this example of sawm, the obligatory fasting and transcendentally 
recommended supererogatory fasting is suggested to be intrinsic good, while the 
voluntary fasting outside the transcendental recommendations becomes the extrinsic 
good, and when a ‘condition’ that is extensive observance is added, the voluntary fast 
outside the transcendental recommendations becomes forbidden, as the condition 
dissolves the connection of extrinsic good with its source of goodness. 
The relevance and importance of ‘condition’ as a criterion for good is a very vital 
factor, as Korsgaard (as cited by Tannenbaum, 2010:283) demonstrates in her 
                                                      
18 Ninth month in Islamic calendar.  
19 During the month of Ramadan. 
20 If the good is viewed from the perspective of this world than the obligatory act can be suggested as 
extrinsic good as they draw their values from hereafter, however to set the bench mark for categorizing 
good, the good is considered under/with Ash’arite’s view of good.  
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research on Aristotle and Kant’s categorisation of good. She further argues on 
distinction of good based on the contextual dependency of good, because not all 
intrinsic good is unconditional good as the unconditional good is defined as “good 
under any and all conditions... no matter what the context” (Korsgaard as cited in 
Tannenbaum, 2010:283). The conditional good, on the other hand, is taken as the 
good whose value of good is dependent on the context and condition, that is in under 
some conditions the conditional good loses it’s goodness value. In theological 
discourse, there are many example of this, for instance, cutting off the hands of thieves 
is explicitly prescribed in Qur’an (5:38), and, therefore, according to the above 
categorisation, it would come under intrinsic good. However, it was stopped by the 
Caliph Omar Ibn al-Khattab as in spite of being an intrinsic good, it is not unconditional 
good. The conditional and unconditional goods do not depend on the source of the 
good but circumstances, which can affect their value goodness. Tannenbaum (2010) 
base her argument on Korsgaard’s work, and suggests that the conditional good is a 
form of a process as it “depends for its value on the value of its results or product”, 
while the unconditional good is as an activity and is pure like ‘justice’ (Korsgaard 
cited in Tannenbaum, 2010:283). The unconditional good and conditional good is 
very subjective matter, and there is no bench mark available for identifying it, 
therefore, the first layer assessment only attempts to filter the intrinsic good from 
extrinsic good. Moreover, the extrinsic good is mostly clearly marked within the 
manual along with the conditions it needs to retain its goodness. For example, a 
regulation regarding bakers, in the manual advises muhtasib (hisbah official) to 
“stipulate that each shop must bake a certain amount of bread ... so that the town will 
not be disturbed through lack of it” (al-Shayzari, 1999:48). To assess the nature of 
goodness within this regulation, first it is established that the right to stipulating the 
production function of market players is not directly established in the transcendental 
sources, which signifies the extrinsic nature of this regulation. Moreover, the 
regulation mentions a condition when stipulating the production function of bakers 
will have a value of goodness; which is when there is a high probability for 
production of bread to be under the aggregate demand, as this will adversely affect the 
price and wellbeing of population. In the absence of such insecurity the act of 
stipulation would not have any goodness in it and therefore it reaffirms its extrinsic 
nature. 
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As can be seen in Figure 3.7, the first layer assessment filters the regulations into two 
parts that is: the regulations having intrinsic good and the regulations having extrinsic 
good. The process of filter is conducted on the above-defined criteria and benchmarks 
as described in figure 3.7. Thereafter, a ratio of the two is calculated and percentage 
out of total number of regulations is calculated. This process will not only allow the 
development of a better understanding on the ratio between intrinsic good and 
extrinsic good, it will also provide insight into the make up of manual in reference to 
scriptures.  
Figure 3.7: The Process of Deconstruction  
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3.4.2 Second Layer Assessment 
The Aristotelian views, along with other Greek schools of philosophy like Platonism, 
Neoplatonism, Stoicism and others had a profound affect on early Muslim thinkers, 
which lead to new kind of literature on ethics with a unique synthesis, in which 
multiple schools of philosophy were integrated together and an attempts were made to 
make them compatible with Islam. Miskawayh (1968: 69) in his work Tahdhib al-
Akhlaq made a similar kind of attempt with Aristotle’s characterisation of good, while 
supporting the views on good held by earlier philosophers, he asserts that “The good 
... is that towards which all things aim ... and anything which is useful towards the end 
may [also] be called a good” (emphasis is original). 
Aristotle categorises such a good as final good and describes it as greatest humanly 
achievable good, which ‘we wish for’, ‘chosen’, ‘valued’ and ‘pursued’. 
(Tannenbaum, 2010:257-61). Miskawayh (1968:71) further interprets this and 
explains that: 
Some good ... are like ends, other like matter, and still others like tools... In 
substance -  I mean what is not accident - God (exalted and blessed is He!) is the 
First Good, because all things turn towards Him in desire for Him and so as to 
obtain from such divine goods as immortality, eternity, and completion... 
Completion is that (end) which, once it is attained, we do not need anything else.  
Miskawayh understood Aristotle’s final good in the Islamic paradigm as a cause that 
leads to an ‘end’, which is an elements of a set of ‘ infinite divine good’. The set of 
divine good (D) in an uncountable infinite set, whilst the proper subset of it is a finite 
set of final good (F) which can be ‘wished for’, ‘chosen’, ‘valued’ and ‘pursued’ in 
this world. In an attempt to open the means, which achieve good ends, Maliki scholars 
especially al-Qarafi divided the rulings (or regulations in current context) into wasail 
(means) and maqasid (ends) (Auda, 2008:241). The second layer assessment similarly 
is also an attempt to evaluate regulations based on the means and ends, however it is 
using the ‘finite set’ of final good, which can be ‘wished for’, ‘chosen’, ‘valued’ and 
‘pursued’, as shown in the equations below:  
     F               D 
while                                      D  = {...f1,f2,f3...} 
and                                         F   = {f1,f2,f3...fn}  
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The ‘completion’ as described by Miskawayh is the most significant attribute of set F 
and ‘completion’, which Shari’ah aims at as maqasid al-Shari’ah.  
Maqasid al-Shari’ah is the purpose, objectives and aims of Islamic law which are 
noticeably observed throughout the entire body of Islamic law (Auda, 2008:5) and as 
Shari’ah is presented as a type of methodology to ‘turn towards the God, so as to 
obtain from divine goodness’; similar to the final good in Miskawayh’s description. 
Therefore, maqasid al-Shari’ah must also be a proper subset of set F, which in return 
is the proper subset of set D. For this reason, the second layer assessment is using 
maqasid al-Shari’ah as a benchmark for evaluating the concentration and quantity of 
final good within the regulation of hisbah manual. Moreover, such an appellation of 
maqasid al-Shari’ah, the inherit drawback of maqasid al-Shari’ah, as highlighted in 
Auda’s (2008:5) investigation is that they “fall short to include specific purposes for 
single scripts/rulings ... that cover certain topics”. Therefore, the standard darurat 
(necessities) in maqasid al-Shari’ah that is preservation of din (religion), nafs (soul), 
nasl (family), aql (intellect) and mal (private ownership) are re-contextualised in a 
manner that they are relevantly applicable in the socioeconomic sphere, while 
maintaining compatibility with the ways in which ministers of Islam would have 
approached them and historically comprehended them in settings of hisbah. The 
visual demonstration of this is shown in the Figure 3.8. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.8, the first category of darurat or necessities, preserving of 
faith is taken in the context of regulation within the manual specifically designed to 
preserve the status quo of Shari’ah within the market, protecting the ascendancy of 
religious institutions and establish the preponderance of Islam. For example, a 
regulation in the manual states that muhtasib should prevent the ahl al-dhimma (non 
Muslims under the protection of Muslims) from constructing buildings higher21 than 
those of Muslims and furthermore the manual prevents the ahl al-dhimma from 
publicly celebrating their religious festivals (al-Shayzari, 1999:122). These 
regulations were created for establishing or preserving the Islamic semblance of 
towns, and, therefore, it would fall under the category of faith, although under the first 
layer assessment it would come under extrinsic good. In the hindsight of current 
understanding on human rights and liberties, such regulation seems to carry no 
                                                      
21 The regulation does not refer to construction any building higher than the mosques, but it refers to 
residential or commercial building owned by dhimmis to be lower than that of Muslims.  
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goodness value. However, the two layers of assessment within the model are 
categorising regulations based on the good they aim to achieve rather than their 
method of achieving it, and this model does not analyse the effectiveness or efficacy 
of the method by which regulations attempt to achieve that good. Although as the 
model shows that in spite of the above regulation falling in the first category that is 
faith, the contents of the regulation has an extrinsic value of goodness, and therefore 
this regulation is not good for sake of itself and is extracting good from ‘preserving of 
faith’. This supposed link can be questioned and if proven insubstantial, it would 
result in the regulation losing its extrinsic value of goodness and consequently 
dropping from the category of faith.  
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Figure 3.8: Refining Maqasid al-Shari’ah for Deconstruction 
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The category of faith does not include the regulations designed to preserve the 
religious obligations and the religious legal requirements on the socio-economic 
conduct of agents. These are included in the second category, namely ‘preserving of 
soul’., which includes the regulations designed extricate and conserve the socio-
economic agents from calamities of this world and hereafter. The understanding of 
calamities in Shari’ah is used as a benchmark, which can result from many practices 
such as hoarding, gharar22 (uncertainty), riba (interest), swindling and others; and 
any regulation aimed at preventing such practices would fall under this category as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.7.  
The third category is protection of wealth, which is contextualised within this model 
as the concept of asabiyyah (asabiyyah as defined in the work of Ibn-Khaldun). Ibn-
Khaldun considers wealth as a social product rather than individual (Ibn-Khaldun, 
1950:76), for whom the wealth in socioeconomic sphere carries a wider meanings as 
it not only refers to the material gain but also to the quality of social fabric. Therefore, 
within the context of this model it is interpreted as the social relations and cooperation 
aimed at economic gain; the community cohesion towards a just, transparent and fair 
market mechanism; social solidarity; communitarianism that is, the inculcation of 
individuals on their responsibility towards the community, development of social 
capital; engendering and entelechy of assimilation for socioeconomic cohesion. Any 
regulation accommodating these ends would imply fulfilling this category.  
The fourth category is the ‘preservation of mind or intellect’, and it is taken in the 
context of social consciousness. Mead (1912:401-406) elaborates the mechanism of 
social consciousness and explains: 
A physical object or percept is a construct in which the sensuous stimulation is 
merged with imagery which comes from past experience. This imagery on the 
cognitive side is that which the immediate sensuous quality stands for, and in so far 
satisfies the mind ... [Moreover] Inner consciousness is socially organized by the 
importation of the social organization of the outer world.  
 
Transcendental sources of Islam attempt to develop the social consciousness by 
narrating the divine reactions to the actions of nations of previous Prophets. The 
regulations attempt to arrange the social organisation of the outer world in harmony 
                                                      
22 Hazardous transaction, where details are uncertain or unknown. 
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with fitra (Islamic understanding of natural constitution) and towards the normative 
socioeconomic fabric, in such a way that it carves the social consciousness into the 
mould of Islamic doctrine while also resulting in social stimulation. The regulations 
satisfying these ends would come under the fourth category.  
The fifth category refers to the salvation of family, which within the dimensions of 
the market and society would refer to preservation of the natural,23 persons and legal24 
persons, which is achieved by implementing adequate health and safety measures. 
Therefore, any regulation concerned with the health and safety would classify under 
the fifth category.  
Since contextualisation of maqasid within the socio-economic sphere involves formal 
reasoning; thus, a method can be devised for thinking it in mathematical terms. 
Therefore, each category has been assigned a variable that is faith is represented by 
a1, soul by a2, asabiyyah by a3, social consciousness by a4 and, health and safety by 
a5. Thereafter, each variable is mapped with order of preference onto the list of real 
numbers, where the highest ranked maqasid is mapped onto the largest number in the 
list, second highest maqasid onto the second largest number in the list and so on, as 
shown in the Figure 3.8 Moreover, the list of real numbers do not measure any 
quantity (at present) other than preference in order of maqasid, and in conjunction 
with their respective variable, they are as follows: a1=5; a2=4; a3=3; a4=2 and a5=1.  
The process of assessment is designed such that, the default value of each variable is 
zero and if the regulation satisfies one or more categories of maqasid, the variable is 
assigned its due value and all the variables are added together. The sums of ‘a’ series 
variables represent the degree of final good within those regulations. The addition of 
the variables based on the fact that one regulation can fit into more than one maqasid 
and the summing up of variables gives a regulation more weight, if it effectuates more 
than one maqasid. The degree of final good in the manual is based on the sum of 
score of all the regulations within the manual as shown in the Figure 3.9.  
 
 
                                                      
23 Human beings 
24 Corporate personhood 
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Figure 3.9: Quantifying Maqasid al-Shari’ah for deconstruction 
 
Due to the nature, definition and philosophical dimension of final good, the second 
layer assessment only attempts to calculate the proportion of final good in each 
regulation and in the manual as a whole. For further usefulness of this test of truth, 
which is outside the scope of this research, the overall score of the manual could be 
compared to the score of any similar collection of fatwas (legal opinion) to develop an 
understanding on the nature, quality and feasibility of manual. For instance, the 
Shari’ah-screening handbook of different Islamic banks or the policies built on 
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theological rationales within different Muslim countries can be examined and 
compared. The individual score of each regulation could not only help the jurists, 
Shari’ah scholars and theologians of current era to examine the legal opinions of past 
jurists. Therefore, the methodology of second layer assessment could further be 
developed and improved for utilisation of maqasid as a philosophy of Islamic law.  
3.4.3 Empirical Analysis  
Instead of conducting a purely syntax or semantics analysis, as is the norm in Islamic 
studies. This study will examine layers of complexity in the meaning, as Edwards 
(1991:523) asserts that the discourse is “not just a way of seeing, but a way of 
constructing seeing”. Edwards’ (1991) assertion is especially important in the context 
of this research, because hisbah manuals were constructed for the purpose of 
distinguishing between good and evil in the society and the market.  
The hisbah manual will be deconstructed form a discursive perspective and by using 
critical discourse analysis, along with means-end analysis. This will allow us to 
examine each regulation in the manual as an idea that has “a straightforward linguistic 
expression” (Winch, 2008:128), which is constructed with an aim to achieve a certain 
output and has a very specific episteme. By examining the purpose and episteme of 
the regulations in the manual, we will be deconstructing each regulation. This 
approach will give us a method for examining the interaction of multilayer relations in 
construction of the regulation, and allow this study to investigate the value attending 
to these constructs, as suggested and supported by work of Gale (2010), Fairclough’s 
(1992), Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), and others. 
In order to prepare the hisbah manual Nihayat al-Rubta fi Talab al-Hisbah (the 
Utmost Authority in the Pursuit of Hisbah), for assessments, the text of the manual 
was divided into 402 independent regulations as shown in Appendix II. The set of 402 
regulations were than subjected to the two layers of assessment described and 
explained above, which is demonstrated in the Appendix II.  
3.4.3.1. Findings of first layer assessment  
The first layer of assessment, which separates the regulations aimed at intrinsic good, 
from the regulations focused on the extrinsic good, discovered that out of 402 
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regulations, only 60 could be classified as intrinsic good, whereas the remaining 342 
regulations fell under extrinsic good, giving a ratio of 10:57 between intrinsic and 
extrinsic good, as shown in the table 3.1.   
Table 3.1:  First Layer Results                                   
 
No. of Regulations 
Percentage  
 
Intrinsic Good 
60 
14.93% 
 
Extrinsic Good  
342 
85% 
 
Total  
402 
 
 
Ratio 
10:57 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 depicts that for every hundred regulations, 85 incorporated extrinsic goods. 
On the ratio of intrinsic good and extrinsic good produced by this empirical analysis, 
it could be argued that the author’s emphasis in this manual was to regulate the 
market with means, which in his estimate would lead to good. The extrinsic 
relationship present in majority of regulations also signifies that during the 
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implementation of these regulations muhtasibwould need to follow two-fold process: 
initially the muhtasib would need to check, ensure and regularly monitor the 
continuance of extrinsic relationship of good, followed by the process of 
implementing the regulations.  
The ratio of 10:57 statistically also suggests that the essence of transcendentalism in 
Nihayat al-Rubta fi Talab al-Hisbah is quite low; therefore, it cannot be considered as 
the pure representations of natural law and neither the regulations can be justified 
purely on religious grounds. The high concentration of regulations with extrinsic good 
also submits that the goals of regulation, that is ‘what regulations were proscribing or 
what regulations were establishing?’, was not bad, wrong or evil by any directly 
divinely prescribed measure. This indicates that the divinely prescribed measures, 
which are the primary sources, are not directly relevant to the market regulations and 
was used as an ethical torch in carving of regulations. However, when we examine the 
epistemology of regulations, the primary sources do not perform a role of an ethical 
theory and instead function as a source of law, while the bearing of regulations with 
the realities of the market is mostly established by the principles of  “selection of the 
better course … application of juristic discretion” (Sachedina, 1999:26), and under the 
attempts “to promote people’s welfare and to prevent corruption and hardship” 
(Kayadibi, 2010:33). Therefore, on grounds of low density of regulations with 
intrinsic goodness and with majority of regulations formulated with human cognition 
(juristic cognition) on public welfare and prevention of corruption; it could be 
suggested that the regulations do not fall in the roam of ‘Islamic natural law’, and 
neither they can be justified based on reasoning similar to ‘Divine Command Theory’.  
It could be argued that hisbah regulations, similar to other Shari’ah rulings, create a 
grey area outside the Islamic natural law, and this grey area infiltrates the boundaries 
of positive law. However, this style of reasoning raises serious questions, such as: 
Does the rulings (like hisbah regulations) that fall under that grey area carry the 
divine will? If we answer it ‘yes’ based on the argument that the method and scope of 
epistemological process of these rulings is inspired by the primary sources, and as 
primary sources reveal the divine will, therefore the subject matter of the rulings will 
or should also have divine will infused in it. This line of reasoning can then be 
followed further to argue that any system that is in someway or form inspired by 
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primary sources should also carry the divine will or otherwise there should be some 
acceptability criteria for a system to be ‘inspired by primary sources’. However, there 
is no explicitly described criteria: some theologians use adherence to orthodoxy, 
acceptability and consensus as the criteria, but this posses further questions on 
practical distinctness of ‘divine will’ and ‘jurist’s whim’. If the answer to the above 
mentioned questions is ‘no’, then we have the unanswered questions fundamental to 
every theory of law, that is: ‘Why should the law be obeyed?’ and ‘Why is it biding?’. 
The epistemic issue underlining the hisbah regulations becomes prominent, when we 
test the result of the first layer assessment along with epistemological theory of hisbah 
regulations with theses of Kelsen’s legal theory.25 We discover that the subject matter 
of hisbah regulations26 is “at the whim of the legislator, and that its concepts and 
principles are not founded on spatial and temporal data of experience” (Stone, 
1964:101). It could be argued that the ‘selection of the better course’ and ‘public 
interest’ can be structured appropriately to compensate for the requirement of spatial 
and temporal data of experience, nevertheless this leeway would not affect the above 
argument. As within the current epistemological settings evidence from any other 
theory of knowledge (like empiricism) cannot over rule the regulations constructed 
using the higher sources of law like consensus. The current epistemological settings 
will also hold the focus on linguistic and textual analysis, while keeping the focus 
away from the historical experiences: from cause and effect of regulations in the 
market, ‘from the cause and effect of market forces’ and ‘knowledge gained through 
observing the market mechanism’. In pursuit of regulating the market, the static and 
stagnant nature of text in primary sources, when faced with the variable and changing 
temperament of markets, would have to be more or less depend on the juristic 
cognition, while the principles of ‘selection of the better course’ and ‘public interest’ 
are also very much dependent on the juristic cognition.  
The juristic cognition is itself inherent in the construction, derivation and 
interpretation of law. However, Kelsen argues for benchmark on it and suggests, “that 
there must unity of juristic cognition” (Stone, 1964:100). However, the current 
epistemological settings do not lead to unity of juristic cognition, as it does not isolate 
                                                      
25 For further reading, see: Stone, (1964). 
26 Hisbah regulations in nihayat al-rubta fi talab al-hisba. 
   127 
the sociological, psychological and ethical matters from the ‘juristic subject matters’. 
The sociological, psychological and ethical matters remain embedded, or at least they 
are assumed to be by Muslim ministers, in the primary sources. The post eighteenth 
century development in the fields of sociology, psychology, economics and ethics 
were not seriously considered as knowledge and therefore they had little or no 
influence on the Islamic epistemological settings. The lack of isolation of these fields 
means that they are still jumbled up in the ‘juristic’ subject matter, which 
consequently leads to incongruity in juristic cognition. The uniformity in juristic 
cognition may be achieved by using maqasid al-Shari’ah as epistemic foundations, as 
argued by many jurists and mostly maintained by Muslim scholarship of last thirty 
years.  
3.4.3.2 Findings of second layer assessment  
As part of the conceptual and empirical analysis, the second layer of assessment 
measures the degree of final good relative to maqasids as the corresponding ends of 
regulation. When we consider the real numbers assigned to each maqasid, that is 
faith=5, soul=4, asabiyyah =3, social consciousness=2 and health and safety=1, and 
suppose that each regulation aimed to accomplish the respective maqasid or 
maqasids, would carry the weight of that maqasid or maqasids in terms of assigned 
real numbers. This is based on the assumption that regulation realising the goal of 
higher maqasid should have higher importance. Moreover, some regulations satisfy 
more then one maqasid and in that case, we have added the weight of the respective 
maqasids and assigned an aggregate total to the regulations. This data is plotted on 
graph and represented in form of a histogram in Figure 3.10.  
The histogram in Figure 3.10 shows that more then eighty percent of regulations 
weighted five or below, which justifies the manner of categorisation carried in the 
layer, as majority of regulations aim to achieve one or two maqasids. This also 
suggests that majority of regulations where precise in their subject matter and did not 
have many broader subjective moral principles, which would apply to a more then 
two maqasids. This phenomenon makes it plausible that regulations may have been 
adversely affecting some maqasid, while satisfying the others. For example, a 
regulation might have been constructed for protecting the ascendancy of religion or a 
religious institution, but this regulation, due to its design or manner of execution, may 
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have been producing adverse affect for asabiyyah, faith or other maqasids. It could 
further be argued that there is a probability that affects of regulations may have been 
cancelling each other, as each regulation concentrated on the maqasid it was designed 
to protect, which may have made post-regulated market conditions worst than pre-
regulated marked conditions. The protection of a maqasid at the cost of another 
maqasid could be justified through the hierarchy of maqasids; however, the Pareto 
chart in Figure 3.11 illustrates that the number of regulations does not follow the 
priority order of maqasids, as the manual focuses on some maqasids more as 
compared to the other ones.  
 
Figure 3.10: Frequency of Final Good in Regulations by Maqasid 
 
Note: See Appendix I for data and estimation 
This Pareto chart in Figure 3.11 presents distribution of regulations in reference to 
that maqasids, which they aim to achieve. This distribution is without any influence 
of weight from the assigned real numbers and the regulations that satisfied multiple 
maqasid are duplicated, and are counted separately under those maqasids. Figure 3.11 
further demonstrate that majority of regulations in the Nihayat al-Rubta fi Talab al-
Hisbah are focused on health and safety issues, while approximately 64% are devoted 
to protection of soul, and preservation of health and safety standards. 
 
Figure 3.11: Pareto Chart of Final Good Per Maqasid 
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Note: See Appendix I for data and estimation 
The high concentration of regulations focused on health and safety issues, 
corresponds to the account of historians and academics (such as Glick, Gotein, 
Buckley, Tyan and so on); many of them cited historical documents or examples to 
point out that the institution of hisbah was operating merely as a municipal authority; 
politically restricted and structurally disabled to utilise its actual potential. The 
interesting epistemological argument, which arises from having a hisbah manual with 
almost 40% regulations aimed to ensure health and safety, is that the health and safety 
at market place or workplace welfare revolves around occupational risks, which 
requires spatial and temporal data of experience, instead of textual analysis or 
linguistic analysis of static text. This issue with current epistemological settings 
becomes further clear in Figure 3.12, which confirms that majority (96.6%) of 
regulations in the hisbah manual in question in health and safety has extrinsic 
goodness and only minority (3.4 %) can be labelled as intrinsically good. The 
extrinsic goodness in bulk of regulations, under health and safety, suggests that these 
regulations were not good for their own sake, but drew goodness from something else. 
This ‘something else’ should have been spatial and temporal data of experience, but 
instead would probably been, an understanding built from juristic cognition based on 
their personal experience of markets, about the factors that could lead to ‘wrongs’ or 
about factors whose introduction in the market could lead to ‘right’. 
 
Figure 3.12: Sources of ‘Good’ in Regulations Categorised Under Maqasids 
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Note: See Appendix I for data and estimation. 
The next maqasid with second highest number of regulations is protection of soul, 
while the protection of faith has the lowest number of regulations. It should be noted 
that the protection of faith has lowest number of regulations, because there is 
normally not much room in the market for expressing one’s faith. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.12, the ‘soul’, on the other hand, received much more 
attention, as in the absence of any theories constructed for improvement of market 
mechanism, the manual resorts to regulating the human activities based on there 
possible effects on the after life. The high density of regulations focused on soul could 
support the earlier discussion on the sociological, psychological and ethical matters 
being infused in the subject matter of juristic cognition.  
Interestingly, 65% of the regulations aimed at protecting soul and 74% of regulations 
protecting faith have extrinsic good. The high concentration extrinsic good on the 
matters at core of religion, suggests that knowledge on the methods of protecting soul 
and faith within the market, has to come from the market itself. In case of this manual, 
this knowledge was probably processed and analysed through juristic cognition to 
create set of connections between intrinsic good and activities; these activities were 
then formulated in form of regulations, which carried that connections, making the 
regulations extrinsically good. It may, therefore, be suggested that regulations could 
be more efficient, if juristic cognitions was replaced by clearly drafted ethical theory, 
while the real quantifiable knowledge built on spatial and temporal data of experience 
on markets substituted the ‘subject matter used of juristic cognition ’. 
A rationalist approach using priority, can be argued as an antithesis for the above 
statement, which is often propagated by modern Muslim scholars. However, as can be 
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seen in Figure 3.13, when we look at the sequence of maqasids in reference to the 
number of regulations per maqasid; the hierarchy does not match with the 
theoretically proposed order of priority as shown in Figure 3.13, which is adopted 
from Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.13: Priority of Maqasid 
 
 
Whereas when the regulations are separated on grounds of intrinsic or extrinsic good 
as in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15, and then sorted on basis of highest concentration of 
regulations per maqasid, the results are very different. As can be seen in Figure 3.14, 
the concentration of intrinsically good regulations follows the theoretically set priority 
of maqasids, with exception to protection of faith, this finding support the theoretical 
construct of priorities of maqasid, and suggests that primary sources are more 
concerned about protecting the soul from punishments of hereafter, than 
establishment or protection of other maqasids.  
Figure 3.14: Intrinsic Good                         Figure 3.15: Extrinsic Good  
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Note: See Appendix I for data and estimation 
As can be seen in Figure 3.15, the regulations with extrinsic good, on the other hand, 
do not synchronise with the theoretical priority settings of maqasids. Accordingly, it 
could be suggested that the unsynchronised order could be the result of jurist’s 
attempt to deal with practical issues within the market and society. If that was the 
case, then the results depicted in Figure 3.15 suggest a positive order of maqasids, 
which resulted from efforts of juristic cognition to regulate the market and/or society 
on contrary to figure 3.15, which suggests a natural (natural in context of Islam) order 
of maqasids. This underline the need to shuffle the maqasids, and the most apparent 
factor that could have influenced this rearrangement would be the understanding of 
market conditions through juristic cognition.  
The results depicted in Figure 3.16 show the hierarchy of maqasids on the basis of 
percentage difference between intrinsically and extrinsically good regulations. In 
other words, it shows the maqasids arranged in the order, in which jurists deemed 
necessary to supplement the intrinsically good regulations with extrinsically good 
regulations. The estimation of regulations in Figure 3.16 is based on percentage 
difference for compensating the large variation in total number of regulations under 
each maqasid.  
Figure 3.16: Sequence of Maqasids  
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Note: See Appendix I for data and estimation 
 
As the depicted results in Figure 3.16 shows, jurists on total included 63% more 
extrinsically good regulations in reference to the intrinsically good regulations; for 
protection of faith, jurists had to construct 55% more regulations, while under 
protection of soul, the percentage difference is 38%. It could be argued that the 
hierarchy of maqasid, in Figure 3.15 renders an incomplete picture, as the hierarchy 
could suggest the order of maqasids where jurists contemplated the insufficiency of 
regulations with intrinsic goodness and therefore counterweighed it by constructing 
extrinsically good regulations. Thereupon the Figure 3.16 would represent the depth 
of insufficiency of intrinsically good regulations per maqasid.  As can be seen, 
protection of faith has least number of extrinsic (Figure 3.15) and intrinsic (Figure 
3.14) regulations while it comes second in Figure 3.16. This characterises that jurist 
had to construct twice as many regulations, as there were intrinsically good 
regulations in primary sources, so to protect the faith. It could be argued that either 
the primary sources provided twice as less protection to the faith, compared to what 
manual considered essential, or the manual provided extended protection than what 
primary sources advocate. These premises can be extended with relevant ratio to other 
maqasids. The Figure 3.16 grades the maqasids in reference to ‘consideration’ shown 
by manual in protecting them, in reference to the protection provided to them in 
primary sources.  
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It should be noted that the estimated classification of maqasids is further different 
from the earlier examined hierarchies. The factors that could influence the 
‘consideration’ a maqasid receives over another should depend on the market 
conditions, as the market conditions can change leaving a maqasid more vulnerable 
than others. This would require any manual to take vulnerability of maqasid in 
consideration and address each maqasid in accordance with the needs of markets. The 
important point in all this discussion is that the theoretically argued hierarchy of 
maqasids will continuously change, as regulations try to protect these maqasids in 
changing socio economic conditions.  
The contemporary Muslim scholars, arguing for maqasids as a philosophy of Islamic 
law, would argue that if and when the hierarchy of maqasids needs to be reshuffled, 
the instrument of that reshuffle has to be notion of ‘public interest’ in Islamic law. 
However as established earlier, the principles of ‘selection of the better course’ and 
‘public interest’ are very much dependent on the juristic cognition and the predated 
Islamic thoughts on sociological, psychological and ethical matters, which are not 
isolated from the ‘juristic subject matter’ for these principles. This most of all causes 
disunity in the cognition. Moreover, different market conditions would result in 
different understanding on the right course of action that stipulate conditions 
guaranteeing public interest, which will create distinctive hierarchy of maqasids, 
followed by construction of regulations to protect the maqasids in that distinctively 
set hierarchy. The use of public interest in the current framework creates an almost 
ideal setting for ‘regulatory capture’. 
While the jurists are responsible for upholding the public interest but they are not 
accountable to public. At the same time, jurists themselves are subject to socio 
economic factors. In other words, the juristic activities are financially supported either 
by government funds or by charitable fundraising. There are interest groups and 
lobbyist in both cases, which can dominate the decision-making in their favour. In 
absence of any inclusion of public opinion, the costliness of information about 
uncertain socio economic conditions poses another challenge to the current 
epistemological settings. The jurists also require the willingness of polity, which 
should create further regulatory capture. This raises further questions such as: ‘how 
much of theoretically designed and theologically shaped motive of jurist translates 
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into practice?’, ‘in principal would a jurist construct the ‘best regulations’?’ 
‘Principally to what extend would a jurist compromise self interest and interest of the 
their profession?’, and finally: ‘is it even possible to comprehend public interest in 
current epistemological structure?’ and if it is possible to comprehend then ‘is it 
possible to construct regulations on this understanding that would actually produce 
goodness in a civil sense? 
3.4.3.3 Results and method of estimation  
As the analysis and the findings presented above indicate, the test of truth raises very 
vital philosophical and practical questions, while also answering some important 
ones. The main objective of the test was to check the scale of coherence with the 
multiple realities in the constructed current epistemological settings. Additionally, the 
assessment of means (hisbah regulations) through the categorical importance of ends 
(good), that the regulations aim to achieve, gives a foundational idea on the relevance 
of regulations and their constructions.  
Nihayat al-Rubta fi Talab al-Hisbah was one of the widely used manuals within 
hisbah. Therefore, in terms of methods of estimation, we can rationalise that entire 
corpse of regulatory manuals will have similar value of good in them. This estimation 
is rationalised mainly on the wide use and acceptance of  Nihayat al-Rubta fi Talab 
al-Hisbah. Al-Shayzari, the author of the manual in question, was trained in theory of 
Islamic law and also practiced Islamic legal theory as a judge; his importance earned 
him an entry in ‘Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature’, and also the attention of many 
historians and bibliographers from other dynasties, such as Hajji Khalifa from 
Ottoman Empire (Giffen, 1998:711). Al-Shayzari’s manual was considered as one of 
major work on institution of hisbah, and therefore it was widely cited by other 
manuals and used as guidelines by various muhtasib (Buckley, 1999: v). While in the 
modern era, Al-Shayzari’s work and the hisbah manual are still as major discourse in 
many studies, such as Stilt (2012), Shatzmiller (1994), Ghabin (2009), Sabra (2000), 
Coetzee and Eysturlid (2013), and many others. On these premises, it is safe to 
deduce that the issues highlighted in the Al-Shayzari’s hisbah manual are constant 
within most, if not all hisbah manuals, and regulations constructed using Islamic legal 
theory for supervision or governance of market and society.   
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This empirical model is designed to test also acts as a criterion for distinguishing 
higher quality of legal opinions from lower ones, as it provides a framework for 
assessment of collection of legal opinions, as demonstrated through appraisal of the 
hisbah manual of Nihayat al-Rubta fi Talab al-Hisbah. Though the test is based on a 
subjective construct as in any part of social sciences and would favour certain type of 
regulations regardless of their efficiency or suitability, nevertheless the two layers of 
assessment helps in developing some basic quantifiable understanding on the quality 
of regulations along with the zones of concentration and nature of legal opinions. 
The first reality against which the regulations were tested was the epistemological 
relevance of primary sources. There are only 21% intrinsically good regulations with 
direct epistemic connection to primary sources, in comparison to 79% of extrinsically 
good regulations, which are product of juristic cognation largely on the basis of 
analogies between the real events in society and market, and “relations of the 
stipulations of the legal ‘ought’” (Oeser, 2003:161). As can be seen in Figure 3.17, 
the results are therefore not statistically significant to conclude the coherence of 
regulations with this reality.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17:Intrinsic and Extrinsic Good in Reference with Maqasid  
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Note: See Appendix I for data and estimation 
The second part of the test looked at the coherence between the philosophically 
created and theologically justified principles such as doctrines of necessity, on the one 
hand, and the aims of regulations, on the other hand. The findings of the second layer 
assessment suggest that there is no direct or apparent correspondence between the 
construction and subject matter of regulations, and the philosophical foundations and 
theological justification of principles of necessity.  
3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
The previous chapter provided the groundwork for the enquiry in this chapter, as it 
highlighted the institutional failures experienced in the operations of hisbah whereby 
it is argued that the institutional practices drifted largely from the theory. This chapter 
conducted an enquiry into the theories behind the concept of hisbah. 
The results of this chapters have highlighted that it is not just operations, which are 
responsible for failures in institutional interventions, as the theory also plays a vital 
part. In exploring the theories, the existing literature is divided into two parts, that is: 
Class A and Class B. The class A literature are the philosophical constructs that 
outlines the duties and sets the political space for operations of hisbah. The major 
work in this class, is by al-Mawardi (1996), Ibn-Taymiya (1992) and Al-Ghazzali 
(2004:43). Some of these work, such as al-Mawardi (1996) provided the grounds for 
operations that created institutional failures. While, the common theme in almost all 
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of them is the use of Islamic legal theory as a theory of ethics. The Class B literature 
comprises of regulations that are the result of the use of Islamic legal theory as a 
theory of ethics. The deconstruction of Class B literature demonstrated a weak 
ontological authority and low levels of goodness within the market regulations.  
In the process of deconstruction, this study discovered that ontology of theological 
authority of regulations within the manual of Nihayat al-Rubta fi Talab al-Hisbah is 
weak, and, therefore, the whole manual can be considered weak in terms of value of 
intrinsic good in it. The theological authority of a notion is taken within context of its 
authenticity to the divinely inscribed nature, as advocated by theology.  
These results are consistent with the findings of other observers on corpse of Islamic 
law, as discussed in detail earlier in this chapter, who consider gap between theory 
and practice in regards to public interest and general good as a major component 
within the construction of regulations, as discussed by Hallaq, (1997) (2009), Schacht 
(1960) (1982), Cook (2000) and others. 
The results raise important macro question on workings of Islamic law, such as: what 
exactly is ‘good’? If we take the Shari’ah hokum or Shari’ah judgement as being 
good, then we could argue that the only measure of goodness in a Shari’ah hokum is 
its epistemological roots. The epistemological roots are in reality the juristic analysis 
and construction on logical concentration, which moves from general to specific, and 
the transcendental obligation claimed by such regulations is questionable, especially 
as our findings have shown that legal opinions and regulations does not necessarily 
have justifiable goodness that is traceable to the primary sources. This suggests that 
there is a problem in existing theories of governance in the institution of hisbah, as 
they are unable to justify their legitimacy to be observed.  
From purely a theological point of view, the above discussed test of truth, suggests 
that we can not theologically classify existing regulations for institution of hisbah as 
‘good’, and legitimise them via doctrine of ‘will of God’. Moreover, there is also the 
question of epistemic sources that created the existing regulations, as they remain 
unchanged in the Islamic thought. There is also a large probability that unchanged 
sources when used by the same theory, will produce almost identical results. This 
takes us back to the original issue of intervention. The processes of institutionalised 
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intervention justify its existence by claiming the ability to foresee, distinguish, and 
prevent evil, while prescribing good. However, the analysis of hisbah manual reveals 
that the use of legal theory to substitute for an ethical theory for identifying good and 
evil is problematic.  
The aim of this research is to explore governance within Islamic thought in the form 
of the institution of hisbah as well as exploring the episteme that is the cause of the 
recognized and unrecognised incoherencies and inconsistencies in the theories, 
regulations, and laws associated with the institution of hisbah. So far, we have 
examined the operations of institution of hisbah, and the highlighted the institutional 
failures. During this process, we learned that theories of hisbah does not provide a 
framework to prevent these institutional failures. Therefore, we deconstructed the 
theories of hisbah and traced the root cause of these failures in the ‘use of legal theory 
as a theory of ethics’.  
In order to complete the second part of the aim, that is ‘exploring the episteme that is 
the cause of the recognized and unrecognised incoherencies and inconsistencies in the 
theories, regulations, and laws’, we will now explore the Islamic legal theories, along 
with broader discourse on Islamic thought to understand three major issues. Firstly, 
what is the rationale for Islamic scholarship to heavily rely on Islamic legal theory for 
judging the moral conduct of activities in market and society. Secondly, what are the 
reasons that the Islamic legal theory, when used as an ethical framework, participated 
in creating institutional failures, instead of preventing them. Thirdly, whether there is 
an ethical theory within the broader Islamic thought that should have been used as a 
principal framework. By answering these three questions, we should be able to shed 
light on the sources of incoherencies and inconsistencies in the value judgments 
within theories, regulations, and laws, and hence fulfill the aim of this research. It is 
also important to highlight at this point that institutional intervention through hisbah, 
within the Islamic thought, is justified by the ability to effectiveness in judging the 
moral conduct of activities and intervening in them respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4  
GENEALOGY OF CRISIS  
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
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The aim of this research, as stated in Chapter 1, is to explore governance within 
Islamic thought in the form of the institution of hisbah as well as exploring the 
episteme that is the cause of the recognized and unrecognised incoherencies and 
inconsistencies in the theories, regulations, and laws associated with the institution of 
hisbah.  
The discourse being examined and developed in this research has so far focused on 
the first part of the aim and examined the operations of institution of hisbah, and the 
highlighted the institutional failures. The factors causing these failures were traced to 
the theory of hisbah, Whilst, deconstructing the theories on hisbah, this research 
uncovered that the underlying factors that are causing the failures in the operations of 
hisbah are grounded in the use of Islamic legal theory as an ethical theory within the 
framework of subscribing good and prohibiting evil.  
These finding completed the first part of the research aim, as we successfully 
explored governance within Islamic thought in the form of the institution of hisbah. 
However, the second part of the research aim to explore the episteme that is the 
causing the incoherencies and inconsistencies in the theories, regulations, and laws 
associated to the institution of hisbah. The quest to find the episteme of the issues 
highlighted in the earlier chapters, have taken this research to Islamic legal theory, as 
in this chapter.  
This chapter, hence, attempts to develop an understanding on the reasons for which 
the Islamic legal theory was used as an ethical framework, and, as to why it 
participated in creating institutional failures, instead of preventing them. This chapter, 
hence, deconstructs the Islamic theories to investigate the episteme of institutional 
failures, within the theory, when it is applied as an ethical theory. We examine the 
theological legitimacy of judging the moral conduct by a legal theory and how it 
philosophically affects the notion of morality in Islam. Thirdly, this chapter surveys 
the Islamic thought for an ethical theory, which could or should have been used as for 
judging the moral conduct of activities by the institution of hisbah.  
The ontological justification for institutional intervention is the ability to effectively 
point out the wrongs in the market and the society, and then efficiently prohibit 
wrongs and subscribe good. To examine this, in the previous chapters, we looked at 
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the market regulations in the Islamic world and observed the operations of institution 
of hisbah. However, while observing the operations of hisbah, this research 
discovered continuity of institutional failures. Therefore, the research moved into 
theory of hisbah to examine the underlying factors within the theory and upon 
deconstruction of Nihayat al-Rubta fi Talab al-Hisbah, a hisbah manual, we 
substantiated that the majority of market regulation are not a result of direct 
manifestation of the primary sources of Islam. This suggests that in practice 
institution of hisbah was unable to foresee, evaluate and prohibit evil, and while the 
theoretical model, that was held responsible for judging the moral conduct for the 
institution of hisbah, was unable to provide the theologically and philosophically 
legitimate categorisation of good and evil. The findings of the previous chapter 
suggest that problem lies with the application of legal theory as an ethical theory. The 
market regulations are constructed using legal framework. Therefore, this creates an 
inherited religious duty to obey them. However, if legal theory is unreliable in acting 
as an ethical theory, then this inherited religious duty of obeying them, diminishes. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on the Islamic legal theories and deconstructs them 
with the objective of understanding the underlying factors in its episteme that cause 
failures and inconsistencies, when the legal theory is treated as an ethical theory. 
4.2 CONTEXTUALISATION 
The inconsistencies caused by the use of legal theory within the religious ethics, also 
resulted in questions raised in the contemporary literature on the need for such a set 
up (Moten, 2013).  These questions were initially posed by modernity to the Muslim 
world; however, the investigation within the last chapters suggests that there is a good 
case for raising these questions from within the Islamic tradition, without the need of 
superseding the whole tradition. 
These questions have direct association with ‘what is good?’ These questions are not 
focused on the validity of Islamic belief system or the nature of Islamic law, but the 
validity of law and sharia within the Islamic creed. 
The answers to these questions may be determined by understanding the criteria of 
membership of a rule into Islamic legal system. Any rule that fulfils the criteria is 
legally valid and therefore whoever is following the given legal system will also 
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follow that rule. There are many theses within legal positivism and natural law on the 
possible criteria of legal validity, as Islamic law has positive and natural sides to it, 
therefore its laws has to have natural and positive validity to it. The positive validity 
is especially essential for justifying the historical conflicts between the theological 
theory and legal practices. The natural validity is required because the entire legal 
theory of Islam stands on these grounds and without it, Islamic law becomes antiquate 
legal practice of previous epochs. 
The uneasy truce between Islamic legal theory, legal practice and reality, begins in 
early years of Islam. The application of revealed law with its theological immutability 
to the mutable socio economic realities and varying circumstances, time and space 
created the gap between theory and practice. Over the history different theological 
arguments, legal tools, and philosophical standpoints emerged in an effort to reconcile 
the differences. This created a continuous vacillation on morality of things, while also 
raising the question of legal validity.  
The intricate relationship between law and reality was acknowledged during the time 
of Prophet, and some Quranic legislation like on zina (a form of adultery) had an 
intrinsic oblique nature, established by constituting over stringent requirements for 
evidence, to accommodate for the social reality of the time. Donaldson (1953:46) 
considers this as an attempt to “provide occasions for the exhibition of brutality with 
the object of general intimidation”, but Imber (1996:195) uses this legislative 
characteristic to argue that after demarcating the crime and subscribing a punishment, 
“the shari'a consciously and explicitly renders conviction impossible”. Calder et al. 
(2010:63-64) analysis this further and elaborate that:  
it is reasonable to assert that a certain degree of hermeneutical dexterity could 
ensure that the ḥadd penalties need never take place. For all practical purposes, the 
management of sexual misconduct is trans-ferred to the category of taʿzīr, and 
thereby to human discretion, and to local and contingent custom and practice. But 
local custom (positive law?) is not a part of divine law.  
The reliance of Qur’anic legislations on positive law as a correcting mechanism was 
not always the case. During the time of Prophet, where there was an apparent gap 
between the reality and the law, the divine would intervene to address the problem by 
issuing explanative peremptory commands or changing the legislative position. 
Qur’an (16:101), itself explains this process by the asserting that “We substitute a 
verse in place of a verse - and Allah is most knowing”, which is then backed by the 
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justification that: “Allah eliminates what He wills or confirms, and with Him is the 
Mother of the Book” (Qur’an 13:39). Similar to most theological issues, there is 
diversity in the understanding of these verses and meaning of ‘Mother of the Books’, 
however, generally accepted theological argument is that the decrees and legislations 
ordained by God, are and can be abrogated by God, as God possesses the most 
thorough knowledge. This argument then inevitably goes further to suggest that the 
socioeconomic realities are one of the conditions that may trigger an abrogation and 
change in position; and the other reason for divine abrogation was the clarification of 
a Qur’anic passage that is obscure and contradictory by nature.  
The theologians from all ages have considered the understanding of ‘abrogating and 
abrogated’ verses as one of the most important tool in understanding the script of 
Qur’an. Its importance is partly due to the regularity with which the verses were 
abrogated and partly due to the change in the legislative position and modification in 
theological understanding created by the abrogation. Some verses had far reaching 
affects and greater abrogating capacity than others; for example, Donaldson (1953:51) 
accounts a verse that abrogates or modifies a hundred and twenty four verses. The 
extent of abrogation emphasises the continuous need for clarification required on the 
face of ever changing socioeconomic realities that kept on making Qur’anic passages 
either obscure or contradictory.  
Science of abrogation goes to the heart of Islamic philosophy, as Islam considers 
Adam, Hud, Salih, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and others as prophets from the same God, 
who either confirmed the previously revealed and established legislation, or abrogated 
it with the new one. The abrogation poses serious questions on the existence of 
independent and universal notion of good and evil. The orthodox position on 
abrogation takes a philosophically middle and theologically safe ground, as it neither 
fully confirms the existence of a universal good or evil, nor does it fully deny the 
presence of such existence, and in the absence of a workable clarity on this issue, it 
views abrogation as an expiry on the ‘time and space dependent’ usability of divine 
law, in which one divine law replaces the other in response to human progress. In 
metaethical sense the abrogation of divine commandments means abrogation of one 
notion of good actions for another. Al Shahrastani (as taken from Donaldson, 
1953:52) conceptualises this orthodox position on abrogation and summarises it as:  
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lawfulness and unlawfulness are not predications which belong to  actions as if 
they were attributes of them, nor are actions to be classed as good or evil, nor does 
the law-giver cause them to acquire attributes which cannot annulled or confirmed. 
But the predications (of right and wrong) belong to the speech of the law-giver… 
Thus the prediction is verbal, not actual; legal not intellectual; and one can 
abrogate another. 
  
The underline notion in orthodox position is: the historical progress of humans 
exposed them to new situations and challenges, and the God altered and modified its 
legislations accordingly, so that the ‘righteous path’ always remained clear for 
humans. With the death of the final messenger, the door of transcendental change in 
legislations was closed, and the process of abrogation ended. This denouement was 
theorised by jurists in context with the above stated notion, which lead to many 
conclusions such as “Muhammad… is the climax of man’s evolution, as Islam is the 
climax of successive laws” (Al Shahrastani, as cited by Donaldson, 1953:52).  
The view that law can efficiently serve the changing socio economic realities, while 
being constant and determinate in itself, created gaps between theory and practice. 
The gap between theory and practice was the first sign that a crisis is lurking under 
the development of corpse of Islamic law. The investigation into the operations of 
hisbah in Chapter 2 highlighted the existence of this phenomenon. Chapter 3 focused 
on the discourse on hisbah and highlighted the redundancy of current discourse to 
effectively subscribe good and forbid evil. This redundancy was grounded in the use 
of legal theory as a substitute for ethical theory. This chapter, therefore, further 
expands on this, by examining the Islamic legal theories to understand the underlying 
factors as to why it is not a substitute for an ethical theory by examining the workings 
of Islamic legal theory outside of institution of hisbah and in the context of 
governance. It observes that the gap between theory and practice, highlighted in the 
operations of hisbah, is a consistent phenomenon that exists in most applications of 
Islamic legal theory.  
4.3 PIOUS FICTION, UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS AND UNEASY TRUCE 
The socio politico conditions of the post Prophet Muslim world, the distribution of 
power, different concentrations of religious knowledge, dynamics in which jurists, 
juriconsults, theologians, polity and political authorities interacted with each other, 
created two major types of gaps in theory and practice. Schacht (1960:110) identifies 
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these two types, calling one a “pious fiction and unresolved conflict”, and naming 
other “an uneasy truce” (Schacht, 1982:84) between the political authorities, 
theologians and jurist. However, Schacht points them out in two different discourse 
and does not analyse the interlink between them, contrary to this research which 
focuses on them as two different effects of the same cause.   
Islamic law presents itself as a doctrine of understanding the divine commands and 
consequently does not recognise human agent as source of legislation; therefore, the 
government is theoretically limited in Islamic law to only implementation and 
administration of regulations without much or any powers for impinging them 
(Schacht, 1960:110). The subject matter of Islamic law does not have a uniform hold 
on every aspect of life, but it instead has concentrations points, that is: it has a 
thorough subject matter on matters related to family and inheritance, while for penal 
law, constitutional law and taxation, it’s subject matter in minimal or non existent and 
the subject matter on law of contracts categorically falls in the middle of above two 
(Schacht, 1982:76).  
The social facts regularly produced occasions where governments had to step in and 
legislate especially where the subject matter of Islamic law is thin. This existence of 
new legislation was purely based on social facts, however, “out of deference to the 
sacred law” (Schacht, 1960:110), the new legislations were and still are silently 
accepted as an extension of Islamic law, which is compatible with Islamic theology 
and primary sources. This fictitious acceptance of Islamic persona in formulated 
legislations, for bridging the gap between religious law and secular administration is 
what Schacht (1960:110) calls as pious fiction. Schacht (1960) highlights number of 
methods used by political authorities to accept the Islamic persona of legislations 
created by political authorities, but for us the essential characteristic is that the ‘pious 
fiction’ occurs when Islamic law’s subject is almost nonexistence and new legislation 
is constructed based on social facts, and treated as if it belongs to, fits in and is 
extension of Islamic law’s corpse. For instance, zakat (mandatory alms giving) is 
considered as the only theologically acceptable tax in Islamic law. However, 
throughout history governments levied different tax besides zakat, which were silently 
accepted by the population through maintaining the pious fiction.  
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The creation of Anglo-Islamic law in Indian sub-continent during the 18th century is 
also another example of pious fiction, as the Islamic law of family and inheritance 
was mixed with parts of British law and was applied under the rule of East India 
Company. This mixture was a workable solution and is practiced to date, without 
many questions raised on the contradiction of the holistic nature of strict theory of 
Islamic law, and theological and philosophical confusions that arise from a mix legal 
system. 
Islamic law developed out of the ideas and principles formed in the first hundred 
years of post-Prophet era. These ideas and principles were collection of ethical, legal 
and spiritual standards that were argued by religious scholars as the main duties 
incumbent on every Muslim. The development of the legal theory took place within 
scholarly circles and implemented through the hands of political authorities. The 
remoteness between development and implementation of Islamic law produced 
challenges that required compromises. These compromises between the strict legal 
theory and functional legal practice formed an uneasy truce is Islamic law. The 
religious scholars were so much aware of this uneasy truce that they engineered tools 
like doctrine of necessity to “dispensed Muslims from observing the strict rules of the 
Law” (Schacht, 1982:84). The uneasy truce created the room required for preventing 
the full application of theory in practice, whilst the citizens were placid with just the 
official recognition of Islamic law by the State.  For instance, the influence of Arabian 
Peninsula’s legal culture on the development of the theory of Islamic law resulted in 
the deviation from explicit Quranic stance on the use of written document, as legal 
evidence towards the use of oral testimony.  
The theory continued to develop throughout the Middle Ages focusing purely on oral 
testimony, whilst Schacht’s (1982: 82) analysis suggests that on contrary to 
theoretical framework, the legal practice concentrated more on written documents and 
the witnessing was considered more of a formality. This contrasting and antagonistic 
priority in legal evidence is the gap between theory and practice; we are referring as 
‘uneasy truce’. The major characteristic of uneasy truce is that it is formed when there 
is doubt on judiciousness of an existing ruling in legal theory, which leads to it being 
desisted from practice and replaced by a more practical, effective or efficient ruling, 
thereupon leaving religious scholars to engineer a theological and legal justification 
   148 
for the substitution of ruling. On of the examples of this is the discontinuation of 
punishment of theft by cutting the hands, just few years after the Prophet’s death, 
which was later on justified by the religious scholars thorough the doctrine of 
necessity and principle of public good, although it is explicitly stated and emphasised 
in Qur’an and hadith.  
4.4 THE ISSUE OF LEGAL VALIDITY  
These two kinds of gaps between theory and practice, that is: uneasy truce and pious 
fiction raise an important question of legal validity. The pious fiction makes a ruling 
valid, because political authorities deem the ruling as essential or necessary, while the 
uneasy truce validates the rules based on its coherence with social facts.  
On the issue of legal validity, the pious fiction follows the same line of reasoning as 
the classical Hobbesian27- Austinian28 theory on ‘pedigree thesis’, which argues that it 
is the political sovereignty which assigns legal validity to law that is: the law needs to 
be obeyed because it is purely a coercive command of sovereign (Hobbes, 2004:120; 
Austin and Rumble, 212:1995). Pedigree thesis received extensive criticism from 
political scientists and philosophers. In Islamic theology and philosophy this thesis is 
supported by a very weak argument and is not accepted in its completeness, as the 
political authorities are theologically responsible for implementing the divine rule and 
sovereignty belongs to God; however, political authorities should be obeyed as they 
are divinely chosen. This, if strictly applied, makes the legal theory rigid to the degree 
of impracticality, while when loosely applied, it gives way for totalitarian State.  
Some theologians suggest that political authorities have the power to temporarily 
suspend or alter the existing transcendental laws, as long as the permanency of 
transcendental laws is superficially acknowledged. This argument essentially attempts 
to bring the pious fiction in the roam of uneasy truce. The line of reasoning followed 
by this argument, along with all those theological arguments, which use the social 
facts as a rationale for suggesting that the transcendental law should be antiquated in 
favour of law, which better serves public interest; are essentially reasoning the  
                                                      
27  “Law is the command of the law-maker, and his command is the declaration of his will.” (Hobbes, 
2004:120) 
28 “Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a 
sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that 
person or body is sovereign or supreme.” (Austin and Rumble, 212:1995) 
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‘separability thesis’, which historically made up the foundations for legal positivism. 
It is abstractive in nature as it suggests that there is a conceptual difference between 
morals and laws. Fuber (1996:122) interpreted this thesis in the broader terms, as he 
argued that: “Law does not necessarily have (positive) moral value [and]… The  
definition of ‘law’ should be morality-free”. On the contrary, Hart29 (1997:185-186) 
interpreted this thesis in a narrower sense and suggested that the legal validity of law 
is not necessarily dependent on the demands of morality. Whilst there is an accord 
among legal positivist on existence of legal system without any restriction imposed on 
legal validity by moral demands; however, dissension arises on the possibility of a 
legal system, with such restriction.    
The ‘inclusive legal positivism’ (also known as soft positivism) subscribe to the 
‘social thesis’ and takes the position that “moral principles or substantive values” 
(Hart et al., 2012:250) can be incorporated to make up a criteria for legal validity, 
whilst ‘exclusive legal positivism’ (also known as hard positivism) endorses the 
‘source thesis’ and argue that “moral considerations never affect the legal validity of 
norms” (Marmor, 2001:71).  
While, on the other hand, social thesis is an extension Kant’s suggestion that the 
powers of sovereign are grounded in the natural norms, which was structured by 
Kelsen, into the notion that the ‘basic norms’ (Grundnorm) are the source for the 
validity of law (Bindreiter, 2002:15). The social thesis, therefore, suggests that the 
“existence of the law is purely a matter of social fact” (Oladosu, 2004:53), and 
considers the “social facts, such as social rules or conventions which happen to 
prevail in a given community” (Marmor, 2001), as standards from which the basic 
conditions of legal validity should be extracted.  
The social thesis gives the most suitable rationale for understanding the evolution of 
Islamic law and its current state in the Muslim world, which is also theologically 
justifiable, as it attempts to tap into the Islamic norms, which are imbedded in the 
Muslim society after centuries of practice. The primary source’s account of consensus 
along with the divine commitment that Muslim community as whole will always 
                                                      
29 “simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain 
demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so” (Hart, 1997:185-186) 
 
   150 
confirm to morally good, ethically right and divinely approved course of action, also 
theologically favours the social thesis. The acknowledgement of social thesis (instead 
of Qur’an and hadith as legal sources) by the Islamic law would not only solve the 
problem of legal validity, but also the epistemological and moral issues. However, 
contrary to the way primary sources perceive society, the Islamic law perceives 
society and social norms from very different angle, as it takes the society and social 
norms as something in need of constant correction.    
Raz (1979) further developed the notion of social thesis within exclusive legal 
positivism and presents a case for ‘sources thesis’, in which he suggests that the 
validity of law in relation to institutions and claims, “Anything (however morally 
acceptable) not admitted by such institutions is not law, and vice versa” (Wacks, 
2012:106) and suggests that the only acceptable criteria for testing are “efficacy, 
institutional character, and sources” (Wacks, 2012:106). Dworkin (as taken from 
Postema, 2011:405) argued for the distinction between ‘rules and principles’, ‘facts 
and values’, and ‘what is law and what law ought to be’, and used the pedigree thesis 
and obligation thesis to construct ‘discretion thesis’ (judges have discretion to alter 
and modify law). Dworkin by separating rules and principles suggested the moral 
nature of principles, which places him very close to natural lawyers. However, 
Dworkin does not agree to the premises that the “morally acceptable content is a 
precondition of a norm's legality” (Marmor, 2001). Currently Islamic law aligns itself 
towards the Dworkin’s argument with an exception that Islamic law maintains the 
moral acceptability as a precondition for norm’s legality. This requirement comes 
from the natural law that forms a part of Islamic law, and it stresses on the moral 
contents of norms to act as a criterion for legal validity. In the modern times Islamic 
law uses the combination of source thesis and discretion thesis for justifying the 
conversion of a rule into a law and for arguing the validity of law in Islam.  
In current framework of Islamic law, a law is justified with a reference to its sources, 
as long as religious institutions or religious scholars accept that reference. A law may 
be accepted, but its may not be applied. The application of law is at the discretion of 
religious institutions or religious scholars, and when they identify an inapplicable law, 
they may modify or alter it into something more suitable for application. The legal 
validity in Islamic law becomes a function of reference to sources and acceptability of 
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scholars and consequently makes apparent the depth of the crisis. The crisis covers 
the subject area of epistemology and ontology, and it can be divided into three major 
categories, that is: ‘crisis in sources of law’, ‘crisis of legitimacy’ and ‘crisis of 
morality’. 
The part of legal validity that depends on the reference to the sources means that there 
is always a need for a connection between the law and the sources. The connection is 
established or justified by the use of hermeneutics, evidence and reasoning, whilst the 
law may formulate on the social facts. The interaction between the law, which is 
based on social facts and the primary sources of Islam, creates an arrangement where 
harmonisation is almost impossible to achieve. Most of the times the difference is 
such that jurist have to reply on weak reasoning to justify the connection, while in 
other times the difference is so great that even weak reasoning cannot be established, 
which results in silent acceptance. This creates a crisis in ‘sources of law’.  
Some jurists prefer position of primary sources and only accept a law to be valid, 
when it has a connection based on strong evidence and reasoning, while others give 
more weight to social facts and accept a law with weak reasoned connection, or no 
connection at all. The casual and desultory role played by primary sources raises the 
question on the practical importance of these sources in validating the law. The 
theologians and jurists argue that there is certain set of values, moral principles and 
ethical guidelines in the primary sources, which makes them absolutely theological 
necessity in the process of legal validity, although these values, principles and 
guidelines may be ignored or violated for a brief period of time; however, in the long 
run they are essential and obligatory. The form and substance of these values, 
principles and guidelines, or the lack of it, creates a crisis in morality.  
Certain theological argument emphasis the acceptance by religious scholars as a 
criterion for morality and for legal validity; however, in absence of any central 
authority like Vatican or political authority like Caliphate, there is a crisis of 
legitimacy created by this argument. 
4.5 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRISIS  
Crisis is a condition of a complex system or tradition, when the tradition functions 
poorly. MacIntyre (1998) who also coined the term ‘epistemological crisis’, described 
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the condition of a tradition, when its methods of enquiry cease to make progress by its 
own standards of rationality, and when the “Conflicts over rival answers to key 
questions can no longer be settled rationally” (MacIntyre, 1998:361-362), then that 
tradition is in a state of epistemological crisis. A tradition may reach this condition 
when: 
 the use of the methods of enquiry and of the forms of argument, by means of which 
rational progress had been achieved so far, begins to have the effect of increasingly 
disclosing new inadequacies, hitherto unrecognised incoherences, and new 
problems for the solution of which there seem to be insufficient or no resources 
within the established fabric of belief. (MacIntyre, 1998:362) 
Islamic scholarship is not alien to this condition, as Islamic law in its evolutionary 
development has repeatedly encountered this condition. We are using the term Islamic 
law instead of Islam, because, Islam’s notion of “individual’s submission to the will 
of God” (Cornell, 2005:13-20) developed into a corporative system governed by 
Islamic law, and with this development the focus shifted from individual’s salvation 
to the construction of a schemata that may unite culture and creed by means of a legal 
system to create a virtuous society, where the emphasis is not on ‘society as collection 
of individuals’ but on ‘society as a corporate entity’ (Cornell, 2005:13-20).  
Islamic law has historically experienced epistemological crisis in cycles. In second 
and third century of Islam, the epistemological crisis was resolved by the introduction 
of Greek logic. This occurred upon the realisation that tools and processes of an alien 
tradition could coherently solve the problems faced within the Islamic tradition. 
Although in spite of this realisation a pious fiction was still maintained for creating 
acceptability for the borrowed parts of alien tradition, by giving a superficial Islamic 
episteme to the borrowed parts of alien tradition. Cornell (2005) suggests that the 
need and importance for maintaining this pious fiction becomes apparent on 
observing the philosophical tradition in Islam, which unlike legal tradition, openly 
acknowledged the alien traditions as epistemological sources, and, therefore received 
immense criticism on “lack of authenticity” (Cornell, 2005:3). 
From a very early period, the Islamic legal theory has attempted to use ‘reason’ as a 
combination of rationalism and empiricism, as a source of law to fill in the 
epistemological crisis (Auda, 2008). However, accepting an authority of reason has 
always raised difficult questions for jurists and theologians over the years. Due to the 
epistemological limitations of the primary sources, the reason always had and always 
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will have an authority within the Islamic law. This authority of reason is in the 
context of legal validity and as an epistemological source.  
The early rationalists, such as Mutazilities and others, argued that the reason is not an 
authoritative source but rather a supportive one, which confirms the divine injunctions 
(Fakhry, 1991:11-14). They claimed that God can only act justly and can only do 
good, and these virtues (the good and the just) are actions of God and therefore 
separate and outside of Him. This assumption allowed them to view ‘the nature’ as 
purposeful creation of God that is just and good, and with this notion of nature, they 
argued that humans can develop better understanding of good and bad by observing 
the natural world. Emon (2010:26-27) observes that in rationalist’s argument:  
the normative content of empirical assessments is founded upon the fusion of fact 
and value, by which nature is invested with a presumptive normativity that stems 
from God’s purposeful creation of nature for human benefit. 
The rationalist jurist’s view point therefore is that: as there is a fusion between facts 
and values, we can distinguish between good and bad through observation of natural 
world, pursuing that good and refraining from that bad becomes a divine obligation 
which will be rewarded and punishable by the God (Emon, 2010:27).  
The rationalist argued for the fusion of facts and values, and mixing the two, they 
addressed the problem with the theory of value in Islam and the epistemological crisis 
in Islamic law. This provided Islamic law with a new source of law and a workable 
theory of value.  
The rationalist thesis stands on the assumption that the natural world is constant, static 
and determinate, whilst also implying that the God is obliged to honour human 
classification of good and bad, as long as classification is constructed on observation 
of the natural world. The rationalist jurists’ thesis was heavily criticised, by the 
voluntarist jurist, on the assumption and implications of the thesis.  
The voluntarist’s antithesis is that the values and facts cannot fused in such fashion, as 
they argued that the “nature is not sufficiently determinative, objective, or 
foundational to ground the authority of reason” (Emon, 2010:29). They further 
objected to the bounding of God’s will to the rational moral judgements of humans, as 
it has direct implication on the theological concept of omnipotence of God.   
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Voluntarist’s critique, however, did not address the crisis in epistemology, and, the 
problem with theory of value; therefore, they used the principles on which they based 
their criticism, as foundation of building a synthesis. They argued for philosophically 
uncompromisable omnipotence of God and that the divine is under no obligation to 
honour or be subjected to human reasoning. The voluntarist then theologically 
engineered an argument on un-obliged grace of God and then used it to establish an 
epistemological connection between the natural world and the will of God. They 
argued for the examination and analysis of the “source-texts with divine authority to 
determine obligations and prohibitions that reflect the divine will” (Emon, 2010:29).  
The theory of un-obliged grace of God allowed voluntarist to envisage nature as 
fusion of facts and values, and therefore recognise reason as “an ontologically 
authoritative source of Shari’a norms” (Emon, 2010:33). The recognition of reason 
was an attempt to address the epistemological crisis; however, voluntarist kept their 
commitment to the omnipotence of God, by devising models for restricting reason and 
by prioritising the sources. In theory, the utmost importance is given to the 
transcendental sources, and human reason can only be applied in circumstances where 
these sources are silent. The application of reason is also regulated, as theory argues 
that practical reasoning must satisfy some fundamental values, such as maslahah 
(public good) and maqasid al-Shari’ah (objective of Shari’ah) (Emon, 2010:33). 
This theory of un-obliged grace of God was practiced with the support of pious 
fiction, and uneasy truce in most parts of Islamic history. The consequence of limiting 
the epistemological use of reason and ordering its ontological authority under the 
transcendental sources was that the epistemological crisis was reduced but not tackled 
completely, and with reason and observation of natural world, epistemologically 
restricted, and, hence exhausted, Islamic scholarship turned toward ‘piousness’ as an 
epistemological source Schacht (1960; 1982).  
Piousness has a robust ontological existence in Islamic theology and philosophy, so 
much so that it is classified as a purpose of life. Islamic law utilised ‘piousness’ as an 
epistemological source in multiple ways (Auda, 2008). First the piousness was used 
as a foundation for the assumption that with the percentage increase in the literacy of 
Islamic law, the person’s level of piousness will also increase, and once a person is 
well versed in the theory of Islam, they will be inclined to choose the good and right 
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course of action, as they will be a subject to divine guidance due to their level of 
piousness; therefore, their judgement should be trusted compared to a commoner’s, as 
suggested by Hallaq, (1997) (2009), Cook (2000) and others. Secondly, piousness was 
used as a base argument to deter any cynicism towards the clergy, and officials such 
as muhtasib (Glick, 1972).  
The manner in which reason was restricted and piousness was used, it marginalised 
any possibility of development in political theory along the lines of public 
accountability, while also relegating any illustrious developments in axiology (study 
of value and value judgements) or towards theory of knowledge that acknowledged 
empiricism or constructivism.  
Similar to the early centuries of Islam, when Greek logic and Christian Theology 
forced Islamic law to reconsider its position, legal theory and episteme; the 19th 
century hermeneutic of suspicion, liberalism and politico economic challenges of 
post-colonial era also posed similar questions, which re-highlighted the 
epistemological crisis (Hallaq, 2004).  
There were many efforts to reform the theory and practice of Islamic law over the 
years. Analogous to efforts of Jewish reformers like Samson Raphael Hirsch and 
Abraham Geiger, who argued against the rigid halakhic framework of the rabbis and 
attempted to substitute it with models built on rational faith and Kant’s principle of 
morality as the genuine religion; Islamic law also went through similar phases from 
late 18th century onwards. From Indian subcontinent, Syed Ahmed Khan, Ghulam 
Ahmed Pervez and the in recent times Kassim Ahmad in Malaysia attempted 
reorientation of Islamic law’s position on key socio economic aspects by arguing 
against the ontological authority of hadith and suggesting Qur’an as the only 
epistemological source which needs to be interpreted without making reference to 
sunnah. This approach, whose methods still required a trained authoritative clergy, 
was labelled as Quranism. In face of socio politico resistance the Quranism moment 
was unable to develop sufficient religious ministry to have a broader impact on the 
Muslim world. The requirement for theological experts was such a vital factor, as 
Quranism tried to keep Qur’an as a main source, while reinterpreting most of it’s 
content concurrently, which required theologians who could develop the literature, 
whilst simultaneously creating an acceptance by educating the populace.  
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There have been many Islamic movements over the history, which do not fall under 
schism and instead are genuine attempts at reforming Islam by addressing its 
epistemological crisis. Some of them are liberal in nature, as they argue for private 
autonomy for interpreting sources; some are conservatives, as they argue for universal 
implementation of Islamic law whilst using the pious fiction and uneasy truce for 
addressing the crisis, and some are ultra conservatives, who attempt to alter the 
reality, instead of focusing on the sources.  
The ultra-conservative reformists attempted to apply top down strategy, as they 
argued for establishment of an Islamic State, which could socially engineer the 
society into a condition of being where the epistemological crisis is bridged and the 
socio economic reality is aligned with all the positions, assumptions and expectations 
of Islamic law and Islamic theology. The ultra conservatists view this crisis as crisis 
in ‘reality’, rather than crisis in epistemology. Their adamant emphasis on unalterable 
orthodoxy of Islamic legal traditions meant that they inherently rejected and closed all 
the door for reformation. However, they did acknowledge the crisis, and responded to 
it by denying the ontological authority of ‘modern reality’ by disallowing it any moral 
grounds, consequently they rejected everything attached to or product of it, including 
the human knowledge that developed during this time. Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab, Abul A'la Maududi and others attempted to politicise Islamic faith 
for dehellenisation of human beings from modernism. They argued for reshaping the 
human beings, redesigning the society and altering the reality in such a manner that a 
singularity between the ‘changeable’ (that is: human beings, the society and the 
reality) and ‘unchangeable’ (position of transcendental sources and Islamic law’s 
assumptions) can be achieved. Through this methodology, the ultra conservatives 
concluded the current epoch as pure evil and developed a ‘bad consciousness’ of 
reality, and to balance this evil, they constructed a ‘false consciousness’, a conjured 
up utopia, where human beings will function according to every notion of 
‘unchangeable’, and hence there will be no epistemological crisis. This phenomena is 
also observed by Rieff (1992), in context of Freudian conflict, as he claims that, 
“religion somewhere assumes a fixed point, at which conflict is resolved” (Rieff, 
1992:267). 
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The ultraconservative, while bound by their extreme views on compliance to 
scriptures and with a desire to reach that fixed point, where all conflicts are resolved, 
argued for reconstruction of social fabric in such a manner that in the future that fixed 
point is attained, where the ultraconservative interpretation of scriptures and social 
reality are mirror reflection of each other, thus, all the conflicts are resolved and 
epistemological crisis is solved.  
The use of, what Nietzsche refers to as ‘false consciousness’, for resolving the 
conflicts caused by the epistemological crisis is not unique to ultra conservatives and 
their political ideology. In post 1970s, an attempt to Islamise the knowledge also 
regularly fell in similar traps with the attempts of IIIT or the Islamisation of 
knowledge. The attempts on developing an economic system that conforms to the 
assumptions of Islamic law resulted in a narrative of an ideal economic agent called 
homoIslamicus, which is antithetical to homoeconomicus. The homoIslamicus, who 
upholds the moral commitments because of piousness and every course of action they 
take is filtered through their God fearing nature, was a concept thought out by 
speculative theology during the evolution of Islamic law. Historically, Islamic 
scholarship attempted to use this dimension of ‘piousness’ as an epistemological 
source, when they restricted the application of reason and downgraded its ontological 
authority. This concept failed in positive application, and, therefore is not applicable 
as a normative construct. However, as the discourse on homoIslamicus strictly follows 
same episteme as Islamic law, therefore it is rearguing the same position that was 
theologically assumed many centuries ago. This process of circling the conclusion is 
because of the stagnation in episteme; therefore, different types of reasoning will still 
provide similar results.  
In the modern times, the neoconservative religious scholars, jurists and theologians 
face similar crisis, and in an effort to reconcile the present day reality with the 
conception of Islamic law, the current debate is largely focuses on using the doctrine 
(such as maslahah and maqasid al-Shari’ah) of the past, to extend the ontological 
authority and epistemological use of reason. These doctrines were essentially 
designed by the previous generations to restrict the use of reason, but the reliance of 
modern scholarship on these doctrines was, out of the fear of violating orthodoxy as 
   158 
they tried to theologically engineer vents for using episteme that were otherwise alien 
for Islamic law.  
The efforts to make reason “an authority source for divine injunctions” are centuries 
old, and for centuries these attempts are sidelined by labelling them as heterodoxy to 
extent of heresy (Emon, 2010:13). Therefore, the neoconservatives portrayed 
themselves as loyal to the traditional form of religion, whilst having ambivalence 
towards modernity, in which they applied distinctly modern epistemology to highlight 
the failures of modernism (Hallaq, 1997). The application of modern epistemology 
did not lead to direct acceptance of authority of these source, as the discourse on 
ontological authority of sources remained covered in rhetoric of the doctrine (such as 
maslahah and maqasid al-Shari’ah) of the past (Schacht, 1960, 1982). Moreover, the 
rhetoric allowed the neoconservatives to present themselves as a continuation of 
orthodoxy.   
The multitude of schemas for reformation has one common denominator, which is 
that they all give perfunctory importance to Qur’an as an epistemological source and 
they argue that laws and policies need to be ruled by the religion in one form or 
another. The schemas deploy two main techniques that is they maintain a claim on 
the: “exclusive theoretical validity… of an autonomous customary law; [and] 
‘ulama’,… [as] the only qualified interpreters” (Schacht, 1960:84). 
The emphasis on these two features is a result of political economy of religious 
scholars in Islam’s religious market. These two features work together to legitimise 
‘the need and the authority’ of religious scholars. Political authorities and in recent 
times the corporations, such as Islamic banks, then ratify this need and authority, as 
religious scholars in return theologically engineer the dispensation of “Muslims from 
observing the strict rules of the Law” (Schacht, 1960:84), so political authorities and 
corporations, such as Islamic banks, can create practically viable solutions. The 
practically viable solutions through this process are important for political authorities 
and corporations because of conscientious notion within the Muslim community on 
spiritual significance of theoretical validity of every solution by an autonomous 
customary law. The religious scholars personify themselves as the bridge between the 
impractical divine law and the practical reality, and as an architect of practical 
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solutions, they were successful in continuously reinventing the rationale for their 
existence and their authority.  
In the post-colonial period, the newly born nation states opted for the positive law 
with an Islamic touch out practicality, which meant that the religious scholars who 
were trained as lawyers for religious courts by religious schools, had their work cut 
short; however, religious school across Muslim world continued to produce the 
religious lawyers cum religious scholars. The oversupplies created an over flow of 
religious scholars into political and social arenas, where they attempted to apply their 
expertise in Islamic legal theories. For example, the financial deadlock in Muslim 
world, due to aversion of interest bearing financial instruments, provided a unique 
opportunity for the emergence of a new creed of religious scholars and financial 
institutions. The financial institutions required theoretical legitimacy for using the 
Islamic brand, and for religious scholars it was another chance of rationalising their 
existence and their authority.   
In the post 19th century, the argument on authority and need for religious scholars was 
challenged by many reformists (Hallaq, 2004); the developments in information 
technology, easy access to discourse and multiple opinion of specialists on Islam’s 
subject matter also antagonised the traditional authority of religion, as it paved a way 
for individualisation of religious understanding. Many reformists, such as Tariq 
Ramadan, have also campaigned for a revaluation of the religious authority of 
scholars at institutional level. 
Almost all the strands of reforms, along with all the schemas cited Qur’an as an 
epistemological source, whilst using reason, logic and even personal experiences to 
reinterpret verses or argue for a specific position. Even the sensitive topics, such as 
Islamic law’s stance on homosexuality, is argued by all sides (that is: liberalist, 
activist and conventionalist) through reference quoting the Qur’an and reinterpreting 
its verses.  
The reference to Quran is used as show of legitimacy, and, it does not act as a process 
of legal validity. In current practice, modernism forms the loose criteria for legal 
validity of the acceptance of rule as a law. This process is neither theorised, nor 
explicitly accepted in Islamic discourse, but it is practiced in political, economic and 
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financial strands of governance by Islamic law. For example, the liberals use 
Modernism as criteria for interpreting the sources of Islamic law, in which only those 
positions, laws or interpretations are acceptable that are coherent to modernism. 
Conservatives, on the other hand, stay loyal to the traditional interpretations of 
sources; however, they use coherence to modernism as a benchmark for sorting the 
interpreted rulings into implementable laws and impracticable rulings, whilst the 
ultraconservative use modernism as yardstick in theorising morality.  
4.5.1 The Modern Crisis: The Unspoken Criteria for Validity  
There are many theoretical constructs and politico-legal events that clearly display 
liberalism’s setting standards of legal validity in Islamic law, by acting as an 
epistemological source. The citing of the ideas of liberty and equality in liberalism, as 
an epistemological source is crucial, because the corpse of Islamic law lacks any 
original discourse on these topics (as established in the earlier chapter). The narrative 
of some of the significant events, as relevant cases for evidencing, is as below: 
In 2009, Saudia Arabia’s Shari’ah governed Abha General Court issued death 
sentences for seven men, as they were convicted of armed robbery. According to the 
shari’ah law “the offences that they committed amounted to acts of ‘corruption on 
earth’” (Amnesty International, 2008:10), which qualifies them for the severest of 
punishment. The court orders, which were corroborated by the King Abdullah, was to 
execute the six men by the firing squad, whilst the seventh man’s body was to be 
“displayed to the public in a cruciform position for three days” (Spencer, 2013b; 
Telegraph, March 5th, 2013). The public display of dead body is coherent with the 
norms of Islamic law, as the Muslim tradition claim that it acts as a deterrent for to be 
criminals.  
Many human right groups, along with Amnesty International and Human Right 
Watch lobbied against the sentenced; as they pointed out that the confessions were 
taken under intense physical and mental torture (Amnesty International, July 4th, 
2013) and that at least two of the convicted were minors at the time of the crime 
(Spencer, 2013b; Telegraph, March 5th, 2013). The outrage expressed by human right 
groups, led to the negative publicity and international coverage of the many 
underlining facts, such as the rate of executions for non- murder offenses exceeds the 
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execution rate for murder in Saudi Arabia (Amnesty International, 2008:12). The 
governor of Asir province (Prince Faisal bin Khaled al-Saud) responded by issuing an 
order for the planned execution to be on an open-endedly held (Spencer, 2013b; 
Telegraph, March 5th, 2013). 
This is not an isolated event, where decisions made under the governance of Islamic 
law, are indefinitely halted due the opposition based on the modern values. When we 
examine this event from the fence of epistemology of law and legal validity, we can 
observe that the decisions of Islamic law can in certain context be legally validated by 
modern values and international conventions, and if they fall short they may be 
invalidated or modified. The theological justification for any alteration in the ruling 
can be engineered by using tools like ‘choosing the lesser harm’ and so on. All 
violation of human rights or international conventions do not get noticed, and neither 
all noted violations receive enough support for Islamic authorities to be pressurised 
into altering, deferring or dropping the legal rulings. The fact that under certain 
conditions modern values and international conventions play a role of a filter by 
screening for the rulings of Islamic law that should not be applied. Although this role 
is only played in certain conditions, but assuming these certain conditions as ideal 
conditions, one can suggest the value intervention of modernism acts as criteria of 
legal validity. The value intervention that formulates a criterion becomes more 
prominent, when we examine the thoughts and discussions behind the current legal 
positions of Islamic law in the Muslim word.  
The substratum behind the current positions of Islamic law is that the value 
judgements of modern thoughts are more coherent to the socio economic makeup of 
society in the era of post industrial revolution. Practitioners of Islamic law have, 
therefore, made many efforts to arrive at the value judgements similar to the ones 
achieved by modern thought. During such effort, they focused on those values within 
the legal sources that are closed to the modern value judgements and then attempted 
to develop them by tweaking the traditional methodology of Islamic law, to produce a 
discourse, which can bring Islamic law to similar conclusions as modern value 
judgements, because they do not assign or acknowledge any ontological authority of 
the discourse in modern thoughts, which creates these value judgements. The 
traditional position of Islamic law on issues such as: “polygamy, the marriage of 
   162 
minors, the right of the father to give his children in marriage without their consent, 
and the right of the husband to unilateral and arbitrary dis- missal of his wife” 
(Schacht, 1960:106) were historically considered as just and fair. However, the 
Tunisian version of Islamic law has reformed the classic positions by accepting them 
as inadequate with the modern times. For example, the legal prohibition of polygamy 
in Islamic law, by the Tunisian authorities, in spite of its explicit allowance in 
scriptures was controversial, but nevertheless it is an attempt to arrive at the position 
similar to modern value judgements. The contentiousness arises in explicitly 
acknowledging that the Qur’anic legal contents are incommensurate to reality.   
Overall, the legal decisions outside of scriptures are more frequently criticised and 
practitioners of Islam feel at ease to alter or modify them. However, when it comes to 
the Qur’anic legal ruling, they “restrict their criticism to the form in which the 
subject-matter appeared” (Schacht, 1960:104). The criticism is largely focused on the 
form, in an anticipation that the substance and spirit of the subject matter will have 
higher moral values, and it will allow Islamic law to produce legal rulings that are at 
least compatible, if not similar to the value judgements of modernism. The focus on 
spirit and substance is also used to justify and create human autonomy, which is 
largely absent in the traditional Islamic law. Bukhsh (as cited by Schacht, 1960:104) 
in an attempt to rejuvenate the Islamic law of inheritance (as it discriminates against 
the women), produced the simple methodology for reforming Islamic law, as he 
argued that the subject matter of Qur’anic legal rulings does not have an ‘eternal 
value’. Therefore, we should not focus on their positive contents, but rather 
concentrate on the Qur’anic norm of establishing social justice through regulations 
(Schacht, 1960:104). Abdar-Rahman et al. (2008), on the other hand, focused on 
reinterpretation of the form of the subject matter and the positive contents; However, 
as Schacht (1960:105) suggests any scheme of reinterpreting the primary sources to 
make them coherent with modernism implies that “the Muslim scholars, for more than 
a thousand years, should have misunderstood the correct meaning of those ‘sources’ 
of Islamic law, and ‘Abdur-rahman’s whole method is unacceptable to an historian”. 
The schemes that attempt to annihilate all the historical understanding for   
reinterpretation of scriptures, not only commit the fallacies for historians, but also for 
theologians. Therefore, this research only focuses on the reformation schemes that 
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examine the scriptures for tendencies underlying the relevant passages in an attempt 
to rejuvenate and revive them. This is consistent with Tillich’s approach, which 
proposes that revelations are relative and not absolute statements (Tillich, 1951:106-
157). Philo in an attempt to harmonise the Greek philosophy and Jewish theology in 
50 CE, followed similar methodology as he argues that the true meaning of scriptures 
are absent in the surface meaning and instead they lay beneath the surface meanings; 
therefore the literal interpretation needs to be supplemented by an ‘allegorical 
interpretation’ (McGrath, 2006:48). In case of Islamic law, the schemas of 
reformation do use value judgement of modernism as a benchmark to decide on what 
should constitute as the ‘true meaning’.  
Lewis (2006) examines the un-secular nature of Islam and highlights that the manner 
Qur’an covers socio, politico economic and religious matters, and the status of 
Prophet as religious and political leader, means that there are no historical foundations 
in Islam which follow secularization thesis, to the extent that the world secular or 
secularism are almost absent in Arabic language. In addition, Gellner identifies 
similar trends and declares Islam as ‘secularisation resistant’ (as taken from Cliteur, 
2010:272). In explaining, Rashid al-Ghannouchi, the co-founder of Tunisia’s largest 
Islamist party An-Nahdah, when faced a political necessity to officially acknowledge 
the notion of secular state, in the post Arab Spring Tunisia, he faced the phenomena 
examined by Gellner and Lewis, as there is lack of a clear rationale that can serve as 
foundational argument for justification of secular state in Islamic thought. Al-
Ghannouchi grounded the argument in the treaty signed by Prophet in Medina, as he 
suggests that the treaty shows the dichotomy between the religious sphere governed 
by observance and obligation, and the political sphere directed by reason and ijtihad 
(Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy: Video, July 18th, 2013). This study 
does not focus on the theological cogency of the argument or its historical validity, as 
what is relevant for this study is that the ‘process’ followed by al-Ghannouchi to 
develop the Islamic thoughts in the manner that they coincide with already established 
positions in modern Western thoughts, without assigning any ontological authority to 
modern Western thoughts. The ‘process’ therefore treats modern value judgements as 
unspoken criteria for validating the Islamic law. It also shows that Islamic law shows 
a normative commitment with the modern value judgements, as the Islamic law 
attempts to develop itself in such a way that there remains a higher degree of 
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conformity between the Islamic law and modern value judgements; all this is being 
undertaken without acknowledging the existence, dominion or precedence of modern 
value judgements; hence, they remain outside roams of Islamic thoughts. Schacht 
(1960:120) suggests that the confusing of the past about what constitutes as 
legislation has lead to the current practice where jurists, juriconsults and theologians 
are using:  
… timid, half-hearted, and essentially self-contradictory… method of picking 
isolated fragments of opinions from the early centuries of Islamic law, arranging 
them into a kind of arbitrary mosaic, and concealing behind this screen an 
essentially different structure of ideas borrowed from the West, [which result in an] 
unreal and artificial…modernist Islamic legislation[s, which]… often appears 
haphazard and arbitrary.  
The major issue with the modern Islamic legislations is the manner by which it 
opposes, whilst simultaneously utilising the modern westerns value judgements. This 
approach creates framework of ‘post reformed Islamic legislations’ that lacks “solid 
and consistent theoretical basis” (Schacht, 1960:120). 
4.5.2 Paradoxes: The Sisyphus of Islamic law 
This opposition and simultaneous utilisation of the modern value judgements 
formulates absurd and contradictory paradoxes. Although they may seem alike but 
this paradox is not similar to the ones, discussed by Kierkegaard (Westphal, 2014), in 
which we can only have “faith by virtue of the absurd” (McCombs, 2013:1-32). The 
dissimilarity between these paradoxes is because of the difference in episteme. In case 
of Kierkegaard’s paradox, it rises from the narrative whose narrator and subject of 
narration is transcendental, that is: God narrating about the divine command issued by 
the God in an event which involved God and human beings; while the paradox 
created from fusion of Islamic law and modernity is a result of social construct with 
its roots in epistemological crisis.  
The schemas of reformation, and the theories of Islamic law, categorise Qur’an as 
discourse that requires faith by the virtue of absurd, as demanded by philosophy of 
theology and similar to the Kierkegaard’s Christianity (Westphal, 2014).   This status, 
however, remains confined within the bounds of theory, and is not assimilated into 
practice. In the context of examining operations of Islamic law from the fence of legal 
philosophy, it could even be loosely suggested that in current settings, the 
interpretation of Qur’an is a social construct. The meaning of the verses exists outside 
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of the discourse of Qur’an, and within the society. These meanings are brought into 
the Qur’anic text by reader who lives in a social construct different from the time 
which is referenced in Qur’an. From legal point of view, within the current schemas it 
does not carry any intrinsic meaning as the meanings are assigned to Qur’an and its 
verses through socially constructed process. Therefore, its meanings cannot be true in 
every possible interpretation, and its legislative logic consequently is not tautological. 
The absence of intrinsic meaning originates from the difficulty in connecting the 
present day reality with the context, convention and circumstances of Qur’an. In the 
past, a whole discipline of Qur’anic exegesis was developed to create singularity in 
the meaning (Hallaq, 1997:22-32), yet, even in the bulk of available exegesis, some 
passages have singularity in the meaning assigned to them, due to formal or informal 
consensus between groups of religious scholars, while where such consensus is not 
established, passages have multiple meanings or possible schisms. It may further be 
suggested that the exegesis have somewhat lost their meanings as well, as they 
become more and more out of context with the present time. Advances in natural 
sciences has also forced Islamic thoughts into reinterpreting the primary sources, and 
sometimes contradicting the historical meanings in the exegesis. This cycle of 
reinterpretation to accommodate the continuously changing reality may cause 
continuous percentage decrease of the original meanings of Qur’an (original as the 
one historically understood and applied by Prophet) in the contemporary 
understanding of Qur’an. All of the schemas of reinterpretation have a common factor 
that is they focus on certain commandments, while rejecting the other. This rejection 
is not the rejection of the historically agreed abrogated versus, but it is focused on the 
commandments that are accounted for in the historical terms. Considering the 
theological assumption that every commandment is ethical, the process of selection in 
which some commandments are selected (Schacht, 1982), while others are rejected, 
creates an ethical dilemma and hints towards a moral crisis.    
It should be noted that theory considers Qur’an as an unquestionable source of law; 
with Maliki tradition in special argue that there are no preconditions for its application 
(Philips, 1990:75). In explaining, the dhaahiree concentrate on the literal meaning, 
while others are open to consideration of form and substance, while assigning a 
meaning to it. In practice, however, the legislative rulings of Qur’an are adjourned 
with the ‘rationale’ of realising universal justice, attaining public interest, reducing 
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religious obligation or elimination of practical difficulties, which signifies that it is the 
social constructs that create the conditions for suspension of Qur’anic rulings. 
Therefore, it could be suggested that the social constructs have epistemological 
priority over Qur’an in the practice of modern Islamic law. Because the post-reformed 
Islamic legislations artificially mix the modern value judgements, while lacking any 
solid and consistent theoretical basis, whilst simultaneously using social constructs as 
rationales, without recognising the constructedness of reality, as a justification for 
reforming traditional Islamic law or for adjourning the legislations in the original 
sources, the end products is predominantly incongruous and absurd.  
In order to observe the utilisation of modern value judgements without assigning any 
ontological authority to them as a source of knowledge; this research will use a 
modern Islamic financial instrument called tawarruq as an example. Tawarruq 
mitigates a cash loan, which is used in Islamic finance through modern value 
judgements to construct a contract that mitigates contemporary financial instruments. 
However, rejecting the empiricism as a source of knowledge within the construction 
of this contract.   
4.5.3 Tawarruq: A Hamletian Dilemma in Epistemological Terms.  
Tawarruq is one of the end products of the modern Islamic finance system; which is a 
transaction, by which Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) provide cash to their clients 
with the objective of overcoming their very short-term liquidity problem, where a 
client buys a tangible commodity from IFIs on deferred payment, which includes 
price and a profit rate for the bank, and then the client sells the commodity to third 
party (mostly organised by the bank) to generate the required cash (El-Gamal, 2006). 
Despite its growing popularity and wide spread use by IFIs, tawarruq transactions are 
subject to strong criticism (Al-Eshaikh, 2011:47). After extensive debate by 
contemporary Islamic scholars and jurists, the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, issued a fatwa, or an Islamic legal ruling, which classified the 
existing practice of organised tawarruq as Islamically illegitimate (Haneef, 2009:1). 
The contemporary practice of tawarruq, referred to, as ‘organised tawarruq’ is 
slightly different to the ‘classical tawarruq’. It is argued that in classic tawarruq there 
was no arranged agreement between the client and the buyer of the commodity, unlike 
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in the case of organised tawarruq. However, classic tawarruq was not less 
controversial then the organised tawarruq.  
In spite of the fact that four major school of thought considered classic tawarruq as 
permissible at one point or another in the past. Scholars, such as Al-Eshaikh, (2011) 
raised their concerns by arguing that classic tawarruq is worse than riba (interest), it 
has tendencies of taljiah (deceptive sale), it produces a debt culture, and suggesting 
that classic tawarruq is a type of inah (buy back sale) which is prohibited (Al-
Eshaikh, 2011:47). The scholars, such as Haneef (2009), who historically supported 
the classic tawarruq argued on theological terms, such as suggesting that as long as a 
client does not buy and sell the commodity to same entity, and second sale is made to 
a different entity, there is no riba in this contract (Al-Eshaikh, 2011:46).  
The debate on organised tawarruq is not that different from the historical debates on 
classic tawarruq, as the paradigm with which the debating parties approach this issue 
remains the same. The parties, such as Kahf and Barakat (2005:13-15) arguing against 
organised tawarruq, suggest that it is worse than riba as it is similar to usury, and that 
it encourages the debt accumulation, it lacks transparency, along with giving 
theological arguments on how different it is from classic tawarruq and how similar it 
is to the economic activities prohibited by the original sources. The arguments 
supporting the practice of organised tawarruq also give theological arguments (El-
Gamal, 2006), while also arguing the necessity of such financial tool to modern 
financial institutions and customers. Almost all the arguments in favour of or against 
organised tawarruq assume that a customer will lose money in the transaction, as the 
bank would be charging a profit margin.  
Alzaidi and Kazakov’s (2012:321) research reveals that a customer equipped with 
forecasting tool can choose a profitable commodity for organised tawarruq and 
without violating any of Islamic law’s principles, and consequently, the customer can 
make this transaction profitable. In exploring, Alzaidi and Kazakov (2012:319-320) 
created a simulation with 480 clients, and 100 retailers, who had 28,336 tawarruq 
(including the reselling) deal between them, in which clients made on average 0.03 
percent profit after the reselling; with this they insinuate that it is a profitable market 
for clients, and as well as banks. Thus, Alzaidi and Kazakov’s (2012) study shows the 
certainty expressed within the discourse on tawarruq that the clients will lose money 
   168 
and that the clients are not able to resell the commodity bought within the tawarruq 
transaction, is incorrect, as the simulation based experiment shows that clients “can 
have full control of the reselling process and that on average they generate profit.”  
(Alzaidi and Kazakov, 2012:319) 
The discourse on tawarruq and the issues surrounding the debate are oblivious to the 
findings of Alzaidi and Kazakov (2012) work. This does not imply that the Islamic 
thoughts do not acknowledge empirical evidence, as the economic theories, 
arguments and empirical evidence are regularly quoted in Islamic economics and 
finance literature to support a position. The matter of problem with the Islamic 
finance, Islamic economic and to some extend all modern Islamic thoughts is that it 
acknowledges the empiricism as an epistemological source but denies any authority to 
it. For example, in a hypothetical situation, if there is a sufficient empirical and 
rational evidence to conceptualise that interest or riba reduces public difficulty, 
carries public interest, creates social capital, increases economic growth and improves 
piety, implements justice and fairness in the society, and so on, would it result in 
abrogation of Qur’anic versus, which prohibits riba. Or a more direct question would 
be ‘could empirical evidence ever be enough for Islamic law to change its position on 
riba or any other transcendentally subscribed matter?’ 
If the answer to this question is ‘no’, then we are faced with the problem, where 
Islamic law will continue to propagate a practice knowing that it is creating more 
harm then good, whilst justifying the suffering on transcendental basis, with a 
compensation in the hereafter. This goes against the notion of shari’ah, as 
theologically it is supposed to ease human life and not make it harder. Moreover, the 
justification that there will be a compensation in the hereafter, can only be accepted 
with a faith by virtue of absurd, because there is no transcendental proof that God will 
acknowledge the human reasoning that a divine command for a specific epoch, social 
setting and circumstances when applied to completely different situation, resulting in 
harmful consequences will qualify for reward in the hereafter. Some of the scholars 
tried to classify the Qur’anic versus into groups, with versus that are open to 
interpretation and the unalterable ones. However, there is no theologically legitimate 
manner of this classification and it remain on the ground of subjectivity (Gatje and 
Welch, 1976). 
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If the answer to this question is ‘yes’, then we are faced with the question of ‘why do 
we need scriptures as sources?’, as ‘yes’ answer affirms that empiricism as an 
epistemological source has greater ontological authority as compared to scripture as 
source of knowledge (Hallaq, 1997), for which, Islamic practitioners may argue that 
there will only be temporary suspension of divine command and when the situation 
becomes favourable, the divine command will be revivified in its original form. This 
implies that divine commandments are not suitable for all times, which raises further 
questions, like the divine commandments are suitable for which time? The suspension 
of sentence for stealing, during post-prophetic era (Hallaq, 1997) can be given as an 
example. Therefore, the following questions emerge: Who decides the conditions for 
when divine commandments become suitable? And what are the conditions? Or most 
importantly, are divine commandments only suitable for the time and space at which 
they were transcendentally delivered?  
All these strata of questions and many others issues are grounded in the futile state of 
current epistemological theory of Islamic law, with an underlined epistemological 
crisis. The epistemological crisis was lurking underneath development of Islamic law 
and to some extend this crisis influenced the evolution of Islamic law. However, the 
development of enlightenment thoughts, and progress in alternative epistemological 
theories produced challenges for Islamic law’s static epistemological theory, and at 
the beginning of modernity, the effects of epistemological crisis started to become 
more prominent and identifiable (Heck, 2002). The modern epistemological theories 
consequently questioned and influenced the contemporary episteme of Islamic law, 
and ever since Islamic scholarship is inspired to produce value judgements similar to 
the value judgements produced by modern epistemological theories. However, due to 
theological constraints and political conditions of 19th century, such as colonialism, 
contemporary Islamic scholarship is always reluctant to assign any ontological 
authority to modern episteme, whilst they continue to use the modern epistemology 
theories such as empiricism to support their theologically constructed arguments 
(Khan, 2013). 
Considering the favourable response of Islamic scholarship, for example, to socialism 
than to capitalism and neo-liberalism, suggests that the epistemological crisis also has 
normative connotation, as there is a lack of normative direction in contemporary 
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Islamic thoughts. In this lack of normative direction, and in the presence of working 
model of modernity, the Islamic scholarship indulge in replicating and imitating the 
value judgements similar to that of modernity, which creates an epistemological 
vacuum, where there are no sources adequate enough to provide or produce, what 
Islamic reformers are hoping to achieve. One of the primary reasons that practitioners 
of Islam deny ontological authority to modern value judgements is because they have 
a ‘faith by virtue of absurd’ that transcendental moral values will get carry forward to 
any notion that is grounded in the primary sources of Islam. There have been many 
historical debates within Islamic thoughts on the existence or non-existence of such 
transferable transcendental moral values (Moten, 2013).  
There is much rhetoric in Islamic thoughts that draws on transferable transcendental 
moral values as means to justify legal, spiritual or customary ends (Rosenthal, 2009). 
The existence of transferable transcendental moral values may be used to justify the 
epistemological crisis, as it implies that any notion loosely attached to the primary 
sources may have a transcendental moral value in it. Although this in itself is a weak 
argument, because epistemological crisis, and lack of normative direction infers to the 
impracticality and credulousness of Islamic law. However, the argument based on 
transferable transcendental moral values is regularly applied within the Islamic 
scholarly circles. All the discourse on Islamic thoughts, which quotes, infers, deduces 
or refers to primary sources, indirectly acknowledges the existence of these 
transferable transcendental moral values. This is indifferent to the position taken by 
the discourse, such as liberal, conservative, orthodox or so on, because as long as 
there is a direct, causal or loose reference to the primary sources, the discourse 
implies the existence of transferable transcendental moral values. 
In sum, the existence of transferable transcendental moral values is especially 
problematic when the legal theory is applied in the ethical settings, as it does not 
provide any normative direction to construct normative ethics, that is: it fails to give a 
picture of utopia. It also creates the operational failures, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 
theoretical problems as discussed in Chapter 3.   
4.6 THE CRISIS IN MORALITY  
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Orthodox theory of Islamic law draws its sacredness from the assumption that 
anything allowed by legislation is morally correct and anything that it prohibits is 
morally corrupt. The primitive assumption behind this belief is the assumption that 
there exists, in the primary sources, a transferable transcendental moral values. The 
first issue with conforming to the moral values and legal commands is that nearly all 
the contemporary schemas of Islamic law pick out few historic Islamic legislations, 
while rejecting other historic legislation of Islamic law. The process of cherry picking 
historic legislations raises the question that is morality really based on Islamic law or 
is Islamic law morally redundant in contemporary sense. If Islamic law is morally 
redundant then it looses its moral claims and its theological legitimacy. 
There are many schisms in the moral philosophy of Islam, and all of them do not 
stand by the assumptions that legal principles make up moral values. The orthodox 
schism that makes this assumption transmutes the legal principles into moral 
evaluations by categorising every act into “obligatory, or commendable, or 
permissible, indifferent, or reprehensible, or forbidden” (Schacht, 1960:107). The 
contemporary discourse also assigns these five qualifications to every act. However, 
the main emphasis remains on the technical legal aspect of the acts (Schacht, 
1960:107). The development of this classification is the result of the evolution of 
Islamic law and the primary sources do not directly follow these qualifications, as 
they approach morality from dissimilar premises and with slightly different 
perspective. Theodicy plays an essential role in the way primary sources approach 
morality, as they do not demonstrate anti-hedonistic tendencies, instead they argue 
that there exists a singularity between the hedonist strives, moral development and 
aesthetic improvements.   
4.6.1 Ethos of Islamic Axiology 
The axiological perspective of primary sources combines aesthetics and ethics in a 
framework of theodicy; there is a conjunction between this perspective and the pre-
Islamic Arab society that is somewhat similar to the way New Testament relates to 
Old Testament in the Christian theology.  
Majority of Islamic discourse acknowledges this connection; however, it views the 
pre and post Islamic Arab society as a juxtaposition, where pre-Islamic society 
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demonised to emphasise the moral transformation of society, because of Islamic 
creed. Historically the pre Islamic Arab society not only were loosely aware of 
foreign Weltanschauung, but there were also traces of foreign influences such as the 
Christian and Jewish traditions (Donaldson, 1953:3). Apart from the bad morality that 
was a construct of superstition and fostered by constraints and exigencies of desert 
life, there was a strong moral stamina imbedded and preserved within the pre Islamic 
Arab society (Donaldson, 1953:4-13), which was based on following strands: 
generosity (al-karam), tranquillity (al-hilm), vendetta (th’ar) and clique mentality 
(asabiyyah).  
Generosity formed the primary virtue behind hospitality; vendetta underpinning the 
notion of social justice influenced a large part of pre-Islamic Arab ethico-cultural 
understanding; clique mentality defined the ethical approach in political sphere; and 
tranquillity represented the acceptance of calamity and evil, with forbearance and 
clemency, by the virtue of absurd, which later on developed into the concept of 
predestined fate or qadar in Islamic theology. Majority of moral arguments and 
theological constructs in Islamic thoughts are grounded in these four pre-Islamic 
concepts (Heck, 2002). Thus, overall there is no singular moral theory, as there is 
variance and diversity in the moral judgements, the method constructing and 
obtaining the moral judgements, within the Islamic ethics.  
There are two strata in Islamic ethics: the original uninterrupted ethos of primary 
sources, and then there are the ethical theories, developed by commentators, 
traditionalists and jurists, from the ethos of primary sources (Fakhry, 1991:10). This 
distinction is vital and it implies that primary sources does not contain any ethical 
theory or a blue print for one, which deduces the notion that there is no 
transcendentally subscribed criteria which could classify unconditional good, and 
without such criterion, everything endorsed by ethical theories falls under conditional 
good (Fakhry, 1991:10). There are two major issues with this: firstly any act endorsed 
as ethical or good has to accepted as right based on the assumption that there exist a 
‘transferable transcendental moral values’, and as the ethical theories are grounded in 
divine discourse, they possess the values that enable them to distinguish between 
good and bad. The second issue is with the conditions that activate goodness in the 
conditional good and without clearly defined conditions, how can we ever be sure 
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there is goodness in the conditional good? These two issues connect the crisis in 
morality with crisis is epistemology, as its lack of episteme that creates the moral 
crisis.  
From the perspective of institutional intervention, this suggests that institute of hisbah 
requires another theoretical framework, which could analyse the existence of 
goodness in the conditional good and look at the conditions necessary for the 
existence of goodness in the conditional good.   
4.6.2 Scriptural Morality 
The original uninterrupted ethos of primary sources, which make the first stratum of 
Islamic ethics, are “naturally a very vague and elusive concept” (Fakhry, 1991:10) 
that is grounded in problems of: right and wrong, divine justice and human 
responsibility, and free will and determinism.  
Qur’anic discourse on ethics refers to some general principles such as: duty to God, 
moderation, forgiveness, retaliation, limited liability, oaths and rewards, while 
encouraging virtues such as humility, honesty, charity, kindness and trustworthiness, 
and condemning vices like boasting, blasphemy and slander, paired with regulation on 
matters such as property of orphans, nursing and weaning, divorce, inheritance, 
privacy, debt and accounts, spouses and relatives, and duties like subscribing good 
and prohibiting evil (Donaldson, 1953:14-17). However, the Medinan revelations are 
more focused on legal issues, whilst the Qur’anic verses revealed in Mecca has more 
faith and moral related connotation, as they are grounded in three religious 
convictions such as duty of humans, God’s love and creations, judgement and 
retribution in the hereafter (Donaldson, 1953:21-29). 
The Qur’an uses variety of terms to connote the notion of moral goodness, such as 
goodness (khair), equity (qist), justice (adl), known good (maruf), righteousness 
(birr), right (haq) and piety (taqwa) (Fakhry, 1991:12). Fakhry (1991:13) 
linguistically examines these terms and cross references them with their application in 
the context within the Qur’anic text, and suggests that the word ‘goodness’ “links 
doing good to per-forming the ritual acts”; the ‘known good’ is pre-Islamic word 
denotes moral approval and it signifies the morally approved actions; the term 
‘righteousness’ “often occurs in somewhat abstract contexts…[it] may be described as 
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eschatological” Fakhry (1991:13), where a good work is correlated to its just reward 
in the hereafter. Qur’an, hence, in its entirety has an ‘explicit textual basis’ for two 
types of paradigm for morality: one is that in which the sanction of good is 
consequential as it is based on the punishment and rewards as promised in the Qur’an, 
which is instigated by jurists, theologians and Mutazilah tradition of Islamic thought, 
while the other paradigm for morality was developed in the 8th and 9th century Sufi 
school and it adds the ‘love’ and ‘pleasure of God’, and pursuit of piety in the 
sanction of good (Fakhry, 1991:11-14). 
The word goodness or khair is announced in the Qur’an, with a call of doing good, 
which refers to the ritual acts, and its does not carry much relevance for the human 
activities outside of prayers and worship. The known good or maruf, which also has 
antithesis, that is reprehensible (munkar), along with a divinely subscribed duty of 
establishing the known good and forbidding the reprehensible, lacks the specifics on 
what may classify as known good or reprehensible. Al-Isbahani (taken from Cook, 
2000:25-26) suggests that it is any good that can be known by revelation or by reason, 
while Zajjaj restricts this definition and suggests that it is the good known by 
revelation alone, whilst Tabri assimilates the good with social knowledge and 
customs (urf). The exegesis, therefore do not go in much detail of what good and evil 
are, but they hint towards the possible directions for developing an ethical theory. 
Prima facie (the apparent nature) inspection of the Qur’anic text and exegesis 
suggests that goodness ought to be defined in the social context, similar to social 
constructivist approach towards the episteme of good and bad. Social constructivist 
approach is different to relativism and objectivism, as it suggests that: “there are 
pockets of objectivities, and each pocket is demarcated by the group that acts 
according to what is believed to be true” (Cottone, 2001:41). 
This approach takes the ethical debate away from psychology and theology, as it 
suggests that every community has their bracketed of absolute truth and the 
understanding of good and evil is part of the knowledge within the brackets. The 
community observes their bracket of absolute truth as objective, whilst outside 
communities view it as relative. The prima facie of Qur’an, traditions and exegesis 
provides a concept for this kind of moral understanding, where the bracket of absolute 
knowledge within the Muslim community is the episteme for morality. The usage of 
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Jewish law by Prophet Muhammad to judge between the Jewish people also supports 
this view, as the Prophet Muhammad used the Jewish bracket of absolute knowledge 
to judge between. The jurists and juriconsults, however, did not purely base the 
Muslim community’s bracket of absolute knowledge as source of morality, instead 
they categorised it as lower source of law. This is because, the theory of Islamic law 
takes the assumption that whatever rule is validated as a law by the theory, that law 
becomes a known good and by becoming the known good, the duty of obeying and 
subscribing it falls on every Muslim (Hallaq, 1997). It could be argued that ontology 
of Islamic law is fundamentally flawed as it uses its own inventions and assumptions 
to support its existence and its authority.  
Donaldson’s (1953:40) work suggests that this divine authority of Qur’an, within the 
moral roam, “imposed lasting restriction on the moral development” as the divinely 
inspired doctrines are intrinsically rigid. While the restrictions on the moral 
developments can be witnessed historically, however, the main cause of these 
restrictions is not just rigidity of the text, as the explicit Qur’anic text is abstract 
enough for justifying the development of objectively grounded moral obligations. 
Instead the cause is a combination of changing conditions in Islamic religious market, 
the course of evolution of Islamic law and thoughts, along with historical dynamics 
between civil polity and ecclesiastical polity.  
The Qur’anic text imposed restriction on the moral development, not just by the 
rigidly in its nature of being, but also through its subject matter. Other than previously 
discussed two schemas of morality in subject matter of Qur’an, there are also 
passages, which show that the right course of action is not always morally good and 
ethically correct. This adds further dynamics to the moral dilemmas and due to these 
complexities, there are multiple and contradicting moral theories in Islamic thoughts.  
For example: the additional burden of sustaining Meccan immigrants disturbed the 
equilibrium of Medina’s economy, and after the six failed efforts to capture Meccan 
caravans in an effort to enforce an economic blockade on them and deteriorating 
living conditions of Muslims in Mecca, created an extreme and intense social 
situation; consequently, in the holy month for peace (Rajab), the Prophet sent forth 
seven men towards Nakhlah with sealed instruction, which were to be opened on the 
day after the departure and the instructions were to raid a Meccan caravan without 
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compelling those members of the group of seven, who may object to the violation of 
the terms of the holy month of peace (Donaldson, 1953:30-31). Five out of seven 
consented and successfully raided the caravan, which was poorly guarded due to the 
prevailing custom of cessation of hostilities during the holy month; on their return to 
Medina, further objections were raised on violation of this norm, which resulted in the 
revelation of Qur’anic verses of 2:21730 and 22:39-4031 (Donaldson, 1953:30-31). 
Strict adherence to holy month of peace is a pre-Islamic custom, which was endorsed 
by Islamic scriptures; therefore, we can classify it as the known goodness. However, 
as the revealed verses mentioned above suggests that known goodness is not 
unconditionally good, as it was overridden or abrogated due to socio economic 
situations. Another way of rationalising this is by connecting it to pre-Islamic notion 
of vendetta (th’ar), in which case it could be suggested that in spirit of vendetta 
(th’ar), a known good maybe violated and it still will be classified as the right thing to 
do. Moreover, the verse in question ends with classifying social upheaval and chaos 
as a higher evil than taking a life. From categorical moral sense, this is similar to what 
Kierkegaard describes as “teleological suspension of the ethical” (Kierkegaard et al., 
2008:39). The justification for this ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ maybe 
connected to the Qur’an (18:01-82), which give a narrative of Khizar32, who follows 
the divine will, and in doing so, gets cautioned by Moses on the killing of innocent 
and destruction of private property. While Moses’s objections are based on the known 
goodness and evil, social responsibility and personal commitment to morality, 
however Khizar, who obeys God’s will in his actions, responds (Qur’an, 18:68) to 
Moses’s objections by pointing to the epistemological crisis in Moses’s understanding 
of morality (Hallaq, 1997).  
                                                      
30 “They ask you about the sacred month - about fighting therein. Say, "Fighting therein is great [sin], 
but averting [people] from the way of Allah and disbelief in Him and [preventing access to] al-Masjid 
al-Haram and the expulsion of its people therefrom are greater [evil] in the sight of Allah . And fitnah 
is greater than killing” (Qur’an, 2:217). 
31 “Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. 
And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory. There is sufficient explicit textual basis to 
support the social thesis, where “[They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without 
right - only because they say, ‘Our Lord is Allah’ And were it not that Allah checks the people, some 
by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and 
mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned. And Allah will surely support those who 
support Him. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in Might” (Qur’an, 22:39-40). 
32 The status of Khizar is unclear, as to whether he was a saint or a prophet.  
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The above Qur’anic narratives imply that there is not much ontological authority for 
the known goodness and evil, social responsibility and personal commitment to 
morality, as the final good defies the authority of them all. Fakhry (1991:22) 
examination of the Qur’anic moral motif for the final good suggests that the final 
good is the stipulation that humans ought to be in an appropriate relation to divine and 
through this relationship they will be able to satisfy the conditions required for 
righteousness and piety. The issue with such a notion of final good is that when it is 
contextualised with rest of discourse, it implies, due to lack of authority of known 
good, that any and all known moral codes can be and should be broken, in order to 
establish such a condition, when humans are in an appropriate relation to divine. The 
quixotic nature of what may be categorised as an appropriate relations and the 
ambiguity of what are the conditions that may produce this appropriate relation, make 
this notion imprudent, where any immoral acts becomes right, for the achievement of 
the final good of being in the ideal relationship with God. Moreover, by categorising 
killing as a lesser of an evil than social upheaval and chaos, signifies that protecting 
the status quo is far more important than establishing justice. There is also a sense of 
antinomianism in the text, with a view on epistemology similar to epistemic 
conservatism33, as the Qur’anic morality focuses on the inwards (within in the person) 
process and the pursuit of an inward goal may justify the outward actions performed 
for it. In other words, the stipulation to attain piety and righteousness is an inward 
process and the overall concept of goodness in Qur’an is purely a matter of faith.  
This theme continues in the oral traditions of the Prophet. Similar to Qur’an there is 
no clear definition of good or evil in the traditions; however, there are sufficient 
textual basis to infer that the goodness is identified in relation with: “conformity to 
the dictates of Islam… [,] to the will of the (orthodox) community and its head, and in 
dissociation from any schismatic or heretical groups” (Fakhry, 1991:24). 
In other words, the locus of scriptural morality is the inward belief and intentions, 
whilst the outward actions are viewed as something of lesser importance, and the 
natural morality concerning them can be ignored under circumstances. There is also 
insufficient textual ontological authority for outwards morality and inadequate 
                                                      
33 Epistemic conservatism suggests that a person's believing some premises or claim is a reason in 
support of that claim or premises.  
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episteme for construction of an ethical theory for outward actions in un-interpreted 
ethos of scriptures (Fakhry, 1991:24). 
Theologically the consequence of inward beliefs is deferred to hereafter in contrast to 
the consequences of outward actions. Islamic law attempts to ignore the inward focus 
of morality and tries to morally regulate the outward actions. This paradox of 
regulating the outward actions using the inward focusing scriptural morality creates 
an incongruous setting, which forms the part of crisis in morality. Thus, Islamic 
scholarship, particularly commentators, traditionalists and jurists have developed 
ethical theories by interpreting the primary sources to settle the incongruous moral 
settings in scriptural morality. This is specifically problematic for the institutional 
interventions justified on the grounds of morality, as intrinsic morality of scriptures is 
judgement on the subjectivity, which cannot be theorised into a model. This takes us 
back to the initial problem of lack of normative direction.   
4.6.3 Theological Ethics 
Theological theories of ethics are grounded in the primary sources, namely Qur’an 
and traditions, or hadith and Sunnah, and they attempt to bridge the gap between the 
need to regulate the outward actions and the focus of primary sources on inward 
believes. There are two major approaches within this category, that is: the rationalist 
approach by Mutazilites and Qadri, and the voluntarist approach by Asharites based 
on theistic subjectivism (Fakhry, 1991:11-14).  
The Mutazilites were the first to extensively discuss the dichotomy of good and evil. 
They argued for a correlation, between good and praiseworthy, and between bad or 
evil and blameworthy, whilst rejecting the ontological perspective of Neo Platonist’s 
such as Al Farabi and Avicenna, which states that “a thing is good simply because it 
is” (Fakhry, 1991:32). The Mutazilite methodology is built on the understanding of 
good on the foundations of intuitive ethical knowledge, which is: “autonomous and 
self-validating… [and] requires neither ‘acquired’ nor ‘deductive’, evidence to 
support it, not even the warrant of divine revelation” (Fakhry, 1991:33). 
The Mutazilites, unlike the naturalist Islamic philosophers, made room for the 
revelation within the ethical domain by suggesting that it demonstrates the ethical 
principles already established by reason. They further created a framework for 
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practical use of the intuitive ethical knowledge of individuals by detaching the four 
terms in commanding good and forbidding evil, then independently defining them as:  
… commanding’ (amr) is telling someone below one in rank (rutba) to do 
something, while forbidding (nahy) is telling them not to; ‘right’ (ma’ruf) is any 
action of which the agent knows or infers the goodness (husn), and ‘wrong’ 
(munkar) any action of which he knows or infers the badness (qubh) (Cook, 
2000:205). 
The Mutazilites’ methodology is very close to the scriptural morality, as they used 
inwards moral function, of intuitive ethical knowledge as an episteme of moral 
theory, to regulate the outward actions. This theory also uses the social and political 
status quo to create legitimacy for commanding good and forbidding evil within the 
social and political hierarchy. However, it fails to create a well defined and clear 
structure for normative ethics. Moreover, such form of ethical theory would create 
autocracy where the political and religious powers will be concentrated in the hands 
of a few and their decisions could not be subject to any legal or moral restraints, as 
any decision they make would have ontological goodness based on their intuitive 
ethical knowledge, with the legitimacy of their intuitive ethical knowledge 
epistemologically grounded on their social or political status, hence legitimising 
anything or everything they may do. If the moral presuppositions in Mutazilites’ 
theory of ethics are accepted, then any attempt to criticise them creates a pattern of 
circular reasoning, for example actions of a tyrant ruler are right because they are the 
rulers.  The intuitive ethical knowledge can be accepted at an individual level, 
however there are fallacies, which become prominent when this theory is approached 
from the fence of political economy. 
Contrary to Mutazilites’ deontological theory that argued for an intrinsic obligation of 
abiding the good that has been identified by reason, the Asharites attempted to 
produce antithesis in which they debated that there is an obligation in goodness only 
when there is a divine command to do so. They inferred this from the moral 
presupposition that good is what god wills and evil is what he prohibits (Fakhry, 
1991:46). In other words, the known good and known evil is only that which we know 
through revelation, therefore the obligation to act upon is grounded in revelation.  
The Asharites perspective had far reaching effects in the Islamic thought and they act 
as a prototype in the post Asharites development of Islamic law. The presupposition 
in Asharites’ ethical theory poses the question of, ‘why should Muslims follow those 
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rulings of Islamic law that are not explicitly mentioned in scriptures?’, especially 
when they cannot be accepted using the pedigree thesis, as there is no current political 
sovereignty, which may assign validity to these rulings and laws. Even in a 
hypothetical case of an existing sovereign political power and an assumption on 
acceptance of pedigree thesis, the question arises of what validates the power of 
sovereign. In the roam of ethics, this theory gives way to crisis in ontology of 
episteme for morality, because if the obligation is limited to scriptures, then on 
majority of matters, which are not addressed in the scriptures, there is a problem of 
legitimacy of any existing source from which morality can be drawn. If they are to be 
drawn from the scriptures on the assumption that there are transferable transcendental 
values, then one may argue that why does the transcendentally assigned obligation is 
not transferred along with the scripture’s transcendental values? It may be advocated 
that the reason the transcendentally assigned obligation does not transfer along with 
transcendental values is because there is no direct divine assurance or positive 
declaration from God or the Prophet that the conclusion inferred from scriptures is 
good, right or correct. The lack of divine assurance, eschatology indemnity and 
certainty implies that there is an intrinsic doubt in the existence of goodness in the any 
conclusion, rule or ethical statement inferred from scriptures. This doubt, which is 
grounded in lack of divine assurance, eschatology indemnity and certainty, forms the 
fundamentals of crisis in morality. The crisis in morality is an offshoot of the overall 
crisis in epistemology, which is the root cause for creating inconsistencies in the 
institutional implementation of the morality by the institute of hisbah.   
The acceptance of assumption on ontology of transferable transcendental values and 
transferable transcendentally assigned obligation forms another enigma. Under this 
assumption the values and obligations are transferred when a conclusion is inferred 
from scriptures. The socio economic reality we live in and the course of human 
development or even the socio economic development of Muslim community is not 
inferred from the socio economic reality of the Prophet’s era. The socio economic 
reality and the development in it, is a reactive reaction to socio economic needs, and if 
we attempt to morally regulate a reality developed as a result of socio economic 
needs, using the regulations inferred from the directives in scriptures focused on the 
Prophet’s era, than the result is that there is a gap between the socio economic reality 
and the inferred moral regulations. In other words, the episteme of moral regulations 
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is the ‘good’ transcendentally subscribed for a society almost fourteen hundred years 
ago; in order to relate this good with present socio economic settings requires further 
epistemological sources and theological engineering. These required epistemological 
sources or lack of them goes back to the epistemological crisis. Even in case these 
sources are identified using theory of Islamic law, correlating and connecting the 
‘good of the past’ with ‘what is ought to be good in the present?’, becomes a matter of 
perspective. The multiple perspectives lead to a crisis in legitimacy, where there is a 
lack of framework to classify the existing multiple perspectives into valid and invalid 
(Heck, 2002).  
The only valid form of acceptance for the underlining assumption on ontology of 
transferable transcendental values and transferable transcendentally assigned 
obligation is through the ‘faith by virtue of the absurd’, which implies that the prior 
stated assumptions can be replaced by any similar analogous assumption, as long as 
they are accepted based on the ‘faith by virtue of the absurd’. An alternative 
assumption could be that, the Prophet embedded the transcendental moral values into 
society and they continue to exist in the bracket of absolute truth of Muslim 
community; Muslim communities’ bracket of absolute truth is the only available 
source, where the transcendental values exist, they exist because they can be 
represented, as all the evolution in socio economic conditions of human beings have, 
over the time, abrogated all the sources of Islamic law, within the socio political 
domain, especially the primary sources. This assumption, similar to the one taken by 
theologians, is to be accepted by faith in the virtue of absurd, and the epistemological 
crisis, which exists with or without this assumption, requires new epistemic sources 
so that it may be resolved, but this assumption paves a way for new epistemic sources. 
Switch in the paradigm of assumptions is not heretical is the larger sense, and neither 
it should be dismissed as an historical fallacy, because the most claims of Islamic law 
and Islamic thoughts are “the best account which anyone has been able to give so far” 
(MacIntyre, 1977:455); with the socio economic progress, and with the progress in 
human knowledge, the narrative of ‘the best account’, along with the belief on what 
categories as ‘the best account’ vicissitudes and changes. The claims of Islamic law 
and moral presuppositions may be vindicated as the best of what has emerged from 
Islamic tradition, however as they fail to correspond with reality whilst maintaining to 
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produce claims that are highest moral guidelines, for all of human kind, as there is an 
epistemological crisis in current schema. As MacIntyre (1977:445) elaborates that 
resolving such a crisis demands questioning the prevailing “criteria of truth, 
intelligibility and rationality” and constructing from ground up a fresh and different 
narrative, which could reformulate the criteria of truth and result in new 
understanding. The rhetoric on logical invulnerability to scepticism of Islamic 
tradition and claims that emerge from those traditions does not apply in the socio-
economic domains, as it does not categorically fall in the same class as the 
unfalsifiable religious truth of dogmatic theology; such as the hisbah manuals and the 
market regulations justified based on theology. This in context of of judgement of 
activities is based on morality through institutional intervention, which means that 
there ought to be different narrative of morality that could provide that moral 
judgements. That is, a new epistemic source upon which the institutional intervention 
can be based and justified. In context of institution of hisbah and governance of 
society and market, this suggests that Islamic law should no longer be used as an 
ethical theory and instead an ethical theory based on a new epistemic source needs to 
replace it. 
4.6.4 Philosophical Ethics 
Islamic philosophers were the first to disregard the assumption in theologian’s ethics, 
and instead they grounded their theories in Stoic, Platonic or Aristotelian philosophy. 
Fakhry (1991:67) examines that Islamic philosophers used scriptures only for 
“literary embellishment or dialectical reinforcement”, as they abjured the use of 
scriptures as an epistemological source. The philosophical endeavour in Islam is an 
autonomous enquiry; however, Islamic religious doctrine still plays an integral part in 
its development, as the philosophers attempted to create an inner coherence between 
the revealed knowledge and philosophical investigations, which becomes more 
prominent in the political dimensions of Islamic philosophy. Due to the religious 
influence, Islamic philosophy presupposes the singularity of truth and therefore it 
sometimes goes to great lengths in order to justify the prevalence of religion, while 
maintaining the superiority of philosophical method of enquiry, which consequently 
produced a body of ideas variant with the orthodox set of beliefs (Esmail, and Nanji, 
2010:71). 
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The development of philosophical traditions was a major step in creating the body of 
ideas, which are not based on legalism. The political and legal practice strayed from 
nomism in very early stages of Islam; while the theory continued to view the legal 
decisions as strong moral conclusions. However, as Donaldson’s (1953:269) analysis 
on Islamic nomism and Islamic ethics of legalism suggests that it “is opposed to those 
conceptions of morality which postulate an end to be pursued or an ideal to be 
realized”. Whilst, not all, but few of the ethical theories constructed by philosophers 
attempt to construct new epistemological sources, while some even focus on the 
normative ethics, and in doing so they systematically depart from the Islamic nomism 
and Islamic ethics of legalism. Therefore, in order to find an alternative to the Islamic 
legal theory, at this stage, this research explores the epistemological and ethical 
thoughts of Islamic philosophers.  
Al Kindi (Butterworth, 2005) advocates the search for a new epistemological source, 
as he argues that Aristotle’s work on metaphysics has insufficient guidance on 
normative issues and suggests a need for a new source of moral guidance which is 
neither grounded in “metaphysical knowledge nor divine inspiration” (Butterworth, 
2005:268). Al Kindi’s own work is less focused on the definition or construction of 
ends, as his focus is more towards the methods of making the way to undefined ends 
comfortable, although he does construct a presupposition “As long as we know of no 
purpose for human existence, virtue – above all, moral virtue – must be our goal” 
(Butterworth, 2005:271). Al Kindi’s work is grounded in the concept of moderation, 
anti-hedonism, Stoic moral fortitude and apatheia34 as he examines the notion of 
sorrow, its causes and remedies, whilst keeping the focus on individuals and not on 
society as a whole; the underline theme of al Kindi’s work continues on in the work 
of al-Razi, Miskawayh and Avicenna (Fakhry, 1991:68).  
Al-Farabi’s work follows a slightly different theme, as it coalesces the logical rigour 
and empiricism in the work of Aristotle with the Plotinus and Neoplatonic mystical 
intuition (Critchley, 2009:86). It introduces the notion of ultimate happiness, in the 
debate, as an end to human action, whilst theorising a concept of utopian society with 
a philosopher king as a ruler; al-Farabi associates the morality with political theory 
and loosely builds a case for application of theory of value in the normative ethics to 
                                                      
34 State of mind undisturbed by passion and sufferings.  
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the political economic settings (Butterworth, 2005:279-280). Al-Farabi continues with 
the theme of singularity asserts that knowledge emanates from the God and is 
transmitted to humans, where some knowledge is inherently possessed by all human, 
while specialised knowledge, like philosophy, needs to acquired; with this assertion 
al-Farabi orchestrates the “subordination of prophecy to philosophy” (Therese-Anne, 
2003:104-110), which is contrary to al-Ghazzali (in his post philosophical years) who 
argues for even the basic laws of physics and principles of astrophysics to be 
grounded in the scriptures (Therese-Anne, 2003:110).  
In terms of causation, Al Farabi accommodates the Islamic thoughts in the Greek 
philosophy, while Avicenna accommodates the Greek philosophy in the Islamic 
thoughts. Al Farabi whilst justifying the subordination of prophecy to philosophy 
proposes that “Prophecy is simply an overflow of intelligibles on the imagination” 
(Therese-Anne, 2003:104), and Avicenna suggests superiority of prophecy to 
philosophy by explaining that the prophetic intelligibles do not require logic as a 
connection, as they directly “overflow into the imagination, which translates them 
into symbols, parables, and so forth” (Therese-Anne, 2003:111). Al Farabi 
philosophise the Islamic thoughts and Avicenna Islamise the philosophical thoughts, 
however, in spite this difference in their schematics, together they create a world view 
in which:  
a distinctive emanation scheme is superimposed on the Aristotelian universe, and 
wherein the last of the incorporeal intelligences, the transcendent active intellect, 
performs functions in respect to both the sublunar physical world and the human 
intellect—is embraced by a fair number of Moslem thinkers. (Davidson, 1992:128) 
After al-Ghazzali’s attack on philosophy, Averroes attempted to reconstruct the 
argument that philosophical endeavour provides religious and political wellbeing 
(Butterworth, 2005:282). Averroes uses Qur’anic discourse as an epistemological 
source to argue for an epistemological source for morality outside of scriptures, so it 
could be suggested that by building his argument in such a fashion, he adheres to the 
assumption of transferable transcendental values (Davidson,1992). In his work, he 
argues for an objective view on morality, as advocated by the majority of Greek 
philosophy, and he loosely assembled a theory of value, which considers the existence 
of ‘good’ with intrinsic value of goodness and a meaning of good which is 
independent of scriptures, along with an assertion that such a meaning should be 
preferred even when it contradicts scriptures (Hourani,1985:250-251).  
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Averroes, while wrestling with an ages old debate of ‘how and why does a perfect 
God create evil?’ and ‘what is God’s responsibility?’, further postulates two major 
points, that is: the outcome of theistic subjectivity imply absurdity, as it transforms 
the basic tenets of Islam into intrinsically empty and valueless conventions, because 
under ‘theistic subjectivity’ they are only ‘good’, because God says they are good and 
they do not have any intrinsic value in them; thereafter he asserts the presence of 
objective values in good and in truth (Hourani,1985:253). 
The theistic subjectivism stands only on the notion of authority of scriptures and it 
was largely a construct of Shafi, which was further developed by Asharites and 
rigorously asserted by al-Ghazzali in the pre-Averroes era. However, in spite of 
Averroes’ efforts to put forward a case against the theistic subjectivity, it became a 
dominant view in Islamic jurisprudence. The acceptance of theistic subjectivism as a 
convention introduced rigidity in the episteme of morality and of law, resulting in 
epistemological crisis, and this is also the point in history, where the accretion in the 
understanding of morality reached the tipping point and transformed into a crisis in 
morality.  
This does not imply that Averroes’ theory of value or his notion of existence of 
objective truth may have prevented the crises in epistemology or in morality, as in 
modern philosophy the concept of objective truth is largely contested due to lack of 
reference point in notion of objective truth. The discourse focusing on philosophical 
issues in Islamic thoughts is rich and diverse, and the above discussed scholarship is 
not the only personalities, which argued against the orthodox view and theistic 
subjectivism. For instance, Ibn Hazm examined paradox of religious obligation and 
moral responsibilities in Islamic thoughts, while also critiquing the paradigm in which 
Islamic law uses analogy and deduction; and al-Tusi further developed Miskawayh’s 
work to assert the parallelism between the political economy and ethics (Fakhry, 
1991:143,168).  
The root of the mentioned crises, however, are not in un-acceptance of a certain 
perspective or discontinuation of certain schism, but they are grounded in the 
establishment of an orthodoxy, which rejected any ontological authority to 
epistemological sources, which are outside the rigid list of sources that it classified as 
primary sources. The narrative discussed above also does not imply that the 
   186 
philosophical thoughts ceased with Averroes, instead the philosophical endeavour in 
Islamic thoughts continued into the 20th century; in post Averroes era, Abu al-Barakat 
worked on expanding Avicenna’s discourse on active intellect; Suhrawardi 
constructed science of illumination; Mulla Sadra’s work coalesces the Suhrawardi’s 
science of illumination and Avicenna’s concept of intellect with Sufi and Shiite 
thoughts (Davidson, 1992:179), as Mulla Sadra constructs the existentialist argument 
within Islamic thought, without debilitating history of Islamic thought, by 
constructing the principle of “existence proceeds the essence” (Razavi, 1997:130). 
Despite such attempts, in overall the Sunni orthodoxy continues to be defined in 
context of theistic subjectivism.  
The reliance on theistic subjectivism creates issues, when a state official exerts his 
views to morally judge the market or the society, and justifies the legitimacy of their 
views based on this logic. The theistic subjectivism is also problematic because the 
view point of God can be theologically argued to be uncomprehend-able, while in 
practical terms it is unknowable because of the termination of lines of communication 
between humans and the God. The theistic subjectivism on its own is unable to 
provide any explicit answers, especially for the large number of modern issues that 
are alien to history of medieval times, so the during the process of constructing an 
answer, the theistic subjectivism changes to juristic subjectivism.  
The juristic subjectivism justified on the grounds of theistic subjectivism embedded in 
the theories of hisbah discussed in the previous chapter, which consequently create 
institutional failures, as highlighted in the Chapter 2. 
4.6.5 Religious Ethics 
Some juriconsults, jurists and theologians attempted to address the problems within 
theistic subjectivism by breaking away from dialectic, hermeneutic and 
methodological approach, and concentrating on spirit of Islam through construction of 
an Islamic worldview. Al Hasan al Basri is one of the famous scholar within this 
category, who attempted to compile a list of virtues that portray goodness in one’s 
character and they are to be achieved by a continuous process of reflection, self-
assessment and absolute submission to God; his teachings not only influenced the 
Qadari sect and development of Mutazilites’ creed, and are also regularly quoted by 
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Sufis (Fakhry, 1991:151-153). Al-Ghazzali also generated a notion of Islamic 
worldview, by assembling the category of things, which ought to be protected, which 
he called the purpose of Islamic law. Al-Ghazzali’s work has political economic 
connotation, while the al Basri is focused on the individual’s pursuit to salvation.  
While Al Juwayni first introduced the concept of purpose of Islamic law in the 11th 
century, later al-Ghazali formulated five objectives as the purpose of Islamic law. In 
line with such developments, al-Qarafi then added another objective, while al-Salam 
extended the scope of the purpose of Islamic law. In addition, ibn Taymiyyah asserted 
on an open-ended list of objectives and Al-Shatibi initiated an inductive approach to 
Qur’an for documentation of this open ended list of objectives (Rane, 2010:94). The 
more contemporary jurists from this category solely focus on the doctrine of purpose 
of Islamic law, considering it to be a lens that allows a birds eye view on all of human 
affairs (Auda, 2008:192-244). 
Overall, the notion of purpose of Islamic law is not only accepted in the orthodox 
theory of Islamic law, through recognition of its ontological authority, but it is also 
presented as something that parallels to a theory of value. However, the close 
examination of its historical evolution and the investigation on the method of its 
contemporary usage suggests that resoluteness of this doctrine is to systemise, 
rationalise and legitimise the ‘juristic subjectivism’, along with permitting a 
dimension of consequential moral reasoning within the framework designed on 
concept of categorical reasoning, within the Islamic law (Hallaq, 2004).  
The inductive reading of scriptures for identifying the purpose of Islamic law is 
problematic, because there is no method for testing the findings, other than using an 
endorsement by other scholars as criteria of qualification. The test-less inductive 
reasoning makes the end product or identified purposes of Islamic law, a product of 
jurist’s subjective understanding, built on personal experiences and influenced by the 
confirmation bias. The acceptance of this process, also means that any socio 
economic or politico religious motive can be justified as an objective of Islamic law, 
by simply grounding it in scriptures; such process would also not only legitimise 
positions of Islamic fundamentalism but also would hint towards the normative of 
Islamic law. The criterion based on endorsement by other scholars is also a 
challenging notion, because of crisis in legitimacy.  
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A more recent effort to address the crisis in epistemology and in morality is by 
Islamic scholarship, such as Ahmad (1980), Ariff (1989), Chapra (1992), Naqvi 
(1981, 1994), Siddiqi (1981), and others, resulted in formulation of an axiomatic 
approach in constructing Islamic economics. Within this approach, a premise is 
devised by inductive reading of scriptures, and thereafter it is treated as a ‘self evident 
truth’, so it may be used as an episteme for constructing a reasonable argument to 
justify variable positions. For instance, Malik (2011:197-198) similar to most 
scholarship working within this genre, starts from oneness of God (tawhid), and the 
oneness of his message to infer that all human beings are one nation, and concludes 
with formulating the axiom of equality constructed on the notion of oneness of God. 
However, it could be argued that God distinguishes between humans based on their 
piety, and then advises humans to only follow the examples of the examples pious or 
face the consequence in the hereafter, based on this an equality axiom may be 
formulated, which implies that there is no equality in human beings, neither in this 
world nor in hereafter, or another axiom could be formed similar to line of reasoning 
of Shiite doctrine of pure blood that implies that humans are not even equal at birth.  
The question is not that human beings are equal or not, and neither is the focus on 
whether Malik’s (2011) argument is valid or not. The point of stating above example 
is to demonstrate that it is possible to accommodate most, if not all, positions by 
formulating a corresponding axiom through selective inductive reading of scriptures; 
once a desired axiom is formulated, a relevant argument to prove one’s subjective 
position can be manufactured.  
Naqvi (1994; 2003) attempts to address this issue in his conceptualisation of Islamic 
economics by constructing a criterion, which may bring coherence to axiom approach. 
However, there is only one of four criterion stated by Naqvi, which attempts to 
directly address this issue, and that is the axiom should be cohesive with Islamic 
ethical views and should not violate the ethics of Islam (Naqvi, 1994:1-40). A 
question may be raised on which Islamic ethics are to act as a criterion, to which, 
Naqvi (2003:100) may assert that ethics of Islam are those that are “universally 
accepted by those who believe in them”. There are no universally accepted ethics in 
Islam, however Naqvi may be hinting towards the ethics in orthodox Islam, which is 
founded on the concept of theistic subjectivity with an under layer of juristic 
   189 
subjectivity. The issue with such method is that the axiomatic approach attempts to 
address the epistemological and moral crisis caused by the theistic subjectivism, by 
using epistemological source same as theistic subjectivism, that is: scriptures. In other 
words, the axiomatic approach attempts to restrict the development of knowledge, by 
drawing parameters grounded in epistemological source similar to the method of 
enquiry, that is the theistic subjectivism, which it attempts to replace. This would 
imply that either axiomatic approach would create another copy of the same 
knowledge produced by the orthodox ethical understanding of Islam and the crisis 
within the orthodoxy will remain as it is, or the second scenario would be that 
axiomatic approach would violate the imposed conditions and create new knowledge 
that may address the crises, but the very structure through which the axioms are 
created, can be used to create anti-axioms to refute it. The axiom on equality is an 
example of this inherent problem, as it violates the historical orthodox understanding 
and hence violates the criterion. The classic jurisprudence or orthodox theory in Islam 
has always taken an antagonistic position to equality of human beings, especially 
within political theories, economic understandings, social structure and religious 
domain. There is suffice discourse to take the positive position on equality, and there 
is also sufficient narrative in scriptures, along with historical references that can allow 
the construction of an antithesis of equality. This inherent flaw exists within the form 
of enquiry that constitutes axioms, because there is no adequate test of truth designed 
for the inductive approach with the axiomatic approach, and the paradigm presented 
within the current framework as a test of truth, is structurally loose enough to allow 
creation of antithesis of most postulates, while some of axioms, by their very nature, 
self-violate the parameters of set by this paradigm.  
Moreover, analogous to most discourse in the genre of religious ethics, the focus in 
the line of enquiry within majority of discussions that debate the axiomatic approach 
is on establishing logical foundations for ethical prepositions and logically justifying 
their existence, rather than constructing a theory of ethics. They remain inflexibly 
grounded in traditions and scriptures, with occasional use of Greek philosophy. 
Moreover, similar to work from early period of Islam, the discourse circles around 
key Qur’anic concepts, by quoting and referring to “Koran and Traditions in support 
of their moral or religious disquisitions” (Fakhry, 1991:151). 
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The four type of ethics discussed so far have distinctive forms of enquiry, but in terms 
of their stand points, they are very close to each other, this is because the 
epistemological sources play an integral part in construction of stand points, and as 
there is uniformity in the epistemological sources used by the four types, with slight 
exception to philosophical ethics, therefore the results are very similar. The 
philosophical ethics does comprise of efforts to establish an epistemological source 
with an ontological authority outside of scriptures. However, they are not fully 
developed frameworks. Avicenna’s work on absence of any innate knowledge in 
human beings at birth (tabula rasa), influenced enlightenment thinkers such as Lock 
and also loosely contributed towards the development of empiricism, and they are 
relevant to the history of psychology and philosophy. However, within the original 
settings, they are inadequate to solve the epistemological or moral crisis of Islam. 
Similarly, religious ethics also attempt to formulate a different standpoint; however, 
their form of enquiry based on the inductive reading of scriptures is problematic.  
The moral crisis is a strand of epistemological crisis, but autonomously it is formed in 
Islamic thought, as there is no fully developed paradigms, which can provide a 
practical, workable definition of good and bad, produce a reasonable theory of value 
that could be used in normative ethics to set normative worldly goals. By accepting 
few assumptions, theistic subjectivism may be argued to be a moral framework, 
whose moral judgments may have a moral value even when they defy the reason. 
However, the theory of Islamic law allows for a qualitative distinction to exist 
between the right action constructed using pure reason, and the right action explicitly 
grounded in the scriptures. The reconciliation of this qualitative distinction requires a 
new episteme that provides a decisive factor. In the current format of Islamic law, the 
juristic subjectivity is used as a decisive factor to create a mixture of the two above 
categorised actions: different jurists have different subjective perspectives and 
therefore create a different mixture of the two categories, and the judgement calls by 
different jurists can be and historically have been contradictory in their nature, which 
transfers the question of ‘what is ethically correct?’ to roams of legitimacy. In other 
words, which jurist’s subjectivity is legitimate to the effect that the assumed 
‘transferable transcendental values’ gets carried forward in their judgement? Some 
scholars have attempted to create a criterion, for identifying the jurists with correct 
subjectivity to jurists with incorrect subjectivity; however, most of the discourse on 
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this topics revolves around character traits and reputation, though this is also not a 
well-developed arena within Islamic thought, as there is no database similar to in 
function to credit history, credit score or credit report that may check the worthiness 
of the jurists. Even with a database like this, a decisive factor would still be required 
to choose between the opinions of highly ranked jurists (Hallaq, 2004). The issue with 
the existence of difference of opinion between jurists is that the Muslim would only 
abide by Islamic legal decisions, so that they are awarded with the expected rewards 
in the hereafter. For a legal decision to have the theological legitimacy that its 
violation will definitely result in penalty in the hereafter, then only can it be 
subscribed as good, and its violation be considered as evil.  
When there are conflicting views on ‘what may constitute as good?’, then there is no 
certainty that consequence of following such law or moral judgement will result in 
reward in the hereafter. If there are two conflicting views between two jurists, then 
there is an equal probability that following anyone of them could result in penalisation 
in the hereafter. Without this certainty, Islamic legal decisions and moral judgements 
lose their legitimacy to demand abidance from Muslims. The improbability in 
knowing which one of numerous juristic subjectivisms would classify for the reward 
in the hereafter, means that the notion of obeying Islamic law for the sake of 
hereafter, is not statistically significant rationale for demanding obedience, especially 
considering the assumptions on which the theory of Islamic law is constructed are 
also human suppositions. If we take hereafter out of the equation, then Islamic law 
loses its monopoly on the reward in the hereafter, along with its moral grounds when 
compared to other legal systems, which implies that Muslims are under no obligation 
to follow the decisions made by jurists in constructing Islamic law. This type of 
metaphysical and spiritual issues, along with practical problems with the structure of 
Islamic jurisprudence produce a crisis in legitimacy.  
This issue became more problematic, when Islamic legal theory is applied as an 
ethical theory. Without legitimacy to morality the tradition looses the grounds for 
institutional intervention, as there is no certainty that what is subscribed will actually 
be good and what will be prohibited will actually be evil.  
4.7 CRISIS IN LEGITIMACY  
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The crisis in epistemology, when creates crisis in morality, also creates ethical 
questions on the use of Islamic legal theory as an ethical theory; however, the crisis in 
legitimacy completely renders all the rules and regulations created by Islamic legal 
theory as obsolete. Therefore, this research explores this crisis in legitimacy in further 
detail, due to the large-scale effect it has on the manner Islamic law when used for the 
governance of the society and the market 
The crisis in legitimacy has two major strands, the first part is an off shout of crisis in 
epistemology and morality, and it is produced essentially when pedigree thesis is 
applied to legitimise juristic subjectivism as an epistemological source and to assign 
moral value to the decisions produced by this process. The second part of crisis in 
legitimacy deals with the premises of rightfulness of subscribing good and forbidding 
evil, that is: who has the legitimacy to advocate good, and the extent to which a good 
needs to be implemented and the scale to which an evil is to be prohibited.  
4.7.1 Either\Or: The Simulation of Consensus  
The first strand of crisis in legitimacy has many layers. The ontological authority of 
juristic subjectivity is justified by the Islamic legal theory by using the assumption 
that supposes the existence of transferable transcendental values, and the extension 
comes is the notion that these transcendental values are transferable, not only through 
inferring a statement from scriptures, but they also transfer into jurist’s consciousness 
as they receive training from traditional Islamic educational institutions. The earlier 
widely quoted Islamic scholarship was not trained in the traditional Islamic 
educational institutional settings, and this part of assumption creates historical 
inconsistencies (Hallaq, 1997).  
When jurist produce conflicting decisions or propositions, then that puts into question 
the premise that Islamic legal theory’s assumption that there exists the transferability 
of transcendental values, and in the absence of any other test to check for the 
transferable transcendental values, the aptness of taking such assumptions is also 
questionable. The conflicting views question the Islamic legal theory’s assumption 
because within the conflicting views, one of them has to be incorrect. If one has to be 
incorrect, then there is also plausibility that both could be incorrect. The incorrectness 
is not based on the consequence of the views, but whether they will result in positive 
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outcome in hereafter, as Islamic law draws its legitimacy from hereafter, and with the 
existence of the plausibility of being incorrect, Islamic law loses its legitimacy. 
Certainty in the existence of goodness within the rulings of Islamic law is essential, 
because Islamic law does not acknowledge the separatist thesis as its theory asserts 
the existence of moral values in its legal judgements.  
Historically, ecclesiastical juristic authorities have presented themselves as a group 
divinely endorsed to have a monopolistic hold on many religious and political 
activities, such as acting as a counsel to rulers or monarch, being the only legitimate 
educational establishment to teach Islamic thought, being suitable for performing 
missionary duties, being able to act as judicature, and most importantly being the 
carriers of all goodness present within entirety of Muslim community when it comes 
to performing ‘consensus’ (Hallaq, 1997). In other words, the Muslim jurists 
restricted the notion of consensus by introducing a qualification of righteousness, and 
being a jurist classifies as being righteousness. The legitimacy is, therefore, based on 
righteousness, similar to the way the Islamic political theory considers righteousness 
as a qualification to be a ruler. By introducing righteousness in the equation, which is 
an immeasurable and unfathomable concept, the juristic monopoly on legitimacy was 
constructed.  
In support of this paradigm, the argument of general ignorance of Muslim community 
was constructed and it was argued that their representative, similar to Muslim 
community, would not be able distinguish between good and evil, however many 
contemporary thinkers have challenged this notion. For example, Rahman (1986:95) 
asserts that the notion of Islamically unenlightened and uninformed community of 
Muslims cannot be philosophically accepted, because it implies that the Muslim 
community does not exist, which is equal to “rendering Islam null and void”. 
Therefore, consensus of community, instead of consensus of scholars ought to be 
entertained by the discourse and practice of Islamic thought. 
The idea of consensus of community, instead of consensus of scholars, is a 
progressive notion, as it acknowledges the existence of the understanding on known 
good and known evil within the aggregate knowledge of the community, but the 
contemporary discourse that supports this notion, does so to create an episteme for 
creating legitimacy and for assigning value to moral and immoral actions, which 
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would work parallel with the ecclesiastical juristic authorities in Islam in such a 
manner that ecclesiastical authorities will continue with their claim over morality and 
legitimacy, and only the roam of exercising their power would be reduced by 
introducing the new variable of ‘knowledge of community’.  
Other than the question of which one of these two, that is: ecclesiastical juristic 
authorities and knowledge of community, carry the ‘transferable transcendental 
values’ especially when they will contradict in their judgements, which is an 
observable issue, for example, in Iranian political system, as it attempts to coalesce 
the two: the major issue with the notion of communal consent is that it shares the 
same episteme as the antithesis of communal consent, and the line of enquiry is also 
very much similar, as both ideas are constructed through inductive examination of 
scriptures. This raises the question of which one of these notions is legitimate and 
why? 
The contemporary discourse favours the later notion of communal consent as a 
criterion for deciding goodness, because this notion is validated by the idea of global 
democratisation as part of modernism. The value judgements of modernism are used 
to validate the notion, without assigning any ontological authority to its values. This 
forms the part of crisis in legitimacy as the arguments and the counter arguments have 
similar line of enquiry and share the same episteme, so both are on the same plane 
when it comes to legitimacy, and the theory does not recognise the existence of the 
external factor, which it implicitly uses as a judicator, that is: value judgements of 
modernism, and such set up creates the legitimacy crunch. 
The orthodox Islamic thoughts does acknowledge the ontological presence of 
communal knowledge on goodness, however they restrict its use in decision making 
by limiting the notion of consensus to consensus of earlier generations or consensus 
of current religious ministers, and through this restriction the theory constructs the 
need for the existence of religious scholars and religious institutions that can produce 
scholars, so these scholars can create legitimacy of edicts through based on consensus 
or through juristic subjectivism.  
The lack of singularity in the institutionalisation of religious scholars and religious 
institutions gave rise to diversity in edicts based on consensus or decrees based on 
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juristic subjectivism, and as the claim on legitimacy of all these multiplicity is 
grounded in same framework, the result is cancelling35 each other’s authenticity. As 
an operational example in Islamic finance, for instance, Farooq (2006) cites the list of 
scholars who have surveyed the Islamic literature on the definition of riba, and they 
claim there’s a consensus on it, and he then lists the scholars who after reviving the 
discourse on riba claim that there has never been a consensus on definition of riba, 
which demonstrate the lack of consensus on whether there was a consensus. Khan 
(2013:216), while acknowledging the issue that the there is “no agreement about 
whose, opinion, of which period, to what extent” should be used in the doctrine of 
consensus, suggests that consensus should be understood through law of numbers, and 
should be taken as “agreement of the majority (of scholars) that is also accepted by 
the people in general”. Khan (2013) adds the notion of acceptability by the people, 
because the science of consensus in Islamic law is going through the crisis of 
legitimacy, and, therefore needs an external validator to validate, which consensus is 
legitimate and which is not (Khan, 2013). The issue with validating the consensus of 
scholars by consensus of general public is that, the concept of consensus of scholars 
was introduced, because of the assumption that general public is ignorant and not well 
informed. So, this forms a pattern similar to circular reasoning, as it tried to use the 
same idea, which it was meant to replace. Moreover, consent of Muslim community 
creates the problem of geographic boundaries, as Muslim population is dispersed in 
different nation states, along with the lack of a system that provides a public space, 
where Muslim community can express opinion and create consensus. Even if these 
questions were answered, then the question would be what makes them legitimate? 
The issue of legitimacy would always be present within consensus, because the 
concept of consensus is being developed from within the model of Islamic law, and is 
being applied as an external validator to validate the output of Islamic law.  
                                                      
35 They cancel each other out because of their claims on carrying a consequence of carrying divine 
rewards and punishment within them, and divine judgment cannot be valid in the hereafter, if the 
divine subscribes contradictory notions of goodness. Moreover, if it is argued that the transferable 
transcendental values are present in both contradictory statements, then questions come to the method 
of deciding which on of the statements carries more value. If it is the human realities (like socio 
economic reality) that decides the superiority of value, then the orthodox assumption of good is what is 
what God says, does not stand, as such notion (the presence of transferable transcendental values in 
contradicting statements) is true then, it may be suggested that God prescribes good, but human 
realities decide assign intrinsic value to ‘prescribed good’, which would mean human realities are 
superior when it comes to making an action good. This however is not theologically plausible, as it 
goes against the goes against the idea of omnipotent God. 
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If the concept of consensus is developed from outside of sources of Islamic law, so 
that it does not share the same episteme and line of enquiry, then it can be used to 
validate the Islamic rulings, because in this setting, it will not share the same problem 
of legitimacy, morality and epistemology as the ones it is trying to validate. The 
discourse on who’s entitled and who is obliged to command good and forbid wrong 
has similar complications on issue of legitimacy. The entitlement to ‘commanding 
good and forbiding wrong’ is also theoretically restricted, and the theory has always 
favoured the political establishment.  
4.7.2 Delphic Veil of Legitimacy   
The historic discourse on who’s entitled to command good and forbid wrong revolves 
around the categorical capacity of state to command good and forbid wrong, and the 
capacity to confront state for the purpose of commanding good and forbidding wrong. 
The orthodox Islamic scholarship, while validates rebuking the state or rulers and 
deplores the rebellious against state for commanding good and forbidding wrong, 
however, when it comes to the question of whether the state has monopoly over use of 
violence for the purpose of commanding good and forbidding wrong, the opinions of 
orthodox scholarship is so much apportioned that “those who espouse the idea and 
those who reject it are alike part of the mainstream.” (Cook, 2000:479). 
The two propositions create a very different type of society, and the synthesis 
between them is very much possible, either by using the judgement values of 
modernism as a validator and choosing the opinion that allows the use of violence 
only by the state, or through manufacturing consensus by simply ignoring the 
historical discourse that claims the conflicting position  (Cook, 2000:480). In both 
cases it would be a fallacy, as in prior case it is a fallacy in ontology, as validity is 
based on something, whose existence is not recognised, while in later case it is fallacy 
on the historical part. In other words, there is no legitimate method within the current 
framework to legitimise the superiority of one proposition over another. 
The essence of crises is in the opposition to the separatist thesis, as Islamic law 
combines the notion of morality with obedience of law. This is because the theory of 
Islamic law is constructed on the assumption of transferable transcendental values, 
which create the crisis in morality and legitimacy, and as there is no epistemological 
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source, with recognised ontological authority, that could validate the legitimacy or 
existence of morality within the current framework of Shari’ah; the unresolved issues, 
along with unsolved problems within the tradition has produced inadequacies by 
creating rival concepts of reality. The continuous development of human knowledge 
outside of Islamic tradition has challenged almost all the rival concepts of reality 
within the tradition. Other than recognised incoherence in historically constructed 
certitudes, the development of new epistemologies that are unrecognised with Islamic 
thoughts, has generated “new problems for the solution of which there seem to be 
insufficient or no resources” (MacIntyre, 1998:362). The major problem that has 
proved intractable within Islamic tradition is the identification of good and wrong, 
followed by the legitimacy of such identification, this is because the form of enquiry 
applied by the current setting of Islamic tradition, either connects good with the 
practices of the past or with the hereafter. Attempts by the traditional-constituted 
enquiry to create coherent relevance between the practices of the prophetic period 
with the problems of today, made the tradition sterile, which further lead the 
traditional form of enquiry to create complicated assumptions, such as transferable 
transcendental values, that created incoherent outputs. The connection of good with 
the hereafter, gave way to the issue of juristic subjectivity, which formed the problem 
of legitimacy and resulted in the supposition on existence of transferable theistic 
subjectivism, which transferred to humans, when they get trained by an Islamic 
educational establishment. While this supposition was constructed to formulate a 
theory of ethics, it, however, resulted in producing incoherence in the classification of 
categorical imperative of good. The tradition went through these conceptual 
engineering, as it attempted to create an understanding of ethical goals and moral 
values, and in doing so, it entered the period of epistemological crisis.  
MacIntyre (1998:362), while examining the tradition-constituted enquiries as they 
enter a state of epistemological crisis, observes that such a crisis can only be resolved 
through the development of new concepts and different theoretical models, because:  
the new theoretical and conceptual structures…[will] escape the limitations of 
those theses which were central to the tradition before and as it entered its period of 
epistemological crisis,[because of this, the new concepts can]…in no way be 
derive-able from those earlier positions.  Imaginative conceptual innovation will 
have to occur. The justification of the new theses will lie precisely in their ability 
to achieve what could not have been achieved prior to that innovation.  
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The new conceptual and theoretical structure would neither be derivable using the 
conventional episteme of the tradition, nor through the customary form of enquiry 
customary to the earlier positions within the history of tradition. However, the 
construction of the new conceptual and theoretical structure, through ‘imaginative 
conceptual innovation’ that essentially is foreign to the history of the tradition, does 
not imply that the fundamental continuity of the shared beliefs historically defined up 
to this point within the bracket of absolute knowledge, will be disrupted. In other 
words, in the history of Islamic tradition, the schemas of reformation carried over the 
epistemological ideals from one paradigm to another, but to address the 
epistemological crisis, the perpetuation of epistemological ideals will require 
interruption. However, the discontinuation of epistemological ideals does not entail 
the disruption of progress in a ‘single intellectual life’ (MacIntyre, 1977:467) of 
Islamic tradition. Any new episteme that could replace the juristic subjectivism and 
resolve the epistemological crisis needs to be constructed without the disruption of 
Islamic tradition as a ‘single intellectual life’. This new episteme could then provide a 
new conceptual and theoretical structure for defining good and evil, within the society 
and the market, and provide the required normative direction. While, the crisis in 
legitimacy caused by crisis in morality, which is grounded in crisis in epistemology, 
require a new episteme for defining good and evil. Until, Islamic tradition can address 
these crises, there are no grounds for institutional intervention for the purpose of 
subscribing good and prohibiting evil in the society or the market.  
This research now explores  the Islamic tradition to define the ‘single intellectual life’ 
of the Islamic tradition, which needs to be kept alive, whilst a philosophical construct 
from outside of the tradition can be introduced as the new epistemic source.    
4.8 GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
The continuation of single intellectual life form of tradition can be suggested, as long 
as there exists an establishable association of the narrative and tradition with the 
theory and method of the new conceptual and theoretical structure. For instance, 
Mulla Sadra’s work without replicating or debilitating the previous forms of enquiry 
in the in Islamic philosophical thoughts, constructed a paradigm shift in the Islamic 
tradition, whilst maintaining the continuation of single intellectual life form of 
tradition (Razavi, 1997:130; Kamal, 2005:106). 
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The essence of single intellectual life form of Islamic tradition can be traced in the 
stereoscopic vision of three themes, that is: pain and pleasure, hierarchy and eternity. 
The hierarchy and eternity are like the “temporal and ontological coordinates… with 
eternity embracing all time and hierarchy vertically grading all beings” (Marenbon 
and Luscombe, 2003:51). ‘Pain and pleasure’, on the other hand, form the episteme 
for injunctions and human purpose, in the Islamic tradition. All three of the concepts 
are “at any rate both presuppositions and problems” (Marenbon and Luscombe, 
2003:51), and much of Islamic thoughts are dedicated to creation of a synthesis of the 
paradoxes within these themes. 
The dichotomy of pain and pleasure is multiplex within the tradition, as unlike 
Christianity and more like Judaism, Islamic tradition encourages its followers to 
pursue pleasure, but it simultaneously nudges them to create equipoise between 
immediate gratification and delayed gratification, with an ascertain that the 
equilibrium has to be created and maintained for greater good.  
The tradition uses the concept of hierarchy as a substructure to objectify the ontology 
of an order in the Universe as a whole and an order in every form of being, be it 
intelligible, material or transcendental, and within this order every being has its 
specific place and a certain function; the principle authority a being possesses 
determines its place and function (Marenbon and Luscombe, 2003:60). 
The theme of eternity was explored within the tradition in two different dimensions: 
the philosophers viewed eternity as timelessness, and discussed the problems like 
freewill and fate, whilst others perceived eternity as perpetuity. The transcendental 
beings are considered to be in timeless state, whilst all the material and intelligible 
beings are yield that forms the part of perpetuity of temporal existence. The existence 
of human beings is temporal within the ‘perpetuity of temporal existence’, while 
infinite as a whole, because human beings move to timeless state after their temporal 
existence within this world.  
One of the perpetual things within the ‘perpetuity of temporal existence’ is the ‘shared 
ethic’ of life forms. The ‘shared ethic’ is perpetuity within ‘perpetuity of temporal 
existence’. While existence of a individual human is temporary within the ‘perpetuity 
of temporal existence’, the existence human species is perpetual. In this perpetual 
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existence, each generation of human beings creates a packet of goodness, which 
accumulated in the ‘perpetuity of shared ethic’. The customs, conventions and social 
consents maybe a reflection of goodness in ‘perpetuity of shared ethic’; however, they 
are neither the measure, nor the gauge for understanding goodness. The goodness in 
‘perpetuity of shared ethic’ can be understood by observing the evolutionary 
trajectory followed by human species, after the state of self-consciousness, that is: if 
we could draw a path from the point where human achieved self-consciousness, to the 
present time, and then considering all the possible paths, we may have chosen in our 
post self-consciousness evolution, the path chosen by us is the path towards goodness, 
and have value of good in it. The ‘perpetuity of shared ethic’ is, therefore, not just 
values shared vertically by all the humans of one particular generation, but it also has 
a horizontal dimension, whereby it includes the values shared by all the human beings 
that ever existed. For instance, Pinker (2011) scientifically examines the human 
history and suggests that there’s a gradual decrease in practice of violence and decline 
in aggressive impulse within human being. This suggests that we are evolving away 
from violent creatures, which within this narrative would infer to the premises that 
violence is bad or evil.  The value of good, in the settings of ‘perpetuity of temporal 
existence’ is similar to existence of matter and energy.  
Matter and energy are also perpetual things within the ‘perpetuity of temporal 
existence’, and their existence within ‘perpetuity of temporal existence’ is forever, 
because, they may alter their form, but they can neither be destroyed, nor created36. 
The value of good, in the settings of ‘perpetuity of temporal existence’, can also not 
be destroyed, although it may alter its form, however it can be created. Evil, on the 
other hand cannot be created but maybe destroyed or allowed to exist in different 
form. Therefore, evil is not the lack of goodness, but instead an inherent ingredient of 
fabric of the universe.  
Budiansky (1999) in The Covenant of the Wild: Why Animals Chose Domestication, 
loosely follows a similar theme, where he examines the human attitudes towards 
animals, in contrast to the treatment of wild animals by nature in the natural worlds, 
and asserts that the domestication of animals is a natural evolutionary process of 
mutualism, which provides a comparatively better well-being for animals in contrast 
                                                      
36 The word creation here, does not touch upon the divine capability of creation. 
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to the living conditions in the wild. The biological interaction between the species that 
is based on predation or parasitism is categorically the result of fabric of nature, 
whilst mutualistic or commensal interactions are innovative techniques, which are 
metaphysically grounded in life’s intrinsic goodness that produces cooperation, and is 
used by living organism to gain advantage, through goodness, in the competitive 
environment created by nature. The grouping of predation or parasitism as grounded 
in evilness of nature, and mutualistic or commensal interactions as grounded in 
intrinsic goodness of life, are not based on their biological origins, instead the 
categorisation is at metaphysical level, to substantiate the origin of good and evil 
(Cook, 2000).  
In the pre-life universe (nature), there was an absence of goodness, and with the start 
of life, the ‘perpetuity of temporal existence’ also started, and each life form, in the 
human evolution, added a value of goodness to the ‘shared ethics’. Therefore, life and 
living things are intrinsically good; however, they maybe forced to do evil because of 
the conditions created by nature, as the evil is the building block of personality of 
nature. To balance this evil, human beings were created, with a capacity to change the 
makeover of the nature and replace the evil with goodness in ‘shared ethic’, and 
because of this capacity they were labelled as a ‘vice-regent’ of God. The divine 
contribution towards human endeavour was made in the form of chain of revealed 
religions, which ended with Islam. Islam is the final transcendental contribution 
towards goodness in ‘shared ethics’, because after this contribution, the accumulated 
goodness in the perpetuity of ‘shared ethics’ is considered to be enough to set human 
beings on a course, where they can materialise their capacity of changing the very 
fabric of the nature, by replacing the evil with goodness of the ‘shared ethic’ (Fakhry, 
1991). 
These are the presupposition for construction of an assumption, which imply that 
fabric of nature is evil and the humans in particular, and life forms in general, during 
their life span, add a small value of goodness within the perpetuity of shared ethics. 
This valued is added through their actions, which are grounded in life, as life is 
intrinsically good. The evils committed by the humans in particular, and life forms in 
general, are a result of circumstances created by the nature, which is intrinsically evil. 
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Accordingly, the extinction of evil is only possible in a scenario, where humans are 
able to control and transform the very fabric of nature.  
The individual human beings maybe judged in the hereafter based on the amount of 
value of goodness they may add in relation to the circumstances produced by nature, 
the aggregate of goodness added, to perpetuity of shared ethics, by every generation is 
always a positive value. The input added by every generation gets accumulated in the 
perpetuity of shared ethics, and therefore it could be the valid criterion for 
categorising the actions as good or evil.  
This narrative implies that Prophet of Islam delivered the final piece of divine 
contribution and it exists as a part of the perpetuity of shared ethics, and all the values 
of goodness are embedded in the aggregate consciousness of all humans (Fakhry, 
1991). This assumption is essential, as it essential to move forwards from the crises, 
whilst keeping alive the single life form of Islamic thoughts.  
The notion of goodness embedded in the aggregate consciousness of all humans is not 
practically absurd. While the consequence of difference between Islamic world and 
Western world is clearly visible one, however, the difference is more on the 
operational side, then on understanding of values, as Cook (2000:591) examines that:  
On the Muslim norms are usually intelligible to us to the extent that they tend to be 
closely related to what we recognise as moral dangers. Mainstream Western culture 
has little use for an outright prohibition of alcohol; but we do not approve of 
drunken drivers or like to see people become alcoholics. Our ideas as to how 
women should be dressed and the degree to which they should be segregated, while 
puritanical by some West African standards, are a long way from traditional 
Islamic mores; yet we worry a great deal about the less desirable consequences of 
the interactions we permit between the sexes.  
The difference between the two worldviews is the consequence of difference between 
the understanding of public matters and private ones, as where Islamic thoughts do 
not distinguish between the duty of forbidding wrong, and concept of rescue, the 
Western thoughts uphold the concept of rescue by citizens, while institutionalising the 
duty of forbidding wrong (Cook, 2000:594). These differences are not the difference 
in concept of value, but between autonomy of humans and implementation of 
objective values, even with issues of banning or discouraging consumption of alcohol, 
or implementing completely segregated society or unisex wards in hospitals, or 
punishing the crime of theft by chopping off the hands or by jail sentence, difference 
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is not in moral value, but the extent to which these values are to be upheld. Therefore, 
the idea of goodness embedded in the aggregate consciousness of all humans is not a 
radical notion in Islamic thought.  
In terms of sources of law and legal validity, our narrative aligns with soft positivism, 
as it subscribes to the ‘social thesis’ and takes the position that “moral principles or 
substantive values” (Hart et al., 2012:250) can be incorporated to make up a criterion 
for legal validity. However, morality and law are distinct disciplines, and while law 
may reflect some moral principles, it is not the pure reflection of morality. This 
narrative also goes against the notion that homosapiens are actually homoeconomicus 
(Khan, 1995) and this narrative is also antithesis of the idea that “Behind every act of 
altruism, heroism, and human decency you’ll find either selfishness or stupidity” 
(Haidt, 2013:107). 
As Hume and Mencius analogically suggested that “morality is like taste in many 
ways” (Haidt, 2013:106), for which numerous receptors are required to capture it’s 
various dimensions. Whilst, we can judge the already performed actions by using the 
already existing values of goodness in perpetuity of shared ethic, but in order for us to 
add further value of goodness in the perpetuity of shared ethics, we need a theory 
value for the normative ethics, that can be used to set goals for humankind and set the 
course for humanity in socio economic and political domains. Such a theory should be 
able to address the responsibility human beings have, due to their position in the 
hierarchal chain of beings, towards other material or intelligible beings in the 
universe. The theory of value for the normative ethics should also be constructed in 
such a way that it creates equipoise between immediate gratification (pleasure) and 
delayed gratification (pain), so that positive wellbeing is reasonable achieved, along 
with normative wellbeing.  
Such a theory of value for the normative ethics can then provide the moral measure by 
providing a new episteme to judge the activities in the society and the market. This 
will essentially address the crisis within the tradition, and such theory could be used 
to replace the Islamic legal theory and juristic subjectivism for subscribing good and 
prohibiting evil, which will legitimise the process of institutional intervention through 
institutions like hisbah.  
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4.8.1 Islam, Objectivism and Moral Foundational Theory: A Scene of Thematic 
Importance 
The normative wellbeing of human beings is of paramount importance in the Islamic 
thought, however the lack of clear moral code in the primary sources, and in the major 
theological discourse could be due to theological reason, as Hume (1817:156) 
observes that: “immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not 
only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself”.  
The Qur’an on the matter of justice tries to address this theme, by suggesting that 
there is no obligation on God to do justice, but he still does it out of divine grace. In 
the absence of immutable measures of right and wrong, the Islamic thoughts produce 
a theme, which is the undercurrent connecting the three notions: pain and pleasure, 
concept of hierarchy and conception of eternity. This theme shows a very close 
conceptual relation with rand’s objectivism and moral foundation theory. 
The theme charted by Islamic tradition, follows similar line of reasoning to rand’s 
objectivism. Both perceive the pursuit of a moral life as a necessity for survival. 
While, Rand argues that the standard of value is human life, and suggests that the 
reason, purpose and self-esteem are three values, which work parallel with virtues of 
rationality, productiveness and pride to act as a mean for realising one’s life 
(Rand,1964:26). Rand builds on the theme of selfishness and further elaborates this 
idea, by asserting that (Rand, 1964: 28):  
The basic social principle of the Objectivist ethics is that just as life is an end 
in itself, so every living human being is an end in himself, not the means to 
the ends or the welfare of others—and, therefore, that man must live for his 
own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to 
himself. To live for his own sake means that the achievement of his own 
happiness is man’s highest moral purpose. 
This theme is similar in much ways to the theme of orthodox Islamic tradition, as 
every human being is seen as an end in himself or herself, because any moral actions 
they perform are not considered sacrificial, and instead they are perceived as an 
investment towards their salvation in this world or the next (Fakhry, 1991). The 
metaphysics of hereafter makes the selfishness a virtue, as long as this selfishness is 
not short sited. This places Islamic theme in very close proximity to basic social 
principle of objectivism.  
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This is not to suggest that objectivism and theme of Islamic tradition are entirely 
similar, because on many important issues, such as epistemology, they are miles 
apart. Objectivism’s coordinal value of reason and purpose coordinated with virtues 
of rationality and productiveness are defined in a metaphysical manner within 
orthodox Islamic tradition (Fakhry, 1991). This Islamic understanding of these virtues 
is antithetic to objectivist ethics; however, these definition and concepts of orthodox 
Islamic tradition are part of crises and therefore would need alteration.  
Another dimension to the theme of Islamic tradition is that it not just upholds the 
selfish behaviour of individuals, but also attempts to balance it, so the society as a 
whole is not damaged by the selfish pursuits. The tradition attempts to create the 
balance between the two using the foundations of care for others, fairness and justice 
in treatment of other fellow Muslims, liberating the oppressed Muslims, keeping loyal 
to the mainstream Islam and subversion to authorities and traditions along with 
practicing sanctity and degradation. This is similar to the discourse of Moral 
Foundation Theory, with an inherent mechanism to produce values that create a 
cooperative group, which gives advantage to the group in competing communities 
(Haidt, 2013). Haidt elaborates on this point by examining the difference in Qur’anic 
approach to apostate and to Jewish tribes, and suggests that: “The love of loyal 
teammates is matched by a corresponding hatred of traitors, who are usually 
considered to be far worse than enemies” (Haidt, 2013:329). 
In modernism and with the birth of nation states, this leitmotif, however, is unable to 
balance the selfish pursuits and social development, because there are no 
distinguishable barriers, which can be used to distinguish Muslim community at 
micro or macro level. The issue of pledging allegiance to country or undetectable 
global Muslim community, or to any other available identity is widely discussed in 
the problem of identity crisis of Muslims living in West or in East. Therefore, there is 
also a need of a fresh leitmotif, which may be used to balance the selfish pursuits and 
social development. 
4.9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter focused on the Islamic legal theories with the objective of deconstructing 
them to understand the underlying factors in its episteme that cause failures and 
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inconsistencies, when the legal theory is treated as an ethical theory. During the 
process of deconstruction, we discovered that the primary sources of law are almost 
impossible to contextualise within the modern life and this resulted in the heavy use 
of juristic subjectivism as an epistemic source within the legal theory. Juristic 
subjectivism is subject to the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection, and 
therefore it is the epistemic source that is causing the major institutional failures, 
when the legal theory is used as an ethical theory. Chapter 2 elaborated on these 
institutional failures, while Chapter 3 demonstrated the juristic subjectivism creating 
alternate morality to scriptures.  
This chapter also discovered the underlying epistemological crisis within the Islamic 
tradition, which led to heavy reliance on the juristic subjectivism as an epistemic 
source. It is argued in this chapter that the use of juristic subjectivism as an epistemic 
source causes a crisis in legitimacy and crisis in morality, which then causes the 
institutional failures, when institution of hisbah intervenes in society and market to 
subscribe good and forbid evil.  
The previous two chapters consolidated on the first part of the research aim, as we 
explored the governance within Islamic thought in the form of the institution of 
hisbah. The institutional practices suggested that the philosophical and theological 
framework behind operations of institution of hisbah is problematic. While the 
enquiry into the theory of hisbah showed that the root cause of the problem is in the 
use of legal theory to judge the moral conduct of activities. In this chapter, we 
explored the episteme of these problems and highlighted the reliance on juristic 
subjectivism as an epistemic source to be the underlying factor; hence, this chapter 
achieves the research aim set for this research. 
As a theoretical frame, MacIntyre (1977) is utilised in this chapter to develop the 
argument presented, and further argue that the epistemological crisis can only be 
solved by creating a new epistemic source for the tradition. That is, the resolution to 
the crisis requires construction of a new epistemological source that is outside of the 
current tradition and it is able to replace juristic subjectivism. A new understanding of 
value has to be constructed which forms a part of this new source. The construction 
and formulation does not mean the discontinuation of single life form of Islamic 
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tradition, and the only criteria for acceptability of this new source is that, that it can 
address all the issues raised in this chapter.  
In responding to the identified deficiencies, an attempt is made in the next chapter to 
construct an epistemic source, that could replace the juristic subjectivism and resolve 
the epistemological crisis within the tradition, which can pave the way to better 
understand the observed tensions in the Islamic finance sphere in reference to ‘form 
versus substance’ debate, namely legality vs. ethicality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5:  
BEYOND CERTITUDES: AXIOLOGY OF OBJECTIVIST 
SUBJECTIVISM FOR DEVELOPING AT ETHICAL REALM 
FOR OPERATIONALISING HISBAH INSTITUION  
  
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, this research deconstructed the Islamic legal theories and 
discovered that the primary sources of law are almost impossible to morally 
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contextualise within the modern life, as the ethical judgements within the primary 
sources are based on inward subjective morality, which makes it very difficult to 
theorise them into a theory of normative ethics. This phenomenon created an 
epistemological issue for theologians, philosophers and jurists, and the majority of 
them relied on Islamic legal theory as a framework, with juristic subjectivism as an 
epistemic source for judging the moral conduct. This epistemic source, however 
created philosophically and theologically incoherent theories, which were discussed 
in Chapter 3. This consequently created institutional failures when institutional 
intervention was used to subscribe good and forbid evil. However, the ontological 
authority for institutional intervention was justified in the tradition by the assumption 
that the state is capable of distinguishing between good and evil, which is able to so 
while subscribing good and forbidding evil. The explorations in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that this in not the case. The previous chapter investigated the 
source of this problem, and we discovered that the Islamic tradition is in an estate of 
epistemological crisis, which is creating crisis in morality and in legitimacy within the 
tradition.    
The debates in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 consolidated on the first part of the research 
aim, as we explored the operational and theoretical side of governance within Islamic 
thought in the form of the institution of hisbah. The previous chapter, focused on the 
second part of the research aim as we explored the episteme of the problems 
highlighted during the examination of theory and operations of institution of hisbah. 
In the previous chapter, the research discovered an epistemological crisis in the 
Islamic tradition, which has caused a crisis in morality and crisis in legitimacy.  
In the last chapter, the research also utilised MacIntyre (1977) as a reference frame to 
argue that the epistemological crisis can only be solved by creating a new epistemic 
source for the tradition. That is, the resolution to the crisis requires construction of a 
new epistemological source, which could replace the juristic subjectivism. It need to 
be from outside of the current tradition and it need to provide a new understanding of 
value. The construction and formulation of such episteme does not mean the 
discontinuation of single life form of Islamic tradition, and the only criteria for 
acceptability of this new source is that it can address all the issues raised in the earlier 
chapters.  
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This chapter attempts to construct such an epistemic source, which could resolve the 
epistemological crisis within the tradition, and provide an understanding, which could 
solve the current tension in regards to ‘form versus substance’ and ‘legality vs 
ethicality’ debate. This study will firstly attempt to understand the origin of personal 
and public realms, and the interaction between the two. The study will then attempt to 
construct a framework through which we can suggest ideal interaction between the 
boundaries of the two realms. The constructed framework would be argued on the 
grounds of philosophical and theological coherent, and it will be presented a 
normative theory of ethics.  
In the last chapter, we constructed the assumption that divine contributions to human 
ethos are embedded in the perpetuity of shared ethos, which forms a part of perpetuity 
of temporary existence. Therefore, the objective normative goal of human beings, as a 
whole, is to safeguard the perpetuity of temporary existence, by ensuring its 
continuity, so individuals can add a value of subjective-goodness into the perpetuity 
of shared ethos, within their temporary existence in the material world. The 
subjective-goodness is the good perceived by an individual through their subjectivity, 
while the perpetuity of temporary existence is the human civilisation in its totality. In 
this, the perpetuity of shared ethos is the accumulated aggregate human knowledge of 
goodness that manifests in the perpetuity of temporary existence. 
Over the human history, the values, ethics, traditions and world view is used by the 
people to assign meaning to their lives, to apprehend the reality and develop an 
understanding of the world around them. Heiberg and Stewart (2005) examines that 
the development of human civilisation, the new discoveries, scientific breakthroughs 
and growth of knowledge, creates a certain incoherence in the prevailing worldview, 
which makes it difficult for the people to assign meaning to their lives and to 
apprehend the reality. With the emergence of an incoherence, the prevailing 
worldview cannot provide a point of orientation for the people to create a stable 
stance for their existence and a perspective for understanding the reality of their time 
(Stewart, 2013). In this state, the belief in traditional institutions and practices 
becomes “like a ghost from past ages, which had lost all meaning in the present” 
(Heiberg and Stewart, 2005:90). In the absence of any firm point to comprehend the 
human life and the world around it, the age becomes engulfed with uncertainty, and 
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this condition becomes the crisis of that age, in this uncertainty lies an ‘inner 
necessity’ for the values, traditions and the worldview of the past to change and 
accommodate the realities of the present.  
Kierkegaard (Kierkegaard et al., 1989:260) also investigates this phenomenon in 
observing that “The given actuality at a certain time is the actuality valid for the 
generation and the individuals in that generation”, and when this actuality becomes 
incoherent to the reality of the next generation, the values vital for the sustainability 
of prevailing worldview starts to disintegrate, resulting in the breakdown in the 
plausibility of the worldview. 
The Islamic tradition of our age, has reached a similar stage, where a new form of 
worldview is required, a worldview that is relevant to our time and space. The 
aftermath of the crisis in Islamic tradition of our time, which is somewhat similar to 
the crisis of Heiberg’s era, is the ‘juristic subjectivism’, the ‘religious relativism’, and 
‘religious nihilism’. The ‘religious nihilism’ is the practice of a religious custom, 
when the metaphysical meanings in the practice of that custom are absent from the 
conscious minds of followers of that religion. The ‘religious relativism’ is when the 
followers of a creed hold contradictory moral judgements about an action or an event. 
The important distinction here is the distinguishing worldview of a tradition, and 
single life form of a tradition as two separate identities, and the assumption that the 
worldview may change with change in times, while maintaining the continuation of 
single life form of that tradition.  
Kiekegaard et al. (1989: 260), similar to MacIntyre, Heiberg and many others, 
suggests that in the state of such crisis the "actuality must be displaced by another 
actuality, and this must occur through and by individuals and the generation”. In 
Keikegaard et al. (1989: 242) is in the view that the mode of substituting one actuality 
for another,  “must result from the assertion of subjectivity in a still higher form. It 
must be subjectivity raised to the second power, a subjectivity’s subjectivity, which 
corresponds to reflection’s reflection”. 
Similarly Heiberg and Stewart (2005:90), while examining the crisis of his ages, 
suggests that “when the present had ended and was finished and therefore belonged to 
   211 
the past, to what is dead, when there was a material, that is, a formless substance 
which, in the creation of a new form, could find a resurrection from what is dead”. 
The resurrection of Islamic tradition, thus, requires a new form of worldview with 
new set of goals that assert the subjectivity of our subjectivity, as objective values that 
are valid for our generation, so that this new form may be used as a point of 
orientation for understanding the life and the reality, which we live under.    
In an effort to understand the fundamental nature of value, this research is focusing on 
the juxtapositions of: ‘external objective universals demanded by tradition or culture’, 
‘the individual’s internal subjective ‘will’ based on rationality’, and ‘the individual’s 
internal rhetoric, which is contingent and relative, that may be based on whims and 
feelings of individual’.  
This study, therefore, attempts to explore the origin of these realms, and by doing so, 
endeavours to construct the boundaries between the two realms from the perspective 
of their origin. The objective of this chapter, hence, is to develop a deeper 
understanding of value, in abstract and in concrete sense, so that the important and 
unimportant facts can be distinguished in non-spiritual socio economic matters, and 
the human actions can be categorised as good or bad in this world. However, “A 
whole metaphysical picture is needed to underpin this fact–value distinction” 
(Brinkmann, 2004:61) that “may not be benign or Utopian” (Crawford, 2004:11). 
This understanding can then be used to construct a theory of normative ethics for the 
objective of engineering a post crises source for Islamic tradition. The aim of this 
chapter is, therefore, to formulate a framework for institution of hisbah, both in 
abstract and philosophical, and practical and operational sense.   
5.2 FUSION OF OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY: CONCEPTUALISING 
THE OBJECTIVIST SUBJECTIVISM  
The forerunner of the above-mentioned juxtapositions is the Athenian society, where 
the Daimon of Socrates, the Oracle at Delphi, and Sophists representing the three 
positions simultaneously existing and interacting with each other. This co-existence, 
interactions and its outcome, is also marked as the start of the transition from the 
objective and external morality to the subjective and inward morality, while it took 
over two thousand years for this transition to produce practicable notions of human’s 
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subjective autonomy. The examination of the three juxtapositions in the Athenian 
society, in their underdeveloped simplest forms, can, hence, help us to develop a 
better understanding of their nature.   
The examination of conflicts in Athenian society is not just an analysis of the events 
of the past, because, these conflicts are pertinent to the problem of our time; as the 
rapidly changing reality put into question the demands of tradition and culture, 
consequently the conflicting groups of above mentioned three juxtapositions emerge 
in the postmodern times. These conflicting positions contradict with each others’ 
notion of truth and its validity; therefore, the construction of a synthesis between them 
requires the examination of conflicts in Athenian society. 
The sophists are the relativists who consider the moral judgements as subjective, that 
are dependent on human will, but the Daimon of Socrates is distinct to the sophists’ 
relative subjectivism, as the Daimon of Socrates does not represent Socrates’ will, but 
rather it represents an objective truth acquired by individual’s subjectivism, while the 
Oracle at Delphi or the Athenian society represents the demands of traditions and 
culture that are considered as objective and universal by that tradition and culture.  
The relativism of sophists reduces all the moral judgements to subjective and relative 
opinions that lack any validity or authority, and following them becomes a matter of 
individual choice; any regulatory framework for socio, economic or politico system 
requires certain validity and some authority. Therefore, this study focuses only on the 
external public morality, as in the case of Oracle at Delphi, and the internal subjective 
moral understanding, as in this case of Daimon of Socrates. 
The Athenian society did not recognise the freedom of individual subjectivity, where 
ethics were understood in context of established traditions and norms. Socrates 
rejected the external objective morality of Athenian society and tried to replace it with 
the subjectivy constructed on thoughts, while Sophists attempted to replace it by 
subjectivity constructed on individual whims and feelings such as pain and pleasure.  
Hegel (1995:411) also examines these three positions, and suggests that “Socrates 
opposed to the contingent and particular inward, that universal, true inward of 
thought. And Socrates awakened this real conscience, for he not only said that man is 
the measure of all things, but man as thinking is the measure of all things”.  
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According to Hegel, Socrates asserts the freedom of individual’s subjectivity and 
approaches the notion of good from the stand point of reflective morality, where good 
is determined by the virtue of perceptions, by exercising individual’s subjectivity 
through reflective thinking (Hegel, 1995:411). In other words, good is neither what is 
externally taught by tradition or customs, nor it is based on the feelings of individual, 
but it is the thoughts of an individual that filters things into the category of good and 
bad, and every individual ought to have the right to exercise this reflective morality.  
Hegel (1995), marks the Socrates’ Daimon as the start of paradigm shift in the 
understanding of morality from the external towards the internal, and creation of a 
value system for subjectivity, which resulted in the worldwide acknowledgment of 
subjective freedom. However, unlike Tennemann, Hegel (1995) does not view 
Socrates’ actions as righteous and his conviction as injustice, instead Hegel (1995) 
points that Socrates denounced the public morality and rejected the value system of 
the tradition, and by doing so undermined the concept of democratic state. Hegel 
(1995:426) elaborates on this, and explains that:  
The Spirit of the Athenians… in itself, its constitution, its whole life rested on a 
moral ground, on religion, and could not exist without this absolutely secure basis. 
Thus, because Socrates makes the truth rest on the judgment of inward 
consciousness, he enters upon a struggle with the Athenian people as to what is 
right and true. 
Hegel’s (1995) interpretation of Socrates’ Daimon is that it encourages people to 
disregard the public morality that exists in the outward sphere, and look for truth 
inwardly, such notions threaten the secure basis required to build a law-abiding 
society.  
Socrates’ notion places private views of an individual above the established customs, 
public morality and the law of the state. Two-and-half millennium after Socrates, a 
mock trial of Socrates was conducted in Greece, which divided the international panel 
of judges, on whether Socrates is guilty or not (Bouzali, Nov 28th, 2013). In this, five 
of the ten judges chose the superiority of external objective values of Athenian over 
subjective freedom of Socrates, while the other five showed corresponding logic of 
past, such as the one followed by Tennemann, Kant, Mendelssohn and others, and 
voted in favour of Socrates. In past, Socrates trial was viewed as gross injustice; 
however the majority of the modern discourse no longer express the same view, such 
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as Cartledge’s (2007) work. The modern discourse is mostly consistent with Hegel’s 
interpretation of Socrates’, as it takes the position that Socrates trial and the guilty 
verdict was completely justifiable, although the reasons for this justification may vary 
from discourse to discourse. 
The paradigm shift in morality that started from Socrates has over the years created 
realm of subjective freedom for individuals to express themselves according to their 
inwards morality; laws, such as Human Rights Declaration, theoretically protect this 
realm. One of the key features of postmodernism is that it emphasis that every 
individual should exercise their inner subjective morality within the realm of 
subjective freedom, and any attempts to employ the subjective morality outside of the 
allowed realm is not only rejected, but it is also subjected to all-out retaliation. The 
realm outside of the ‘realm of subjective freedom’ is governed by accepted customs, 
validated traditions and social postmodern norms; we are referring to this realm as 
external realm, while realm of subjective freedom is referred as internal realm.  
If R is the entire realm where moral judgements can be expressed or extracted from, 
then the combination of internal realm (I) and external realm (E) is the power set of R, 
as there are no other subsets of realms outside of the subset of I and E, which come 
together to form the power set of R. In other words, the internal realm consists of an 
individual and everything outside it belongs to the external realm, so when a person 
interacts with another person, theoretically that person is interacting with contents 
belonging to external realm. Moreover, all the contents of internal realm or the area of 
internal realm, acceptable by the postmodernism in form of social agreement, is not 
completely protected by the laws and conventions. We are calling the area of internal 
realm protected by law as ‘fenced internal realm’ and the area of internal realm 
unprotected by law is being referred to as ‘unfenced internal realm’.  
The opposition to Socrates’ Daimon, in postmodern world, is mostly the consequence 
of attempts on imposing the individual subjectivity outside the internal realm, while 
any discourse or position sympatric to it is mostly the consequence of external realm 
invading that space of internal realm, which is not protected by law, but established as 
a pace for internal realm by historically agreed social contracts. It should be noted that 
the invasion of unfenced internal realm is very plausible and regular phenomenon, 
because societies are more powerful and therefore able to influence, erode or invade 
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the realm of individual’s subjective freedom, especially the unfenced internal realm. 
Hegel (1995:426) rationalises this invasion by asserting that there needs to maintain 
an absolute secure basis for the external realm to ensure its existence; therefore, 
society cannot allow the inward consciousness of internal realm to challenge the 
external realm, and in a process of avoiding such conflicts the external realm may 
overwrite and invade the unfenced internal realm. Consequently, more a society’s 
basis is unsecure, the more it attempts to invade the internal realm, which sometime 
results in invasion of fenced internal realm that is theoretically protected by 
international conventions and laws. In Islamic discourse, this invasion is discussed as 
the factors that may lead to social chaos and upheaval, and Islamic legal theory 
sometimes goes to great length to stop them.  
The internal realm and external realm have their distinct value system, moral 
judgements and validity of truth. Over the history, the philosophical discourse, 
customs and traditions have developed in such a manner that they encourage 
individuals to focus inwardly for truth and morality, rather than extracting it from 
outward public morality. The contradiction between the internal realm and external 
realm has led to laws and conventions, and many political systems and distinctive 
social ideologies have emerged that focus on the establishing pragmatic divisions 
between the two realm. This study, therefore, attempts to explore the origin of these 
realms, and by doing so, it endeavours to construct the boundaries between the two 
realms from the perspective of their origin. The construction of boundaries of two 
realms based on the origin of these realms would imply that the understanding of 
what may constitute as a prudent scope of these realms, would be inferred from 
subjectivity of each realm. This assertion of higher form of subjectivity, which is like 
the “subjectivity raised to the second power, a subjectivity’s subjectivity” 
(Kierkegaard et al., 1989:242), would mean that the normative goals of each realm 
and the contents of such goals can be understood from the subjective prospective of 
each realm. Thus, the validity and authority would carry forward in the normative 
goals and value system, as they will assert a higher form of subjectivity in their 
corresponding realms, and this feature makes this conceptualisation different from 
relativism.  
5.2.1 Objectivist Ethics  
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This study uses the objectivist ethics as a point of orientation for conceptualising the 
origin of the two realms (external realm and internal realm) with the objective of  
Rand (1964:11). This study employs theory of objectivist ethics, because this theory 
takes the position that “Ethics is not a mystic fantasy—nor a social convention—nor a 
dispensable, subjective luxury, to be switched or discarded in any emergency. Ethics 
is an objective, metaphysical necessity of man’s survival” (Rand,1964:11). This 
coincides with ‘single life form of Islamic thoughts’, as primary sources construct 
their narrative on the grounds that ethics are metaphysical necessity for survival of 
human beings (Fakhry, 1991).  
This study shares this foundation stone with the objectivist ethics. The objectivist 
ethics theorise the ethics as objective, metaphysical necessity of humans by 
considering the life of an organic life form (human beings) as an end in itself, and not 
a means to any end, such as welfare of others. As Rand asserts an individual has to 
live for their own sake, “neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to 
himself” (Rand, 1964:16). Therefore the highest moral purpose of human beings, 
according to objectivist ethics, is the achievement of happiness by means of survival, 
and anything that sustains the life of the being is proper and good, while anything that 
negates it is evil and blameworthy. This notion does not outreach to the issue of life 
and death, but instead focuses on survival, within broad sense of the word, by linking 
all the activities that sustain one’s own life to the happiness and the links all that 
which challenge one’s own life to suffering (Rand,1964).  
This notion is similar to Kant, as both consider the morality as objective, rather than 
relative. However, as Kant considers a ‘good will’ as good, “not because of its fitness 
to attain some intended end, but good… in itself” (Kant et al., 2011:17), the 
objectivist ethics consider life as good in itself. Similar to utilitarianism, our 
interpretation of objectivist ethics also uses the consequentialist premise, and similar 
to utilitarian argument it also uses the proposition that “happiness is the end and aim 
of morality” (Mill, 1990:34), but instead of “considering utility to be the test of 
morality” (Mill, 1990:34), it proposes the survival and sustaining the life-form as a 
test for morality (Rand, 1964). The objectivist ethics suggests that the survival of life 
form requires values, which are established by a code of ethics; and the ethical code is 
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determined through the virtues of reason through rationality, purposefulness through 
productivity and self-esteem through pride (Rand, 1964:11-14). 
Objectivist ethics conceptualise life as ‘the standard of value’ and the individual life 
as ‘the ethical purpose’ of that individual. Accordingly, life is considered as an 
instrument that provides assessment on the choices one ought to take, and these 
choices are the means to the achievement of the purpose; and the purpose is surviving 
in such a manner that one lives “a life proper to a rational being… and the life he has 
to live is his own” (Rand, 1964:11-14). The ‘standard’ and ‘purpose’ does not come 
automatically, instinctively, involuntarily or infallibly, and it can only be realised by 
the virtue of productive work that optimally utilises human’s “creative ability, his 
ambitiousness, his self-assertiveness, his refusal to bear uncontested disasters, his 
dedication to the goal of reshaping the earth in the image of his values” (Rand, 
1964:15). 
The conceptualisation of ‘standard’ and ‘purpose’ is essential construct for the 
normative understanding within the theory of ethics. This is also important, because 
the examination of the previous chapters revealed that this dimension is largely 
missing from the discourse of the Islamic tradition.  
 
 
5.2.2 Power of External Realm and Autonomy of Internal Realm 
When we consider the external realm and internal realm as two separate life forms, 
where external realm represents the shared ethos’ perpetuity of temporary existence, 
practiced in form of traditions and social norms, and the internal realm as individual’s 
subjectivity based on individual’s faculty of reasoning, and then on this notion, when 
we apply the abstract principles of objectivist ethics, we are drawn towards the 
conclusion that the external realm and internal realm ought to value the things that 
sustain their life. Therefore, the ‘standard’ for ‘external realm’ is the ‘survival and 
continuity’ of external realm, and the ‘purpose’ of external realm is to achieve that 
productivity, which optimally uses the creative ability of available resources in the 
realm to reshape the nature and the world in the image of its values. The internal 
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realm subsequently has similar standard and purpose within its realm. The goal for 
both realms is to reshape the nature and the world, within its realm, in the image of its 
values, and this corresponds to the assumption constructed in the previous chapter, 
which states that the very fabric of nature is intrinsically evil. The reshaping of the 
nature and the world means the development of the world and restyling of the nature 
so it assistances the realm in its survival, assuring its continuity.  
The notion of ‘nature as intrinsically evil’, proposed by this study, is very much 
similar to Hobbes description on state of nature, which is constructed on “a number of 
individually plausible empirical and normative assumptions” (Lloyd, 2013:62), and in 
which he describes the life as: “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short… [with] no 
account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; and… worst of all, continual fear, and danger of 
violent death” (Hobbes et al., 2006:102). 
Thereupon, what this study is purposing is that both the realms, that is: the ‘external 
realm’ of socially enforced traditions, and ‘internal realm’ of individual’s subjectivity, 
are driven by the quest for survival. This quest for survival is not the animalistic 
survival, which only demands the perseverance and continuation of life form, but this 
quest for survival is humanistic, as it demands meaning and purpose. The purpose is 
the transformation of reality, surroundings and nature, so it becomes partner rather an 
adversary in the quest. The external realm and internal realm, both try to express 
themselves in their surrounding reality, and by expressing themselves, they are alter 
the surrounding reality to make it fit for their individual quest.  
At a fixed time, there’s only one space, which the two realms attempt to alter and 
transform. This creates an unresolvable conflict and rivalry between the two, and to 
resolve this issue we, over the history, have attempted to divide this single space into 
two partitions, so both realms have a designated area to express their subjectivity. The 
subjectivity’s subjectivity of each realm is to transform the space, at any given time, 
to make it suitable and compatible with its survival.  
While majority of the discourse, including objectivist ethics, on this topic only treats 
internal realm of individual’s subjectivity as grounded in the existence of individual 
human life forms, this study, however, proposes to view the external realm as life 
form in itself. By considering both realms as two independent life forms, we are able 
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to rationalise the conflict in such a manner that it may be possible to theorise a 
solution to this conflict. Treating external life form follows similar doctrinal argument 
to ‘corporate personhood’, which recognises corporates and other groups of people 
with common interest, as single life form from the legal perspective. We are treating 
the social, economic and political traditions, customs and laws, of external realm, as a 
phenomena generating out of a single life form, and the purpose of these traditions, 
customs and laws is to ensure the survival of that life form. The single life form of 
external realm, hence, is the perpetuity of temporary existence, where the shared ethos 
exists, and the external realm facilitates the existence of individual lives of humans 
who temporarily exist alongside it. 
When we assign a value to things based on their assistance in survival, then the 
internal realm must give some positive numerical value to the existence of external 
realm, as it assists in its survival, and when an individual’s internal realm values the 
existence of external realm, it contributes towards the things that assist in the survival 
of external realm. This is when external realm also places a positive numerical value 
to that individual’s internal realm. When these positive values are placed from both 
parties, then a social contract forms. Our argument is similar to ‘contractarianism’ of 
Hobbes (Darwall, 2002), and Rawl’s ‘contractualism’ (Rawls, 2000), as it 
acknowledges the existence of an unspoken contract. However, our argument does not 
consider these unspoken contracts as a legitimate moral norms that one ought to 
follow. The reason for this distinction is that we purpose that in pursuit of survival the 
internal realm and external realm assign each other positive values, which results in 
unspoken contracts, but the legitimate moral contents are those that assist in survival, 
not the unspoken contracts. The unspoken contracts may reflect the legitimate moral 
contents that assist in survival, but it may not always be the case, and the unspoken 
contracts are the results of legitimate moral contents, but not the foundations for 
determining the morality.  
Similar to unspoken contracts, all the traditions and laws of external realm and all the 
moral principles formed by an individual through reflective thinking, do not form a 
test of morality and neither do they define the moral correctness, as these are only 
time and space dependent conclusions drawn from legitimate moral contents for a 
particular life form, and they only provide the moral reflection of what was correct for 
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that particular life form in that time and space. We are calling this time dependent 
moral premises as ‘restrictive morality’.  
5.2.3 Restrictive Morality and Moral Stickiness  
Restrictive morality therefore exists in pockets, where each pocket is objective to a 
particular life form (external realm or internal realm) and simultaneously relative to 
other life forms (within or outside of that time and space); a particular life form 
view’s its pocket of restrictive morality as an absolute truth. An individual has only 
one pocket of restrictive morality within the internal realm, while it may contain 
conflicting moral principles. However, the external realm has many pockets of 
restrictive morality that compete with each other to create a worldview for the 
external realm. 
The model of normative morality proposed by this study is not based on the restrictive 
morality, because the restrictive morality suffers from the ‘moral stickiness’, and 
because of moral stickiness it can illustrate an incorrect reflection of legitimate moral 
contents. The legitimate moral contents are the moral contents one ought to follow, 
and our aim in this section is to develop an understanding of the form and substance 
of the ‘legitimate moral contents’, along with the measure or criteria that may decide 
on what thing or action may constitute as part of ‘legitimate moral contents’. 
The ‘legitimate moral contents’ project an image of morality for an individual life 
form and that life form can consciously read this image. The reading and hence the 
interpretation of this image is dependent on the time and space, in which that life form 
exists. The conscious reading of this image results in formulation of restrictive-
morality, and the restrictive morality provides the building blocks for internal 
subjective values, customs and believes. This process occurs in the internal realm, for 
a human being, and also in external realm, for a society or community.  
The restrictive morality provides point of orientation for constructing the meaning of 
life and making sense of the reality, and by doing so, it also produces the rationale for 
the customs, values, and believes for internal realm and for the traditions, laws and 
duties in external realm. This use of restrictive morality makes it rigid and resistant to 
change. As the space and time alters the ‘legitimate moral contents’ produce a new 
image, but the conscious reading of this image ought to form a new restrictive 
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morality, which ought to replace the old one. However, the life form (human or 
society) resist to change the point of orientation, through which they make sense of 
themselves and the world around them, and due to this resistance, they contest and 
defy to change the old restrictive morality for the new restrictive morality. In such 
circumstances, the life form continues to practice the old restrictive morality and in 
doing so, the life form perceives the actions and choices made on old restrictive 
morality as morally correct, while they might not be morally correct according to the 
new restrictive morality. We are referring to this phenomenon as moral stickiness. 
During moral stickiness the life form, in spite what it pursues and what it perceives as 
morally correct, does not improve its chances of survival and may not progress to 
meet the standard and the purpose, and the actions and choices made during moral 
stickiness may even be detrimental to life form’s survival, as the moral stickiness 
makes the value system of life form independent of the conditions, situation and 
reality in which that life form lives. The solution to moral stickiness is the outside 
intervention; in case of internal realm, the intervention may come from external realm 
and in case of external realm it may come from an internal realm of an individual. 
One of the rationales for constructing a ‘theory of ethics’ is that it provides realm with 
a framework to self-adjusting its restrictive morality and move away from the state of 
moral stickiness, without foreign intervention. An ability to self-adjust and avoid 
moral stickiness is one of the most vital instrument for fulfilling the standard and 
achieving the purpose of life, as it allows life form to constantly and pragmatically 
benefit from the ‘legitimate moral contents’. 
Objectivist ethics is not the only solitary discourse that asserts that the legitimate 
moral contents are based on survival of the life-form. Many interdisciplinary 
approaches have been used in the past to explain the moral and ethical problems in the 
philosophy. The recent development in this field has used sociology, psychology and 
evolutionary theory to support or undermine different metaethical positions, or to 
construct an episteme of good and evil, or to rationalise the origin moral behaviour 
and capacity in humans (Korsgaard, 2006).  
Some of the empirical approaches by the moral philosophers looking for scientific 
inquiry, such as Joyce (2006), Korsgaard (2006) and Kitcher (2006), into the origin of 
moral behaviour in human beings use evolutionary theory, while others who do not 
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want to consider morality as an unintentional ‘by product’ of natural selection, such 
as Prinz (2008), argue for independent evolution of morality. Many of the inquiries 
using evolutionary biology, focus on origin and nature of human behaviours such as 
altruism, by appealing to discourse such as Hamilton’s (1964) ‘inclusive fitness’ 
theory or to Trivers (1971), Smith (1982), Axelrod (1984) or to Alexander (1987) and 
Joyce (2006); while other inquiries, such as Wheatley and Haidt (2005), concentrate 
on the contents of morality, the factors that might influence the contents of moral 
judgements, and the factors that might influence the motivation to act on moral 
judgement. 
Whilst this study acknowledges the influence of the natural selection on morality and 
psychological and social connotations of moral judgements, the focus of this study, 
however, is not on scientifically explaining origin of morality or exploring the 
contents of existing moral judgements or rationalising the moral or immoral 
behaviour of people; instead this study concentrates on the normative contents of 
morality rather than an empirical sense.  
The normative sense of morality focuses on ability of a framework to judge the moral 
conduct of an activity, in relation to the goal. It shows the course of action that needs 
to be taken in a given situation and a ratio of sacrificing one value to achieve another. 
The nature of inquiry pursued by this study is, therefore, normative in its nature, and 
the episteme of morality this chapter attempts to construct focuses on normative 
direction. 
5.2.4 Formulating the Metaethical Foundations  
In lieu of discussing the answers to the fundamental questions raised above, we first 
have to state the foundational principles of ethics that give us a metaethical 
perspective to approach these questions. As discussed earlier, we are considering 
nature, by its very nature, as evil and every action of an individual life form to alter 
the fabric of nature, by developing partnerships with others, by adapting or by 
evolving, is an attempt by that individual life form to introduce goodness, the 
goodness from the perspective of that life form. This consequently makes ‘life’ an 
epistemological source of goodness.  
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The perspective of goodness held by an individual life form, which we are referring to 
as restrictive morality, suffers from moral stickiness and therefore its contents may 
not correctly reflect what is to be considered as good. The moral stickiness occurs 
when the conception of morality shifts to accommodate the change in reality. The 
shift occurs because ‘legitimate moral contents’ are essentially a ‘collection of all the 
things’ that aides the life form’s survival, whilst also maintaining the ‘standard’ and 
giving way for the life form to achieve its ‘purpose’, and with change in reality and 
circumstances the “collection of the things’ also changes, which are mostly time and 
space dependent. The restrictive morality does not always keep up with this change 
and may not update all its contents, resulting in moral stickiness.  
The solution to moral stickiness is some sort of intervention that forces the life form 
to change the point of orientation, which it uses to understand its life and reality 
around it. The change in point of orientation gives way to for restrictive morality to 
update. In this metaethical perspective, therefore, ‘a thing ‘X’ is to be defined as 
good, ‘if X, when objectively viewed, is subjectively beneficial for the survival of 
realm of individual life form in question.’ When X is no longer beneficial then X will 
move from category of good things to bad or evil things.  
Moral goodness, therefore, is contingent, as it differs from time to time and comes in 
to, and goes out of, existence with change in circumstances, time and space. 
Restrictive morality, as it fails to keep up with these changes, becomes liable to 
arbitrariness of moral stickiness, and consequently loses any possibility of 
dependency or any legitimate moral authority. The claim to legitimate moral authority 
relies on the certainty that moral contents exist without any contingencies; therefore, 
restrictive morality is not the reliable source of morality. In context of ‘is’ and 
‘ought’; an internal realm relies on the restrictive morality as a point of orientation to 
create a moral understanding of things, what the realm ought to do is use the 
‘legitimate moral contents’.  
In practical sense, when an individual commits or participates in anything that has a 
potential to harm, or harms the existence of its internal realm, that individual is acting 
on a restrictive morality that is suffering from moral stickiness. We have theorised the 
existence of two realms from everyone’s perspective, that is: internal realm and 
external realm. An individual acts or reacts positively to parts of external realm that 
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the restrictive morality interprets as advantageous or valuable to the survival of 
internal realm, while the parts of the external realm that it perceived as inimical to 
existence of internal realm is treated with hostility by the individual. In the cases, 
when the internal realm of an individual and the external realm act in a manner that 
they protect each other’s existence, helping each other in survival, then a maximum 
productivity towards the achievement of the independent purposes of both realms may 
be accomplished in that setting through mutual effort. In other words, there are 
billions of people in the world at a given time, indicating  billions of settings between 
internal realm of an individual and external realm, which therefore does not only 
suggest a maximum productivity within even a single setting, but also even 
suggesting a positive progress towards the purpose of each realm in majority of 
settings would be a utopian vision.  
When an individual is born, external realm provides the resources required for the 
construction of internal realm of that individual, and all the effort put together by the 
external realm that fosters the development of the internal realm. Hence, it would be 
wasteful if external realm is unable to extract any benefit from the internal realm, 
while internal realm pursues its independent purpose. Thus, it is in the interest of 
external realm to benefit from internal realm, in as many settings as possible, so that 
the external realm may progress towards its purpose. However, a realm only 
positively contributes towards the other realm, when it perceives the purpose other 
realm is pursuing will benefit the realm’s survival and help the realm in pursuit 
towards its own purpose.  
From the perspective of the external realm it is not possible to positively contribute in 
the pursuit of an internal realm towards its purpose in every or even in majority of the 
settings; which, therefore, require a measure through, which it can select the settings, 
in which it is viable for the external realm to implement a mutual beneficial 
agreement, where external realm contributes towards the pursuit of internal realms 
purpose, and internal realm reciprocates the same.  
The external realm, by definition, requires such mutual beneficial contracts, because 
the ‘labour’ required for external realm to pursue its purpose is only provided by 
internal realm of individuals. The survival of internal realm, in most of the cases, is 
therefore in the benefit of the external realm, due to possibility of contribution of 
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labour towards the purpose of external realm, and for internal realm the existence of 
external realm is vital to its own survival. Therefore, a mechanism maybe required 
that could constructively and prolifically allow a realm suffering from moral 
stickiness to reposition its point of orientation. Moreover, the finite space is either 
ruled by the external realm or the internal realm and more space a realm has to 
express itself, the more it can transform that space for the its own benefit; therefore, a 
measure is also required that can pragmatically divide a space between external and 
internal realm in each setting. The theory of normative, from perspective of this 
metaethical view, should be able to give some guidelines on these three fronts.  
The ‘purpose’ and ‘standard’ referred above, also need to be defined in the context of 
this metaethical view, as this definition is slightly different, in abstract and in concrete 
sense, to the objectivist ethics’ understanding of these terms, in spite of the conceptual 
borrowing from the objectivist ethics. This research at this stage  explores the 
meaning of standard and the purpose within the context of this study, while it also 
compares it with the original position of objectivist ethics. 
5.2.5 The Standard and The Purpose  
Objectivist ethics consider ‘life’ as an instrument, source and standard of value, while 
the ethical purpose is the measure of life: the ethical purpose of an individual’s life is 
to live her own life, which Rand (1964:11-14) phrases as one has to life a life best to 
the creative ability they have; “a life proper to a rational being… and the life he has to 
live is his own”. Such a life can only be realised by the virtue of that productive work, 
which is undertaken purely for one’s own (Rand, 1964:15).  
In context of internal and external realms, the objectivist ethics, claim that it is ethical 
responsibility of an individual to always act in interest of their internal realm, in such 
a manner that the space within their internal realm is used in an optimal way. This 
purpose of individual is not realised mechanically, instinctively or involuntarily, so 
that individual has to use their rational faculty to push towards this purpose (Rand, 
1964:15). The rational faculty mentioned here is more in sense of Socrates’ Daimon, 
rather than the desires and whims of the individual.  
In perspective of this metaethical view, the internal realm’s standard and purpose is 
similar to the one described by the objectivist ethics, as we propose that the purpose 
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of life, in context of internal realm, is to subjectively, but rationally, undertake the 
productive work, according to one’s ability. When an individual X is born, X takes a 
small part of external realm ‘S’ and declares it as X’s internal realm. X’s ability 
depends on the combination of nature, determined by the biological development, and 
nurture provided by the external realm such as physical, psychological, social and 
other nutriments. What X ought to do is, use its ability productively for the betterment 
of its internal realm by creating physical value for self-preservation. In other words, 
the ethical demand from an individual is to productively progress towards a 
consciously chosen and rationally defined endeavour; “It is not the degree of a man’s 
ability nor the scale of his work that is ethically relevant” (Rand, 1964:15), rather 
what is of utmost ethical importance and what morality truly demands from an 
individual is “the fullest and most purposeful use of his mind” (Rand, 1964:15). 
Therefore, when an individual X uses its mind in the most purposeful manner, while 
using preservation and betterment of her own life as a measure to differentiate 
between good and evil, whilst pursing the consciously chosen and rationally defined 
endeavour, then X is doing what is morally correct. 
When it comes to external realm, the objectivist ethics take the assumption that if 
every individual pursue a consciously chosen and rationally defined endeavour, then 
such endeavours would not contradict or be counterintuitive to the progress of human 
civilisation as a whole, because rationality does not contradicts (Rand, 1964). The 
external realm is the most important realm in the perpetuity temporary of existence, as 
it nourishes the newly born internal realms; therefore, it can be left to invisible hand 
of rationality to iron out any antithetical settings and, therefore, theorising the 
workings of external realm does not dispute the assumption of objectivist ethics. 
Moreover, the external realm has many diverse sectors, such as social and cultural 
settings, and the consciously chosen and rationally defined endeavour selected by an 
internal realm, to some extent, depends on which sector of external realm, internal 
realm comes in contact with and the variety of social and cultural settings there are in 
the external realm, can produce even more diverse endeavours for internal realms. 
The construction of objective normative goals for external realm is important, not just 
because of this, but also because the purposeless existence of external realm threatens 
its existence, by undermining its claim to authority and purposeless existence of 
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external realm means that external realm has no grounds to compel an internal realm 
to conform.  
The external realm is an eco-system, it is a “whole complex of physical factors” 
(Tansley 1935:299), which creates: “nonliving environment interacting as a functional 
unit” (United Nations, 1992: Article 2) with all the organism-complex. In other 
words, it is the system, outside of the internal realm, that is “composed of physical-
chemical-biological processes active within a space-time unit” (Lindeman, 1942:400). 
The external realm differs from Grinnell’s (as cited by Vandermeer, 1972:107). 
concept of niche, due to its scale, as external realm encapsulates everything. 
However, external realm is to be understood in the perspective of an “ultimate 
distributional unit, within which each species is held by its structural and instinctive 
limitations” (Vandermeer, 1972:107).  
When we approach external realm as an “ultimate distributional unit, and examine the 
distribution of resources, we find that the distribution of resources is normally 
achieved by combination of predation, and competition and an effort to gain 
advantage may result in corporation (Connell, 1979:461-462). The structural and 
instinctive limitations of species, their interaction with each other and their 
classification, along with the mechanism through which the species benefit from the 
‘ultimate distributional unit’ (external realm), by consuming  material resources, such 
as food and non-material resources such as knowledge, are widely discussed in detail 
with ecology, as it focuses on the organisms and their environment, such as the work 
of Vandermeer (1972), Martin and Diamond (1979), Kingsland (1985) (2002), 
Cooper (2004), Haila and Levins (1992) and so on. However, the focus of this study 
is not to concentrate on ‘why’ and ‘how’ of ecological endeavours, but to use 
ecological findings and concepts as building blocks to conceptualise a theory of value, 
because of this, instead of using jargons specific to field of ecology, we are calling 
everything that exists outside an individual’s subjective realm (internal realm) as an 
external realm, which includes the ‘ultimate distributional unit’, the environments and 
so on. The word ‘environments’ here refers to the specified set of operational habitats 
of all the organisms.  
Historically ‘natural ecosystems’ were viewed as the highest form of eco-systems, 
and humans were considered as an external disturbance (O'Neill et al., 1987:9). 
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However, however modern ecologist, like Egler (1964; 1970), Costanza  (1996) and 
other, recognise the need for integrating, humans and human made environment as an 
important part of earth ecosystem. One of the results of this was conceptualisation of 
‘the total human ecosystem’ in the work of Naveh and Lieberman, (1994), and Naveh 
(2000). If the total human ecosystem can be seen as an “overarching conceptual 
super-system” that also includes the mental, physical and spiritual spheres, and it can 
be regarded as “the highest evolutionary ecological entity” (Naveh, 2000:358), and 
defined as concept: “integrating humans with all other organisms and their total 
environment at the highest level of the global hierarchy, should become the unifying 
holistic paradigm for all synthetic ‘‘eco-disciplines” (Naveh, 2005:228). Then the 
external realm would be ‘total human ecosystem minus the internal realm of one life-
form’. Such distinctions are necessary for correct conceptualisation of purpose of 
external realm.  
The rationale for using ecosystem approach as a paradigm for this research, is that 
ecosystems “represent a perception of systems in the natural world that maybe 
inherent to human experience” (O’Neil, 1987:40), and they categorises the resources 
and then integrate them in a system that promotes “conservation; sustainable use; and 
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits” (Alcamo et al., 2003:52). It is also one 
of the most comprehensive scientific methodologies that allow us to take an holistic 
approach to the problem at hand, as it includes human beings “with their cultural 
diversity,… [as] an integral component of many ecosystems.” (Alcamo et al., 
2003:52). We have used ‘total human ecosystem’ as a point of orientation to define 
external realm, because it allows way to genetic and observed, rational and empirical, 
natural and positive “knowledge, wisdom, and ethics with their scientific and 
professional expertise from the natural and social sciences and the humanities” 
(Naveh, 2005:228). This would also allow us to accommodate for the continuity of 
the Islamic thoughts within this thesis.  
Each generation of an organism inherits genes and environment to build its internal 
realm. The selective biases imposed on the ancestors of that organism, by the blind 
action of natural selection are indirectly reflected in the genes. In addition, in the 
environment, the inherited information provides details on “past adoptive 
successes…[of] earlier generations relative to [their]… selective environment” 
   229 
(Odling-Smee et al., 2003:180). This information is, what we conceptualized earlier 
as restrictive morality. 
In context of the environment, the external realm has two major parts: the natural 
ecosystem and the novel system (derived from novel ecosystem); both of them have a 
distinct evolutionary history. The natural ecosystem, which resembles its historic 
natural state in past and present, when altered, tempered or modified by human beings 
into a hybrid state is the ‘novel system’. Therefore, the human footprint index that 
quantifies the trends in evolution and ecology at a global scale, suggests that the rate 
of change from natural to novel system has rapidly increased in the past fifty years 
and “many biotic and abiotic variables is greater than in the previous 10 000 years” 
(Hobbs, Higgs, and Harris, 2009:600). The human intervention, historically, evolved 
from being non-existence, to existence but under the influence of natural ecosystem, 
to being a cause of external disturbance to the natural ecosystem, to a major player 
within the earth’s ecosystem (Steffen et al., 2004:12). The evolution from simple to 
complex, most of the times “appear suddenly as ‘bifurcations’ ” (Naveh, 2005:230) as 
a previously stable system transforms into a new complex state. The emergence of 
this new order that can be observed by the appearance of new structures and new 
behaviours, within the novel system can be marked by the bronze revolution, 
agricultural revolution, industrial revolution and so on within historical trajectory of 
developmentalism.  
The novel system which initially started as a part of natural system, has developed to 
such an extent that it does not only influence the natural systems but it has taken over 
the natural system to such a degree that causes of major effects in the natural system 
can be traced to the novel system. This position is empirically supported by many 
studies, including IGBP’s research that observed various variables from non-human 
dominant state to human intervention in natural systems (Steffen et al., 2004:12).  
The external realm has two major parts: the novel system and natural system. The 
purpose of external realm, based on the evolutionary development of external realm, 
is to transform the natural system into novel system, and by doing so the external 
realm is expressing its subjective view, which it derives from the perpetuity of shared 
ethos, discussed earlier.  
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The purpose of external realm is the trend in which it has developed and that is: 
taking the natural ecosystem and modifying it for its own use. The external realm, 
therefore, requires the input of all the internal realms of individuals from every 
generation. In return of this input, the external realm provides the resources to 
individual for development of their internal realm, which enables external realm to 
transform the control of an ecosystem from nature to itself. The rationale for this 
quest for transfer of control from purely natural to hybrid (human and nature) or 
totally human controlled ecosystem is because external realm extracts resources from 
these ecosystems and the distributes it to individuals, and in return individuals provide 
input to the external realm that allows it further take charge of ecosystems or parts of 
an ecosystem. Through this circular process the external realm assures its survival and 
survival of internal realms. In order to further expand on the interaction between 
external and internal realm based on survival, we will conceptualise the realms as a 
living organism in the following section. 
5.2.6 Justification of Scientific and Philosophical Coherence and Consistency    
Conceptualising external realm as a living organism with evolutionary history, 
entropy and a purpose is not foreign to science, as many non-living things, such as 
celestial bodies are considered to be evolving from simple to complex, with 
observable stages of bifurcations (Maeder, 1987). The uncertainties of modern time 
have led to a major paradigm shift in the method of scientific enquiry, from “entirely 
reductionistic and mechanistic… to more holistic, organismic and hierarchical ones” 
(Naveh, 2005:229) that recognise the reality of complex systems and the uncertainties 
and ambiguities within them. This paradigm shift has produced many interdisciplinary 
studies that focus on nonlinear chaotic processes (Naveh, 2005:229-230). Many 
studies such as Gibbard (1990) and Kitcher (2006) appeal to evolutionary biology to 
focus on the origin of ethical guidance, and acknowledge the normative implications 
of moral contents. However, most of these studies do not support the existence of 
independent moral facts, as they tend to sympathise towards the expressionist37 
position on moral issues, while other studies like by Gould (1997), Gould and 
Lewontin (1979), Fodor (2000), Copp (2008), Fraser (2010) and so on, use moral 
                                                      
37 Further reading on expressivism, see: Horgan and Timmons (2006). 
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psychology, instead of psychological Darwinism (Fodor, 1998; McCloskey, 
2006:440) to argue ontological existence of universal human morality, while 
maintaining the evolutionary biology’s premises that morality is an “ineluctable 
consequence of consciousness evolved for other reasons.” (Gould, 1997:56). 
However, most of these studies concentrate on episteme of moral behaviour by 
analysing and evaluating the empirical nature of moral behaviour in humans, and 
inspite of acknowledging the ontology of psychological moral facts, they are not 
focused on ‘ought’.  
The narrative of objectivist ethics, which does address the origin of morality is 
consistent with the premise of evolutionary biology, as the morality, at a very basic 
level, is not perceived as an end in itself, but as a mean to an end and the end is 
survival. The acts like altruism can also be justified in this concept of selfish pursuit 
for survival, as demonstrated by Dawkins (1989, 171-77), where he focuses on how 
selfish genes produces biological altruism. While this study agrees with the stance of 
evolutionary biology and moral psychology and uses their findings to support the 
thesis, however this study does not adhere to the philosophical standpoint of 
expressivism, instead the findings are interpreted from the standpoint of objectivist 
ethics. This study takes the position that moral judgements exist and they are 
objective. However, this objectivity is not universal, but subjective to the organism 
observing the moral issue, which we are calling ‘objective subjectivity’. 
From the point of view of methodology used in the process of conceptualising the 
narrative, through the speculative metaethical interpretation of scientific observation 
for creating a metaethical stance for theorising a goal and a purpose to describe moral 
obligations (ought) is not a new form of inquiry, as the attempts on “seeking a 
philosophical foundation of morality” (Hussain and Shah, 2006:270-272) by 
“engaging in discourse of a certain kind is not a matter of mere guess work; it requires 
taking into account certain fact” (Cuneo, 2006:60) for contextualising “ ‘ought’… 
[that] seems to be relative to a particular goal or purpose” (Wedgwood, 2006:152).  
However, Korsgaard’s (1997:210) work on normativity explains that there is a 
significant difference between “What justifies the claims that morality makes on us?... 
and… Is there anything we must do?”.  
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This research is, therefore, based on the objectivist ethics, and therefore the burden of 
proof on justifying the claims of morality is not on this research, as it is using the 
proof provided by the objectivist ethics. Nevertheless, this study satisfies the premises 
of Humean theory of motivation, which suggests that beliefs on their own cannot 
motivate us and therefore they “must be combined with some independent desires” 
(Parfit, 2006:341), and the independent desire, conceptualised within this study, that 
provides moral motivation is survival, as this research takes into account the facts 
provided by the ecology, and determined by evolutionary biology to contextualise the 
concept of internal and external realm, and defines the ‘ought’ relative to these realms 
by using the framework of objectivist ethics.  
So far we have conceptualised the existence, jurisdiction and prerogatives of internal 
realm and external realm, along with the relationship between them, which is 
consistent with concept of niche and ecosystems within ecology. The purpose of each 
realm is defined by observing their evolutionary path to development. An individual’s 
purpose is to survive and sustain its life, which deduces and becomes the purpose of 
internal realm. The purpose of external realm is also to survive and it manages and 
sustains its life by utilising the resources from the natural system, by transferring 
them to a novel system, and these are the resources it ought to efficiently distribute 
among the internal realms and ensure their survival, so internal realms, created within 
the perpetuity of temporary existence, can continue to provide it with labour that is 
necessary for converting natural system into novel system. The study then uses the 
stance taken by objectivist ethics to argue that the purpose of each realm is also the 
moral obligation of that realm.  
This notion of moral obligation of each realm is to pursue its purpose and by doing so 
it ensures its survival, makes this ethical approach “an objective, metaphysical 
necessity” (Rand, 1964:11), as it rationalises the subjective reason for having a 
subjective moral judgement, which is like “subjectivity raised to the second power, a 
subjectivity’s subjectivity” (Kierkegaard et al., 1989:242). This conception is also 
philosophically consistent with Hegel’s (1995:426) interpretation of Socrates and the 
modern interpretation of Socrates’ trial (Cartledge, 2007; Bouzali, 2013), as it 
justifies the hostility the external realm, which may show towards the internal realm 
that threatens the existences of external realm.  
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During the above conceptualisation of metaethical foundations, we have also 
theorised the phenomena of moral stickiness. Genetic innate information and the 
environment comes together to govern human’s behaviour, imprinting and instinctive, 
similar to other animals (Breed and Sanchez, 2012:68); while the genetic innate 
information is shaped by their ancestral biological heritage, and the environment is 
shaped by the ancestral social heritage, whilst both heritages are a by product of 
natural selection. The material they gathered by the genetic innate information and the 
environment, allows human to form a picture of morality, in the form of reflective 
morality, which they use to distinguish between right and wrong, and exhibit of this 
sociobiological foray into ethical behaviour by humans is due to their biological 
makeup (Ayala, 1995:118). But this information used for construction of reflective 
morality, which is within the biopsycho-sociocultural construct of human nature, and 
it is usually based on the outcome of events from the past and therefore might not be 
relevant to the problem at hand (Holcomb, 2004:69-70), and this phenomena, when 
occurs, we are referring to it as moral stickiness. An example of such a phenomena, 
which is also widely discussed in evolutionary biology is the necessity for hominoids 
to abandon their heritage when they become full time biped, that is once the human 
ancestors left the life in trees and started roaming permanently on the land, the new 
environment of the biped life on the planes must have demanded that they abandon 
their heritage, so they can successful take right course of action to ensure their 
survival  (Kinzey, 1987:76); if hypothetically they would not have abandoned their 
outdated heritage, then any decision they would have made, in respect to their 
survival, would have suffered from moral stickiness. This phenomenon is not a 
conceptualised abstract, as it has biological basis, as an increase in an allele’s 
representation in the gene pool through a process of phenotypic variation (Dawkins, 
1989:171-77; Dawkins, 1982) can create phenomena, which we are referring to as 
moral stickiness. 
The phenomena of moral stickiness have raised concerns about the use of biological 
heritage (reflective morality) as an epistemological source of human behaviour, for 
developing public policy and other socio economics purposes, due to the aggressive 
behaviour and inhumane social organisation of human’s biological ancestors (Rose 
and Rose, 2000), and the fear that any such steps would “reinforce immoral aspects… 
induced by natural selection” (Holcomb, 2004:70). Crawford (2004:11) elaborates on 
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this concern and explains that “Bees, wasps and ants do not need to develop laws and 
institutions to help make their society better”, because their moral reflection is largely 
based on biological usefulness. However, humans strive for things beyond mere 
biological usefulness and this pursuit of autonomous goals translates into their 
reflective morality, making reflective morality prone to moral stickiness (FitzPatrick, 
2000, 355-356), therefore it would be logical to suggest that if bees, wasps and ants 
developed to same rational level as humans and started pursuing goals beyond 
biological usefulness, than they may also suffer from similar problems (McDowell, 
1995) such as moral stickiness.  
This research has so far constructed the philosophical grounds and metaethical 
foundations. This conceptualisation is essential prior to constructing the theory of 
value that ought to act as a new episteme and solve the epistemological crisis. During 
the deconstruction of discourse on hisbah and then the examination of use of Islamic 
legal theories as a replacement of an ethical theory, this research discovered the 
theological and philosophical incoherence. In order to address this issue, the above 
discussion was structured to provide a coherent philosophical and theological 
grounds. The following section, hence, presents an attempt to construct a theory of 
value, which then can be used as an epistemic source for judging the moral conduct of 
activities by the state institutions. Such a theory of value is to be grounded on the 
philosophical grounds and metaethical foundations as discussed discussed above. The 
construction of the proposed theory of value is done in such a manner that the theory 
can provide a normative direction to morality. 
5.3 OBJECTIVIST SUBJECTIVISM: THEORY OF VALUE 
Human beings, due to their pursuit of goals beyond the dominion of biological 
usefulness, can suffer from moral stickiness, and therefore require institutions and 
laws to correct their moral compass, so that they, the humans, do not harm their 
internal realm or external realm, while pursuing goals relative to biological usefulness 
and relative to human’s ecology (biological relativism). Some metaethical views, 
consider this biological as a unique character of human beings, and define morality as 
pursuit of these goals. However, these goals while are important, they are also relative 
to human ecology, biological usefulness such as survival and therefore are relative to 
morality.  
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The laws and institution that are supposed to intervene and cure the reflective 
morality of moral stickiness and influence the human behaviour through education 
and social intervention, assume that the human behaviour is malleable (Crawford, 
2004:11). However, such approaches have raised concerns from different sides of 
political spectrum, as some perceive that such course of action would lead to a 
dystopian society, similar to the ones sketched by Orwell (1977) in 1984 and by 
Huxley (1946) in Brave New World, while others view this approach as recipe for 
creating utopia, such as the one depicted by Skinner (1974) in Waldon Two. There are 
also those who foresee a complete breakdown of humanity, in the absence of an 
intervention that can cure moral stickiness, as described by McCarthy (2006) in the 
narrative of The Road.  
The intervention is a well-debated concept within politics, economics, and other 
social and life sciences. Generally, the various form of interventions are foreign, 
economic and social. The concept of intervention is separate from the problem of 
realisation of socialism (Mises, 1977:2-3). Therefore, by using the term intervention 
we are focusing on the intervention in social or economic matter to correct the market 
of social norms.  
Intervention works on the principle of causation, where an event A is identified as a 
cause of a distinct event B, and manipulating the occurrence of A “would be an 
effective means by which a free agent could bring about the occurrence of B” (Price 
and Menzies,1993:187), because “A causes B if control of A renders B controllable” 
(Hoover, 1988:173) and by altering the value A, we can alter the value of B; in other 
words, “manipulation of a cause will result in the manipulation of an effect” (Cook 
and Campbell, 1979:36). Intervention, therefore, is when a socio-politico institution, 
such as government, with an intention of maintaining or establishing “the good 
society” (Peacock, 1992:59) issues “an isolated order by the authority in command of 
the social power apparatus” (Mises and Greaves, 1998:10) that either aimed at “an 
alteration of the social structure” (McClelland, 1998:481) or “to change behavior in 
the interests of society” (Lees-Marshment, 2009:220), which we are referring to as 
social intervention. In the case of  an economic intervention, it forces the “owner of 
the means of production to use these means in a way different from what they would 
do under the pressure of the market” (Mises and Greaves, 1998:10). An example of 
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social intervention would be the government advertisement of a policy, such as the 
UK government’s health social marketing strategy of 2007 or Canadian government’s 
‘aboriginal’s welfare campaign’ of 1995 (Lees-Marshment, 2009:220). It is common 
practice for governments to intervene by advertising the “incentives available for 
people to join the legitimate and the risks for staying in the underground economy”  
(Bajada, and Schneider, 2005:232). In addition, there are many systematic studies, 
such as Kotler and Roberto (1989), McKenzie-Mohr and Smith (1999), Mohr (2012) 
and Andreasen (1995), that focus on methodology, effectiveness and history of the 
government social intervention to alter public behaviours. While, for economic 
intervention, there are many examples in the post financial crisis policies of various 
countries around the world, Kaye (2011:41) asserts that “there is no such thing as a 
free market economy – the pure Adam Smith is always tweaked”.  
It should be noted that since the great depression there is a general consensus on the 
necessity for government intervention (Aikins, 2009:23). However, economist, 
sociologist, human right activists and others debate on the extent of government 
intervention in social and economic sphere, for example the human right advocates 
would recommend the government intervention for protection and promotion of 
human rights, but condemn government intervention that may violate natural human 
rights; the point of this example is that the scale of intervention is debatable issue, and 
not the act of intervening, and by intervention we are only assuming the institutional 
or government interventions that attempt to maintain or establish a ‘good society’. 
The interventions are not just at state level, but there are also global interventions, 
such as the international conventions.  
In context of metaethical narrative, the external realm intervenes in an internal realm, 
when external realm perceives that the actions of that internal realm maybe harmful to 
the existence of external realm. The action of an internal realm could be harmful to 
external realm, due to moral stickiness of internal realm, or due to the fact that self-
interest of internal realm is set on such a path that it is counterproductive to 
subjectivity of external realm. There are many international conventions, which are 
designed to intervene and protect the internal realms from over-intervention or 
exploitation from external realm, as shown in Table 5.1. Alcamo and Bennett 
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(2003:123) examine the reasons, why internal realm requires protection from external 
realm, and emphasise that:  
states view indigenous knowledge and institutions as local in scope, relevance, and 
power, whereas the rules and knowledge of the state are viewed as bigger in scale, 
scope, and significance. As a consequence of this thinking, there is a strong 
tendency to override, minimize, or ignore local considerations, issues, or 
preferences. 
It is completely moral, from external realms perspective, for external realm to act in 
its own interest. However, from perspective of internal realm, the above-mentioned 
situation is immoral and unethical, and therefore requires intervention. An internal 
realm can also indulge in activities that threaten the existence of external realm and to 
prevent such scenarios to occur at large scale, there are also many international 
conventions that protects certain resources for the usage of external realm, by 
prohibiting any individual internal realm to utilise them for subjective benefit, and by 
assigning the exclusive ownership of these resources to the external realm, such as the 
idea of ‘common heritage’ devised by the UN, which was theorised the “exclusion of 
a right of appropriation; the duty to use resources in the interest of the whole of 
humanity” (Held, 2003:170). This was later used in the seminal treaties such as the 
Moon Treaty of 1979, Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean 
Floor, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and world heritage convention.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Idea of Common Heritage by UN 
Jun 1945 Charter of the United Nations  
Jun 1946  UN Commission on Human Rights 
Dec 1948 Genocide Convention/Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Nov 1950 European Convention on Human Rights  
Jul 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
Dec 1952 Convention on the Political Rights of Women 
Sep 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons 
Sep 1956  Convention Abolishing Slavery ILO’s 
Jun 1957  Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor  
Nov 1962  Convention on Consent to Marriage 
Dec 1965  Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination International 
Dec 1966 Covenants on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights/Civil and Political 
Rights; Optional Protocol. 
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Nov 1973  Convention on the Suppression of Apartheid  
Jun 1977  Two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
Dec 1979  Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 
Dec 1984  Convention against Torture  
Nov 1989  Convention on the Rights of the Child 
May 1993  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
Nov 1994  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  
Jul 1998 UN conference agrees treaty for a permanent International Criminal 
Court 
Source: Compiled from The Economist (1998), Manasian (1998), United Nations (1988) and 
Held (2003). 
There are few concepts that theorise the balance between protecting the existence of 
external realm and assuring the autonomy of internal realms, but the nature of this 
divide is such that there always are trade-offs. The common practice is to turn to 
economics for analysing these trade-offs and then to turn to politics for selecting an 
appropriate trade-off, as these trade-offs are not politically neutral, Because, each 
trade-off benefit certain group, and sometimes these “trade-offs…become conflicts or 
crises created by a more powerful group (often the state) around the provision of one 
favored form of ecosystem service from which they can obtain rent or other benefits” 
(Alcamo and Bennett, 2003:123).  
Internal realms and external realm are two separate systems that are aware of each 
other: “suppose that one of them is prosperous whereas the other is extremely 
impoverished” (Caney 2005, 111). In such a situation, there are two major kinds of 
crises that may arise, and would require some sort of intervention: one is of positive 
nature, where the prosperous realm pushes the impoverished realm to extreme 
poverty. This positive issue is widely discussed in politics and economics, and under 
local and global distributive justice, poverty and global and national wealth. For 
instance, one of the theories is Rawls’, where he focuses on this issue and suggests 
that, “Well-ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies” (Rawls, 
2003:106), or in any text book on economics the notion of justice is defined using the 
inequality of income distribution.  
The second kind is, of normative nature, when the prospect of normative prosperity is 
sacrificed for the quest of positive prosperity of either or both realms. The prospect of 
this normative crisis leads to the understanding of the need for safeguarding the 
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interests of future generations (Dator, 2006:190), which later translated into 
UNESCO’s 1997 ‘Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations 
Towards Future Generations’, in which it is asserted that: 
With due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the present 
generations … have the responsibility to bequeath…[,] to identify, protect and 
safeguard the tangible and intangible … common heritage [,] to future generations 
[.]…Each generation inheriting the Earth temporarily should take care to use 
natural resources reasonably [. It] … may use the common heritage of humankind, 
…provided that this does not entail compromising it irreversibly [and]… progress 
in all fields does not harm life on Earth. 
The philosophical entailment of this notion is the paradigm shift from conception of 
future generations ‘will have’ rights once they are present to the concept that future 
‘do have’ rights even before their time. Baier (1981:171) elaborates on the 
underlining meaning of this and suggests that his understanding of ‘rights’ gives rise 
to “obligation on our part” because other than political and civil rights that future 
generation will have or do have, they “now have right to share… to a share of what is 
now left of” (Baier,1981:171, the emphases are original) tangible and intangible scare 
resources. In other words, the condition of external realm should be such that they can 
benefit from external realm, when their time comes.   
There is a consensus in the current scientific discourse that homoeconomicus, by 
producing the “exponentially expanding technosphere, has become a major 
destabilizing biological and geological force” (Naveh, 2005:359), so much so that the 
earth is approaching a tipping point. Furnass’s (2012) analysis suggest a global move 
towards strategy similar to Bhutan’s, where growth in GDP would need to be replaced 
by qualitative measures, and future policies to make economic and social trade-offs 
for achieving sustainable state. 
The philosophical standpoint of different disciplines, such as economics and politics, 
and environmental sciences and ecology, creates a different vision of what futures 
should be like: economics emphasises on continuous growth, “reproducible capital 
and education and training (human capital)” (Streeten, 1998:251); the ecology and 
environmental sciences look at the exhaustible resources and viability of ecosystems, 
while the politics focuses on public choice and sociology concentrate on equality. 
Pasek (1992:513) analysis these dichotomies and suggests that economics has very 
thin focus on value judgements when it comes to allocation of resources. Therefore, 
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the problem of economic consideration of future generations, “seem to raise issues 
that are probably more in the domain of philosophy than of economics” (Pasek, 
1992:513), while Leopold (1949:vii–ix) elaborates that: “community is the basic 
concept of ecology, but that … [it] is to be… respected is an extension of ethics” 
(Paavola, and Lowe, 2004:34); many others, such as Sidgwick (1907), Pigou (1952), 
and Ramsey (1928) also suggested that there is an “unfavourable treatment of future 
generations” (Asheim et al., 2001:253) in the current system, which should act as a 
rationale for manoeuvring such a shift in understanding.  
Schneider and Volkert (1999:123), while analysing the effectiveness of incentive 
driven environmental policies by using the public choice approach, suggest that 
environmental policies may never be effectively implemented in representative 
democracies, because of competitive political market that largely focuses on utility 
maximisation, and on occasions when these policies are implemented, they are 
effectuated with ineffective instruments. However, the distribution of resources needs 
not to be a matter that is subjective to a discipline, as an objective method can be 
designed. Solow (1974:16) asserts that such a method should be able to “keep the 
future in the style to which we have become accustomed” and the rate, of utilising the 
scare resources of earth, that can achieve this, would be the ‘right rate’. Naveh 
(2005:359-240) cites many studies that show that we are at a stage where further 
indecorous choices in utilisation of resources may push evolutionary trajectory 
towards extinction of life on earth, while our current technological capabilities far 
exceed our ethical understandings; the only available measure of value is 
sustainability.  
5.3.1 Sustainability: Autonomous Measure of Value  
The manner in which resources are utilised impact the environment, while the 
environment creates spatial changes, and the human actions along with public choice 
responds to these change. It could be further argued that the value created by public 
choice changes according to changes in human environment interaction (Adger et all, 
2003). While the value created by environment or sustainability of the environment is 
more intrinsic and objective and the public choice large provides the context for that 
value. As Geertz (1973:14) suggests: 
   241 
Culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviours, 
institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something 
within which they can be intelligibly that is, thickly described.  
While discussing the prospect for valuing the sustainability over public choice, Held 
(2003:174) argues that: 
From the location of nuclear plants, the management of toxic waste, and the 
regulation of genetically modified foodstuffs, to the harvesting of scarce resources 
(e.g., the rain forests) and the regulation of trade and financial markets, 
governments by no means simply determine what is right or appropriate [as]… 
Decision- making… is often skewed to dominant geopolitical and geo-economic 
interests whose primary objective is to ensure flexible adjustment in and to the 
international economy.  
Peacock (1997:33) discusses the reasons for this skewness in decision making and 
concludes that “political institutions are… influenced by the underlying economic and 
social structure.” This notion is supported by empirical evidence in study conducted 
by Horbach (1992), which shows that the environmental goals are traded-off in favour 
of higher environment. Schneider and Volkert (1999:127) also examine this issue and 
suggest that voter have a very “little incentive for casting his/her vote for the approval 
of such an environmental/economic policy”. While, public choice does have its 
position, and it can help prevent economic or political injustice, however 
sustainability is outside the scope of democratic authority. There are many things that 
are considered as beyond the democratic authority, such as human rights (Locke and 
Laslett, 1988:307-318). The environmental policies, like human rights, are therefore 
currently implemented as an international policy; for instance the bioethics are 
implemented by affirmation through international conventions (Agius, 2006:101). 
Moreover, valuing and preferring sustainability over public choice is a widely debated 
idea in literature relating to environmental sciences, and in the publication of global 
institutions that are focusing on the issue, such as UNESCO. 
In context of the metaethical view constructed earlier, the public choice, which is a 
function of external realm cannot be a measure of value of goodness, because it can 
suffer from moral stickiness, while sustainability acts as a measure of value, because 
through sustainability the continuation in life form of external realm and internal 
realms may be guaranteed.  
The first obstacle faced by the discourse advocating sustainability to be a measure of 
value, is to argue a philosophical foundation for this concept. However, majority of 
   242 
literature has chosen to incorporate the concept of sustainability in other widely 
acceptable philosophical standpoints, such as consequentialism and utilitarianism. 
The popular argument is to argue on the existence of rights for future generations, 
with attached obligation for present generation, or to use White’s (1967) thesis to 
suggest a shift from anthropocentrism to non-anthropocentrism, where non-human 
natural things are assigned values independent of their usefulness to human beings. 
Both of these arguments are then extended to include the benefit to future generations 
or preservation of the non-human natural things as form of public good, followed by a 
utilitarian approach in which the future generations or non-human natural things are 
included in the notion of ‘greater number of people’ (Schneider and Volkert, 
1999:127). 
The major problem with such arguments is that the use philosophical foundations of 
utilitarianism and modem deontology, which are deeply entrenched with the notion of 
“development and progress and that they fail to consider the negative consequences of 
it” (Roo, 2003:162), because they approach the resources of earth as an instrument, 
and due to their individualistic nature, Norton (1982:319) stresses that due to these 
reasons “they cannot provide the basis for an adequate environmental ethic”. While 
majority of discourse on these topics, including the UNESCO declaration, agrees on 
the necessity and requirement for protecting the interests of future generations (Dator, 
2006:190). However, as Pasek (1992:516) points out that considering future 
generations as moral subjects has significant moral significance, because they do not 
exist at this point in time, and even if the present generation adequately protects the 
interests of future generations, it may not be seen as adequate in the subjective view 
of future generations. Assigning rights and values to non-existence human beings also 
raises the ontological questions of definition of ‘being’. Many other studies, such as 
Koopmans (1960), Diamond (1965), Svensson (1980), Epstein (1986), and Lauwers 
(1997), has also raised similar concerns about impracticality and implausibility of a 
notion that advocates protecting the interests of ‘infinite number’ of future 
generations, while Dasgupta and Heal’s (1974) examination of this notion suggests 
that such framework may never produce optimal solutions for creating a sustainable 
planet for future generations, or for solving the environmental issues facing the 
present generations. 
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The solution, therefore should be something other than a mere tweak to current 
utilitarian reasoning, as the technosphere is rapidly creating significant social, 
economic and political realities (Tonn, 2007:1097), the development that took 
centuries in the past is materialising in months, “faster than natural selection can do 
its work” (Vinge, 1993:89), subsequently the earth’s ecosystems are degrading and 
deteriorating with a similar rate (O’Neill and Kahn, 2000). 
On contrary to the above stated approach and the problems that approach creates, this 
study proposes different perspective. This study turns back towards the classic 
understanding of internal and external sovereignty, which was “dislodged within the 
boundaries of nation-states by successive waves of democratization” (Held, 2003:170; 
Potter et al., 1997). The utilisation of the classic understanding for conceptualisation 
of a new paradigm does not deny that the classic concepts were laden with 
contradictions (Krasner, 1999). The rationale for using the classic concepts is that this 
research does not use public choice as a measure of morality, and therefore turns 
towards only other framework available to construct this model.  
This study, therefore, proposes that external realm and internal realms have right to 
pursue what succours and assists their individual survival, and by grounding this in 
the objectivist ethics, this pursuit is ethically right and morally good. However, these 
realms may suffer from moral stickiness and threaten their own existence either by 
conflicting with other realm, or through the act of self-harm, and therefore moral 
stickiness, like price stickiness, requires some sort of intervention. Such a scale of this 
intervention need be decided by the measure of value, which is sustainability. 
Sustainability is to be understood in the context of each realm creating conditions that 
will assist it in prolonging its own life. The sustainability of internal realm is very 
much dependent on the sustainability of external realm, and as internal realms exist 
for comparatively shorter period of time in this perpetuity of temporary existence, 
therefore we are focusing on the sustainability of external realm. In this understanding 
of sustainability, through conceptualisation of external realm as an individual life 
form, we no longer have to theorise the safeguarding of infinite number of future 
generations, and neither have to face the issue of impracticality that consists within it.  
While the majority of the discourse on this topics refrains from defining 
sustainability, including the publication of World Commission on Environment and 
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Development, some of the discourse considers the definition of sustainability as an 
obligation on us to ensure that the “average quality of life [such as]… nature’s 
instrumental value… be shared by all generations” (Asheim, 1994:4). However, as 
this study has taken a perspective different to current literature, therefore we have to 
define sustainability independent of the obligation to infinite future generations.   
Overall, the concept of sustainability has an inherent vagueness to it, therefore there is 
still no clear agreement of its scientific definition; there are few indicators acting as 
tools of measurement, however there is no clear understanding about the goals of 
sustainability (Phillis and Andriantiatsaholiniaina, 2001:435-436). The discourse 
committed to defining sustainability advocate diverse perspectives, some 
conceptualise this concept from the point of understanding the optimum level of 
population that can be supported by the environment, such as Mitchell (1971), and 
Watt (1977), while others consider sustainable growth as zero economic growth or 
maximum economic growth, such as Thurow (1980), Georgescu-Roegen (1971), Daly 
(1980), and Boulding (1966). Then, there are those that instead of defining 
sustainability, they focus on characteristics of a sustainable society, such as 
Goldsmith (1972), Brown (1981), Milbrath (1984) and Pirages (1977). There is also 
some discourse, notably by Julian Simon (1998), which stresses that only measure of 
scarcity of any resource is the continuous increase in prices, and then uses empirical 
data on commodity prices to suggest that that is not the case or point towards the 
example of food production matching the rate of population increase (Lam, 2005:113-
114), and he continues on to assert that historically human beings have always 
avoided Malthusian scarcity via substitution mostly through technological 
advancements, therefore sustainability in not a significant issue (Toman, 2006:248), 
whilst others, such as Pearson (1985), think the notion of sustainability is important, 
but the concept is elusive.  
The criticism on the notion of sustainability largely depends in the context it is 
defined. Toman (2006:248-249) suggests three major conceptual issues that needs to 
be addressed in a definition of sustainability: the notion of fairness, clear 
understanding of what is to be sustained, and a reliance on the human impact relative 
to capacity of environment to sustain humans. The notion of fairness is taken in the 
context of dividing economic benefits and costs between present and future 
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generations “according to some representative set of individual performance” 
(Toman, 2006:248), with a clear understanding of what is it that ought to be sustained, 
accompanied with the clear reliance on either the economist perspective of 
dependency on human skill to innovate substitute of resources or ecologist suggestion 
of proactive management of resources at a safe level. 
This study defines sustainability as the ability of external realm to support the 
existence of internal realms, by providing them with space and resources, of any kind, 
so internal realm can express its subjectivity in the space provided. This definition of 
sustainability needs to be understood in the context of the direction on which the 
external realm as a life form evolved.   
In context of three conceptual issues raised by Toman (2006), this research with a 
metaethical view of nature as intrinsically evil, consequently favours the economist’s 
notion of reliance of human ingenuity to alter the fabric of nature of converting it into 
good, which aligns this study with concept of anthropocentrism.38 The point of 
separation from economist’s notion on sustainability is that this study, by use of 
objectivist ethics, values life rather than economic progress, and therefore it takes a 
standpoint on sustainability of life in its entirety, and not the sustainability of 
economic progress, or ecological systems or current way of living. This makes this 
research different from majority of discourse on the topic. 
In regards to what needs to be sustained, this research asserts that: if we take the 
tangent on which the external realm has evolved over the known history; then we can 
call the gradual evolutionary progress as a direction, which is taken by evolution to 
sustain, support and preserve the traditions and the environment. We can then argue 
that the course on this direction was metaphysical set by the perpetuity of shared 
ethos, which has the pockets of divine revealed guidance embedded in it along with 
all the good produced by all the human kind over our history.   
The tangent followed by the gradual evolutionary progress of external realm may be 
nigh impregnable concept to define. However, there are many measures through 
which we can map this tangent. In an effort to map this tangent, we are starting from 
the time of Socrates, where he was condemned because of exercising his Daimon 
                                                      
38 Evaluating reality exclusively from perspective of human values.  
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(internal realm) in opposition of accepting the morality of Oracle of Delphi (external 
realm). We are approaching this concept from stand point of classic theory of internal 
and external sovereignty, and sovereignty has essential rights (Hobbes, Martinich and 
Battiste, 2011:285). These rights in case of external and internal realm are the rights 
of survival and right to express their subjectivism in the space and time allocated to 
them. The incident of Socrates marked a major shift in, what later developed to be the 
recognition of sovereignty of internal realm, while the recognition of sovereignty of 
external realm maybe traced back to the ancient societies with “a continuous and 
uninterrupted line of development” (Gurvitch, 2000:95) of civil law. Since Socrates, 
there has been a gradual acknowledgement of simultaneous sovereignty of both 
realms. This recognition has translated in the increase in the space for internal realm, 
and decrease in the space of external realm. While, this increase in the space of 
internal realm and decrease in the space of external realm fluctuates from society to 
society, however, over time, we have globally consented on the absolute restrictions 
for each realm, where the other realm should not intervene. In case of internal realm 
these restrictions are in the form of human rights, while for external realm they are 
imbedded in the global conventions on collective human heritage. Table 5.1 depicts 
the gradual legal recognition of sovereignty and equality of internal realms. The 
tangent followed by the gradual evolutionary progress of external realm has been such 
that it has over the period provided more space and resources to internal realms, and 
have intervened less in their subjectivity. This evolutionary progress has resulted in 
gradual decrease in such conflicts between the two realms that may threaten each 
other’s existence. The gradual decrease in the conflict between the realms can be 
measured.  
For example, Pinker’s (2011) empirical analysis, which looks at different cultures, 
communities, race, religion, democratic and non-democratic states around the world 
and examines the timeline of: rate of death in warfare, homicide rate, death as a result 
of quarrels, judiciary torture, rate of capital punishment and state sponsored 
executions, rate of death in state-based and non-state based conflicts, hate crime 
murders and nonlethal hate crimes, death in Islamic and world conflicts, domestic 
violence and assaults, timeline of laws propagating violent punishments, rate of 
abortion and child abuse, time line for the decriminalization of discriminatory laws, 
interpretation of animal cruelty in media, Flynn effect of raising IQ and evolution of 
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tolerance, empathy and reason in human brain and timeline of vegetarianism and 
feminism, concludes that there is not just continuous reduction in violence, but “the 
global trends … in violence at many scales, viewed from the vantage point of the 
present, point downward” (Pinker, 2011:30). Pinker’s (2011:29) analysis also suggest 
that the “decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that 
tolerate or glorify violence”. Pinker’s (2011) work is not an isolated study in this area, 
as many other empirical researches all conclude similar attributes, such as Crafts 
(1997) compares the data from human development index and looks at human 
wellbeing since 1870 to suggest similar trend, while many other studies, for instance 
Prados-De-La-Escosura’s (2000) examination of timeline of trends in GDP, Crayen 
and Baten’s (2010) mapping of timeline of global trends in numeracy, and Riley’s 
(2001) investigation of the global rise in life expectancy, support and extend Pinker’s 
(2011) findings.    
In terms of the metaethical view constructed earlier, the above facts transpire that the 
external realm is tangent of evolutionary development follows a path where external 
realm is continuously recognising the autonomy of internal realm, by providing it 
more resources and space to express its subjectivity. For example, a child born in 
today’s world is not forced into the same profession as his forefathers, unless he/she 
chooses to do so. In other words, the authority of ancestral heritage is replaced by the 
authority of inner subjectivity. The tangent also follows a path where external realm is 
fencing the space and resources that are essential of its own existence and should be 
out of the reach of any internal realm, such as UN’s constructed notion of common 
human heritage. The metaethical view rationalises the direction of this tangent as 
something that was and is materialised by the perpetuity of shared ethos.   
It is, therefore, the continuous development in this direction that needs to be 
sustained, along with the ability of external realm to support the future internal realms 
by providing them with resources and space. In other words, what needs to be 
sustained is the external realm’s ability to support the life form of internal realms 
within the perpetuity of temporary existence, and the level of support should be such 
that it is coherent with the tangent of evolutionary development followed by the 
external realm over the history.  
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This notion is antithesis to the existing idea within the literature on environmental 
sustainability, which attempts to freeze the developed ecological terrain of earth as it 
asserts to “keep the future in the style to which we have become accustomed that 
(Solow, 1974:16), or from the thesis that argues that infinite number of future 
generations should have an equal right in current resources (Asheim et al., 2001).  
In spite of being different from the existing concepts on sustainability, this construct 
satisfies the very basic criteria set for defining sustainability. Brown et al. (1987:717) 
suggest that criterion for defining sustainability is that in the narrowest sense it should 
propagate “the indefinite survival” of the human beings, while in the broad sense it 
mean that human beings  “once born, live to adulthood and that their lives have 
quality beyond mere biological survival”, while Tonn (2009:429) argues the principal 
criteria should be standard of fairness, that ensure that: “risks imposed on the 
potential existence of future generations should not be greater than the risk of death 
accepted by current generations”. 
Alongside safeguarding the survival of homosapiens and other life forms on earth into 
the distant future (Tonn, 2007:1098), Slaughter (1994:1084-1085) concludes two 
basic themes, one is that the definition of sustainability should include some sense 
compensation for the future generations for any disadvantage caused by our actions, 
and the definition should also provide initiation for “the process of safe-guarding … 
options… on which all future generations depend”.  
The basic theme in these criterions is the survival of life for infinite timescale, in a 
form that the quality of life is beyond mere survival and fairness in the distribution of 
risk between present and future generations. This study, by valuing life, instead of the 
habitat, and by narrowing the concept of sustainability to sustainability of external 
realm fulfils these criterions. The external realm, within its current stage, provides 
resources more than required for just biological survival, and the concept of fairness 
is grounded in the tangent of evolutionary development of external realm, as the only 
responsibility present generation has is to not to undo or reverse the direction of this 
tangent, if they manage to develop it further then that is an extra input on their end. In 
other words, the obligation is to sustain the external realm and to sustain the 
evolutionary developed state of the external realm.  
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Morality based on value of life propagates the perseverance of every life form, but 
through division of internal and external realm, the obligation to sustain a life form is 
on that life form, but obligation to ensure continuation of specie is on external realm. 
The population of specie may be reduced or increased based on what is sustainable 
for existence of external realm. For example, it is individual moral reasonability of a 
human to ensure its own survival; same way the external realm, as an independent life 
form, is responsible for its own survival, and within this survival lays the survival of 
species. If human population threatens the existence of external realm, then it is a 
moral obligation to intervene and work towards reducing it. In doing so, external 
realm would be intervening in the space of internal realm and infringing its right 
under the condition that it is necessary to do so for the survival of external realm. This 
is the same moral obligation which external realm must exercise when HIV virus, an 
independent life form, threatens the existence of human species, and by threatening 
human species, threatens the existence of external realm. This notion when expressed 
in the context of Thomas Hobbes ‘contractarianism’ of (Darwall, 2002), and Rawl’s 
‘contractualism’ (Rawls, 2000) translates as, all social, spoken or unspoken, contracts, 
conventions and norms stand until they threaten the existence of external realm.  
Sustainability of external realm is the measure of value, as the value is life, and 
external realm is the vehicle that supports all life forms. Maintenance, if not further 
growth, of tangent followed by the gradual evolutionary progress of external realm is 
vital because it provides the protection to all the internal realms from being unduly 
violated by external realm, especially since the sustainability of external realm is the 
measure of value. It also forms the criteria for intervention, as Pinker (2011) asserts 
that although external realm has developed along this tangent, the nature of this 
unmistakable development is such that although it is “visible on scales from millennia 
to years… but… it is not guaranteed to continue” (Pinker 2011:26) on the current 
tanged.  
With this restriction of maintaining the tangent and with sustainability of external 
realm as a measure of value, it could be decided when and to what extent an external 
realm can intervene in space of internal realm. These criteria may also be used to 
decide the optimal boundaries between the external realm and internal realm, that is 
the socio, economic and political areas where Socrates’ Daimon over writes the 
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Oracle of Delphi and the areas where Oracle of Delphi has superiority over Socrates’ 
Daimon, and the occasions when it is moral responsibility of Oracle of Delphi to 
intervene in the space of Socrates’ Daimon and attempt to correct the moral 
stickiness.   
5.3.2 Dry Run of Objectivist Subjectivism 
The above purposed mechanism, in operational sense, means that every internal realm 
should be allowed to express as much subjectivity on as much space as possible, 
unless until their subjectivity threatens the sustainability of external realm, and in 
scenarios when it does threaten the survival of external realm, then there is a moral 
obligation on external realm to safeguard its survival via act of intervention. The only 
restriction on extending and scope of intervention is that the tangent on which 
external realm has been developing over the years is not reversed or diverted.  
Now we will attempt to dry run this concept within multiple scenarios. If we assume 
that 2007-2008 global financial crisis was a threat to the existence of external realm, 
then it was a moral obligation on the external realm to act in a manner to neutralise 
this threat, even when the act of intervention may cause greatest distress to greater 
number of people, because it is a moral obligation on part of external realm to act in a 
manner that benefits its survival. The only restriction on the actions of external realm 
would be the avoidance of any diversion or reversal of the tangent, for example the 
response to the financial crisis could not be forceful abolishment of private property 
or reversal of employment laws that were developed over centuries of struggle. As 
long as the tangent is not adjusted, the moral obligation is on individual internal 
realms, to act in a manner that favours their chances of survival within the time of 
greatest distress to greater number of people. If the initial assumption of financial 
crisis as a threat to the existence of external realm, is proved incorrect, then external 
realm is under no moral obligation to act or intervene in the crisis, unless the crisis 
affects or has potential to affect the tangent. In such circumstances, the moral 
obligation is on internal realms to act in their survival, and if they do not act, and if 
their inaction endangers the existence of external realm, then external realm should 
intervene, but only to correct the moral stickiness of internal realms, so that their 
legitimate moral contents are correctly presented in their reflective morality, that is 
they, the internal realms, can act to secure their survival. A more variable example 
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would be: when a situation x arises due moral stickiness in y number of internal 
realms, then external realm would assess the situation x along with the consequences 
of further developments in situation x. The assessment would be in context of whether 
it is a threat to the survival of external realm, if it is a threat then external realm would 
need to choose such course of action, such as nudging or forceful intervention, that 
will neutralise the situation without adversely affecting the tangent. However, if X is 
not a threat then there is a moral obligation on external realm not to intervene in any 
way or form in the situation x.   
There are many methods through which one can assess what may or what may not 
adversely affect the chances of survival of external realm. The discussion on ways of 
ascribing truth-values to future assertions goes back to Aristotle’s work on assertorics 
in De Interpretatione (Whitaker, 2002:109-131), and over the centuries, there has 
been many development on this issue and currently there are multiple models with the 
discipline of Futurology through which the effects of possible future events can be 
measured. Delphi method, constructed and assembled as a research method and 
procedure for assessing future events in the work of Schmidt (1997), Dalkey, Brown, 
and Cochran (1969), and Linstone and Turoff (1975), is one of the tools that 
systematically identifies and priorities issues for decision making based on alternative 
future scenarios and especially useful in context “where judgmental information is 
indispensable” (Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004:15). ‘Causal Layered Analysis’ is another 
tool of similar kind that is used by numerous studies (Riedy, 2008), as it 
contextualises the past and present (Inayatullah, 2004), for “creating transformative 
spaces for the creation of alternative futures” (Inayatullah, 1998:815) with multilevel 
textual and non-textual analysis such as things such as social causes and worldview, 
to map empirical, interpretive and critical dimensions of future scenarios to provide 
an epistemological framework. These techniques maybe used alongside other 
qualitative and quantitative measures, such as ‘environmental scanning’ that examines 
trends that may affect the likelihood of an outcome, ‘PEST (or STEPS)’ that analysis 
internal and external political, economic, social, and technological factors at macro-
level to suggest viability of a solution in that context, and ‘scenario method’ that 
outlines the future for effective decision making. Using these tools possible effects of 
a current trend or a sudden event on future of external realm can be quantified, and 
through these tools, a decision for or against intervention maybe made. For decisions 
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on scope and scale of intervention, based on the tangent of evolutionary development, 
tools such as Causal Layered Analysis can used. There are many studies that use these 
methods in ways similar to the one purposed above: such as Riedy (2008) 
demonstrates the use of Causal Layered Analysis; (Riedy, 2008), Linstone and Turoff 
(1975) and Okoli and Pawlowski, (2004) expand on the Delphi method, while Peng 
and Nunes (2007), and Clulow (2005) use PEST analysis; Wright and Goodwin 
(2009) and Godet (1986) discuss the use of scenario analysis, and Jain (1984), 
Hambrick (1982), and Kroon (1995:50-83) concentrate on the use of environmental 
scanning.  
In view of the presented debate and also the mentioned methods, the approach 
constructed by this study is consistent with the dominant trend in this field in which 
monetary values is assigned to concepts such as environmental goods and services 
(Vatn and Bromley, 1994:129). After conceptualising the method of determining 
when external realm is morally obliged to intervene and the scope of the intervention, 
the issue that still needs to be addressed is that how this may be achieved, that is: 
what will be the efficient way for external realm, as a living organism, to act morally 
and protect its own survival without suffering from moral stickiness, in context of 
current framework that governs external realm? 
 
 
5.3.3 Reflections 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct such an epistemic source, which could 
resolve the epistemological crisis within the tradition, and provide a framework that 
could solve the current tension in the theory and practice of institutional intervention 
for subscribing good and prohibiting evil. The episteme constructed above, theory of 
objective subjectivism, attempts to do so, by providing a theory of value through 
which moral conduct of an activity can be graded and judged.    
So far, we have focused on the theological and philosophical foundations, which 
includes the origin of personal and public realms, and the interaction between the two. 
The theory of objective subjectivism creates a set of rules through which one can 
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define the moral obligation of a realm to intervene in the other realm. The proposed 
theory is also being in line with the requirements set by the MacIntyre (1998) for 
addressing the epistemological crisis. The epistemological crisis is discovered by this 
study whilst observing the theories and practice of institution of hisbah. The study 
discovered the use of legal theory as an ethical framework to judge the moral conduct 
of the society and the market is considered causing the issues discussed in Chapter 2. 
This chapter has so far constructed a theory of objectivist subjectivity, which could 
provide a standalone framework of normative ethics, hence eliminating the need for 
Islamic tradition to use juristic subjectivity and Islamic legal theory. However, one of 
the important requirement argued in the previous chapter is the continuation of a 
single life form of the Islamic tradition.  
While the discussion so far is focused on constructing the epistemic source of 
morality, along with an explanation of its operations, this study does not address the 
requirement of ‘continuation of single life’, to suggest that the adoption of the theory 
of objectivist subjectivity by the Islamic tradition will not hinder the continuation of 
single life form of the Islamic tradition. 
5.4 OBJECTIVE SUBJECTIVISM, INSTITUTION OF HISBAH AND 
CONTINUATION IN ISLAMIC THOUGHTS 
The issue with current framework of governance in Islamic thought is that the system 
of value it follows is derived from public choice and it is not based on objectivist 
ethics’ notion that value is ought to be derived from the standard and purpose of life; 
consequently, when internal realms, through public choice, agrees on a policy, it 
naturally favours the survival of internal realm, and consequently it has very less or 
no consideration of external realm. There are many studies that empirically observe 
this and theoretically explain it as a rational choice for internal realms, from the 
perspective of internal realms.   
5.4.1 The Dispossessed Road to Institutionalisation 
Zarsky (2002:34-35) examines that variance of regulations in the highly similar 
industrialised countries, and notices that regulations on human rights are far more 
consistent, as compared to environmental regulations. The reason of this policy gap in 
environmental regulations, and lack of it in basic human rights regulations is 
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explained by Vatn and Bromley (1994:129-130), where they analyse a various 
empirical studies on the preference reversals and conclude that value of 
environmental goods are not valued by individuals same as they may value human 
rights, as individual valuate and weigh different attributes of environmental factors. 
Due to this, Oates and Portney (2003:332-334) while investigating the political 
economy of environmental policies suggest that because of this issue, the current 
framework of environmental policies is not a result of pure public choice, but rather a 
consequence of efforts of few interest group that were able to lobby the government, 
in spite of this effort, they suggest that the tone of regulations is set to such a 
frequency that they produce inefficient measures in protecting the environment, and 
interest groups on realisation of this, are currently trying to rally public support, 
however, that is turning out to be difficult after the last financial crisis, because the 
trade-off for ecological objectives can result in economic growth. Kirchgassner and 
Schneider (2003:373), in their empirical analysis, observe that voters prefer pure 
economic objectives, in competition of choice with environmental objectives.  
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992a; 1992b), Gregory et al. (1993), Edward (1986), 
Gregory and McDaniels (1987), and many others have discussed the dominant moral 
dimension of sustainability, and the issue it creates when subjected to the value 
judgment through public choice or in the evaluation by contingent valuation. Carson’s 
(1997:145) examination shows that empirical evidence points that the “public policy 
issues are generally sensitive to the specifics of … the societal conditions at the time 
the question is asked.” 
When individuals make decisions, their rationality is limited to the information 
available to them, which is known as ‘bounded rationality’. Vatn and Bromley 
(1994:134) argues that large body of evidence points towards this ‘bounded 
rationality’ of internal realms and then further asserts that the solution to bounded 
rationality in societal processes is “Contextual devices- institutions- are constructed to 
help people through this problem”.  
The environmental goods are non-market goods, as market cannot correctly measure 
the value of these goods. In addition, the public choice institutions with their current 
mechanism for evaluation of goods also do not favour the correct evaluation of the 
environmental goods, as the current mechanism is sensitive to other outside factors, 
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such as economic conditions, which can influence towards an adverse evaluation of 
environmental goods; and market mechanisms evaluation of goods, by measuring 
monetary trade-offs, which are subject to marginal concepts, such as marginal utility, 
marginal value and marginal benefits. When environmental goods, according to the 
theory of value presented by this research, are not measured by utility to internal 
realms or present generations, then the implementation of policies on sustainability 
should also not be subject to the institutions of public choice or market mechanisms, 
as notion of human rights is not, theoretically, dependent on the decisions of 
institutions of public choice or market mechanisms.   
The policies on sustainability could be included in the statute as a ‘supremacy clause’, 
through the philosophical stance of rule of law, similar to bill of rights in American 
constitution (Cass, 2003) and by using United Nations’ stance to rule of law 
(Brownlie, 1998). However, the issue with such approach is that the notion of 
sustainability constructed in this chapter is not based on the saving of habitat, but the 
ability of external realm to support future life forms, this makes understanding of 
‘what is to be sustained’ and ‘how it may be sustained’, relative to the condition of 
external realm. Therefore, due to the relative and non-universal nature of this 
construct, it cannot be implemented through the philosophy of rule of law, by 
declarations and conventions.   
The conceptualisation of ‘quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation’ in 1967, 
followed by their proliferation in developing and developed world was a result of a 
need to fill the gap within the current governance framework of nation states, where 
neither the public choice institutions, nor the market forces can be used to regulatory 
tools, as discussed by Van Thiel (2004), Willetts (1996) and Hogwood (1995). 
Sustainability is a concept, which lies in that grey area, where an independent quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organisation is required to objectively and externally 
providing the regulations required for preservation of external realm. The provision of 
powers to such quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation is dependent on 
existing structure of political system within a state. However, this study is proposing 
that the formation of regulations should be independent and autonomous to the market 
and public choice institutions.  
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The institutionalisation of objective morality and autonomous regulating of society 
and market, independent of government and market forces, by taking a position of an 
external observer, was historically theorised in form of institution of hisbah, which is 
the core of this study. This feature of having an objective view on morality and then 
total autonomy is key feature of hisbah. It was this key feature that exists in theory 
and notion of hisbah and lacked in the practice of hisbah, that became the rationale 
for criticism of institution of hisbah by historians, where they claimed that the 
institution of hisbah was not able to realise its true potential, as discussed in the 
Chapter 2 and as discoursed by Mundy and Riesenberg (1958:87), Buckley, (1999:9), 
Glick (1972) and others.  
Institution of hisbah, therefore, can use the proposed model, while keeping its identity 
and purpose, as an institution of public morality, responsible for regulating society 
and market, using an objective notion of morality, which is neither dependent of 
timely desire of populace, nor overly sensitive to the appeal of the market forces. 
Considering that the institution of hisbah is a by-product of Islamic thoughts, only 
matter that requires further discussion is the evidence of continuation of Islamic 
thoughts as a single life form within the proposed ethics of objective subjectivism. 
This discussion is not required for establishing the legitimacy or authority of objective 
subjectivism, because the objective subjectivism uses categorical moral reasoning to 
establish the value and then uses the consequential moral reasoning to measure it, and 
therefore the legitimacy and authority is drawn from mix of categorical imperative 
and consequential obligations. The argument for the continuation of Islamic thoughts 
is essential, because the strands and pointers used in the construction of objective 
subjectivism are grounded in the Islamic thoughts, and therefore this discussion is an 
implicit case for acceptability of objective subjectivism as a slice in the evolution of 
Islamic thoughts.  
5.4.2 Objective Subjectivism Grounded in Perpetuation of Islamic Thoughts  
For the purpose of ensuring the continuation of ‘single life form’ of Islamic thought, 
an attempt is made in line with the above debate to use Haidt’s (2013) ‘moral 
foundation theory’ to deconstruct and understand the essence of Islamic thoughts. The 
reason for opting for this theory is that it uses ‘social intuitionalist model’, and goes 
beyond the rationalist model by taking into account conscious moral reasoning and 
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unconscious moral reasoning based on intuition and spirituality, as demonstrated by 
Keefer (2013), Maxwell and Narvaez (2013), Graham et al. (2013) and others.  
The use of ‘social intuitionalist model’ in moral foundation theory, provides us with a 
tools for describing the process through which the moral judgements in Islamic 
thoughts were constructed consciously or unconsciously, which will give us 
weighable evidence, in form of epistemic justification to conclude the ontological 
existence of tendencies in Islamic thought that are the strands of essence of Islamic 
thoughts.  
This study, therefore, suggests that when we examine epistemic justification 
alongside strands of essence, we can suggest, with weighable evidence, that the moral 
judgements of Islamic thoughts provide point of orientation to its followers, through 
which they, the followers, can objectively view the options that increase their chances 
of survival. Hence, it is this notion of survival that this study carries forward in the 
construction of ‘objectivist subjectivism’ and hence warrants the continuation of 
Islamic thoughts, whilst providing a new point of orientation, based on the notion of 
survival, which address the current epistemological crisis in the Islamic thought. The 
rationale for presenting the case for ‘objectivist subjectivism’ with such tangled line 
of reasoning is that this line of reasoning allows us to argue that considering all the 
current sources used for the purpose of governance in Islamic thoughts are obsolete, is 
not same as suggesting the end of line for Islamic thoughts. By keeping the Islamic 
thought alive, while stripping it of its legalistic morality, allows this research to claim 
distinctiveness from the existing paradigms that also aim to address the 
epistemological crisis. This distinctiveness is discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
The Figure 5.1 depicts the visual representation of the proposed model, within which 
the constructed episteme could be used for the institutional intervention by the 
institution of hisbah for judging the moral conduct of activities in the market and in 
the society. For the purpose of comparison, Figure 5.1 also visually represents the 
processes currently in use within the epistemological crisis, along with the processes 
if the constructed episteme is applied.  As can be seen in Figure 5.1, Haidt (2013) and 
Graham et al. (2013) assert that our genes write the first draft of morality, and then it 
is “organized in advance of experiences” (Haidt, 2013:308) and the five moral 
foundations that specify the reorganisation of morality to create moral diversity are: 
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care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/ betrayal, authority/subversion, and 
sanctity/degradation. Figure 5.1 expresses the challenges, emotions and virtues 
attached to each of the five moral foundations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Modelling Institutional Intervention by Hisbah for Judging Moral 
Conduct of Activities in the Market and Society 
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 Source: Adapted from Haidt (2013) and Graham et al., 2013) (modified version) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, Haidt (2013:317) argues that the foundation of 
care/harm “is not universalist; it is more local, and blended with loyalty”, such as 
pooling of funds to support locals. The theoretical principle that evolved in Islamic 
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thoughts to express the concerns of this moral foundation is doctrine of maqasid al-
shari’ah (purpose of the law), which revolves around protecting different categories, 
because they are important for individuals and for society’s survival, while the 
practical principle is zakat that attempts to provide some financial support to the 
needy. The foundation and essence of care/harm is approached from the perspective 
of intent of lawgiver in Islamic tradition, as explored by Raysūnī (2005) and Al-Attar 
(2010), and the system approach is used for broad application of this foundation in 
Islamic tradition, as examined by Auda (2008). 
Haidt (2013:320), while discussing fairness/cheating, and the origins of morality from 
evolutionary perspective, suggests “‘selfish’ genes can give rise to generous creatures, 
as long as those creatures are selective in their generosity”. The concept of zakat, for 
example, teaches and preaches selective generosity, as the category of recipients is 
limited; moreover, the protection created in the doctrine of maqasid al-Shari’ah is 
also limited. At time of development of Islamic thoughts the environment was not a 
concern, therefore there is no protection for it in the doctrine, which creates an 
epistemological crisis in modern times, as discoursed in previous chapter. The 
concept of fairness/cheating acts as a major foundation stone in Islamic theology, the 
concept of God, the reckoning in hereafter and most Islamic religious or social 
practices revolve around it, and it is this concept, which motivates and legally bounds 
the polity to the previous foundation of care/harm. The tradition approaches to these 
two foundations as: it is within the rights of divine that one should be fair with the 
fellow creatures, and the fairness is understood with the foundation of care/harm. The 
fellow creatures are a very broad; therefore, it is defined and restricted through the 
foundation of loyalty/betrayal in Islamic thoughts, as Islamic tradition creates a room 
for exercise of hostility. Haidt (2013:328), whilst tracing the evolutionary basis for 
the notion of loyalty/betrayal, refers to studies such as of Boehm (1999), (2012) and 
Goodall (1986), and asserts that: 
human beings are not the only species that engages in war or kills its own kind. It 
now appears that chimpanzees guard their territory, raid the territory of rivals, and, 
if they can pull it off, kill the males of the neighboring group and take their 
territory and their females. 
The Islamic thoughts developed in medieval times, provide strong basis for acts of 
hostility, which are grounded in the impression of loyalty towards fellow Muslims 
and loyalty towards god, which is then equally balanced with hostility towards 
   261 
apostate and traitors of community or god. The theological concepts in Islamic 
thoughts that use loyalty/betrayal foundation, are actually identifying the terms of 
who to trust and team up with, for creating a cohesive coalition of individuals, and 
Islamic thoughts focus the hostility towards any notion or individual that is 
considered a threat to this cohesive coalition. The cohesive coalition is necessary for 
creating an atmosphere of care driven by a unique understanding of fairness, as 
explored by Ibn-Khaldun (1950:76) under the title of asabiyyah (social cohesion 
achieved through the concept of brotherhood in Islam). 
The cohesive coalition is not achievable just through the divine authority and threat of 
repercussions in hereafter, as Islamic political authority subject related scholars, such 
as Al-Mawardi (1996), created human authority, by theologically engineering 
argument for authoritative class and classified the subordination of this class as a 
religious duty. The theological arguments were mainly based on the principal of 
inequality of human beings, where discrimination was either created based on 
superiority of bloodline or on the social class such as rulers, religious clergy and so 
on, as discussed in Chapter 2. Boehm (1999; 2012), Haidt (2013) and Graham et al. 
(2013) examine that authority not just raw power, but the socially constructed 
authorities is considered as human beings and within animal kingdom are responsible 
for maintaining order and justice, and the status quo of authority is rigorously 
protected. The barring of commanding good and forbidding evil to the ruling class is 
one of the examples of these protections in Islamic thought, as discussed by Al-
Ghazzali (1982b:245). Schaller and Park (2011) illustrates the manner in which the 
concept of disgust acts as a behavioural immune system, and Islamic thoughts not 
only creates a comprehensive concept of disgust, but also impose dietary 
requirements, and incorporate cleanliness as a religious practice, to provide a 
thorough framework for foundation of sanctity. The foundation of sanctity also has a 
spiritual dimension, where different attitudes and attributes such as envy are 
theologically discouraged to create a healthy mental state, along with healthy physical 
condition.  
The above argument, on equality, connects the strands of essence in Islamic thoughts 
to moral foundation theory, which holds to the principal that moral diversities are 
created due to diverse conditions, as the communities construct their morality to value 
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the things that benefit their survival. Approaching moral discourse in Islamic thoughts 
from ‘moral foundation theory’ and ‘social constructivism’, allows us to suggest, 
argue and assert that Islamic thoughts developed under a similar principle that is: to 
value what supports the survival. If we assume this connection to be correct, then we 
can argue that any neo-moral paradigm designed and developed to replace the 
existing understanding of morality in Islamic thoughts, will be and can be considered 
as continuity of Islamic thoughts, as long as it also attempts to value what supports 
the survival.  
The notion that the model in Figure 5.1 constructed by this research addresses the 
epistemological crisis, while ensuring the continuation of Islamic thoughts is 
grounded on the above argument, as demonstrated in the Figure 5.1.  
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This aim of this research is to explore governance within Islamic thought in the form 
of the institution of hisbah as well as exploring the episteme that is the cause of the 
recognised and unrecognised incoherencies and inconsistencies in the theories, 
regulations, and laws associated with the institution of hisbah. The Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 highlighted that the source of problems is the application of legal theory 
within the ethical settings. In addition, Chapter 4 discovered that the legal theory 
heavily relies on the juristic subjectivism, which is the root cause of the problems 
discovered within theories and operations of the institution of hisbah.  
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a framework which can be used as an 
epistemic source for judging the moral conduct of activities within the society and the 
market. The ability of this framework to judge the moral conduct provides the 
theological grounds for institutional intervention, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
In this chapter, we first argued for the metaphysical grounds in the sense that there is 
a coherency between the philosophical and theological foundations of the new 
episteme. Before approaching the problem of value and goodness, we first discussed 
the interaction between personal and public realms. This approach was used to ensure 
that the new episteme does not contradict with the tradition as a ‘single life form’. 
Thereafter, we proposed the theory of value, in form of ‘objective subjectivism’, 
which has a normative dimension to it. The normative dimension of theory is 
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necessary, because lack of normative direction in the current state of Islamic tradition 
is such an issue that was raised during the examination of the theories of hisbah, as 
explored in previous chapters.   
The ‘objective subjectivism’, provides institution of hisbah, with a point of 
orientation, of when the institution needs to intervene in the market and society, along 
with the extent and scope of the intervention. It does so, by suggesting the notion of 
sustainability of external realm as a measure of value for distinguishing between the 
important and unimportant facts in non-spiritual socio economic matters, and then 
using this measure to categorically conclude things as good or bad in this world, in 
the new metaphysical picture that underpins fact–value distinction (Brinkmann, 
2004:61) that is not utopian (Crawford, 2004:11). This framework of governance uses 
the episteme that was alien to the tradition in the period of epistemological crisis. The 
study suggests a new criterion for moral judgement through objectivist subjectivity, 
which forms the new episteme.  This provides a new method of enquiry and a form of 
argumentation that may identify good and bad within market and society, along with a 
scale to suggest the intervention required for subscribing of that good or forbidding of 
that evil. This follows the recommendations of MacIntyre (1998:362), who advocates 
that by providing the above we can address and resolve the epistemological crisis, 
until the time the newly suggested episteme exhausts itself, as every episteme follows 
a cycle and eventually takes a tradition towards an epistemological crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6:  
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
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6.1. SUMMARISING THE RESEARCH 
The first task of this research was to study the history of institution of hisbah by using 
critical discourse analysis. During this initial phase, this study highlighted 
development of the institution of hisbah by observing the evolution of the institution 
and its market inspectors. We cited the pre-existence of role of market inspector with 
similar duties in pre-Islamic Arabia and in Greek civilisation. However, due to lack of 
historical evidence on cultural borrowing and traceable development of hisbah from a 
concept to an institution within the history of Islamic tradition, we concluded hisbah 
as a concept intrinsically original to the tradition. Whilst, observing the evolution of 
practice of hisbah and its development as an institution, from the standpoint of social 
constructivism, we uncovered the socioeconomic and political dynamics that 
influenced the manner in which the hisbah was developed. We also highlighted the 
institutional failures of hisbah, which were mainly caused by the political economy 
framework, within, which the hisbah as an institution operated. Among the failures, 
the most vital were the charges of corruption and lack of accountability of hisbah 
officials.  
Whilst the political turmoil experienced historically accounts for some accounts of 
corruption, there seemed to be flaw in the theoretical infrastructure and philosophy, 
which we explored by analysing the theories on hisbah. The contemporary discourse 
on hisbah is written using hermeneutics methodology by mostly religious apologetics, 
while the classic literature does have narratives on hisbah. However, the classic 
literature are dispersed within the work of scholars and we were unable to find 
theories compiled with a single publication. In some cases such as Ibn-Taymiyah’s 
work on hisbah, the discourse focuses on theological construct and metaphysical side 
rather than the institutionalised nature of hisbah. Therefore, we collected the 
prevailing themes on hisbah within the works of Al-Mawardi, Ibn-Taymiya, and Al-
Ghazzali, and we deconstructed the model proposed by each of these scholars. 
Thereafter, we analysed it by comparing them against the institutional operational 
failures of hisbah. These scholars were mainly chosen due to the availability of 
discourse on hisbah developed by them. However, the unique background and life 
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history of these scholars provided interesting similarities on the concept of hisbah as 
an institution and as a duty.  
The conclusion of this comparison is that the theory purposed by these scholars do not 
provide much safeguarding against the failures, and in some cases, such as in al-
Ghazzali’s model, the purposed model is almost not practically implementable, or in 
al-Mawardi’s case motivated by the political conditions of his time. Consequently, 
from the perspective of current era these models should be considered as obsolete. As 
a result, we focused on the hisbah manuals, which are essentially collection of 
regulations implemented by the institution in the past, and were constructed using 
Islamic legal theories.  
A theoretical enquiry, with an empirical dimension, into the traceable episteme of 
goodness within the regulations is conducted on an eleventh century manual. Enquiry 
consisted of two layers of analysis. The results of the first layer are that most of the 
regulations, about eighty five percent, adjust a social or market action, which is not 
intrinsically good, that is: it is not good for its own sake, but it drawn goodness 
endogenous of it. The second layer of analysis suggested that highest concentration of 
regulations is focused on health and safety issues, almost forty percent, while the 
second highest are aimed at protecting of soul in the hereafter, while only less than 
four percent are intended for the protection of religious faith.  
The high concentration of regulations on health and safety confirm the findings of 
historians, such as Glick, Gotein, Buckley, Tyan and so on, that most of the time 
institution of hisbah was operating merely as a municipal authority; politically 
restricted and structurally disabled. The combination of the two layers, therefore, 
suggest that sixty-five percent of regulations aimed at protecting the extrinsic 
goodness, and over ninety-six percent of regulation within the category of health and 
safety also have extrinsic goodness. The high concentration of extrinsically good 
regulations aimed at health and safety can be rationalised, as the goodness drawn 
from the notion of protection of human life can translate in many ways within the 
regulations. However, the regulations on protection of the soul were not expected to 
be low in intrinsic goodness. It should be noted that the primary sources of Islamic 
law were used as criteria of intrinsic and extrinsic good, and with inferior intrinsic 
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good in regulations, our enquiry moved on investigating the link that connects 
extrinsic good with goodness, which in this case are legal theories in Islamic law.  
We examined the sources of law and the possible rationale, along with its ontological 
authority, in extensive use of the principles of ‘selection of the better course’ and 
‘public interest’ that are extremely dependent on the juristic cognition and the 
predated Islamic thought on sociological, psychological and ethical matters. This 
examination concluded that there is an epistemological crisis in the tradition, which 
extends to crisis in morality and crisis in legitimacy.  
With these crises in mind, the research continued on constructing a possible solution 
to the crises in the form of designing a new episteme along with ensuring the 
continuation in the life-form of tradition. For this, we first suggested an indivisible 
essence of the tradition, and then used it in conjunction with classical theories on 
sovereignty, objectivist ethics and narratives of sustainability in ecology to construct 
the theory of objective subjectivism.    
Overall the conclusion to the research question, that is: ‘What are the causes, within 
the method of enquiry and episteme of Islamic tradition that produces values, which 
were also historically used for governance by the institution of hisbah, that are 
contradictory to the value judgement of modernity?; and ‘what is the nature of schema 
that is required for continuation of the continuity in the evolution of the tradition?’, is 
that: there is an epistemological crisis, which fuels crisis in legitimacy and crisis in 
morality, within the tradition, and it is this crisis which is the main cause of the values 
contradictory to the value judgement of modernity. The solution of this crisis is the 
replacement of current episteme and method of enquiry of the tradition, and we have 
purposed the theory of objective subjectivism, which can act as a schema for the new 
episteme and resolve the crisis. Therefore, the third hypothesis, which was ‘the causes 
are recognisable and solution, in form of a schema, that provides the continuity in the 
evolution of the tradition is constructible’, is considered as valid. While, by mapping 
the inconsistencies in the operations of hisbah, and the incoherence in its theories, the 
first hypothesis was proved wrong. Thereafter, by using MacIntyre’s (1998) work as 
based argument for creating a solution for these inconsistencies and incoherence, and 
thereof constructing a new episteme; this research also invalidated the second 
hypothesis.  
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6.2. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH 
As mentioned, this research, with intention of understanding the issue of governance 
within Islamic thought, investigated the historical theories and operations of 
institution of hisbah, and explored and analysed the issues faced by the institution in 
the past. In addition, this study traced the problems in general and in particular in 
hisbah to an existing epistemological crisis in the Islamic thought within the roam of 
governance. Then we examined every form of epistemic setting currently theorised 
within the Islamic thoughts, and argued that all of these setting produce 
epistemological crisis.  
The result of deconstruction of hisbah manuals and theories of hisbah, was similar to 
the ones predicted by King et al. (1994), and Taylor and Littleton (2006); as the 
method of this enquiry was design to “un- earth enormous amounts of information… 
with a rounded or comprehensive account” (King et al., 1994:4). The result, therefore, 
was that, we were able to suggest existence of an incoherence of good within 
subscribing of good and subsequently an ambiguity on existence of evil within 
forbidding of evil. Thereof, by including the socio-political-historical context, this 
research explored the existence of this incoherence throughout the body of the 
tradition, and from there we inferred the existence of this incoherence as one of the 
main obstacle in evolution of the tradition, which by definition affected the 
governance and operation of hisbah institution.  
In a process of exploring this incoherence, the study formulated the model for 
operations of hisbah in Chapter 3, individually purposed by Ibn Taymiyah, Al 
Ghazzali and Al Mawardi. The framework proposed by each of these Islamic 
scholars, previously existed in fragmented form within their authorship; therefore, 
after surveying the literature, the study gathered the relevant material to construct the 
framework through step-by-step process in Chapter 5. The framework was then 
analysed in context of previously discovered incoherence and theological philosophy 
of hisbah, which resulted in the detection of traces of the incoherence within the 
proposed model of these scholars. The thesis thereafter focused on an eleventh 
century hisbah manual, which was widely quoted in other historical discourse and 
largely accepted by Islamic scholarship. For analysing the regulations within the 
manual, we first constructed a method of enquiry that can analytically and 
   268 
systematically examine the regulation by categorically separating the ‘good’, by using 
the work of Korsgaard (1997) and Tannenbaum (2010), that each regulation attempts 
on subscribing, with the episteme providing the source for cataloguing of that action 
as good, along with the separating the episteme is a hierarchy of the ontological 
authority of the episteme. Such method of enquiry was required, as it allowed this 
study to develop an understanding on the sources that have had large influence on 
categorisation of good and the theological authority of these sources. After 
constructing this method of enquiry and applying it on all the regulations listed in the 
selected hisbah manual, the result was that the top epistemological sources that 
provided bases for categorisation of good and then subscribing of it had very low 
ontological authority from theological perspective. This, consequently, inferred that 
the manual as a whole has a very low ontological authority and therefore asking for 
public abidance and conformity to these regulations on purely theological grounds is 
not justified, especially when the regulations may cause more socioeconomic 
problems then they solve, as historically observed.  
Thereupon, the study surveyed other possible episteme and listed the reason for why 
they cannot be used as epistemological sources for identifying good and evil. This 
transformed the incoherence into an epistemological crisis within the tradition, as 
predicted by MacIntyre (1977; 1998). We then investigated the depth of this crisis and 
in the process cited underlying crisis in morality and crisis of legitimacy within the 
tradition. 
The thesis then used MacIntyre (1977) guidelines on construction of new episteme to 
address the epistemological crisis, along with philosophical premises of Hawking and 
Mlodinow’s (2010:30-60) Model Dependent Realism, to develop ‘theory of objective 
subjectivism’ that can address all three crises and act as a sole episteme for providing 
criterion for distinguishing good and bad, from perspective of governance.    
MacIntyre (1998:362) asserts that the justification for the new episteme “will lie 
precisely in their ability to achieve”, while model-dependent realism (Hawking and 
Mlodinow, 2010:51) provides simplicity in a model, such as using the lowest arbitrary 
or adjustable elements to explain the complex observations as the major criteria for 
model’s acceptability.  
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The objective subjectivism uses the notion of sustainability to create a point of 
orientation, from which we may judge what is good and bad. This keeps the morality 
within the roams of universalism and objectivism, and outside from relativism. The 
rationale for calling it ‘objective subjectivism’ is that our - namely human beings’ - 
subjective view has objective effects on the sustainability of our and other’s life 
within that specific time and space, until it, the view, is forced to change by change in 
circumstance or by increase in our knowledge. However, until that change, this 
subjective view is objective, which is to be used as a criterion for differentiating good 
and bad, so that good maybe subscribed and that evil or bad maybe stopped through 
regulations, laws or policies.  
Having said that the conventional episteme of the Islamic tradition was not able to 
provide a universal and objective point of orientation that may act as a moral 
criterion, in spite of efforts to unify and universalise juristic subjectivism by creating 
theorising legal instruments, creating a veil of legitimacy by creating segregation of 
scholars on religious sects, by attempting to codify the law or by using coherence with 
historical legal opinions as test or by creating concepts of exception within exception 
as an exception to justify nominalistic nature of legal construction. The theory of 
objective subjectivism, however, offers a framework for universal and objective 
regulations, and by doing so fulfils the criteria set by model-dependent realism 
(Hawking and Mlodinow, 2010:30-51; MacIntyre, 1998:362). 
In process of constructing and justifying the objective subjectivism, we have also 
argued that this episteme offers a continuation in life-form of Islamic thoughts, by 
keeping intact the philosophical premises, such as a universal and objective approach 
to morality, which constitutes the underlying foundations of traditional approach to 
regulation of society and market. We have also suggested a metaphysical explanation 
for this at the end of Chapter 4, which by constructing concepts such as: perpetuity of 
temporary existence and divine contribution in human’s perpetuity of shared ethos, 
creates room for a doctrine ‘unknown’ (ghaib) and hence giving way for existence of 
reality outside of our comprehension, whilst arguing that such reality and discourse of 
and on that reality should not be part of epistemic sources that regulate the 
comprehensionable reality. 
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In summary, this research argued for existence of epistemological crisis in the Islamic 
tradition, within the realms of governance of society and market. In responding to the 
research question, this research concludes that the inconsistencies and incoherence 
within the Islamic tradition in the context of institution of hisbah are due to the use of 
juristic subjectivism and Islamic legal theory for judging the moral conduct of the 
activities in market and society. These inconsistencies and incoherencies can be 
addressed, by constructing a new episteme for the tradition, such as the on constructed 
within this thesis in the previous chapter.  
6.3. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCHEMAS FOR REVIVAL  
This research is not the first that argues for an ontological existence of crises in the 
tradition. The hints of crises was picked up at the time of al-Shafi, who attempted to 
address it by constructing a framework for legal theory, thereafter much scholarship 
have focused their attention on it. In recent times, Rudolph and Piscatori (1997), 
Donohue and Esposito (1982), Banuazizi and Weiner (1988), Khalid (2003), Iqbal 
(2003), Umar (2006), Lapidus (1967, 1988, 1996) and many other studies have also 
focused on it. In comparison, what makes our approach slightly unique is that this 
study instead of hinting a crisis in tradition, suggests that there is a crisis in 
epistemology within the tradition, which is anomaly, when it comes to life cycle of 
traditions, as according to MacIntyre (1998:362), every tradition will eventually face 
such crisis and it would require construction of a new episteme to resolve the crisis.  
Similar to studies hinting the existence of crisis, there are many attempts that tried to 
construct the next evolutionary step for Islamic tradition, which would take the 
tradition out of the state of crisis. Overall, there are four broad categories of such 
schemas, that is: traditionalists, secularists, modernist and fundamentalists, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. All of these schemas are reactive efforts to the value of 
judgement propagated by modernity. A number of secularist such as Shibli Shumayyil 
(1850–1917), Farah Antun (1874–1922), Ya’qub Suruf (1852–1917), Salama Musa 
(1887–1958) and others (Tamimi, 2007:45), aim to dissimilate the entire tradition, 
and such course of action furthers the crisis into an identity crisis. On the other hand, 
among others such as: Bennabi and Ghannouchi (as cited by Tamimi, 2007:54), 
attempt to engineer an explanation, using the classic episteme of tradition, to make 
room for the value of judgement of modernism within the classic episteme, which 
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takes the problem further into epistemological crisis, as discussed in Chapter 4, which 
is predicted by MacIntyre (1998:362). Hashemi (2009:2) examines this by suggesting 
that road out of this crisis “cannot avoid passing through the gates of religious 
politics… a critical reading of the historical record suggests [the recovery for crisis in 
other traditions]… emerged not in strict opposition to religious politics but often in 
concert with it”. 
This study, hence, coincides with Hashemi’s (2009:22) position, and therefore argues 
and takes the position that in societies, where ion is “key marker of identity”, the road 
to implementation of secularisation thesis has to come in accord with the religious 
tradition. While, the secularists take the tradition towards crises, the fundamentalists, 
who are product of modernism, attempt to dissimilate the actuality of reality, by 
radically enforcing the tradition’s value judgement on modernity as a solution for the 
reconciliation of the tradition and modernity (Elmessiri, 2000:57). The two schemas, 
which sufficiently negotiate with reality and concert with religion in an attempt to 
create a progressive development within the evolution of tradition, are the modernist 
and traditionalist. Hallaq (2004:42) investigates these schemas by arguing that:  
To put our argument more plainly, in order to rejuvenate the entire traditional 
system- in its founding principles, axioms, hermeneutics, and financial, educational, 
and madhhab institutions –it would be required that Islamic law be more than a dead 
“branch.” And this, in light of the intractable and well-nigh irreversible modernity 
and its imperatives, is a manifest impossibility. Since traditional shari’a can surely 
be said to have gone without return, the question that poses itself therefore is, can a 
form of Islamic law be created from with or without the ruins of the old system? 
In other words, the modernist and traditionalists attempt to reform from within the 
ruins of the old system, as modernists reform the legal theory, while traditionalist 
attempt to preserve whatever form of practical implementation of old system exists 
(Yavuz and Esposito, 2003). However, unlike the four schemes, this research attempts 
to reform without the ruins of the old system, but from within the tradition and it does 
so by conducting an epistemological enquiry, which cites crises and then uses 
discursive logic to construct a solution in the form of ‘objective subjectivism’. In 
doing so, it uses ecology to construct and assert this as “a guiding vision as to the end 
point” as suggested by Amin et al. (2012:15), and uses objectivist ethics as foundation 
to suggest a plan for a “legal infrastructure” (Kuran, 2003:415) through a model that 
is capable of pointing towards the goodness within the reality comprehensible within 
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this world. Overall, the method of enquiry and the schema of reformation constructed 
within this study make it different from the above schemes. 
The enquiry within this study was run, with three possible hypotheses, which are as 
follows: 
(iv) the causes, of the contradictory values of the tradition, are unrecognisable and 
therefore no resolution may be constructed or suggested; and 
(v) the causes are recognisable, but there is no solution that can provide the 
continuity in the evolution of the tradition; and 
(vi) the causes are recognisable and solution, in form of a schema, that provides the 
continuity in the evolution of the tradition is constructible. 
The examination of hisbah, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 demonstrated that the 
contradictory values of Islamic tradition are recognisable; therefore the first 
hypothesis is nullified. The deconstruction of Islamic legal theory in Chapter 4, 
allowed this research to investigate the episteme of these contradictory values within 
the tradition, and by constructing a new episteme for the tradition in Chapter 5. The 
analysis in Chapter 5, hence,  proved that hypothesis two is also nullified. As 
discussed above and in the relevant chapter, this study supports the third hypothesis, 
that suggests that causes are recognisable, and a solution in the form of new episteme 
can be constructed allowing the continuity of the tradition, while addressing the crisis 
within the tradition.  
6.4. THE POTENTIAL IN THE THEORY OF OBJECTIVE SUBJECTIVISM: 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS  
This study argues that there is an epistemological crisis in the Islamic thought, which 
has caused a crisis in morality and crisis in legitimacy. The research used MacIntyre’s 
(1998) work as a conceptual framework to argue that these crises can only be solved 
by introducing a new source of knowledge to the tradition. This is due to the fact 
Islamic tradition in its current state of crisis heavily relies on the juristic subjectivity 
through the Islamic legal theory as source to construct moral. However, the political 
representation of Islam, such as Islamist party An-Nahdah in Tunisia, continue to use 
the same epistemological sources to solve the crisis in the tradition, while these 
source are the root case of the crisis. Similar is true for the case in economic 
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representation of Islamic morality (Khan, 2013), such as the case with Islamic finance 
operations..  
Within such a context, this research has examined the operations and theories of 
hisbah on the governance of society and the market, and discovered consistencies and 
incoherence similar to other scholarship in this field (Khan, 2013). However, instead 
of revisiting the epistemic sources of the Islamic tradition for finding the solutions, 
this research focused on the source of consistencies and incoherence (see: Chapter 4), 
and revealed that the use of Islamic legal theory based on juristic subjectivism for 
judging the moral conduct is the root cause of the problem. Consequently, in the 
previous chapter, this research attempted to construct a new episteme for the Islamic 
tradition, by working within the guidelines provided by MacIntyre’s (1998) work on 
solving epistemological crisis.  
Islamic tradition focuses on the governance of society and market through its moral 
principles as main regulative instruments. The theoretical implications of this research 
is that it has, firstly, highlighted the nature of crisis in the tradition, and secondly 
provided an alternative for moral normative governance of society and market. 
Furthermore, the larger discourse within the Islamic tradition, constructs the premises 
on ideological basis, and occasionally borrows from sources outside of the tradition. 
However, the tradition does not acknowledge any ontological authority of these 
source of knowledge. This research first argues that the state of Islamic tradition is 
such that the only solution is to construct a new episteme. Thereafter, this research 
has constructed a new episteme, whilst ensuring the continuation of life of Islamic 
tradition. Hence, the proposed new episteme in expanding the Islamic knowledge 
articulation, in the case of hisbah, should be considered an important theoretical 
contribution, which also identifies the methodological contribution of this study, 
which is the way a new knowledge and approach is constructed and articulated. As an 
essential methodological contribution, the attempt in this study to construct a theory 
of value should be noted, which can be the foundation of the new episteme in 
responding to the crisis. 
This research, hence, highlights the state of crisis within the tradition, should provide 
the necessary arguments against the use of Islamic legal theory within the realm of 
morality. Moreover, the new episteme could act as a benchmark for creating a 
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paradigm shift in the tradition, from legalistic and positive focus, towards normative 
and ethical approach.   
6.5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FOR ISLAMIC FINANCE AND 
HISBAH: CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE FINDINGS  
Islamic finance is one of the modern endeavours of Islamic thought, where Islamic 
tradition has introduced moral judgments to the operations of finance and banking. 
Similar to institution of hisbah, Islamic finance also attempts to use Islamic legal 
theory based on juristic subjectivity to judge the moral conduct of financial 
instruments. This has resulted in the problems similar to the ones faced by the 
institution of hisbah (Al-Eshaikh, 2011:47). This has lead to criticism raised against 
the ethicality of Islamic finance, with a broader theme of legality and morality debate 
(Asutay, 2007, 2012; Khan, 2013; Alzaidi and Kazakov, 2012).  
The use of Islamic legal theory for the ethical governance of Islamic finance created 
an industry, which criticized from economic grounds to be overly complicated and 
baring additional risk, while from theorist for lacking the ethical dimension. Islamic 
finance, similar to other endeavors of Islamic tradition that try to judge the moral 
conduct by using a legal framework are in a state of epistemological crisis, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. The entire debate around ‘form vs. susbtance’ is a 
consequence of such a crisis, as Islamic rational legality in shaping the form of 
Islamic finance ignores the substantive morality by assumption of the Shari’ah 
scholars that their legal decisions on fatwas are derived also by use of maqasid al-
Shari’ah implying the internalisation of Islamic morality. However, a critical 
examination of this directly shows that Shari’ah scholars by such claims have failed 
to shape the industry along the Islamic morality leading to ‘social failure’ (Asutay, 
2007, 2012). In responding to such a failure, the theory of value constructed within 
this research can provide the episteme and normative direction necessary to address 
these issues in moderating the consequences of crisis.   
The theory of value constructed by this research have the philosophical foundations, 
as discussed in Chapter 5 and theological grounds as discussed at the end of Chapter 
4, which can provide the episteme required for the ethical governance in Islamic 
finance. Moreover, the theory proposed within this research works on normative 
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grounds; therefore, it can also provide the necessary direction for the development of 
Islamic finance industry.  
6.6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE EXPLORATIONS  
The lack of published and available material on the institution of hisbah should be 
considered as an important difficulty, which includes material on its theories, manuals 
and historic account of its operations. While, every effort is made to ensure the 
complete picture on institution of hisbah can be drawn, however the research was 
limited to the availability of the discourse. It is important to note that whatever the 
material is available in English language was utilised. 
This thesis used MacIntyre’s (1998:362) work as a foundation to argue that objective 
subjectivism can solve the experienced crises, because it does not follow the method 
of enquiry of the tradition and uses sources outside of the existing set of sources that 
created the crises. However, the future line of investigation could be to dry run the 
model of objective subjectivism against real life scenarios, in case of anomalies, this 
model could be further tweaked or completely discard in favour of another model. 
Overall, further research is required on ontology of the epistemological crisis in the 
tradition, and the dynamics of current sources of the tradition that cause the crisis, 
along with development of a strategy for construction and practice of new sources 
within the tradition. Using Islamic finance as a case study will help to discuss such 
issues in expanding the debate, as after all Islamic banks and financial institutions are 
perhaps the main if not the only institutions that have emerged in modern times from 
the Muslim world indicating an essential source for testing such debates. 
6.7. EPILOGUE 
This study focused on the governance within Islamic thoughts in the form of the 
institution of hisbah, which started by examining the operations of hisbah, and 
discovered a series of institutional failures, which is then followed by the 
deconstruction of theories of hisbah. In this, the study investigated the use Islamic 
legal theory, which has substituted itself as an ethical theory; and this study 
recognises this as the root cause of the problem. At that stage the research had 
successfully completed the first part of the research aim, and explored the governance 
within Islamic thought in the form of the institution of hisbah. However, to complete 
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the second part of the research aim, that is to explore the episteme that is the cause of 
the recognised and unrecognised incoherencies and inconsistencies in the theories, 
regulations, and laws associated to the institution of hisbah; this research examined 
the Islamic legal theories in Chapter 4. This enquiry detected that Islamic tradition is 
in the state of epistemological crisis, which has caused the crisis in morality and crisis 
in legitimacy within the tradition. The research then used MacIntyre’s (1998) work on 
epistemological crisis to construct a new epistemic source for the tradition, in the 
form of theory of objectivist subjectivity. In particular, this research engaged in 
constructing a theory of value in responding to the need for a new episteme. In 
concluding, this research, hence, has successfully achieved its research aims and 
objectives by responding to the identified research questions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Abdar-Rahman, D. I.; Clarke, A., and Siddiqui, A. A. (2008). Shariah: Islamic law.   
London: Ta-Ha. 
   277 
 
Abu-Tapanjeh, Abdussalam Mahmoud (2009). “Corporate governance from the 
Islamic perspective: A comparative analysis with OECD principles”. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 20, pp.556–567. 
 
Agius, E. (2006). “Enviromental Ethics: Towards an Intergenerational Approach”, in 
A. M. J. Ten Have (ed.). Environmental Ethics and International Policy (pp. 89-116). 
Paris: UNESCO. 
 
Ahmad, K. (1980). “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework,” in Khurshid 
Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari (eds.), Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of 
Mawlana Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi. Leicester and Jeddah: Islamic Foundation and 
Saudi Publishing House. 
 
Ahmad, M. (1991). “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and 
the Tablighi Jamaat”. Fundamentalisms Observed, 1, pp. 457-530. 
 
Ainley, M.; Mashayekhi, A.; Hicks, R.; Rahman, A. and Ravalia, A. (2007, 
November). Islamic Finance in UK: Regulation and Challenges. London: Financial 
Services Authority.  
 
Akama, S.; Nakamatsu, K. and Abe, J. M. (2010). “Constructive Discursive 
Reasoning” in, Mircea Gh. Negoita (ed.), Knowledge-Based and Intelligent 
Information and Engineering Systems (pp. 200-206). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
 
Al Mawardi (1996). The Ordinance of Government - A Translation of Al-Ahkam al-
Sultaniyya w al-Wilayat al-Diniyy. Translated from Arabic by W. A. Wahba. London: 
Garnet Publishing Ltd. 
 
Al-Attar, Mariam (2010). Islamic Ethics: Divine Command Theory in Arabo-Islamic 
Thoughts. UK: Routledge. 
 
Al-Eshaikh, Nourah Mohammad (2011). Jurisprudence on Tawarruq: Contextual 
Evaluation on Basis of Customs, Circumstances, Time and Place. Masters by 
Research Thesis, University of Durham. 
 
Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad Ibn Muhammad (1990). Al-Ghazzali on 
Repentance: Book Thirty-one of the Revival of the Religious Sciences. Translated from 
Arabic by Martin S. Stern. Islamabad: Vanguard. 
 
Al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamed Mohammad ibn Mohammad (1982a). Ihya Ulum-Id-Din: 
Book I. Translated from Arabic by Fazlul-Karim (1982). New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan. 
 
Al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamed Mohammad ibn Mohammad (1982b). Ihya Ulum-Id-Din: 
Book II. Translated from Arabic by Fazlul-Karim (1982). New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan. 
  
Al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamid Muhammad Ibn Muhammad (2004). The Alchemy of 
Happiness. USA: SIME, Available at: <URL:http://majalla.org>, Access Date: 27th 
March, 2014. 
 
   278 
Al-Hindi, Ala al-Din Ali ibn Abd-al-Malik Husam al-Din al-Muttaqi (1998). Kanz al-
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Table 0.1 
 
Faith Soul Asabiyyah Social 
Consciousness 
Health & 
Safety  
Intrinsic Good 5 54 32 32 8 
Extrinsic 
Good 
14 103 51 81 221 
Total  19 157 83 113 229 
 
Table 0.2 
 
Faith Soul Asabiyyah Social 
Consciousness 
Health & 
Safety  
Frequency  19 157 83 113 229 
Weight of 
variable 'a' 
95 628 249 226 229 
 
 
 
 
Table 0.3 
Maqasids Degree of Final Good 
   311 
Faith 95 
Soul 628 
Asabiyyah 249 
SC 226 
H&S 229 
Total  1427 
 
 
Table 0.4 
Value of 2nd Layer 
Goodness 
Frequency of 
Regulations  
1 150 
2 29 
3 23 
4 39 
5 67 
6 39 
7 33 
8 0 
   312 
9 17 
10 2 
11 1 
12 1 
 
Table 0.5  
Interval  Value of 
2nd Layer 
Goodness 
Frequency  Relative 
Frequency 
% 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Frequency  
% 
Cumulative 
Frequency  
2 0 up to 2 179 0.4464 44.64% 179 44.64% 
4 2 up tp 4 62 0.1546 15.46% 241 60.10% 
6 4 up to 6 106 0.2643 26.43% 347 86.53% 
8 6 up to 8 33 0.0823 8.23% 380 94.76% 
10 8 up to 10 19 0.0474 4.74% 399 99.50% 
12 10 up to 12 2 0.0050 0.50% 401 100.00% 
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Entity Regulation 
First 
Layer 
Assessm
ent 
F
a
ith
 
S
o
u
l 
A
sa
b
iy
y
a
h
 
S
o
cia
l 
C
o
n
scio
u
sn
ess 
H
ea
lth
 &
 S
a
fety
 
T
o
ta
l (X
i) 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
Muhtasib should act according to 
what he knows 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
Muhtasib must strive to meet God's 
design and to seek His pleasure with 
both words and deed. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
5 4    9 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
He must be of good intention, 
corrupted neither by hypocrisy nor 
insincerity. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
Muhtasib must diligently apply 
himself to all the norms and 
recommendations of Islamic law, as 
well as the hibitual practices of the 
Prophet. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
5   2  7 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
When the Muhtasib orders and 
forbids the people let him be gentle 
and softly spoken, cheerful and good-
natured. In this way it is easier to win 
over the hearts and achieve the 
desired effect. God said to the 
Prophet: "It is part of the mercy of 
God that you should deal gently with 
them. If you were severe and harsh-
hearted, they would have broken 
away from you". This is also 
necessary because to rebuke too 
severel will perhaps result in 
disobedience, and to exhort too 
harshly will be ignored. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
Muhtasib should acquire a whip, a 
dirr, a turtur and servants and 
assistants, for this is more awe-
aspiring and intimidating to the 
general public. He must assign his 
helpers to the markets and road when 
he is absent, and employ some scouts 
who will keep him informed of what 
the people are doing. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Supervision 
of the 
Muhtasib should refrain from 
accepting people's money and 
Extrinsic  
 3 2  5 
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Markets and 
Roads 
receiving gifts from salesmen and 
trademen. Refraining from his 
safeguards his honour and is more 
appropiate to his dignity. The 
muhtasib must enjoin his servants and 
assistants to abide by these same 
conditions. 
Good 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
Nobody is permitted to bring s shop 
bench from the roofed passageway 
into the main thoroughfare as this 
obstructs passers-by. The muhtasib 
must remore and forbid this because 
of the haarm it may do to people. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
The people of every trade should be 
allotted a special marked for which 
their trade is known, as this is more 
economically sound for them and will 
bring them better business. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
The muhtasib should also segregate 
the shops of those whose trade 
requires the lighting of fires, like 
bakers and cooks, from the perfumers 
and cloth merchants due to their 
dissimilarity and the possibility of 
damage. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
When muhtasib is unable to 
understand the people's occupations, 
to each trade he may appoint an Arif  
who is a virtuous fellow tradesman, is 
experienced in their trade, aware of 
their swindles and frauds, is well 
known for his trustworthiness and 
reliability and who oversee their 
affairs and acquaint the Muhtasib 
with what they are doing. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
The Muhtasib is not permitted to set 
the prices of merchandise over the 
heads of its owners nor to oblige them 
to sell it at a fixed price. This because 
during the time of Prophet prices rose 
and the Prophet refused to fix them 
and considered the fixing of prices a 
transgression against person or value 
of money. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
It is not permitted to meet a caravan, 
that is, for people to go outside the 
town and meet it as it approaches, 
telling them that the market is sow 
and thus buying cheaply from them. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
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Prophet forbade such activities. 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
It is also necessary to stop bundles of 
firewood, sacks of straw, water 
containers, baskets of dung, sand and 
so on being taken into the market 
because of the damage they cause to 
people's clothes. When those who 
bring in firewood, straw and such like 
stop with it in the open squares, the 
Muhtasib should order them to take 
the loads off their animals. This is 
because the loads injure and hurt the 
animals when they stop walking, and 
the Prophet forbade the harming of all 
animals apart from those that are 
eaten. The Muhtasib must also order 
the market people to sweep the 
markets and keep them clear of dirt, 
mud and other things which harm 
people. This because the Prophet said: 
"There should be no harm and no 
hurting". 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
No one is allowed to extend the wall 
of his house or shop into the common 
thoroughfares. This likewise includes 
anything which is annoying or 
harmful to passers-by, such as 
waterspouts coming out of the walls 
in winter and drains coming out of the 
houses into the middle of the road in 
summer. Indeed, the Muhtaisb must 
order those who have waterspouts to 
replace them with chaneels excavated 
within the walls and plastered with 
lime in which water from the roof can 
flow. The Muhtasib must charge 
everyone who has in his house an 
outlet into the road for dirt to close it 
in summer and to dig himself a pit in 
his house into which the dirt can be 
put. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
It is not permissible to stare at the 
neighbours from roof tops and 
windows. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
It is not permissible for men to sit 
without a good cause in the roads 
which women take, or for women to 
sit by their doors in the road which 
men take. Muhtasib must chastise 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
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whoever does these things 
Supervision 
of the 
Markets and 
Roads 
Muhtasib must chastise,... if he sees a 
foreign man and woman talking 
together in a secluded place. For this 
is… suspicious. But God knows best. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
Qintars, 
Ratls, 
Mithqals 
The muhtasib must be acquinted 
with... [weight, measures and scales] 
and verify their size so that 
transactions can take place without 
fraud and according to Islamic Law. 
(Whatever variation there mayhave 
been in the responsibilities of the 
market inspector, his concern with 
correct weights, measures and scales 
always continued to be the primary 
one.) 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Scales, 
Measure, 
Standard of 
Coins, Ratls 
and Mithqals 
Muhtasib must order those who use 
scales to wipe and clean them hourly 
of any oil or dirt, as a drop of oil may 
congeal on them and affect the 
weight. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Scales, 
Measure, 
Standard of 
Coins, Ratls 
and Mithqals 
The merchant must settle the scales 
when he begins to weigh and should 
place the merchandise on them 
gently, not dropping it into the pan 
from his raised hand, nor moving the 
edge of the pan with his thumb, as all 
of this is fraudulent. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Scales, 
Measure, 
Standard of 
Coins, Ratls 
and Mithqals 
Hidden swindles used with scales for 
weighing gold is for the merchant to 
put his  hand infront of his face and to 
blow gently onto the pan containing 
the merchandise this making it 
descend. The buyer will have his eyes 
on the sclaes and not on the mouth of 
their owner. The merchants also have 
ruses by which they give short weight 
when they hold the attachment for the 
scales. They also sometimes stick a 
piece of wax on the bottom of one of 
the pans and put the silver on it, then 
they put the weights on the other pan. 
In this wa they talke one or two 
habbas out of every dirham. The 
Muhtasib must always keep an eye 
open for this. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Scales, 
Measure, 
Standard of 
Coins, Ratls 
Merchants should acquire ratls and 
waqiyas (unit of measurement) made 
of iron and test their accuracy against 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
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and Mithqals the standard weights. 
Scales, 
Measure, 
Standard of 
Coins, Ratls 
and Mithqals 
Some merchants have ruse when they 
hold the measure which make it give 
less. The Muhtasib must therefore 
never cease to spy on them. But God 
knows best. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Oven 
Keepers 
Muhtasib should disperse them 
among the roads, quarters and 
outskirts of the town because of their 
utility and great importance for the 
people. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Oven 
Keepers 
He should order them to maintain the 
chimneys and to clean. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Oven 
Keepers 
The oven keeper must have two 
bakers working with him, one of them 
for bread and the other for fish. The 
fish should be kept apart. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Oven 
Keepers 
The oven keeper should not take more 
dough than has been given to him as a 
fee. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Oven 
Keepers 
The oven keeper's servants and 
hirelings should be immature boys 
because they enter the people's houses 
and meet their womenfolk. But God 
knows better. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Makers of 
Zulabiyya 
The frying pan for zulabiyya must be 
made of fine copper and [should]... be 
polished… [after it is] cleased of dirt 
and verdigris. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Zulabiyya 
Zulabiyya should be made from one 
third finely ground flour and two 
thirds coarsely ground semolina. This 
because if there is a lot of semoline, 
the zulabiyya will be too white, too 
light amd will not cook sufficiently. 
Semolina should be used, however, 
even though it needs more oil than 
fine flour and so is disliked by the 
zilabiyya makers. The best oil to fry 
with is sesame oul, and if this cannot 
be obtained then some other pure oil. 
The zulabiyya should not be fried 
until the dough has risen; the sign of 
this being that it floats to the surface 
of theoul, while when it has not risen 
it sinks to the bottom of the frying 
pan. Alo, risen zulabiyya becomes 
like tubes which stick together when 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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gathered in the hand, while 
unleavened zulabiyya becomes 
crushed and is not hollow in the 
middle. No salt should be put in the 
dough because zulabiyya is eaten with 
honey and it would make one 
nauseous if it contained salt. As for 
when zulabiyya turns black, this 
occurs due to the frying pan being 
dirty, or perhaps only fine flour being 
used and no semilina, or it being fired 
in old oil, or perhaps it was 
unleavened, or perhaps the fire was 
too hot. The Muhtasib must keep an 
eye on them regarding all these 
things. Some small delicate indentical 
pieces should be made, forty of which 
equal one ratl, and when dough if 
these becomes sour, he can use them 
to make other dough sour. But God 
knows best. 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
It is desirable that the slaughterer be a 
Muslim, mature and sound of mind, 
inoking God's name and facing in the 
direction of Mecca when he 
slaughters. He should slaughter 
camels when they are hobbled and 
cows and sheep when they are lying 
on their side. All this is mentioned in 
the Sunna on the authority of 
Muhammad. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
He should not pull a sheep roughly by 
its leg nor slaughter with a blunt knife 
because this is cruel to the animal and 
the Prophet of God forbade cruelty to 
animals. It is permissible to slaughter 
with everything except teeth and nails 
because Prophet forbade these things. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
The Muhtasib should forbid the 
slarughtere from blowing onto the 
carcass of a sheep after it has been 
skinned, because the smell of a man's 
breath spoils and sullies the meat. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
Some of them cut the flest away from 
stomach and blow water in. They 
know places in the flesh in which to 
blow water. The Muhtasib must keep 
an eye on the slaughterers in the Arif's 
absence. There are others who parade 
fat cows in the markets then slaughter 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
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other ones. This is fraud. 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
The Muhtasib must prevent them 
from allowing rumps of the meat to 
hang over the edge of their shop 
benches. These must be put within the 
edge of the bench and the two corners 
so that they do not harm the people or 
touch their clothes. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
He should order the butchers to 
separate the goats meat from that of 
sheep, not to mix them together, and 
to spinkle goat meat with saffron so 
as to distinguish it from other kinds. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
When the butchers finish trade and 
wish to leave, he should take some 
ground salt and sprinkle it on the 
chopping block so that dogs do not 
lick it or any vermin crawl on it. If it 
can not obtain any salt, then he may 
use ground plant ash instead. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
It is common good that the butchers 
do not collaborate and thus do not 
agree together on one price. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
The Muhtasib must prevent the 
butcher from selling meat by the live 
animal. This is because the Prophet 
forbade it. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
If the Muhtasib has any doubts about 
an animal, wheather it died of natural 
causes or was slaughtered, he should 
put it in water, because if it sinks it 
was slaughtered but of it does not it 
died of natural causes. This is the 
same for eggs when they are placed in 
water: they float when rotten and sink 
when they are sound. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
Muhtasib must keep an eye on the 
hunters of sparrows and other birds 
regarding what we have mentioned, 
for most of them have no religion and 
do not pray. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Slaughterers 
and Butchers 
Muhtasib must therefore fear God 
regarding his duties. He must not take 
a bribe nor accept a gift from any 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Sellers of 
Roast Meat 
The Muhtasib must weigh the 
carcasses of lamb for them before 
they are put in the tannur and record 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
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the weights in his register. He must 
weigh them again when they come 
out of the oven, because they are only 
properly cooked when they weigh a 
third less than before and must be 
returned to the oven if the weigh more 
than that. 
Sellers of 
Roast Meat 
He should examine the meat when it 
is beigh weighted to make sure that 
the meat roasters have not hidden any 
iron or lead weights in it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Sellers of 
Roast Meat 
The roast meat must not be covered 
immediately upon remobal from the 
oven nor put in lead or copper 
containers while it is still hot, as the 
physicians say that this makes it 
poisonous. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sellers of 
Roast Meat 
The Muhtasib must order them to coat 
their ovens with cleanclay which has 
been kneaded with clean water, 
because they somethimes take clay 
from the floors of their shops which is 
mixed with blood and dung and this is 
unclean. Perhapes some of this will 
fall onto the roast meat when the oven 
is opened and taint it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sellers of 
Roast Meat 
Sellers of roast minced meat, some of 
them put water and salt in a container 
they have and add a little lemon juice 
to it, then they pass this around while 
the meat is being minced and the 
customers sprinkle it over the meat. 
There may be some of this left 
overnight in summer which turns 
rancid die to the oil which is poured 
on it, so the meat roasters mix it with 
fresh lemon to conceal its smell and 
taste from the customer. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sellers of 
Roast Meat 
Muhtasib must make sure that they 
are not doing… things [that] are 
swindles. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Sellers of 
Roast Meat 
When the butchers finish trade and 
wish to leave, he should take some 
ground salt and sprinkle it on the 
chopping block so that dogs do not 
lick it or any vermin crawl on it. If it 
can not obtain any salt, then he may 
use ground plant ash instead. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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Sellers of 
Sheep's 
Heads 
The Muhtasib should order them to 
scald the heads and trotters clean with 
boiling water, to clean the hair and 
wool thoroughly, and after that to 
wash them in cold water other than 
that which was used to scald them. 
The seller of sheep's heads must put 
his fingers in the noses after curshing 
the bridhe, wash them and take out all 
the impurities, dirt and maggots if 
there are any. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sellers of 
Sheep's 
Heads 
They should not sell goats heads 
alongside those of sheep and must put 
the goats' trotters in the goats' mouths 
to distinguish them from the sheep so 
that they do not confuse someone 
who cannot tell the difference 
between them. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Sellers of 
Sheep's 
Heads 
Perhaps one day they will not be able 
to sell all the heads and thus mix them 
with the fresh ones on the following 
day. The Muhtasib should keep an 
eye on them regarding all these things 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
Cloth 
Merchants 
No one should trade in cloth unless he 
knows the laws of selling, the 
contracts of business transactions, 
what is lawful for him and what 
unlawful. If he does not know , he 
will be unaware of what he is doing 
and and what is forbidden. Umar b. al 
Khattab said: " No one will trade in 
our market except he knows the laws 
of his religion. Otherwise, he will 
take usurious interest whether he 
intends to or not". During the present 
time I have seen most of the cloth 
merchants in the market acting 
unlawfully in their transactions. God 
willing, we shall mention these 
things. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
5 4 3   12 
Cloth 
Merchants 
One of them is collusion. This is for a 
man to offer a high price for a 
commodity while one wanting to buy 
it, in order to entice someone else to 
pay more. This is unlawful, because 
the prophet forbade collusion in 
selling. Abu hurayra related that the 
prophet said: " Do not bid against 
each other, nor hate each other, nor 
envy each other, nor collude against 
each other. Be brothers and servants 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
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of God. Do not offer a higher price 
for a commodity than it is worth in 
order to deceive the people, for this is 
unlawful. 
Cloth 
Merchants 
Another of these things is " sale 
against a brother's sale". This is when 
someone buys a commodity at a fixed 
price with the stipulation that he can 
annul the agreement, and then another 
man says to him: " Give it back and I 
will sell you a better onethan that for 
the same price". This practice is also 
unlawful, beacause the prophet said: 
A man may not sell against his 
brother's sale, nor ask for a girl's hand 
in marriage when she has already 
promised another". Some of them " 
offer a commodity for  sale against 
their brother's offer". this is for 
someone to buy a commodity from a 
man and then for naother man to say 
to him: "I will give you a better one 
than that for the same price, or a 
similar one at a lower price". he then 
shows him the commodity and the 
buyer considers it. This is also 
unlawful, according to what the 
prophet said: " A man must not offer 
a commodity for sale against his 
brother's offer". some of the say to the 
buyer: " I,ll sell you this garment for 
the same price as such and such sold 
his" ,or I,ll sell you this commodity 
for the same price". 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Cloth 
Merchants 
some say to the merchant: " I'll sell 
you this garments long as you sell me 
yours", or " I,ll sell you this gown for 
ten dirhams in cash or twenty dirhams 
on credit". 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Cloth 
Merchants 
Others sell the commodity with 
payment after an unspecified period, 
or sell it with payment on the 
unspecified future event. That is , 
they say: " you don't have to pay for 
this until Meccan pilgrims come", or 
until the grain is threshed" or " until 
the sultan makes his gift" and such 
like. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Cloth 
Merchants 
some of them buy a commodity from 
a merchant like themselves, then sell 
it to another man before taking 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
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possesstion of it. All these are 
unlawful , and they are not allowed to 
do them because the prophet forbade 
it. 
Cloth 
Merchants 
selling by " touch" is also 
impermissible. That is for the seller to 
say to the buyer: " if you touch the 
garment with your hand, you are 
obliged to buy it whether you want to 
or not". 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Cloth 
Merchants 
Nor is selling by " throwing at one 
another "  permitted. That is, for the 
seller to say to the buyer: " I,ll sell 
you this garment I have for the one 
you have". Then when each of them 
throws his garmnet to the another the 
transaction is obligatory. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Cloth 
Merchants 
Selling by a " pebble is also 
impermissible. That is , for the seller 
to say to the buyer: " I,ll sell you 
whatever land or garment the pebble 
falls on". This is because of what Abu 
Sa'id al-Khudri related regarding the 
prophet forbidding selling "by touch" 
by " throwing at one another" and by 
a pebble", by which he intended what 
we have mentioned. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Cloth 
Merchants 
The Muhtasib must make sure that 
they are truthful in the terms of 
purchase and concerning the original 
price in a resale with a stated profit, 
for most of them do what is 
impermissible. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Cloth 
Merchants 
One of these things is for someone to 
buy a commodity for a definite price 
payable after a specified period, and 
then to bargain for an amount which 
will bring them a profit if paid in cash 
immediately. This is not allowed 
because the deferred period is allowed 
for by a portion of the price. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Cloth 
Merchants 
Some of them buy a commodity at a 
stated price, then when the contract is 
concluded and seller asks for the 
price, the buyer reduces it a little. 
This is not allowed once the contract 
has been concluded. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Cloth 
Others buy a commodity at a stated 
price, but if they find it has a defect 
Extrinsic 
 4 3   7 
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Merchants and then return to the seller asking for 
a discount, they firstly bargain about 
the original price which they paid for 
it without the discount. 
Good 
Cloth 
Merchants 
Some of them come to an agreement 
with their neighbour or servant to sell 
them a garment for ten dirhams, for 
example, then buy it back from him 
for fifteen dirhams so that they can 
say : " I bought it for fifteen dirhams". 
All of these thins are unlawful and 
impermissible. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Cloth 
Merchants 
If a merchant buys a piece of cloth for 
ten dirhams then has it bleached for 
one dirham, embroider for one dirham 
and repaired for one dirham, then he 
does not say that he bought it for 
thirteen dirhams because he would be 
a liar. Rather , he says that it cost him 
thirteen dirhams. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Cloth 
Merchants 
And if he himself is the one who who 
embroidered it, bleached and repaired 
it, then he can not say that it cost him 
thirteen dirhams because he has not 
paid for someone else to do it. Neither 
can he say that its price was thirteen 
dirhams because he would be a liar. 
Rather, he must say that he bought it 
for ten dirhams and worked on it to 
the value of three dirhams. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Cloth 
Merchants 
The Muhasib must watch them in all 
we have mentioned and forbid them 
from doing these things. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Cloth 
Merchants 
He must examine their scales and 
cubits, and prevent them from 
forming a partnership with bazaar 
criers and brokers. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
Cloth 
Merchants 
He must make sure that they deal 
fairly with the customers and the 
importers of merchandise and they are 
truthful in all situations. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Brokers and 
Bazaar Criers 
They should be virtuous and 
trustworthy, from among the 
religious, those of integirity and the 
truthful. This is because they take 
responsibility for people's goods and 
are entrusted with selling them. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
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Brokers and 
Bazaar Criers 
None of them is allowed to raise the 
price of a commodity on his own 
account, to be the partner of a cloth 
merchant , to buy the commodity 
himself or to state the price of a 
commodity without its owner 
authorizing him to do so. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Brokers and 
Bazaar Criers 
Some of them approach the makers of 
clothes and weavers and lend them 
gold on condition that nobody sells 
their wares from them. This is 
unlawful as it is a loan for profit. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Brokers and 
Bazaar Criers 
Others buy a commodity for 
themselves and make its owner 
believe that some people have bought 
it from him. Then they agree with 
someone else to buy it. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Brokers and 
Bazaar Criers 
Some of them own the commodity 
themselves and advertise it, 
increasing the price on their own 
behalf and making the peaple believe 
that it belongs to one of the 
merchants. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
Brokers and 
Bazaar Criers 
Others collude with a cloth merchant 
regarding a certain sum, then when 
another merchant comes to the cloth 
merchant with goods, the cloth 
merchnt recommends that the bazaar 
carier should sell them. When the 
goods are sold and money is taken the 
bazar carier gives the cloth merchant 
a sum agreed upon.The cloth 
merchant is acting unlawfully when 
he does this. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Brokers and 
Bazaar Criers 
Whenever the bazaar carier learns that 
a commodity is defective, it is his 
duty to inform the buyer and draw his 
attention to it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Brokers and 
Bazaar Criers 
The Muhtasib must keep an eye on 
them regarding all the things we have 
said and examine their circumstances 
regarding these. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Weavers 
The Muhtasib must order them to 
weave a length of cloth well and 
closely-textured, make it to the full 
length and width agreed upon, to use 
fine yarn and to take the black crust 
off the cloth with a rough black stone. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
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Weavers 
He must prevent them from sprinking 
the cloth with flour and roasted 
gypsum while it is being woven, 
because this conceals its coarseness 
and makes it appear closly-textured. 
This is swindling the people. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Weavers 
When one of them weaves cloth from 
poor quality and knotted yarn he must 
sell it separate from the rest of the 
cloth. If not, this is swinding. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Weavers 
Some of them weave the surface of 
the cloth out of good and uniform 
yarn, then weave the rest of it from 
thick knotted yarn. The , Arif must 
therefore watch and keep an eye on 
them regarding this. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Weavers 
If one of them takes yarn from 
someone to weave them cloth, he 
must take it by weight. Then after 
weaving, he should wash the cloth 
and return it to owner by weight so as 
to remove any suspicion regarding 
him. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Weavers 
If the owner of yarn claims that the 
weaver has replaced his yarn for 
another, the Muhtasib should sendthe 
weaver before the Arif. If they submit 
to his decision then that is the end of 
it, but if not, the Muhtasib must have 
the issue judged according to Islamic 
law. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Weavers 
Some of them have a stone basin in 
front of their shops in which to rub 
the cloth. Then when they leave, the 
dogs come and lick it. The Muhtasib 
must therefore charge the weaver to 
put wooden covers over the cloth or 
to wash it seven times a day if 
necessary, once with dust. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Weavers 
He must prevent them from stretching 
out their cloth in the Muslims road 
because this harms passers-by. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Weavers 
He must also stop them throwing the 
flour and other edible matter which is 
in the cloth under the feet of the 
Muslims. But God knows best. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Tailors They must be ordered to cut the cloth 
out well, to make the neck opening 
Extrinsic  
   1 1 
   327 
properly, to make the gussets wide, to 
make the sleeves and edges to the 
same length and to sew the hems 
evenly. 
Good 
Tailors 
It is best that the stiches are accurate, 
not loose not big, and that the needle 
is fine. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Tailors 
The thread in the needle should be 
short because if it is too long it will 
fray and weaken. It will also weaken 
when the tailor pulls it through the 
cloth. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Tailors 
The tailor must not cut out a valuable 
piece of cloth for anyone until he has 
measured it. He may cut it after that. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Tailors 
if it is an expensive material such as 
silk or brocade, he must weigh it 
before taking it. Then , he has sewn it, 
he must return it to its owner with the 
same weight. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Tailors 
The Muhtasib must keep an eye on 
them because of the peoples property 
which they steal. For when some of 
them sew a silk garment they fill the 
hems with sand and glue and steal a 
corresponding metarial. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Tailors 
He must stop them from keeping the 
people waiting for their clothes to be 
sewn, harming them by making 
themrepeatedly come back and by 
withholding their property. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Tailors 
They should not keep the people 
waiting for a job longer than one 
week unless they have stipulated to 
the customer that it will take longer. 
They must not break this agreement. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Tailors 
The Muhtasib must make the 
repairers swear that they will not 
repair a torn garmnet for the dyers 
and the cloth beaters unless its owner 
is present. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Tailors 
The embroiderers and the ornamental 
stitchers must not transfer embroidery 
from one garment to another which 
the bleachers or cloth-beaters have 
given them.Many of them do this with 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
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the people's clothes. 
Tailors 
As for the makers of qalansuwas, the 
Muhtasib should order them to make 
these out of new pieces of cloth, silk 
thread and dyed linen, not out of old 
dyed pieces of cloth stiffed with glue 
and starch. This is fradulent and the 
Muhtasib must stop them doing it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Cotton-
Carders 
They must not mix new cotton with 
old nor red cotton with white. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Tailors 
They must card the cotton many times 
until the black husks and the broken 
seeds are removed from it. This is 
because if any seeds remain it will 
show in the cotton's weight, and if 
they are left in a blanket, a jubba or a 
qaba the mice will nibble at them. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Tailors 
They must not mix the finest cotton at 
the bottom of the carding box nor the 
pure cotton at the sides of the walls 
with anything else. Some of them 
card bad red cotton, put it at the 
bottom of the pile and cover it with 
pure white cotton. This does not show 
until it is spun. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Tailors 
The Muhtasib must forbid them from 
allowing women to sit by their shop 
doors waiting for the carding to be 
completed, and from talking with 
them. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Tailors 
They must not put the cotton in a 
damp place after it has been carded 
because this makes it heavier and it 
becomes lighter when it dries. This is 
a fraud which they all practice, so the 
Muhtasib must stop them doing it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Flax-
Spinners 
The finest flex is from Giza in Egypt, 
and the best of this is the soft leafy 
variety, while the worst is the short 
rough variety which breaks without 
warning. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Flax-
Spinners 
They must not mix good flax with 
bad, nor flax from Nablus with that 
from Egypt. Some of them mix 
unspun cotton with soft flax after it 
has been combed. All these things are 
fraudulent. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
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Flax-
Spinners 
They must not allow women to sit by 
their shop doors, as we mentioned 
regarding the cotton corders. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Silk-Makers 
They must not dye raw silk before it 
has been bleached lest it should 
deteriorate lator. They sometimes do 
this to make it weight more. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Silk-Makers 
some of them make the silk heavier 
with starch while others make it 
heavier with clarified butter or oil. 
Some of them mix the silk with a 
quantity of other material. The 
Muhtasib must keep an eye on them 
concerning all these things. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Dyers 
Most dyers of red silk, and other 
kinds of thread and material, dye with 
henna instead of madder in their 
shops. The dye appears good and 
bright, but when it is exposed to the 
sun its colour changes and its 
brightness fades. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Dyers 
Some of them darken cloth with oak 
applesand vitriolwhen they want to 
dye in the colour of khol. They put it 
in large containers and it comes out a 
uniform jet-black. But the colour 
changes after only a short time and 
the dye wears off. All this is 
fraudulent and the Muhtasib must 
stop them from doing it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Dyers 
They must write people's names on 
their clothes in ink so that none of 
them get confused. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Dyers 
During holidays, festivals and other 
celebrations, most dyers and 
marandajin alter the people's 
clothesand rent them out to those who 
want to wear them at that time and 
dress themselves up.  This is a breach 
of trust and wrong and the Muhtasib 
must prevent them from doing it. He 
must keep an eyeon them regarding 
the way they make and adultrate the 
dye and show it to their Arif. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Shoemakers 
They should not use too many old 
pieces of cloth as padding between 
the inner and outer linings, nor 
between the inner sole and outer. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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Shoemakers 
They may stitch the padding for the 
heels, but must not stitch a sole which 
has split during tanning nor new 
leather nor any leather which has not 
been tanned. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Shoemakers 
They must twice the thread well and 
make it no longer than cubit, because 
if it is longer than this it will fray and 
be too weak to pull through the 
leather. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Shoemakers 
They should not sew with pig's hair, 
but should rather use palm fibres or 
fox whiskers, as these are better. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Shoemakers 
They must not keep someone waiting 
for his shoes except when they have 
stipulated a certain day. This is 
because the people suffer by 
repeatedly having to return to them 
and by the withholding of their 
property. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
Shoemakers 
They should not use paper, felt and 
such like to make women's slippers so 
that these squeak when the women 
walk, as the women of Baghdad like 
to have them. This is shameful, and is 
a disgrace which does not befit free-
born people. The Muhtasib must 
therefore stop them being made and 
worn. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Money-
Changers 
To make a living out of money 
changing is dangerous to the religion 
of those engaged in it. Indeed, the 
moneychanger will transgress against 
his religion if he is ignorant of Islamic 
law and unaware of the rules 
concernig usury. Thus a person 
should not engage in it until he has 
acquinted himself with the law, so as 
to avoid committing any of the 
various categories of prohibitions. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
5 4  2  11 
Money-
Changers 
The Muhtasib must inspect their 
market and spy on them. If he comes 
across practising usury, or doing 
anything while changing money 
which is not permitted in Islamic law, 
he should chastise him and evict him 
from the market. He should do this 
after acquinting him with the basic 
principles of usury. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
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Money-
Changers 
It is not permitted for anyone to sell 
gold coins for gold, nor silver for 
silver, except in the same quantities 
and by taking immediate possession. 
For if the money-changer makes a 
profit when he is changing the same 
metal, or if he and the customer part 
before possession is taken, this is 
unlawful. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Money-
Changers 
As for selling gold for silver, profit is 
permitted here, but credit and 
concluding the sale before delivery is 
made are unlawful. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
Money-
Changers 
It is not permitted to sell pure coinage 
for that which is adultrated, nor to sell 
adultrated gold and silver coins for 
other adultrated ones, such as selling 
Egyptian dinars for those from Tyre, 
or those from Tyre for the same, or 
Ahadi dirhams for those from 
Qairoun, because of ignorance as to 
their value and the lack of similarity 
between them. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Money-
Changers 
It is likewise not permitted to sell 
whole dinars for cut pieces of a dinar 
because of their difference in value. 
Nor is it permitted to sell dinars from 
Qashan for those from Sabur due to 
the difference in their composition. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Money-
Changers 
It is also not permitted to sell a dinar 
and a garment for two dinars. Some 
money-changers and cloth merchants 
occasionally practise this usury in 
another way. They give the buyer a 
dinar as a loan and then sell the 
garment for two dinars, so that he 
owes them three dinars for a specified 
period when they will ask him for it 
all back. This is unlawful and it is not 
permitted to do it with this condition 
because it is a loan bringing profit. If 
they had not loaned him the dinar, he 
would have not bought the garment 
for two dinars. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Money-
Changers 
Some of them buy dinars with silver 
dirhams or with the qaratis of the 
Franc. Then they say to the seller : " 
pay your creditor with these so that 
you can get rid of them or take them 
from me a few at a time" 'and the man 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
   332 
will agree with him in this due to his 
great ignorance. All these things are 
unlawful and may not be done. The 
Muhtasib must therefore keep an eye 
on them concerning all we have 
mentioned and not mentioned of this 
sort. 
Money-
Changers 
Some people have said that when a 
four mithqal piece is divided its 
weight is clearly reduced. Because of 
this many money-changers hate to 
take them. If one of the money-
changers has to pay someone more 
than four dinars they pay him four 
and promise him the rest at a later 
date. As for the examination of their 
scales and weights, this has been 
mentioned previously. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Goldsmiths 
They must not sell vessels and 
trinkets of gold and silver except for 
what is different in kind, so that the 
increment is lawful. But if the 
goldsmith sells them for their like, 
then increment, credit and concluding 
the sale before delivery is made are 
unlawful, as we mentioned in the 
chapter on money-changer. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Goldsmiths 
If the goldsmith sells any trinkets 
which have non-precious metals in 
them, he must tell the buyer the extent 
of the adultration so that he is aware 
of it. And if he wants to make a 
trinket for someone, he must only 
smelt it in the furnace in the presence 
of the customer and after ascertaining 
its weight. When it has been smelt it 
should be weighted again. If it needs 
to be soldered, the goldsmith must 
weigh the solder before putting it on. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Goldsmiths 
He must not set any stones or jewels 
in a ring or trinket except after 
weighing them in the presence of 
their owner. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Goldsmiths 
In general, the frauds and adultrations 
of goldsmiths are secret and are 
difficult to know. Nothing deters 
them from this apart from their 
honesty and piety, for they know 
tinctures and pigments which no one 
else does. Some of them colour silver 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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in a way which does not leave the 
metal except after it has been smelted 
a long time in a smelting pot. for two 
parts of thisthey then mix in one part 
of gold. 
Goldsmiths 
One of their fraud is the way they 
make silver yellow. They take 
sadhanj which has been roasted and 
oiled seperately, hematite which has 
been roasted with prepared maranj 
sap seven times and vitriol and 
cinnabar roasted with eagle water 
solution in a retort. Then they grind 
them all togather, roast two cups of it 
seven times with the aforementioned 
maranj water, then seven times with 
the eagle water solution. After this it 
will solidify into a red stone the 
colour of blood. They mix one dirham 
of this with ten dirhams of silver and 
it becomes gold with a standard of 
sixteen. If this hard red amalgam of 
precious metal and adultrants is 
dissolved then allowed to harden 
again the silver acquires a standard of 
twenty from which dinars and 
jwellery may made. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2 1 7 
Goldsmiths 
Some of them take hematite and roast 
it seven times with an ox's gall 
bladder. They then add a similar 
quantity of gold coated with sulphur 
which has been extracted from 
quicklime and alkaline ashes. After 
this, it is all roasted with eagle water 
solution seven times and oiled with 
wild saffron oil seven times. It 
hardens into a stone like the precious 
one. If it is dissolved then allowed to 
harden again it becomes stronger than 
the previous one, similar to metal. 
They mix one qirat of this with one 
dirham of silver. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2 1 7 
Goldsmiths 
They can produce so many things 
from alchemy and tinctures that it 
would take a long time to describe 
them, and if I was not afraid that the 
irreligious might learn of these secrets 
I could explain many of them which a 
lot of goldsmiths have not discovered. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Goldsmiths Every Muslim must fear God and not 
swindle the Muslims in any way 
Intrinsic 
 4 3 2  9 
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whatsoever. If the muhtasib comes 
across anyone doing this he must 
chastise and publicly condemn him, 
as has been explained previously. 
Good 
Goldsmiths 
As for the dust and sand from the 
goldsmith's shops, it should only be 
sold for copper coinage or a similar 
equivalent, for it has gold and silver 
in it and may thus lead to unlawful 
profit. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Coppersmith
s and 
Blacksmiths 
They are not allowed to mix copper 
with habaqwhich the goldsmith and 
smeltersof silver extract when they 
smelt, for this hardens the copper and 
makes it less maleable. Then if a 
drinking vessel or a morter is molded 
from it, it will break easily like glass. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Coppersmith
s and 
Blacksmiths 
They must not mix pieces of broken 
copper containers and such like with 
unused copper, rather, each must be 
smelt seperately and orked seperately. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Coppersmith
s and 
Blacksmiths 
As for the blacksmith, they must not 
hammer out knives, scissors, pincers 
and the like from soft iron and sell it 
as steel.This is fraudulent. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Coppersmith
s and 
Blacksmiths 
They must not mix straightened out 
nails with those which are newly 
forged, and must not use pure steel 
for knives, scissors and razors. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Veterinarians 
Veterinary science is an honourable 
one which philosophers have written 
about in their books and on which 
they have composed numerous 
treatises. It is more difficult to treat 
the illness of animals than it is those 
of men, because an animal can not 
speak and tell of its sickness and pain. 
It is only possible to get information 
about their ailments by touching and 
looking. The veterinarian thus needs 
skill and understanding of the illness 
of animals and their treatment. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Veterinarians 
No one should practice veterinary 
science unless he has a religion to 
stop him harming the animal with 
inexperienced blood letting, cutting or 
cauterization and such like, thus 
leading to the death or injury of the 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2 1 10 
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animal. 
Veterinarians 
The veterinarian must examine the 
animal's ankle and inspect its hoof 
before paring it. If it is distorted or 
crooked, he should pare the opposite 
side of the hoof so that he makes it 
even. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Veterinarians 
If the animal's foot is straight, he 
should use small nails at the back and 
large nails at the front. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Veterinarians 
But if it stands in the opposite way, he 
should use small nails at the front and 
large nails at the back. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Veterinarians 
The veterinarian must not pare the 
hoof too much and thus go into the 
animal's flesh. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Veterinarians 
He should not put the nails in too 
loosely so that the shoe moves letting 
in small stones and sand hurting the 
animal. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Veterinarians 
Nor should he put the shoe in the hoof 
too tightly and thus cause terrible 
suffering to the animal. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Veterinarians 
Know that the hammered shoe stick 
better to the hoof, that soft shoes take 
hard nails better and that thin nails are 
better than thick ones. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Veterinarians 
If the animal is in need of having a 
vein opened, the veterinarian should 
hold the scalpel between his fingers 
with the handle in his palm, leaving 
half a finger nail length of the scalpel 
exposed. He should then delicately 
and gently cut the vein on its upper 
side. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Veterinarians 
The veterinarian must not cut the vein 
until he has stoped it with his finger, 
particularly the jugular veins for these 
are potentially dangerous as they are 
next to the escophagus. If he wants to 
open any of the jugular veins he must 
firmly bind the animal's neck so that 
they stand out, then he may do as he 
intends. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Veterinarians The veterinarian must be experienced 
in the illness of animals, be aware of 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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what animals require and defects 
which occur in them.The people must 
resort to him when they cannot agree 
on what the illness is. 
Veterinarians 
Some learned people have stated in 
the books on veterinary science that 
there are 320 illness which animals 
may have. These include tightness in 
the esophagus, disease of the nostrils 
with a discharge, disease of the 
nostrils without a discharge, madness, 
weakness of the brain, headache, al-
hamir, nafakha, tumours, violent fits, 
al-diba,al-khushsham, pain in the 
liver, pain in the heart, worms in the 
stomach, al-maghal, cholic, rih-al-
sawas, gripes, al-sidam, a cold cough, 
a hot cough, an eruption of blood 
joints, stones caught in hooves, 
swelling of the foot, whitlows, 
splithooves, al-nakab, al-khalad, 
facial paralysis, watering eyes, limp 
ears, toothache, and other things 
which would takea long time to 
explain. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Veterinarians 
The veterinarian needs to know how 
to treat the animal and the reason 
behind these illness, for some of them 
cause permanent damage to the 
animal which contracts them, while 
others do no cause permanent 
damage. If it did not take so long I 
would give a detailed account. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Veterinarians 
The Muhtasib must not neglect to test 
the veterinarian concerning what we 
have mentioned and to observe what 
he does with the people's animals. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
Animals 
The slave-trader must be trustworthy, 
reliable and honest, well-known for 
his integrity and respectability. This is 
because he is responsible for the 
people's male and female slaves and 
is occasionally alone with them in his 
house. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
Animals 
The trader must not sell a female or 
male slave to someone unless he 
knows the seller or can find someone 
who knows him. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
He must write the seller's name and 
description in his register in case the 
Extrinsic  
   1 1 
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Animals person sold is a freeman or has been 
stolen. 
Good 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
Animals 
Any one who wants to buy a female 
slave may look at her face and palm, 
but if he asks to examine her in his 
house and bealone with her the trader 
must not allow it unless there are 
other women present. Then he may 
see her whole body. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
Animals 
whoever wants to buy a male slave 
may look at what is above the navel 
and below the knees. All these may 
be done before the contract of the 
sale. After the contract, the man may 
look at all the body of a female slave. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
Animals 
It is not permitted to separate a female 
slave and her child before seven years 
have elapsed. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
Animals 
Nor is permitted to sell to a dimmi a 
female or male slave who might be a 
Muslim. The trader must be 
absolutely certain that the slave is not 
a Muslim. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
Animals 
Whenever the trader knows that a 
person for sale has a defect, he must 
reveal this to the buyer, as we 
mentioned at the beginning of the 
book. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
Animals 
The slave-trader must be well-
acquinted with defects and 
experienced in the incipient illnesses 
and diseases. If he wants to sell a 
male slave, he must firstly examine 
all his body except for his genitals. 
He does this so that if the slave has a 
defect or an illness he can inform the 
buyer of it. The first thing he should 
look at is his face, for if it is 
somewhat yellow or ashen this 
indicates a disease or illness in the 
liver, the spleen or haemorrhoids. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Traders in 
Slaves and 
Animals 
A broker must not sell an animal 
unless he knows the seller or can find 
someone who knows him. He must 
write the seller's name in his register, 
as we have already said, in case the 
animal is defectiveor stolen. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
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Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
Some wise man said that the best kind 
of bath is that which has been built a 
long time, is roomy and has sweet 
water. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The one who heats the water for the 
bath assesses the amount of fuel 
needed according to the temprament 
of the one who wants to use it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
Know that the physical effect of the 
bath is to warm with its air and to 
moisten with its water. The first room 
cools and moistens, the second room 
warms and relaxes, while the third 
room warms and dries. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The bath has both advantages and 
disadvantages. As for the advantages, 
these are to open the pores and 
remove extraneous matter, to 
dissipate odours, to restrainthe body 
when it is loosened with dynastery, to 
clean away the dirt and sweat, 
removing itching, scabies and 
weariness, refresh the body, improve 
the digestion, bring colds and catarrh 
to a head, and be useful against fevers 
which last for only one day, hectic 
fever and quarten fever after they 
have matured. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
As for the disadvantages, the bath 
saps the body's energy, weaken 
enthusiasm when too long is spent in 
it, spoils the appetite for food and 
debilitates sexsual potency. The 
gratest danger is to pour hot water on 
weak limbs. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
Some times people use the bath 
before breakfast or while they are 
fasting and this causes serious 
dehydaration and emaciates and 
weakens the body. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
Sometimes people use the bath just 
after eating their fill and this fattens 
the body. It does cause poor 
circulation however. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The best time to use the bath is after 
the first digestion having eaten one's 
fill. This refreshes the body, fattens it 
and improves the complexion. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The Muhtasib must order to 
attendants to wash, sweap and clean 
the bath a few times each day with 
fresh water, not water that has been 
for bathing. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
They should scrub the tiles with a 
rough metarial so that no soap, leaves 
of the lotus tree or marsh mallow 
stick to them causing people to slip. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
Once a month they should wash the 
supply tank of the dirt which has 
collected in its channels and the 
sediment settled at the bottom. This is 
because if it is left for more than a 
month the water in it will both taste 
and smell unpleasant. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
If the caretaker wants to climb up to 
the supply tank to let the water flow 
in to the baths he must do so only 
after firstly washing his legs in case 
he has been in water used fro bathing. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The pipes must not be closed with the 
hair from combings, rather , they 
should be closedwith palm fibresand 
clean ragsso that there is no 
controversy. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
Incense should be burnt in the baht 
twice a day, especially when the 
attendants start to wash and sweep 
them. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
When the baths are cold the caretaker 
should fumigate them with levender 
as its fumes make the air circulate and 
the bath smell pleasant. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The water used for bathing must not 
be allowed to remain in the baths lest 
it should smell. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The shoemakers and others must not 
be allowed to wash any leather in the 
bath, for people are harmed by the 
smell of the tanning. Lepers and those 
afflictedwith elephantiasis are not 
permitted to enter the bath. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The owner of the bath must have 
some bath robes to hire out or lend 
the people, because strangers and 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3 2 1 6 
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poor people need this. 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The Muhtasib must order them to 
open the bath at dawn becausepeople 
requires it for the ritual ablutions 
before prayer. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The attendant must look after the 
people's clothes and is responsible if 
any of them are lost, according to 
what the Shafi'I school of law 
correctly says. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The barber, that is, the bathhouse 
attendant, should have a light touch, 
be nimble and proficient in shaving, 
and his razor should be wet and sharp. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
He should not stand directly in front 
of the head and the places where the 
hair is, nor should he eat anything 
which makes his breath smell, such as 
onions, garlic, leeks and such like, 
lest he offend the people when he 
shaving them. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
He must cut hair on the forehead and 
the templesas is required, not cut a 
young boy's hair without his 
guardian's permission and not cut the 
first growths of a beard nor the fully-
grown beard of an effiminate man. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The muhtasib must order the messeur 
to rub his hand with pomegranate skin 
to make it rough, remove the dirt and 
thus please the people. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The use of beans and lentils to rub 
with in the bath must not be 
permitted, because these are food 
stuffs and should not be treated with 
contempt. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Baths and 
their 
Attendants 
The Muhtasib should inspect the bath 
a few times each day and take into 
account what we have mentioned. He 
should chastise anyone he sees who 
reveals his nakedness, because it is 
unlawful and the prophet cursed both 
those who see it and those who are 
seen. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Phlebotomost
s and 
No one should practice phlebotomy 
unless he has an attested knowledge 
of the anatomy of limbs, veins, 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2 1 7 
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Cuppers muscles and arteries, and fully 
understands their locations and 
nature. This is so that the scalpel does 
not hit the wrong vein, muscle or 
artery and thus lead to injury of the 
limb or destruction of the part bled, 
for many limbs have been destroyed 
due to this. 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Whoever wants to learn phlebotomy 
must practise on chard leaves, that is, 
the veins which are on the leaf, until 
his hand is steady. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The phlebotomist must not allow 
himself to do any mutual work which 
causes the ends of his fingers to 
become calloused and insensitive and 
hence renders the examination of 
veins difficult. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
He must also take care of his eyes 
with invogorating eye salve and 
compound ointments if he is one of 
those who needs such things. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
He should not bleed a slave without 
the permission of the owner, a child 
without the permission of the 
guardian, nor a woman who is 
pregnant or menstrauting. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The phlebotomist should only bleed 
someone in a well lit place and using 
a sharp instrument, and not when he 
is feeling uneasy. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The Muhtasib must generally exact a 
pledge and a covenant from them that 
they will not bleed anyone under ten 
physical conditions, that they will be 
very cautious in these cases and only 
bleed after consultation with the 
physians. These ten conditions are: 
when the patient is under fourteen 
years old, is very old, emaciated, 
obese, shaking, white and flabby, pale 
with anaemia, has chronic diseases, 
has an extremely cold temprament 
and is in great pain.The phlebotomist 
must recognise these conditions when 
they are present. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
The physians have forbidden the 
bleeding of someone under a further 
five conditions, but these are not as 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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Cuppers harmful as the previous ten. These are 
bleeding someone immediately after 
sexual intercourse, after a bath for 
ritual ablution, when they are full of 
food, when their stomach and bowels 
are heavy, and when they are either 
extremely hot or extremely cold. The 
phlebotomist must be very careful in 
these circumstances as well. 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Know there are two situations 
regarding bleeding: when it is 
optional, and when it is obligatory. As 
for when it is optional, this is done in 
the morning after digestion and 
emptying of the bowels. As for when 
it is obligatory, this is done at the time 
of need, when there is no room for 
delay and when no obstacle is 
allowed to stand in the way. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The person bled must not fill himself 
with food afterwards, rather he should 
eat slowly and lightly. He should not 
exert himself afterwards, but should 
lie down. He must be careful not to 
sleep immediately after being bled, as 
this causes the limbs to weaken. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
If someone' hand swells after being 
bled, they should have the other hand 
bled if possible. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The phlebotomist must have a number 
of scalpels, those for capillaries and 
others. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
He must also have a ball of silk or 
wool and silk or something to cause 
vomitting made of wood or feather. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
He must have rabbit fur and the 
medicament from the aloe plant and 
storax. He takes one part of storex, 
aloe, myrrh and dragon's blood, and 
half a part of burnt vitriol and 
ordinary vitriol and mixes them 
altogather into a cream. The 
phlebotomist then keeps this next to 
him for when he needs it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
He must also have a musk bag and 
musk pastilles and equip himself with 
all we have mentioned in case the 
patient has a fainting fit. In this case 
the phlebotomist should immediately 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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make the patient swallowthe ball of 
silk and the emetic, make him smell 
the musk bag and eat some of the 
pastilles. This will revive him. If any 
haemorrhaging of a vein or artery 
occurs, the phlebotomist should stem 
it with the rabbit fur and the storax 
medicament mentioned previously. 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The phlebotomist must not make an 
incision with a blunt scalpel. This is 
very harmful because it errs and does 
not follow the vein, thus causing 
swelling and pain. He should rub the 
point of the scalpel with oil so that it 
does not hurt when an incision is 
being made, even though this stops 
the incision from healing quickly. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
He should hold the scalpel between 
the thumb and middle finger and 
leave the forefinger to feel with. The 
scalpel should be held no further than 
half way down its length so that it is 
not insufficiently controlled. He 
should not use the scalpel in a suddent 
movement, but rather carefully so that 
he puts its tip into the veins. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
I have never witnessed anyone more 
more proficient in the phlebotomy 
than two men I came across in 
Aleppo, each of them boasting that he 
was more skillful than his colleague. 
One of them wore a thin 
undershirtand bound his hand outside 
of this. Then he immersed himself in 
a pool and bled his hand on the 
bottom of the pool. As for the other, 
he held the scalpel in his left foot, 
between the big toe and the next, and 
then bled his hand. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Know that the phlebotomist must 
make the insicion wider in winter so 
that the blood does not congeal, and 
must make it narrower in summer so 
that the petient does not faint easily. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Repeated bleeding keeps the one bled 
strong. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Whoevere wants to be bled again on 
the same day must have the vein cut 
obliquely so that it does not heal 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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Cuppers quickly. 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The best practice for repeated 
bleeding is to do it only every two or 
three days. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Whenever, the colour of the blood 
changes or the petient faints and has a 
weak pulse, the phlebotomist should 
immediately press on the vein and 
pinch it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Know that there are many veins 
which are bled. Among these are 
those in the head, in the hands, in the 
body, in the legs and the arteries. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The Mohtasib must test the 
phlebotomist's knowledge of these as 
they are sometimes next to muscles 
and arteries. I will mention those ones 
which are most well known. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
As for the veins in the head which are 
bled, there is that of the forehead 
which goes up between the eyebrows, 
the bleeding of which is good for 
heavy eyes and chronic headache. 
There is the vein which lies in top of 
the head, the bleeding of which is 
good for migraine and head wounds. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
There are the two mendering veins on 
the temples, the bleeding of which is 
good for opthalmia, watery eyes and 
itches and pimples on the eyelids. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
There are the two veins behind the 
ears, which are bled to stop the 
begetting of children. 
     1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The Muhtasib must make them swear 
that they will not bleed either of these 
veins because it stops the begetting of 
children and this is unlawful. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
There are veins in the lip , the 
bleeding of which is good for sores 
and canker in the mouth and pains 
and tumors of the gums. Finally there 
are the veins under the tongue, the 
bleeding of which is good for quincy 
and tumours on the tonsils. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
There are six veins of the hands and 
arm. These are the vena cephalica, the 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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Cuppers medical, the vena beSilica, the 
exterior cubital, the vena salvatella 
and the axillary. When the 
phlebotomist is working , he must 
push the end of the muscleonto a soft 
place and make his incision wide if he 
wants to repeat it. 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
As for the medical vein, it is very 
dangerous to bleed this because of the 
muscle which lies beneath it. 
Sometimes this vein lies between two 
nerves , and sometimes there is a 
delicate round nerve like a string 
above it. The phlebotomist must 
theefore be acquinted with this, avoid 
it when he does his bleeding and be 
careful that his incision does not hit it 
and cause chronic numbness. As for 
the vena basilica, this is also 
extremely dangerous due to the artery 
under it. The phlebotomist must be 
careful of this , for if the artery is cut 
the blood will not cease to flow. As 
for the vena salvatella, the correct 
way to bleed it is lengthwise, while 
the exterior cubital should be bled 
obliquely. The more the phlebotomist 
inclines towards the arm in bleeding 
the vena basilica, the safer it is. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
As for the veins of the body, tow of 
them are on the stomach. One of these 
is situated over the liver and the other 
is situated over the spleen. The 
bleeding of the one on the right is 
good for dropsy, while one on the left 
is good for the spleen. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
As for the veins of the legs, there are 
four of them. Among these is the vein 
of the scietic nerve, which is bled on 
the outer part of the ankle. If it is 
hidden, then the branch between the 
little toe and the next is bled. The 
benefit of this is great, especially for 
gout, varicose veins and elephantiasis. 
Then there is the vena saphena which 
is situated on the left side of the leg 
and is more obvious than the sciatic 
nerve. Bleeding it is good for 
haemorrhoids, causes menstrausion to 
occur and benifits the organs below 
the liver. Also among them is the vein 
situated behind the Achilles tendon 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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like a branch of the vena saphena, and 
the benifits of bleeding it are the same 
as with this latter vein. 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
As for the veins and arteries which 
are generally bled and which it is 
permitted to bleed, these are the small 
ones and those situated far from the 
heart, because blood from these will 
stop flowing when they are bled. As 
for the large arteries situated near the 
heart, blood from them will not stop 
flowing when they are bled. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Among those which it is permitted to 
bleed are mostly the arteries of the 
temples and those between the thumb 
and the index finger. Galen instructed 
that they should be bled during sleep. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Cupping is of great benefit and is less 
dangerous than phlebotomy. The 
cupper must be delicate, nimble and 
experienced in the work, for his hand 
must be gentle and quick in making 
incisions and attaching the cupping 
glass. The first cupping shold be light 
and the cup quickly removed. Then it 
should be gradually slowed down and 
prolonged. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The Muhtasib must test the cupper by 
asking him to make an incision in a 
leaf stuck to a backed brick. If the cut 
goes through the leaf then the cupper 
has a heavy hand and is not 
proficient. The sign of the cupper,s 
skill is a light touch and his not 
hurting the petient. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
The learned have mentioned that 
cupping is bad at the beginnig and the 
end of the month. This is because at 
the beginnig of the month the 
humours will neither be excited nor 
roused, while at the end of the month 
they will be without vigour and 
cupping will be of no benifit. it is best 
to cup in the middle of the month 
when the moon is full, because the 
humours will be excited and brain 
growing in the cranium. The best time 
of day for cupping is the second and 
third hours after day-break. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
As for the benefit of cupping, these 
ensue firstly from cupping the hollow 
at the back part of the neck, which is 
a subtitute for bleeding the medial 
arm vein. This is good for heaviness 
of the brows, itchy eyes and bad 
breath, although it does cause 
forgetfulness. As the prophet said: " 
the rear part of the brain is the seat of 
the memory, and cupping weakens it". 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Cupping of the medial vein is a 
subtitutefor bleeding the vena basilica 
and is good for pains in the shoulder 
and the throat, although it does 
weaken the opening of the stomach. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Cupping of the two occipital arteries 
is a subtitute for bleeding the vena 
cephalica, and is good for the face, 
the teeth, the eyes, the ears, the nose, 
the throat and trembling of the head, 
although it does cause trembling of 
the head for those who did not have it 
previously. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Cupping under the chin is good for 
the face, the teeth, the throat and for 
clearing the head. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Cupping the crown of the head is 
good for dizziness and slowing down 
the greying of hair, although it does 
impair the intellect and cause 
imbecility. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
     0 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Cupping the front of the thighs is 
good for pain in the testicles and 
tumours on the thighs and legs. 
Cupping the back of the thighs id 
good for swelling and tumours 
erupting on the buttocks. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Phlebotomost
s and 
Cuppers 
Cupping the legs is a subtitute for 
bleeding. It cleans the blood and 
induces menstraution. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
medicine is both a theoritical and 
practicle science. Islamic law allows 
its study and practice because it 
maintains the health and remove 
illnesses and diseases form the noble 
frame of the body. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
     0 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
The physician is the one who knows 
about the body's anatomy, the 
Extrinsic  
  2 1 3 
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Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
physical constitution of the organs 
and the diseases which afflict them, 
their causes, symptoms and 
characteristics and the medicine 
which benefit them. He knows the 
substitutes for medicines which are 
not available, the manner of 
extracting them and the way they act, 
so that he can give the correct kind 
and dosage of medicine for the 
disease. 
Good 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
It is unlawful for anyone who does 
not have this knowledge to treat sick 
people, nor is such a person allowed 
to embark upon any treatment in 
which there is a risk, or to meddle in 
any of the things we have mentioned 
which he does not fully understand. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
It is related that kings of Greece used 
to appoint to every city a phycisian 
famous for his wisdom. Then he 
would assemble all the other 
physicians before him so he could test 
them. He ordered any whose 
knowledge he found deficient to study 
and to read science and forbade them 
from practising. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
When a physician visited a sick 
person  he asked him the cause of his 
illness and what pain he was feeling. 
Then he prescribed some medicines 
and other things. After this, the 
physician made a note of what the 
petient had told him  and what he had 
prescribed for him during the 
consultation, and submitted this to the 
petient's relatives, laong with the 
testimony of the petient and those 
who were with him. On the following 
day the physician returned , checked 
the progress of the illness and wrote 
another prescription according to the 
circumstances. He wrote another copy 
of this and once again submitted it to 
the peteint's relatives. He did likewise 
on the third day, the fourth day, and 
so on until the petienteither recovered 
or died. If he recovered from the 
illness, the physician received his fee 
and the petient's gratuity. If, however, 
the petient died, his relatives went 
before the head physician and gave 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2 1 10 
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him the copies of the prescriptions 
which the original physician had 
written. If the head physician 
considered that they met the 
requirment of the wisdom and the 
practice of medicine, without 
negligence or carelessness on the part 
of the physician, he would tell them 
so. But if , on the other hand, he held 
the contrary opinion he used to tell 
the relatives: " take blood money for 
your relative from the physician, 
because he is the one who killed him 
with his malpractice and negligence. 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
In this distinguished manner, the 
Greek kings took precautions to such 
an extent that no one could practice 
medicine who was not a physician, 
and no physician could be negligent 
concerning any of it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
The Muhtasib must make them take 
the Hippocratic oath as he does with 
all as physicians, make them swear 
not to administer harmful medicine to 
anyone, not to prapare poison for 
them, not to describe amulets to 
nayone from general public, not to 
mention to women the medicine used 
for abortions and not to mention to 
men the medicine preventing the 
begetting of children. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
They must avert their eyes from the 
women's quarters when they visit 
their patients, and they must not 
disclose secrets not lift up veils. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
The physician should have a complete 
set of medical instruments to hand. 
These are pincers for extracting molar 
teeth, cauterizing irons for the spleen, 
tweezers for removing blod clots, 
syringes used to treat cholic and for 
the penis, a clamp for holding 
haemorrhoids prior to removal, an 
instrument for removing excess flesh 
from the nostrils, a probe for fistuals, 
an instrument for lifting up the eyelid, 
a piece of lead for weigting, a key for 
the womb, an instrument for detecting 
pregnancy, a poultice for the 
intestines, a vessel for removing air 
from the chest, and other things which 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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he needs to pratice medicine, apart 
from the instruments of the eye-
doctor and the surgeon which will be 
mentioned in the appropriate place. 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
The Muhtasib must examine the 
physicians on what Hunayn b. Ishaq 
wrote in his known book The trial of 
the physician. As for the book the 
trial of the physician by Galen, no 
physician can hardly be expected to 
perform what he stipulated for them 
in it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
Regarding the eye-doctors, the 
Muhtasib must also test them on a 
book by Hunayn b. Ishaq, namely, 
The Ten treatises of the Eye. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
The Muhtasib must allow these 
doctors to treat people's eyes who he 
finds in the test know about the seven 
layers of the eye, the three homours, 
the three diseases of the eye amd their 
ramifications, and those who are 
acquinted with the preparation of eye 
salves and the various drugs. The eye-
doctor must not neglect any of the 
instruments of his frofession, such as 
hooks for removing films and 
pellicles on the eyes , a scour for 
removing scabs, scalpels for bleeding, 
a container for eye salves and so on. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
As of the itinerant eye-doctors, most 
of them cannot be trusted as they have 
no religion preventing them from 
assailing people with incision and eye 
salves and with no experience of 
disease and defects. No one should 
depend on them to treat their eyes , 
nor trust their ointments and salves, 
for some of them make salves out of a 
base of starch and gum and dye it 
different colours. They dye the red 
one with red chalk...........the yellow 
one with saffron. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
Some of them make salves from the 
horned poppy and make its base from 
the ben tree which they make into a 
paste with dissolved gum………. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
The Muhtasib must make them swear 
that they will not resort to them if he 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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and Surgeons is unable to stop them treating people. 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
As for bone-setters, no one may 
practice bone-setting except after they 
have mastered the sixth book of the 
Kunnash of the Paul on thissubject. 
They must know the number of bones 
in the human body, which is 248, the 
shape of every one of them, their kids 
and sizes...... The Muhtasib must test 
them on all these things. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
As for the surgeon, they should know 
Gulen's book known as Qatajanuson 
wounds and ointments, and the book 
of al-Zahrawi on wounds. They must 
know human anatomy and the organs, 
the muscles, veins, arteries and 
nerves, so that the surgeon can avoid 
these when he opens abcesses and 
removes haemorrhoids. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
The surgeon must have a set of 
scalpels with him………… 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
Some times they deceive the people 
with a bone which they surreptitiously 
insert in a wound….. They claim that 
it was their cutting medicines which 
extracted it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Physicians, 
Eye Doctors, 
Bone-Setters 
and Surgeons 
The Arif must keep an eye  on them 
regarding these things. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Educators of 
Boys 
They must not teach the boys to write 
in the mosques, because the prophet 
ordered that mosques should be kept 
free of boys and the insane as they 
scribble on the walls and soil the 
floor, not bothering about urine and 
other kinds of dirt. Rather they should 
acquire teaching premises on the 
roads or on the outskirts of the 
markets. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5    1 6 
Educators of 
Boys 
The first thing that the educators 
should teach the boys is the short 
chapters of the Quran……….. Then 
he ought to acquint him with the 
orthodox articles of faith, the basic of 
arthmetic and whatever letter writing 
and poetry is considered appropriate, 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5 4    9 
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..... 
Educators of 
Boys 
In the holydays, the educator should 
order the boys to improve their hand 
writings according to a prescribed 
model, and ask them to write down 
what he has dictated….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Educators of 
Boys 
The educator should order any boy 
who is over seven years old to pray 
with the congregation, because the 
prophet said: " teach your children to 
pray when they reach seven, and 
when they are ten , beat them if they 
neglect it". The educator must also 
order the children to honour thire 
parents.............. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Educators of 
Boys 
The educator should beat them when 
they are ill-mannered, use bad 
language, and other things out side 
the islamic law,…… 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Educators of 
Boys 
He should not beat a boy with a stick 
so thick that it will break a bone, 
nor………… that cause too much 
pain……… 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Educators of 
Boys 
The educator must not use any of the 
boys for his own needs and concerns 
nor for anything which will dishonour 
their parents, such as moving dung, 
stones and such like. Nor must he 
send them to his house when it is 
empty, lest they be open to 
accusations. Nor must he send a boy 
with a women to write a letter or 
anything else, for there is a group of 
godless people who deceive boys in 
this way. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3 2  5 
Educators of 
Boys 
The one who escorts the boys to and 
from the place of learning should be 
reliable……….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Educators of 
Boys 
The educator must not teach a woman 
or a female slave how to write, 
because this makes a woman 
worse….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Educators of 
Boys 
The educator must stop the boys from 
memorising or reading any poetry of 
Ibn-al-Hajjaj and should beat them if 
they do….. Rather he should teach 
them the poetry which eulogize the 
Companions so that he fixes this in 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
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their heart. 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
The covenant of protection is only 
valid from the Imam, or from 
someone whom the Imam authorizes. 
No one should be given a covenant of 
protection unless he has a holy book 
or similar belongings to the 
unbelievers, such as the Jews, the 
Chiristians and the Magians. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
As for anyone else who does not have 
a holy book or similar, like the 
polytheists, idol-worshipers, apostates 
from Islam or atheists and heretics, 
they are not permitted to have the 
covenant of protection nor to be 
confirmed in their beliefs. Nothing 
should be accepted from them apart 
from submission. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
The dimmies must be made to 
observe the conditions laid down for 
them in the treatise on jizya written 
for them by , Umar.b.al-Khattab, and 
must be made to wear the ghiyar. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
If he is a Jew, he should put a red or 
yellow cord on his shoulder; if a 
christian, he should tie a zunnar 
around his waist and hang a cross 
around his neck.; if a woman she 
should wear two slippers, one of 
which is white and the other black. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
When a protected person goes to the 
baths, he must wear a steel, copper or 
lead neckband to distinguishe him 
from other people. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
The Muhtasib should stop them from 
riding horses and carrying weapons 
and swords. When they ride mules, 
they should do so with side saddles. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
Their building should not be higher 
than those of the muslims nor should 
they preside over meetings. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
They should not jostle Muslims on 
the main roads, but should rather use 
the side streets. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
They should not be tha first to give 
greeting, nor be welcomed in 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
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meetings. 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
The Muhtasib should stipulate that 
they offer hospitality to any muslim 
who passes by and give him lodging 
in their houses and places of worship. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
They must not be allowed to display 
any alcoholic drinks or pigs, to recite 
the Torah and the Bible openly, to 
ring the church bells, to celebrate 
their festivals or to hold funeral 
services in public. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
All this was stipulated by Umar b. al-
Khattab, in his treatise, so the 
Mohtasib must keep an eye on their 
affairs regarding these things…… 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Ahl al-
Dimma 
The Muhtasib must take the jizya 
from them according to their social 
status…… Along with jizya , the 
Muhtasib should stipulate that they 
abide by the laws of 
islam……………. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
As for the whip, the Muhtasib should 
choose one of the middle 
thickness…….This is so that it does 
not harm the body and there is no fear 
of injury. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
As for the Dirra, it should be made of 
ox or camel hide and filled with date 
stones. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
As for the turtur, this should be made 
of felt, …..adorned with onxy-and 
tails of cats. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
All these instruments should be hung 
on the Muhtasib's booth for the 
people to see. So that the heart of the 
wicked will tremble and swindlers are 
restrained. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
If the Muhtasib comes across anyone 
drinking alcohol he should give him 
forty lashes with the whip. If he 
thinks that public interest would be 
served by giving him eighty lashes, 
then he may od so. This is because 
Umar b. al-Khattab gave eighty lashes 
to someone drinking alcohol, in 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
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accord with the formal legal opinion 
of Ali b. Abi Talib. 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib must strip off the man's 
clothes, lift the hand holding the whip 
until the white of his armpit can be 
seen and distribute the lashes on the 
man's shoulders, buttocks and thighs. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
If the man committed adultery while 
being a bikr, the Muhtasib should 
whip him in public, as God said: " and 
let a party of beleivers witness their 
punishment". 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
If it is a women, he should whip her 
while she is wearing her covering and 
clothes. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
As for the adulterer who has 
consumated a marriage, the Muhtasib 
should gather the people around him 
outside the town and order them to 
stone him, as the prophet did with 
Ma,iz. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
If it is a woman….. The Muhtasib 
should dig a hole for her in ground, sit 
her in it upto her waist, and then order 
the people to stone her, as the prophet 
did with the woman from Ghamid. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
If the evildoer has committed sodomy 
with a boy, the Muhtasib should 
throw him off the highest point in the 
town. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
This should all be done when the 
crimes have been proved by the 
Imam, after which the Muhtasib take 
charge of him. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
As for the ta'zir, this should be in 
proportion to the people's 
circumstances and commensurate 
with the crime. Forthere are people 
who can be chastised verbally and 
reprimanded…….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
If the Muhtsib sees anyone carrying 
alcohol or playing a musical 
instrument…… he should chastise 
him…..after  pouring the alcohol out 
and breaking the instrument. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
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Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib must do likewise, if he 
sees a foreign man and woman 
togather, either alone or on the road. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib  must inspect the places 
where the women gather, such as yarn 
and flax market, on the banks of 
rivers, at the doors of  women's baths 
and other places. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
If he sees a young man alone with a 
woman or speaking to her about 
something other than a commercial 
transaction, and looking at her, The 
Muhtasib should chastise him…. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib must also inspect the 
preachers gatherings. He must not let 
the men mix with women…… 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
He must inspect the funeral 
ceremonies and graveyards and if he 
hears any woman wailing or 
lamenting he should chastise her…  
because the prophet said: " The 
lamenting woman and all around her 
are in hell. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib must stop women from 
visiting the graves,because the 
prophet said: " May God curse 
women who visit graves…….. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
Whenever the Muhtasib hears of a 
woman who is a harlot or a singer he 
should call her to repent of her sin. 
But if she returns it to again, he must 
chastise her and banish her from the 
town. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
He must do likewisewith effiminate 
men and those who have no beared, 
well-known for their perversions with 
other men. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib should forbid an 
effiminate man from shaving off or 
plucking out his beard and from going 
amongst women….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
The Muhtasib should superintend the 
Friday prayer mosques and the 
ordinary mosques and order the 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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Particular attendants to sweep and clean…. 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasibmust direct all those 
who live in the neighbourhood of a 
mosque diligently to pray the Friday 
prayer when they hear the call to 
it….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5 4    9 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
No one should call to prayer from the 
minaret unless they are honest, and 
reliable and aware of the times of the 
prayers. This is because the prophet 
said: " The Muezzines are to relied 
upon and the Imams are 
responsible…….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib must test their 
knowledge of the times of 
prayers…… 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muazzine should preferably be a 
youth with a good voice. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib should prohibit wailing 
in the call for prayer, that is singing 
and straching out the sounds. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib must order the muazzin 
not to look at the people's houses 
when he climbs up the minarate…… 
Intrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muazzine must be acquinted with 
the mantions of the moon and shape 
of the constellations in these mantions 
so that he knows the times of the 
night and the passing of the 
hours…… 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muazzin may receive payment 
for calling to prayer, but the Imams 
may not be  paid for prayers and their 
function as prayer leaders….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3   3 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
If However, something is presented to 
the Imam without any preconditions, 
he may accept it as a donation or a 
charitable gift. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
The Muhtasib must instruct the Quran 
reciters to recite it in proper 
manner……. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
5     5 
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Particular 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The reciters should not attend a 
funeral service without the next of kin 
sending for him…… 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
No one should wash corpses unless 
they are trustworthy and 
honourable….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib must forbid the blind 
and the beggers …..from reciting the 
quran in the markets to beg…. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib must frequent the 
sessions of the judges and arbiters and 
forbid them from sitting in the Friday 
prayer mosques …to judge between 
people. This is because a man in the 
state of ritual impurity, a 
menstruating woman……. Sometimes 
appear before judges..... 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
Whenever  the Muhtasib sees a man 
acting insolently in a court session, 
contesting the judge's verdict or not 
complying with the judgement, he 
should chastise him for it…… 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib must visit the 
audiences of the governars and 
princes, order them to od good and 
forbid them from evil… 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
When the Muhtasib admonishes them 
and prevent them from being unjust 
he should be courtous and polite…… 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4 3 2  9 
Affairs of 
Hisba in 
General and 
Particular 
The Muhtasib is fully aware of the 
particulars of Hisba over all that 
resembles the above mentioned 
tradesmen and the well-known crafts 
in this book of mine, and he knows 
how to arrive at uncovering their 
swindles…….. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
The usual recipe for harisa, without 
dictating  to its makers and without 
making it difficult for the people, is 
one sa of wheat for eight waqiyyas of 
mutton and one ratl of beef. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
  3  1 4 
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Makers of 
Harisa 
The meat used for harisa should be 
lean and young, free of dirt and 
tubercles, veins and muscles. It 
should be tender, not scrawny, and its 
smell should not be tainted. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
It must be soaked in salt water for an 
hour until all the blood has come out 
of it 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
it is then taken out and washed in 
some other water, out in the cooking 
pot in the presence of the arif and 
stamped with the muhtasib's seal. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
In the early morning the arif will 
come and break the seal and they will 
make the harisa in his presence. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2  2 
Makers of 
Harisa 
This is in case they remove some of 
the meat and put it back the following 
day, for most of them do this if the 
cooking pot is not stamped. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
others boil the meat of cows or 
camels, dry it and store it away, then 
when they have the opportunity they 
soak it in hot water for an hour and 
put it in the harisa. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
Others boil the meat of cows or 
camels, dry it and store it away, then 
when they have the opportunity they 
soak it in hot water for an hour and 
put it in the harisa. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
Sometimes they may have some meat 
left over in the cooking pots, so they 
mix it in with harisa on the following 
day. The muhtasib should control all 
these things with his seal. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
The oil used for the harisa should be 
pure and with a pleasant smell, and 
should  have mastic and cinnamon 
added to it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
Some of them take the bones and 
skulls of cows and camels and boil 
them thoroughly in water until a lot of 
oil comes out of them, then they mix 
this with the oil used for the harisa. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Makers of 
Harisa 
The way to identify this is to drop a 
little of it onto a tile; if this does not 
congeal or is transparent, then it has 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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been adulterated with things we have 
mentioned. 
Makers of 
Harisa 
The muhtasib must order them to 
wash, clean and salt the oil containers 
so that their smell and taste are not 
affected, for maggots multiply in 
them, and if the oil is returned to the 
dirty containers, it becomes stale in 
both smell and taste. But God knows 
best. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sausage 
Makers 
The most important thing is that the 
premises in which they make the 
sausages should be near to the 
muhtasibs booth so that he can keep a 
special watch on them, for their 
frauds are so many they can hardly all 
be known. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Sausage 
Makers 
The muhtasib must order them to use 
only pure, good, lean meat and to 
mince it finely on clean chopping 
blocks. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sausage 
Makers 
When they mince the meat there 
should be someone with them with a 
fly-whisk to keep flies away. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sausage 
Makers 
They should only mix the meat with 
onions, spices or seasonings in the 
presence of the arif so that he may 
know their quantities by weight.  
After this, they stuff it into clean 
intestines. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sausage 
Makers 
They must be watched for their 
methods of adulterating the sausages.  
Some of them adulterate the sausages 
with the meat of cooked heads, some 
with liver, kidneys and hearts. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sausage 
Makers 
Others adulterate the sausages with 
tough and scrawny meat or mix in the 
tough camels and cow. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
Sausage 
Makers 
Some sprinkle water over the meat 
when they are mincing it and the 
muhtasib must forbid them from this. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sausage 
Makers 
Others fill sanbusak with grilled fish 
and seasonings, while some adulterate 
it with shelled beansprouts and onion. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sausage 
Makers 
The muhtasib learns of all these 
frauds by looking into the sausages 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2 1 7 
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and seeing what they contain before 
they are fried. 
Sausage 
Makers 
It is difficult to know once they are in 
the frying pan because the makers 
skewer them when they are almost 
ready and the adulterants come out 
and are cooked over the fire. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sausage 
Makers 
The oil on which the sausages are 
fried should not be old or rancid and 
should have a wholesome flavour and 
smell 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Sausage 
Makers 
After they have fried the sausages, 
they should sprinkle wholesome and 
appropriate ground spices and 
seasonings over them. But God 
knows best. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Confectioner
s 
There are many kinds and different 
varieties of confectionery and it is 
impossible to understand all the 
characteristics and measures of the 
ingredients, such as cornstarch, 
almonds, poppy seeds and so on. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Confectioner
s 
Sometimes there may be much of one 
thing in one kind of confection, and 
little another. Knowledge of all this 
falls under the 'arifs jurisdiction. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4 3   7 
Confectioner
s 
The confection should be well 
cooked,neither raw nor burnt, and the 
maker should always have a fly-whisk 
in his hand to keep the files away. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Confectioner
s 
The muhtasib must watch out for the 
ways they adulterate the confection, 
for there are many. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Confectioner
s 
One of them is for the makers to mix 
the honey of bess with grape pulp. 
The signs of this is that when it is 
cooked it fives off the smells of 
grapes.  Some of them mix the juice 
from sugar cane, which they call 
qattara, with syrup. The sign of this is 
that it settles at the bottom of the 
vessel. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Confectioner
s 
There are varieties of confectionery 
which are adulterated with flour and 
constrach, rice flour, lentil flour and 
the husks of seasame seeds. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
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Confectioner
s 
The sign of this is that when put in 
water it floats on the surface. They 
adulterate the poppy seeds natif with 
semolina, the sign of this being that it 
floats on the surface of the water and 
also that it becomes hard. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Confectioner
s 
Sometimes they adulterate the hiyaji 
natif with semolina fried with kishk. 
At other times they might adulterate 
the yellow natif with breadcrumbs. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Confectioner
s 
The signs of all these frauds is that 
the confectionery floats on the surface 
of water.  Some of them adulterate 
basandud with breadcrumbs or 
perhaps make is with lentil flour. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Confectioner
s 
Some confectioners adulterate 
gazelle's ankle and mashash with 
crystallised suagr cane juice.  The 
sign of this is that the colour tends to 
be brown or black.  Some of them 
adulterate zulabiyya with dissolved 
sugar cane crystals instead of honey. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Confectioner
s 
Similarly, they might adulterate soft 
and juicy khabisa and sabuniyya with 
more cornstarch than is necessary. 
The sign of this is that it crumbles, 
and rises if left overnight 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Confectioner
s 
Some adulterate nubiyya with flour, 
while others adulterate kishkananij 
which is baked in the tannur.  If it is 
so adulterated it falls off the side of 
the oven. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Confectioner
s 
All the adulterations of confectionary 
can be seen in its appearance and taste 
and the muhtasib must keep an eye on 
the makers regarding all these things. 
But God knows best. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
The swindles contained in this and the 
flowing chapter are so numerous that 
it is impossible to know all of them.  
So may god have compassion for the 
one who inspects the apothecaries and 
must learn how to uncover their 
frauds. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
Apothecaries 
The muhtasib should make a note of 
them in the margins of his register 
and rely on the favour of God, for 
they are more harmful to the people 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
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than anything else; drugs and potions 
being of various natures, mixtures and 
purposes depending on their 
ingredients. 
Apothecaries 
Some of them are suitable for an 
illness or physical condition but when 
other ingredients are added to them 
the drugs change their nature and 
inevitably harm the sick person.  It is 
the duty if apothecaries to have fear 
God in his matter. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
The muhtasib must intimidate them, 
exhort them and warn them or 
punishment and chastisement. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
Apothecaries 
He must inspect their drugs every 
week, for one of their well-known 
frauds is to adulterate Egyptian opium 
with horned poppy. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Apothecaries 
There also adulterated it with the sap 
of wild lettuce leaves and with gum. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Apothecaries 
When it has been adulterated with the 
horned poppy, if dissolved in water it 
gives off a smell like that of saffron.  
If it has been adulterated with wild 
lettuce sap, it is coarse and its smell is 
faint. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
When it tastes bitter, has a pure 
colour and is without strength, it has 
been adulterated with gum 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
Sometimes they adulterate  Chinese 
rhubarb with a plant called rawand al 
-dawabbI which grows inn Syria. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
The signs of this is that good rhubarb 
is red, has no smell, is light in weight 
and the superior type of it is free of 
worms 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
When it is soaked in water it turns 
slightly yellow.  Whatever does not 
have these characteristics is 
adulterated with what we have 
mentioned 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
Sometimes  they adulterated bamboo 
concrete with bones brunt in a 
furnace. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
The signs of this fraud is that when it Extrinsic 
 4   1 5 
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is put in water bone sinks while 
bamboo concrete floats.  At other 
times they adulterate frankincense 
with rosin and gum. 
Good 
Apothecaries 
The sign of this is that when thrown 
into a fire the rosin burns, emits 
smoke and a smell. They sometimes 
adulterate tamarind with flesh of 
plums or adulterate juice of lycium 
with dregs of oil and the gall bladders 
of oxen when they cook it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
The sign of this latter fraud is that 
when some of it is thrown on a fire 
the pure lycium juice flares up, then 
when it is extinguished its cinders are 
the colour of blood.  Also, the 
genuine substance us black with green 
inside.  That which neither sets on fire  
nor turns into cinders is adulterated 
with the things we have mentioned. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
Sometimes they adulterate costus 
with elecampane roots.  The way  to 
know this is that the costus smells and 
has tastes when out on the tongue, 
whereas elecampane is otherwise. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
They adulterate the down of nard with 
that of taro.  The sign of this is that 
when put in the month it makes one 
feel nauseous and burns.  They also 
adulterate euphorbia resin with dry 
ground beans, and mastic with resin 
from the savin juniper bush.] 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
The way to recognise this adulteration 
is that the Indian variety gives off a 
smell when burnt and it not bitter. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
They adulterate Cretan bindweed with 
that from Syria, but there is no harm 
in this.  They also adulterate it with 
the down of common polypody. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
    1 1 
Apothecaries 
Some of them adulterate scammony 
with the hardened sap of latex plants. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
The way to know this is to put it on 
the tongue and if its stings then it is 
fraudulent. Some of them also 
adulterate it with ground horn which 
is kneaded with resin water into the 
shape of scammony.  Yet others 
adulterate  it with bean and chick pea 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
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flour. 
Apothecaries 
The way to recognise all these is that 
the genuine is pure in colour like 
ghari, whereas the adulterated is not.  
They sometimes adulterate myrrh 
with resin soaked in water.  The 
indication of this is that myrrh is light 
in weight and has a uniform colour. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
When it breaks, some things the shape 
of smooth finger nails can be seen in 
it similar to pebbles and it has an 
agreeable smell.  If the myrrh is 
heavy and has the colour of pitch it is 
no good.  Some of them adulterate the 
bark of frankincense with that of pine. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
An indication of this is to throw it in a 
fire and if it burns and gives off a 
pleasant small then it is pure , but if 
does the opposite it is adulterated.  
Some adulterate marjoram with 
melilot seeds. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
They adulterate wax with goat's 
tallow and with rosin and sometimes 
when it is being shaped they sprinkle 
bean flour, soft sand or ground kohl 
in it. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
This is then put inside the candle and 
covered with pure wax.  The way to 
discover this is to light the candle and 
see the inside of it.  They adulterate 
verdigris with marble and green 
vitriol. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
The way to recognise this fraud is to 
wet your thumb and put it in it, then 
rub it between the thumb and index 
finger.  If it is soft and becomes 
creamy, it is pure.  But if it turns 
white and granular, it is fraudulent. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
It is possible to put some between 
your teeth and if you find it like sand 
then it is adulterated with marble.  
One can also heat a plate of metal in 
the fire and sprinkle some of it on.  If 
it turns red it is adulterated with green 
vitriol, but if it turns black it is pure. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
They also mix choice yellow 
myrobalan with different kinds of 
myrobalan from Kabul and sell it 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
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along with Kabuli. 
Apothecaries 
They sprinkle water on the pods of 
the cassia tree while they are wrapped 
in cloth when being sold and the 
weight increases from one ratl to one 
and half. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
Some of them take lac, melt in over 
the fire and mix it with powdered 
bake brick and red clay.  Then they let 
it congeal and flatten it out into disks.  
When it is dry they break it into 
pieces and sell it as a dragon's blood. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
Some of them coarsely grind mastic 
then put some opopanax in it and 
cook it with some bees' honey and 
saffron.  When it boils and froths they 
add some more mastic and stir it until 
it congeals.  Then when it has cooled 
they make it into tablets, break it, mix 
it with opopnanax and it cannot be 
detected. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
As for all the medicinal oils and 
others, they adulterate them with 
vinegar after it has been boiled on the 
fire and ground walnuts and almonds 
have been added to remove its smell 
and taste. Then they mix it with the 
oils. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
Some of them take apricot stones and 
sesame seeds, grind them, knead and 
press them, and sell the oil as almond 
oil.  Others adulterate the oil of the 
balm of Gilead tree with that of the 
lily. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
They way to identify this is to put a 
few drops of it onto a piece of wool 
and wash it.  If the oil disappears 
without a trace then it is pure, if not, it 
is adulterated. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
Similarly, when the pure oil is 
dropped in water it dissolves and 
assumes the consistency of milk, 
while the adulterated oil floats like 
ordinary oil and remains in drops on 
the surface. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4   1 5 
Apothecaries 
There are many things we have 
avoided mentioning in this chapter 
because the way they are adulterated 
Extrinsic 
Good 
   2 1 3 
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and blended with other ingredients is 
secret, and we are afraid that someone 
with no religion will learn them and 
swindle the Muslims with them. 
Apothecaries 
In this chapter and others we have 
only mentioned the well-known and 
popular frauds, and have said nothing 
about those which are not well 
known. 
Intrinsic 
Good 
 4  2  6 
Apothecaries 
Most of these have been mentioned 
by the writer of The Alchemy of 
Perfume. May God have mercy on 
anyone who gets hold of this book, 
and may they tear it up and burn it 
seeking the favors of God. 
Extrinsic 
Good 
 4    4 
         
         
  Total 95 628 249 226 229 
14
27 
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Appendix III: Terminologies  
Terms Meanings Rationale of Use 
Tradition Sociological Tradition through 
which people actively create a rule 
bound world. 
The term grounded in the work of 
Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) and 
Fairclough’s (1992) 
Islamic 
Tradition 
Uncodified religious law, and 
customary traditions of the Islamic 
society, along with socio-political-
historical context and meaning. 
 
The term grounded in the work of 
Hallaq (2009: 500- 542). 
 
Islamic 
Thoughts 
Corpse of discourse and literature 
that jointly define the Islamic 
perspective 
This expression was chosen to combine 
the entirety of Islamic discourse under 
one expression. The rationale is to 
capture the dialectic relationship among 
different dimensions of social practice in 
the Islamic world of past and present 
Episteme The discourse that contributes to 
the construction of identity, social 
relations, rationality and ideational 
functions of the tradition. 
The generic expression used in the 
discourse on ethics, philosophy and 
economics.   
Worldview Historically and culturally specific 
and contingent understanding of the 
world and reality, with its 
independent standard of rationality  
 
The term grounded in the work of  
Jorgensen and Phillips (2002:5). 
Epistemological 
Crisis 
The condition of a tradition, when 
its methods of enquiry cease to 
make progress by its own standards 
of rationality 
 
The term grounded by MacIntyre (1998) 
Value Morals describe right and wrong, 
while value is the degree of 
importance of something based on 
the belief and guided by the virtues  
This is in accordance with the meaning 
of value used by the discourse on ethics, 
economics and philosophy.   
Modernity The concept of dignity, morality, 
justice, and fairness from the 
reference point of legal, political, 
economic, and social guidance of 
current epoch. 
The term grounded in the work of 
Hallaq (2009: 500- 542). 
 
Value 
Judgement of 
Modernity 
The degree of importance of an 
activity/behaviour based on the 
belief that are guided by the virtues, 
which are constructed on the 
concept of dignity, morality, 
justice, and fairness, as reflected in 
the legal, political, economic, and 
social guidance of current epoch. 
 
There is a general consensus in the 
discourse, as to what the modern values 
are, and any judgment or importance 
assigned to anything, by using these 
values is the ‘value judgement of 
modernity’. The use of value judgement 
of Modernity, as a point of orientation 
for examining the Islamic thoughts is 
also grounded in the work of Hallaq 
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(2009: 500- 542). Schacht 
(1960) (1982), Cook (2000) and others. 
 
Transcendental A specific understanding of reality 
that is divinely inspired and 
divinely approved. 
An extraction from Aristotle and Kant’s 
work on ethics.  
 
Religious 
Nihilism 
The practice of a religious custom, 
when the metaphysical meanings in 
the practice of that custom are 
absent from the conscious minds of 
followers of that religion 
 
The term grounded in the work of 
Heiberg and Stewart (2005:90) 
Internal Realm The Individual and individual’s 
identity, worldview, rationality and 
ideational functions. See Page 211 
for details. 
The term is used for conceptualising the 
ideas unique to the research. 
External Realm Everything outside ‘internal realm’, 
belongs to the external realm. See 
Page 211 for details. 
The term is used for conceptualising the 
ideas unique to the research. 
Higher form of 
subjectivity 
 
A subjectivity’s subjectivity” See 
Kierkegaard et al., (1989:242) for 
details. 
 
The term grounded in the work of 
Kierkegaard et al., (1989:242). 
Juristic 
Subjectivism  
Approach to the notion of good 
from the standpoint of personal 
reflective morality of a Jurist. 
 
The term grounded in the work of 
Jorgensen and Phillips (2002:5). 
Islamic Values The Islamic values are understood 
as the collection of values 
constructed by Islamic scholarship 
or deduced from theological 
sources of Islam. See Page 7 for 
details. 
The term grounded in the work of 
Hallaq (2009) and Cook (2000). 
 
Moral 
Judgement  
To judge the moral conduct of an 
activity according to one’s 
worldview.  
 
The term grounded in the work of 
Hallaq (2009: 500- 542). 
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